Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union

This paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes. A tractable linear-quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules. In the optimal equilibrium, monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule. Fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level. Simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules. Conversely, the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions.     

Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union

We consider the interaction between the monetary policy in a monetary union, and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries. We use a Barro–Gordon-type model extended to many countries and fiscal policies. Each country’s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries, and the common monetary policy has its time-consistency problem. But if the two types of policymakers agree about the ideal levels of output and inflation, then this ideal is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives, despite ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy, without fiscal coordination, without monetary commitment, and for any order of moves.     

Managing an Economy Under EMU: The Case of Ireland

Ireland's experience of limited monetary independence within the EMS indicated that such independence was bought at the price of significant risk premia on interest rates. This experience informed its decision to join EMU, and membership has resulted in the expected credibility gain. Since the start of EMU inflation in consumer prices in Ireland has risen well above the EU average. However, this need not be a matter of concern within a monetary union. Instead, what should concern the Irish administration is a high rate of inflation in wage rates and domestic asset prices chiefly housing. While monetary policy is no longer available as an instrument of domestic policy, fiscal policy can still be used to effectively target these problems. The lessons of the first three years of membership is that the focus of fiscal policy within Ireland needs to change, and that the EU institutions also need to focus more clearly on the needs of the Euro area rather than on those of individual regional economies.     

Hysteresis and Emu

We consider how differences between the way firms react to a common monetary policy affect the performance of a monetary union. A model is presented in which heterogeneous firms respond discontinuously to monetary shocks. The implication is that the level of economic activity has a selective memory of the extremum values of the shocks experienced, and depends on the distribution of switching values for entry and exit.     

Monetary,Financial and Fiscal Stability in the East African Community: Ready for a Monetary Union?

We examine prospects for a monetary union in the East African Community (EAC) by developing a stylised model of policymakers' decision problem that allows for uncertain benefits derived from monetary, financial and fiscal stability and then calibrating the model for the EAC for the period 2003–10. When policymakers properly allow for uncertainty, none of the countries wants to pursue a monetary union based on either monetary or financial stability grounds, and only Rwanda might favour it on fiscal stability grounds; we argue that robust institutional arrangements assuring substantial improvements in monetary, financial and fiscal stability are needed to compensate.     

Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers

With benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases, are likely to raise welfare. Two types of arrangements are considered for the union's common central bank (CCB): making the CCB more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the CCB. In contrast to the results of Svensson (1997)[Svensson, L.E.O., 1997. Optimal inflation targets, `conservative' central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review 87, 98–114], an optimally designed, conservative CCB may outperform inflation targeting. Finally, we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification. Hence, subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare.     

The trilemma of a monetary union: Another impossible trinity

A monetary union among autonomous countries cannot simultaneously maintain an independent monetary policy, national fiscal sovereignty and a no-bailout clause. These three features make up an impossible trinity, and attempts to preserve all three concurrently will ultimately end in failure. In order to save EMU, one of these three must be abandoned.     

宏观政策的协调机制与欧洲债务危机

通过政策调整损失函数的理论模型分析,认为负的需求冲击是构成欧洲债务危机的前提,而缺乏货币政策协调的持续性扩张财政政策是欧洲债务危机的本质原因。对2000Q1—2010Q1的"PIIGS"的季度数据进行实证分析后,发现5国独立财政政策和欧元区共同货币政策的协调机制是存在冲突的。希腊长期均衡和短期调整均存在主权债务危机风险,因而成为首个爆发危机的国家。西班牙、意大利的短期调整虽暂时缓解了主权债务危机出现的可能,但不能解决发生危机的根本问题。而爱尔兰、葡萄牙只是短期内实施了过度的积极财政计划而造成了主权债务危机假象。     

中国积极财政政策与货币政策效力的比较——对蒙代尔—弗莱明模型的一个修正运用

运用一个修正的MF模型 ,对我国积极财政政策和货币政策的效力进行比较 ,得出在我国现行汇率制度安排下 ,积极财政政策的效果要优于货币政策。当前我国的经济政策应以财政政策为主 ,坚持积极的财政政策 ,淡化扩张性的货币政策。     

A POST‐KEYNESIAN AMENDMENT TO THE NEW CONSENSUS ON MONETARY POLICY

A common view is now pervasive in policy research at universities and central banks, which one could call the New Keynesian consensus, based on an endogenous money supply. This new consensus reproduces received wisdom: in the long run, expansionary fiscal policy leads to higher inflation rates and real interest rates, while more restrictive monetary policy only leads to lower inflation rates. The paper provides a simple four‐quadrant apparatus to represent the above, and it shows that simple modifications to the new consensus model are enough to radically modify received doctrine as to the likely effects of fiscal and monetary policies.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules in an Unstable Economy

This paper examines the implications of different monetary and fiscal policy rules in an economy characterized by Harrodian instability. We show that (1) a monetary rule along Taylor lines can be stabilizing for low debt ratios but becomes de‐stabilizing if the debt ratio exceeds a certain threshold, (2) a ‘Keynesian’ fiscal policy rule can stabilize the economy at full employment, (3) a fiscal ‘austerity’ rule that links fiscal parameters to deviations from a target debt ratio fails to adjust the ‘warranted’ to the ‘natural’ growth rate and destabilizes the warranted path and (4) instability may arise from a combination of fiscal and monetary policy rules which separately would stabilize the system.     

