Estimating a Parsimonious Model of Inequality Aversion in Stackelberg Duopoly Experiments*

In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001) , nearly half of the followers’ behaviours are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self‐interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self‐interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion.     

Fairness in supply chain contracts: A laboratory study

Various contracts can be designed to coordinate a simple supplier–retailer channel, yet the contracts proposed in prior research and tested in a laboratory setting do not perform as standard theory predicts. The supplier, endowed with all bargaining power, can neither fully coordinate the channel nor extract all of the channel profit. We report on a sequence of laboratory experiments designed to separate possible causes of channel inefficiency. The three causes we consider are inequality aversion, bounded rationality, and incomplete information. It turns out that all three affect human behavior. Inequality aversion has by far the most explanatory power regarding retailers’ behavior. Incomplete information about the retailer's degree of inequality aversion has the most explanatory power in regards to the suppliers’ behavior. Bounded rationality affects both players, but is of secondary importance.     

Decreasing downside risk aversion and background risk

In this paper, we show that risk vulnerability can be associated with the concept of downside risk aversion (DRA) and an assumption about its behavior, namely that it is decreasing in wealth. Specifically, decreasing downside risk aversion in the Arrow–Pratt and Ross senses are respectively necessary and sufficient for a zero-mean background risk to raise the aversion to other independent risks.     

Stochastic Route Choice Equilibrium Assignment for Travelers with Heterogeneous Regret Aversions

Most route choice models assume that people are completely rational. Recently, regret theory has attracted researchers’ attentions because of its power to depict real travel behavior. This paper proposes a multiclass stochastic user equilibrium assignment model by using regret theory. All users are differentiated by their own regret aversion. The route travel disutility for users of each class is defined as a linear combination of the travel time and anticipated regret. The proposed model is formulated as a variational inequality problem and solved by using the self-regulated averaging method. The numerical results show that users’ regret aversion indeed influences their route choice behavior and that users with high regret aversion are more inclined to change route choice when the traffic congestion degree varies.     

Risk aversion in a model of endogenous growth

Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being borne by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction predominantly model innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected to reduce the incentive to innovate and we might fear that without insurance innovation completely disappears in the long run. The present paper introduces risk averse agents into an occupational choice model of endogenous growth in which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We derive a clear negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth. Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-off value of risk aversion below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a strictly positive constant. In this case, innovation persists on the long run and consumption per capita grows at a strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for levels of risk aversion above the cut-off value, the economy eventually stagnates.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,turnover, and risk aversion

Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting.     

Voting between tax regimes to fund a public good

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between an income tax and a commodity tax to fund a public good. We implement conditions such that a rational and self-interested subject would prefer the commodity-tax regime. We find that voters overwhelmingly support the income-tax regime. We discuss and evaluate empirically alternative behavioral accounts to explain voting behavior. We find that inequality aversion and efficiency concerns matter for voting. We find no evidence for opportunism or for cognitive ability to affect voting.     

Forecasting stock market volatility: Can the risk aversion measure exert an important role?

In this paper, we predict realized volatility of stock return by utilizing time-varying risk aversion based on a simple linear autoregressive model. Our in-sample results suggest that time-varying risk aversion have significant impact for stock return volatility. In terms of out-of-sample forecasting performance, the empirical results indicate that the incorporation of time-varying risk aversion in the benchmark model can yield more accurate stock return volatility forecasts. Notably, the out-of-sample forecasting results confirm that our conclusions are robust when we apply alternative lag orders and alternative prediction evaluation periods. Finally, we study links between the prediction ability of time-varying risk aversion and the volatility of other stock indices and two kinds of crude oil, and find that the new predictor can effectively strengthen forecasting performance in most case. In view of the importance of volatility risk in the asset pricing process, our research is of great significance for financial asset participants.     

Two remarks on the uniqueness of equilibria in the CAPM

In the standard ‘capital asset pricing model’ (CAPM) with a riskless asset we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness. This condition is a joint restriction on the agents’ endowments and their preferences which is compatible with non-increasing absolute risk aversion and which is in particular satisfied with constant absolute risk aversion. Moreover, in the CAPM without a riskless asset we give an example for multiple equilibria even though all agents have constant absolute risk aversion.     

Time-varying risk aversion and renminbi exchange rate volatility: Evidence from CARR-MIDAS model

In this paper, we investigate the relation between time-varying risk aversion and renminbi exchange rate volatility using the conditional autoregressive range-mixed-data sampling (CARR-MIDAS) model. The CARR-MIDAS model is a range-based volatility model, which exploits intraday information regarding the intraday trajectory of the price. Moreover, the model features a MIDAS structure allowing for time-varying risk aversion to drive the long-run volatility dynamics. Our empirical results show that time-varying risk aversion has a significantly negative effect on the long-run volatility of renminbi exchange rate. Moreover, we observe that both intraday ranges and time-varying risk aversion contain important information for forecasting renminbi exchange rate volatility. The range-based CARR-MIDAS model incorporating time-varying risk aversion provides more accurate out-of-sample forecasts of renminbi exchange rate volatility compared to a variety of competing models, including the return-based GARCH, GARCH-MIDAS and GARCH-MIDAS incorporating time-varying risk aversion as well as range-based CARR, CARR-MIDAS and heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR), for forecast horizons of 1 day up to 3 months. This result is robust to alternative risk aversion measure, alternative MIDAS lags as well as alternative out-of-sample periods. Overall, our findings highlight the value of incorporating intraday information and time-varying risk aversion for forecasting the renminbi exchange rate volatility.     

