Globalisation and Corruption,Revisited

This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing on the role of globalisation and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995–2005 point to three main results: (i) Detection technologies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital and political rights reduce corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption; (ii) Globalisation (in terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more pronounced in developing countries; (iii) Inequality increases corruption, and once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalisation on corruption is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalisation – besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition – affects corruption also by reducing inequality.     

Political risk in private participation projects: The effects of political discretionality and corruption

This article investigates the impact of political risk on the performance of private participation infrastructure projects in emerging markets. Previous studies have shown that firms in regulated sectors are prone to employ political capabilities in their investments overseas. Our analysis of 32,257 projects in 114 emerging countries from 1997 to 2013 shows that higher political discretionality in the host country is negatively associated with project completion. In contrast, a higher level of corruption in the host country is positively associated with project completion. The study makes a contribution to the literature on political risk in foreign direct investments.     

Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural Resources,Market Size,Government Policy,Institutions and Political Instability

Data from several investor surveys suggest that macroeconomic instability, investment restrictions, corruption and political instability have a negative impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa. However, the relationship between FDI and these country characteristics has not been studied. This paper uses panel data for 22 countries over the period 1984–2000 to examine the impact of natural resources, market size, government policies, political instability and the quality of the host country's institutions on FDI. It also analyses the importance of natural resources and market size vis‐à‐vis government policy and the host country's institutions in directing FDI flows. The main result is that natural resources and large markets promote FDI. However, lower inflation, good infrastructure, an educated population, openness to FDI, less corruption, political stability and a reliable legal system have a similar effect. A benchmark specification shows that a decline in the corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South Africa has the same positive effect on FDI as increasing the share of fuels and minerals in total exports by about 35 per cent. These results suggest that countries that are small or lack natural resources can attract FDI by improving their institutions and policy environment.     

Domestic institutions and export performance: Evidence for Cambodia

The paper analyzes the relevance of domestic institutions for export performance of Cambodia. Regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, and political stability are introduced in an augmented gravity model with a panel data set over 1996–2015. The research is the first application to Cambodia, until 2015 a least developed country which is generally believed to have poorly developed institutions. Due to high multicollinearity among the variables, the institutional variables are introduced in the model one by one. Estimation is by the Hausman–Taylor method, which reduces or removes the correlation between the composite error terms and the included variables. All institutional variables show a highly significant positive relationship with Cambodia's exports, with rule of law having the largest impact. It is concluded that the government should give high priority to the further improvements of the legal environment and to strong enforcement of property rights and contracts.     

Profitability of politically corrupt firms: Evidence from Romania

Extending the twin-agency problem model, this paper shows that political corruption affects firms by empowering the controlling shareholders and thereby intensifying agency conflicts within selected firms instead of simple political extractions. The fact that controlling shareholders of politically corrupt firms divert more resources from their firms explains the inferior accounting performance despite the well-documented benefits of political connections. Moreover, a higher degree of diversion does not result in a value discount due to the increased value of control. These are demonstrated by evidence from a unique series of political events in Romania in 2015.     

非税收入规模、官员腐败与财政透明度——基于中国省级数据的实证研究

我国地方财政非税收入近年来不断扩张,相应也带来了一些负面效应,其中有国家发展方式、现行行政体制等宏观的深层次原因,但从其社会因素看,这种财政结构在运行中不断自增强状况,在很大程度上也与部门、官员腐败及有利于维系这种腐败的财政管理互动关联。本文实证分析了非税收入规模、官员腐败与财政透明度的互动影响,研究发现:三者之间存在显著的交互效应;非税收入规模扩张会显著促进官员腐败行为,而官员腐败行为会使官员倾向于降低财政透明度,进而导致非税收入规模进一步扩张。进一步,本文研究了不同类别非税收入与官员腐败、财政透明度的关系,发现行政性事业收费收入规模和专项收入规模存在上述类似的循环影响关系,而与罚没收入规模不构成完整的逻辑循环。本文认为,在现行政府体制下,应控制非税收入规模的膨胀,并主要从治理腐败和加强与改革财政管理方面遏制其负面效应。     

Corruption and FDI: Does the Use of Distinct Proxies for Corruption Matter?

Abstract

The relationship between FDI and corruption/institutional quality in host countries has been widely analyzed. However, the use of distinct samples and indicators for corruption tends to hinder the interpretation and outcomes of econometric assessments. The aims of this paper are to assess the extent to which the use of distinct proxies for corruption provides diverse evidence regarding the relationship between corruption and FDI, and to assess whether controlling for other indicators of institutional quality reinforces the effect of corruption indicators on FDI inflows. In order to accomplish these goals, we estimate a set of multivariate logistic models using 96 countries over the period 2000 to 2010. The results evidence that using distinct proxies for corruption variables, as well as controlling for other types of the countries’ institutional quality, generate distinct outcomes. In isolation, a country’s transparency and its citizens’ corruption perceptions fail to impact on FDI whereas a bribe-free environment is conducive to FDI inflows. When we control for the human, social and economic development of the countries, the impact of a transparent and bribe-free context on FDI attraction is enhanced. Overall, it is clear that in order to become a large recipient of FDI a country has to guarantee a transparent and bribe-free environment, characterized by low income taxes, high literacy rates and generalized economic freedom (own labor and property control by citizens).     