财政政策对经济增长与价格波动影响的动态效应研究——结合货币供给量的SVAR分析

通过建立结构式向量自回归模型(SVAR),就财政政策对经济增长和价格水平的动态效应作深入分析。结果表明,财政支出对经济增长影响波动较大,中长期总体效应为正面影响。而在加入货币政策变动影响后,它对经济增长在中长期效应为负面影响,货币供给总体表现为正面影响,两者对经济增长的综合影响为正。     

Governance of the Euro Area: Fiscal Union,Debt Union,Fiscal Freedom

Over the past three years, as the euro area has struggled with high levels of sovereign debt, it has been gradually developing into a debt union. However, this is not a sustainable arrangement. This article proposes two alternatives to a debt union — a fiscal union and a monetary union with fiscal freedom — and evaluates the pros and cons of each approach.     

政策协调、产业结构升级及宏观经济效应分析

不同模式的宏观政策协调不但会对产业结构优化产生差异性影响,也会影响产业结构优化带来的宏观经济效应。本文在新凯恩斯框架下构建理论模型,并基于贝叶斯参数估计和数值模拟分析政策协调对产业结构优化以及宏观经济效应的影响。研究发现:数量型货币政策比价格型货币政策更有利于产业结构优化,收入型财政政策比支出型财政政策更有利于产业结构优化;价格型货币政策和收入型财政政策的政策协调更有利于产业结构优化对消费、就业和产出的促进作用,数量型货币政策和支出型财政政策的政策协调更有利于产业结构优化对通货膨胀的稳定作用;货币政策对产业结构优化升级这一目标与稳定经济波动这一目标存在着Trade Off现象,财政政策对产业结构优化升级这一目标与促进经济增长这一目标存在着Trade Off现象。因此,建议采取货币政策为主、财政政策为辅的宏观经济调控政策,具体操作体现在减息为主结合降低税率水平为辅的政策协调组合来应对经济增速下滑和产业结构升级。     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads

We introduce “financial imperfections” – asymmetric net wealth positions, incomplete risk-sharing, and interest rate spreads across member countries – in a prototypical two-country currency union model and study implications for monetary policy transmission mechanism and optimal policy. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism associated with nominal rigidities, financial imperfections introduce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy. Moreover, the two mechanisms reinforce each other and amplify the effects of monetary policy. On the normative side, financial imperfections, via interactions with nominal rigidities, generate two novel policy trade-offs. First, the central bank needs to pay attention to distributional efficiency in addition to macroeconomic (and price level) stability, which implies that a strict inflation targeting policy of setting union-wide inflation to zero is never optimal. Second, the interactions lead to a trade-off in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their efficient level) across countries, which implies that the central bank allows for less flexibility in relative prices. Finally, we consider how the central bank should respond to a financial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Under optimal policy, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional inefficiencies by mitigating the drop in output and inflation and the rise in relative consumption and prices. Such a policy response can be well approximated by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule as it helps the real interest rate track the efficient rate of interest.     

Driven by the markets? ECB sovereign bond purchases and the securities markets programme

At the height of the European sovereign debt crisis, the European Central Bank decided to purchase distressed European government bonds. Even worse, and more importantly, the ECB is providing direct support of several hundred billions of euros to troubled banks via its normal monetary policy operations by granting them the opportunity to refinance at an interest rate of 1%. This article argues that these purchases will result in common monetary policy being dominated by national fiscal policies. The most worrisome aspect is that the euro area appears to have stumbled into unconventional monetary policies that, once started, will be difficult to exit. In the euro area, properly functioning financial markets are at risk.     

中国经济增长中货币政策与财政政策有效性的比较检验

本文通过一个广义货币供应量、财政支出和国内生产总值三变量向量误差修正模型(VECM)考察中国1978—2005年间货币政策和财政政策对经济增长影响的差异性特征。在应用脉冲响应函数和方差分解方法研究它们之间的动态特性后发现:积极货币政策的经济增长效果无论在短期还是长期内均要强于财政政策,长期内,积极货币政策对经济增长一直有递减的正效应,但是积极财政政策由于挤出效应的影响,长期内对经济增长呈负效应。     

A theory of the currency denomination of international trade

The currency denomination of international trade has significant macroeconomic and policy implications. In this paper we solve for the optimal invoicing choice by integrating this microeconomic decision at the level of the firm into a general equilibrium open economy model. Strategic interactions between firms play a critical role. We find that the less competition firms face in foreign markets, as reflected in market share and product differentiation, the more likely they will price in their own currency. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.