Disappointment aversion in tournaments

Many experiments and field studies indicate that individuals have an asymmetric attitude towards gains versus losses. In this paper, we extend the canonic tournament model by assuming the workers' preferences exhibit disappointment aversion. First, we find the winning prize is first increasing and then decreasing in volatility and the losing prize shows the opposite. Furthermore, when the volatility exceeds a threshold, both the winning and losing prizes are reduced to zero. By contrast, there is no such kink for the risk aversion case. Finally, we find the piece rates always dominate rank-order tournaments when the workers are disappointment averse.     

A simple mean–dispersion model of ambiguity attitudes

Several characterizations of ambiguity aversion decompose preferences into the expected utility of an act and an adjustment factor, an ambiguity index, or a dispersion function. In each of these cases, the adjustment factor has very little structure imposed on it, and thus these models provide little guidance as to which function to use from the infinite class of possible alternatives. In this paper, we provide a simple axiomatic characterization of mean–dispersion preferences which uniquely determines a subjective probability distribution over a set of possible priors and which uniquely identifies the dispersion function. We provide an algorithm for determining this subjective probability distribution and the coefficient in the dispersion function from experimental data. We also demonstrate that the model accommodates ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg paradox.     

INEQUALITY AND HAPPINESS

In recent years there has been an accumulation of empirical evidence suggesting that individuals dislike inequality. The literature has built upon estimating the degree of this dislike as well as its causes. The use of self‐reported measures of satisfaction or well‐being as a proxy for utility has been one of the empirical strategies used to this end. In this survey, we review the papers that estimate or examine the relationship between inequality and self‐reported happiness to conclude that inequality correlates negatively with happiness in Western societies. Some of the surveyed papers identify particular sources of heterogeneity on preferences over inequality. The evidence for non‐Western societies is more mixed and less reliable. Notwithstanding that, trust in the institutions seems to play an important role in shaping the relationship between income inequality and subjective well‐being. We conclude with suggestions for further research.     

Time varying VARs with inequality restrictions

In many applications involving time-varying parameter VARs, it is desirable to restrict the VAR coefficients at each point in time to be non-explosive. This is an example of a problem where inequality restrictions are imposed on states in a state space model. In this paper, we describe how existing MCMC algorithms for imposing such inequality restrictions can work poorly (or not at all) and suggest alternative algorithms which exhibit better performance. Furthermore, we show that previous algorithms involve an approximation relating to a key prior integrating constant. Our algorithms are exact, not involving this approximation. In an application involving a commonly used U.S. data set, we present evidence that the algorithms proposed in this paper work well.     

Market insurance and endogenous saving with multiple loss states

The standard one-period model for insurance demand does not consider the interaction between the present and the future. Reflecting this observation, we analyze intertemporal insurance demand and saving in a two-period model with multiple loss states. When an individual has no access to a capital market, we first find that an actuarially fair premium does not guarantee full insurance in general, unlike in the standard approach. Income stream and discount factors are also important in determining insurance demand. Second, insurance is neither an inferior good nor a Giffen good. Third, an increase in concavity of the utility function does not always lead to an increase in insurance demand. The current income level and changes in downside risk aversion affect insurance demand. When the individual has access to a capital market, we further have the following observations. Fourth, an actuarially fair premium leads to full insurance. Fifth, insurance is an inferior good and can be a Giffen good under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). An increase in the interest rate leads to a lower insurance demand and a higher saving when the relative risk aversion is less than unity. Lastly, an increase in concavity of the utility function leads to an increase in insurance demand and a decrease in saving. In conjunction, our findings point to the fact that the standard results are not obtainable if insurance demand is considered in isolation from the capital market.     

Risk aversion in Entrepreneurship Panels: Measurement Problems and Alternative Explanations

In this study, we investigate the pitfalls associated with measuring risk aversion within studies of entrepreneurial behavior. First, we raise substantial concerns as to whether standard questions employed can be used to infer risk aversion among nascent entrepreneurs. In our work we show that the US, Canadian and Swedish panel study datasets do not offer evidence that entrepreneurs are more risk averse than non‐entrepreneurs. In fact, we show that the measurements used for risk aversion in these studies are not compatible with classic expected utility theory. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that probability weighting may even counteract the respondent's risk attitude. Therefore, inferring the respondent's risk attitude from choices in the panel study datasets can be misleading in the presence of probability weighting. We therefore suggest that alternative theories of decision making under risk, like prospect theory, are relevant and should be taken into account in future studies on entrepreneurship. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity

We study a principal-agent model in which the (effort-dependent) realisation of output levels is ambiguous, and the agent is ambiguity averse (while the principal is ambiguity neutral). We show that introducing ambiguity aversion will lower profits if the action that the principal wants to implement is the most ambiguous one, while they may increase otherwise. Regarding the design of the optimal contract, we show that under ambiguity aversion the optimal incentive scheme may not be monotone even if a natural generalization of the monotone likelihood ratio property is satisfied, and illustrate how this fact could affect the design of contracts in an applied economic context. We also find that the individual rationality constraint need not bind in the presence of ambiguity aversion unless preferences satisfy constant absolute ambiguity aversion.     

A preference foundation for constant loss aversion

Following prospect theory and in particular the concept of loss aversion, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we consider decision making under risk in which the decision maker’s preferences depend on a reference outcome. An outcome below this reference outcome is regarded as resulting from a loss: a loss decreases the decision maker’s basic utility more than a comparable gain increases this utility. An elegant and simple way to model this phenomenon was proposed by Shalev (2002): the utility of an outcome below the reference outcome is obtained from the basic utility by subtracting a multiple of the loss in basic utility: this multiple, the loss aversion coefficient, is constant across different reference outcomes. We provide a preference foundation for this loss aversion model.     

第三方物流合同的法律分析

阐述了第三方物流合同的概念、特征及主要内容,分析其法律性质,在介绍与第三方物流合同相关的法律关系基础上,从合同的法律适用、归责原则、法律风险及规避等方面分析第三方物流合同。