Is the cure worse than the disease? The effect of emerging market MNEs on host country corruption

In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of foreign investment by emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). While it has been debated whether EMNEs strengthen or weaken the institutions in host countries they invest in, the literature has paid limited attention to how EMNE investment impacts corruption in other emerging markets, one of the most significant destinations of EMNEs. Following Hoskisson et al. (2013), we categorize two types of emerging markets as targets of EMNE investment, a) low-income emerging markets and b) middle-income emerging markets, based on their institutional and market development. Building on the theory of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and the institutional advantage (IA) of EMNEs, we reason that EMNEs enter foreign markets in accordance to where their skills and competencies can be effectively utilized, and this impacts corruption in the host country. We make two key arguments: (1) EMNEs predominantly use their IA in low-income emerging markets, which in the long term increases corruption in the host market, and (2) EMNEs predominantly use their FSAs to gain competitive advantage in middle-income emerging markets, which decreases corruption in the host market. Empirical analysis of Chinese outward FDI from the 2008-2018 period supports our hypotheses. Our research contributes to both the literature on EMNEs and corruption.     

Russian Direct Investments in Poland

SUMMARY

The article describes the expansion of the Russian direct investments in Poland, especially in the oil sector, illustrated with an example of Lukoil. Apart from the capital transfer, the company contributed to long-term sustainable economic development by implementing environmentally friendly production technologies. However, corruption and political involvement related to the expansion of the Russian investments in the strategic assets had negative impact on the perception of Russian investments in Poland.     

地方政府举债的货币扩张效应及其政策协同

各国政府均会面临日益频繁出现的社会供需总量有悖于货币流通和金融稳定的诸多问题,为此财政与金融当局综合运用各种政策工具力求实现经济的稳定和协调发展。作为国家宏观调控的重要工具之一,地方政府举债如何避免政策冲突并最大化政策组合效力,是当前亟待深入研究的重要课题。本文通过构建包含金融摩擦、多期债券和举债规则等要素在内的NK-DSGE模型,深入剖析地方政府举债的货币效应和传导机制,并探讨其与货币政策协同配合的最佳模式。研究发现:(1)1%的地方政府举债冲击(债券久期=5年)会推动货币乘数上升0.39%,产生货币扩张效应,且债券久期越长,该扩张效应越大;(2)面对实体冲击和金融冲击,货币政策对地方政府举债采取适度从紧的反向协同配合,能有效抑制其货币扩张效应,更好地实现经济稳定和复苏;(3)对于久期较长的债券,提高地方政府举债规则的风险反应敏感度有利于增进福利。     

我国地方政府性债务风险生成与测度研究——基于西部某省的经验数据

我国《预算法》明确规定地方政府不得发行地方政府性债券,但为实现社会经济发展,地方各级政府在财力有限的情况下大量举借债务,忽视了地方经济发展的承债能力,从而形成地方政府债务风险的隐患。本文首先基于社会福利最大化悖论分析我国地方政府性债务的风险生成机制,在此基础上,从债务内部结构和外部负担两方面构建我国地方政府性债务风险指标体系,并通过对西部某省经验数据的因子综合评价和时间趋势分解,判断地方政府性债务总体风险及结构来源。最后,针对研究结论提出相应的政策建议。     

投资资本权利扩张与管制的辩证法--FTAA投资规则的规范分析

文章对FTAA有关投资规则进行了规范分析,并在与NAFTA有关规定进行比较的基础上,对FTAA投资规则草案所反映的投资资本权利扩张和东道国对其的管制之间的博弈关系进行了思考.     

企业债务融资方式的比较分析——一个基于金融契约理论的分析框架

建立在不完全契约理论基础上的金融契约理论认为,金融交易本质上是就财产权利所作的契约安排,因此每一种融资方式都可以视为一种不完全契约。本文把债务融资方式分为关系型和保持距离型两种,在Hart-Moore模型的基础上构造一个企业债务融资的不完全契约模型,对两种债务融资方式进行比较分析,结果表明:在项目投资收益率大于市场利率的条件下,关系型债务融资具有帕累托效率。     

家族企业代际传承与债务特征

代际传承前充分的制度安排有助于降低权杖交接的事后成本,债务政策如何支持代际传承构成传承前财务安排的重要内容。文章利用正处于代际传承实施期的家族企业十年的面板数据,检验了代际传承前家族企业债务特征变化。研究表明进入代际传承实施期后家族企业表现出更低的资产负债率、更大的长期债务比重以及更高的流动比率,研究还表明控制权与现金流权的分离程度对进入代际传承实施期的家族企业债务特征起到干扰作用。家族企业进入代际传承实施期后倾向于实施风险更低的债务政策。     

Fiscal consolidation with tax evasion and corruption

Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption in determining the size of fiscal multipliers. We introduce these two features in a New Keynesian model and revisit the effects of fiscal consolidations. VAR evidence for Italy suggests that spending cuts reduce tax evasion, while tax hikes increase it. In the model, spending cuts induce a reallocation of production towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax evasion. Tax hikes increase the incentives to produce in the less productive shadow sector, implying higher output and unemployment losses. Corruption further amplifies these losses by requiring larger hikes in taxes to reduce debt. We use the model to assess the recent fiscal consolidation plans in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Our results corroborate the evidence of increasing levels of tax evasion during these consolidations and point to significant output and welfare losses, which could be reduced substantially by combating tax evasion and corruption.     

Network complementaries in the international expansion of emerging market firms

Can domestic political capital be transferable to more or less similar institutional contexts abroad? Motivated by contradictory results in two streams of research, this study seeks to combine the insights from two theoretical arguments and conceptualize the role of domestic political ties in international expansion as a dual problem of securing key resources from home governments and looking for opportunities in foreign markets and matching resources to capture them. We adopt the notion of network complementarity to examine the complementarity effect of domestic political ties and foreign ties on international expansion. The implication is that EMNE research that concentrates on either looking for foreign opportunities or securing domestic resources, but not both, is likely to be incomplete when international expansion is being studied. Using a longitudinal panel dataset of Chinese international new ventures expanding to 105 foreign markets, we find a positive interactive effect of domestic political ties and foreign ties on Chinese MNEs’ internationalization. This positive interactive effect on internationalization is found to be stronger for expanding to developing host markets than to developed host markets. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on domestic political ties, the international expansion literature, the network complementarity literature, and the international entrepreneurship literature.     

An Analysis of the Effect of Culture and Religion on Perceived Corruption in a Global Context

This study examines the role of both religion and culture [as measured by the cultural clusters of countries in the GLOBE study of House et al. (Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, 2004)] on the levels of perceived corruption. Covering the period from 2000 to 2010, the study uses three different measures of perceived corruption: (1) the World Bank’s Control of Corruption measure, (2) Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and (3) Heritage Foundation’s Freedom from Corruption Index. A system of three simultaneous equations is used, with the jointly endogenous variables being (a) perceived corruption, (b) perceived government legitimacy, and (c) perceived government effectiveness. The results show that both cultural and religious differences are incrementally related to perceived corruption, even after controlling for other economic and political factors. Specifically, relative to the Protestant Christian religion, the non-Protestant Christian religion, the Islamic religion, and Other Religion/No Religion are positively associated with higher corruption (or negatively with anti-corruption), but the Buddhist and Hindu religions appear to be not significantly different from the Protestant Christian religion. On the cultural side, compared to the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition, the other European clusters are incrementally positively associated with higher corruption, but this tendency is offset by more effective political governance, thus leading in the case of the German and Nordic cultures to levels of corruption not statistically different from the Anglo cluster. All the non-European cultural clusters are associated with significantly higher corruption tendencies, but the overall effect is mitigated partially by either greater perceived political legitimacy (Latin-American, Middle-Eastern, Caribbean, and Pacific Islander), or greater political effectiveness (Confucian and South-East Asian).     

Foreign direct investment in emerging markets and acquirers’ value gains

We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of 306 foreign direct investment (FDI) announcements by UK firms in seventy-five emerging markets (EM). Our results show that acquirers enjoy highly significant gains during the announcement period of FDI. Perhaps surprisingly, the highest gains are accrued to acquirers investing in countries with high political risk and high corruption ratings. The type of asset acquired has also a significant effect on the gains of acquirers’ shareholders, with the highest gains accrued to acquirers of physical assets. Also, investments in physical assets in EM with a high corruption rating elicit the highest gains. We contend that UK firms following resource-seeking strategies in EM with a high corruption rating are facilitated access to resources on favorable terms and this is viewed positively by the market participants. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and the endogenous choice to expand internationally.     

A MODEL OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE VIRTUAL AND THE REAL ECONOMY

This paper demonstrates through a formal model how the wealth effect created by a stock market boom leads to the expansion of demand and output mostly through debt‐financed private consumption. However, inherent in this expansion is the threat of a subsequent contraction caused by the rising burden of servicing debt and falling creditworthiness. The formal analysis captures more precisely these conditions; it shows that, even in the medium run, the growth rates of the wealth in the stock market and of the real economy may move in opposite directions.     

Ownership control of foreign affiliates: A property rights theory perspective

This paper applies property rights theory to explain changes in foreign affiliates’ ownership. Post-entry ownership change is driven by both firm-level characteristics and by the differences in the institutional environments in host countries. We distinguish between financial market development and the level of corruption as two different institutional dimensions, such that changes along these dimensions impact upon ownership change in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that changes in ownership are affected by the foreign affiliate’s relatedness with its parent’s sector, as well as by the affiliate’s maturity. We use firm level data across 125 host countries to test our hypotheses.