基于产品生命周期的顾客忠诚意图动态演化模型研究

本文将委托-代理理论和关系营销理论相结合发展了一个顾客-品牌关系形成过程的概念化模型以探讨品牌忠诚的生成机理。根据逆向选择和道德风险的委托代理问题,品牌信号和品牌溢价可以作为解决上述问题的策略。然而,上述策略本身并没有减轻消费者对品牌所提供利益的不确定性和对企业采取机会主义的担心。因此,文章认为顾客对品牌的信任机制才是减少不确定性和机会主义的核心构件。     

DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: A SURVEY OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

Abstract.  This paper provides a selective review of the theoretical literature on delegated portfolio management as a principal–agent relationship. The main focus of the paper is to review the analytical issues raised by the peculiar nature of the delegated portfolio management relationship within the broader class of principal–agent models. In particular, the paper discusses the performance of linear versus nonlinear compensation contracts in a single-period setting, the possible effects of limited liability of portfolio managers, the role of reputational concerns in a multiperiod framework, and the incentives to noise trading. In addition, the paper deals with some general equilibrium dimensions and asset pricing implications of delegated portfolio management. The paper also suggests some directions for future research.     

建筑市场信息不对称及治理对策研究

本文基于不对称信息理论,建立了委托代理关系下的建筑业信息模型,并具体分析了建筑业目前由于信息不对称造成的各种问题,最后对相关问题提出了几点治理对策和建议。     

On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce exclusivity of trades (third best inefficiency). Our setting is the same as that of Bisin and Guaitoli [Bisin, A., Guaitoli, D., 2004. Moral hazard with nonexclusive contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 2, 306–328]. We hence argue that some of the equilibrium conditions they imposed are not necessary, and we exhibit a set of equilibrium allocations which fail to satisfy them.     

“对赌协议”的经济学研究

为研究企业并购过程中所广泛使用的“对赌协议”经济学本质及其影响,基于合同经济学与机制设计理论,以激励理论为核心,建立了投资方进行“对赌条款”设计的决策分析框架。探讨并对比了完全信息、不完全信息以及存在有限责任制等情形下“对赌协议”的Pareto有效性及其最优激励方案。结果表明：当企业管理层的风险偏好是中性的时候,“对赌协议”是一种能够有效保护投资者收益和激励管理层的最优制度安排。这一分析框架很好地解释了现实案例中所涉及的投融资双方的行为以及收益分配结果。     

On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard

This paper shows that the marginal value of a “small amount of non-output information” is generally non-positive in the context of the standard principal-agent model involving moral hazard, which suggests a non-concavity in the value of information. However, when both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, even a small amount of non-output information may exhibit a positive incremental value in presence of a liability constraint.      

Understanding liquidity shortages during severe economic downturns

One feature of economic recessions is the appearance of aggregate liquidity shortages that can exacerbate the economic downturn. We develop a model in which the demand for liquidity arises suddenly in response to continued funding needs of partially completed investment projects whose outcomes are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and moral hazard. When the economy experiences an adverse aggregate productivity shock, incentive constraints that underlie equity contracts may bind, provided the shock is severe enough. In this case, credit-rationing appears, and the heightened demand for liquidity coincides with a greater reluctance to take on equity positions or deepen investments in on-going investment projects. The consequence is a reduction in new investment and termination of on-going projects due to a lack of liquidity, thereby worsening the economic slowdown.     

风险资本家的道德风险问题研究

本文主要探讨在考虑机会成本的情况下,作为风险企业家与有限合伙代理人的风险资本家可能产生的道德风险问题,以及如何通过对风险资本家管理支持力度的合理分配,达到可行的帕累托边界,并最终实现风险企业家和有限合伙人的利润最大化。     

On discrimination in the optimal management of teams

We study the optimal management of teams in which agents’ effort decisions are mapped (via a production technology) into the probability of the team’s success. Optimal wage schemes in such context are largely discriminatory, but we show that the extent of the discrimination crucially depends on the existence of moral hazard. More precisely, for teams with a flat structure, the domain of production technologies giving rise to discrimination is broader when agents’ actions are observable and contractible. For teams with a sequential structure, the result reverses and the domain of production technologies giving rise to discrimination is broader when there exists moral hazard. Finally, in more cooperative environments in which agents are allowed to collude, optimality does not entail discrimination, with or without moral hazard.     

Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology

(Magill, M., Quinzii, M., 2002. Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 149–190) showed that, in a stockmarket economy with private information, the moral hazard problem may be resolved provided that a spanning overlap condition is satisfed. This result depends on the assumption that the technology is given by a stochastic production function with a single scalar input. The object of the present paper is to extend the analysis of Magill and Quinzii to the case of multiple inputs. We show that their main result extends to this general case if and only if, for each firm, the number of linearly independent combinations of securities having payoffs correlated with, but not dependent on, the firms output is equal to the number of degrees of freedom in the firm’s production technology.     

SICK PAY INSURANCE AND SICKNESS ABSENCE: SOME EUROPEAN CROSS-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS AND A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

All European countries have some form of compulsory insurance against the loss of income due to temporary disability. The insurance schemes vary widely between countries both in terms of measurable entities (such as the compensation level) as well as in unmeasurable traits concerning the actual implementation of the programs. In this paper we use European Labour Force Survey data to study how the measurable differences in the programs is associated with differences in absence rates. We also summarize the theoretical literature on insurance principles in this field. Based on the empirical literature we then discuss how different forms of incentives may affect the work absence rate.     

Private Debt and Timely Loss Recognition

Abstract

In this study, we investigate whether private debt contracting provides incentives for borrowers to recognize economic losses earlier in accounting earnings. Focusing on the window around firms' issuances of private loans, we document that timely loss recognition significantly increases following an issuance. This effect is significantly stronger for debt contracts that include performance covenants acting as trip-wires when firm performance deteriorates. We also find that timely loss recognition is particularly used when writing debt contracts is hampered by uncertainty about a firm's future development. These findings are consistent with timely loss recognition being used to increase contract efficiency by facilitating state-contingent control allocation based on a borrower's performance over the loan term.     

道德风险视角下的高校教师激励机制研究

高校教师是高等院校的教学与科研任务的具体承担者,因此对于提高高校教育与科研质量而言,如何克服信息不对称带来的困境、激励教师为所承担的任务积极、努力工作,是一个关键问题。本论文在委托代理视角下研究分析了针对高校教师在完成教学科研任务时的道德风险的产生形式,并探讨了控制其道德风险的激励策略,发现其道德风险的控制效果受到了检测效果的大小和期望聘用年限长短的重要影响。本论文给出了定量描述的影响机制,并对结论的有效性进行了算例分析。     

Multidimensional skin in the game

We analyze the alignment of incentives between an originator and investors in a Bayesian equilibrium model that reflects securitization. It involves private types of originators, differing by marginal cost of effort. This model is the first to consider refunding and risk transfer, that is, both major welfare benefits of securitization, and the empirical finding of a non-monotonic relationship between the subordination level of claims and their sensitivity to the originator’s effort. On this basis, our equilibrium model is the first to explain why horizontal retention prevails in some market environments and vertical retention results in other market environments. More specifically, we show that a strong need for refunding, compared to risk transfer, is an argument for horizontal retention. Furthermore, horizontal retention prevails in equilibria with high effort levels, whereas vertical retention arises rather in equilibria with lower effort levels. Our results indicate new ways to regulate cash flow retention in securitization markets efficiently.     

All-or-nothing payments

We develop a general principal–agent framework in which to study optimal incentive schemes where agents are hired to work on multiple heterogeneous and interdependent projects. The incentive schemes can be based on output measures, interpreted as the principal’s payoffs, as well as input measures, regarded as observation of some of the agents’ efforts. We identify that a unifying feature of the optimal incentive schemes, called all-or-nothing payments, arises in three natural scenarios of the general framework: unobservable inputs, verifiable inputs, and observable but unverifiable inputs. Our framework and results embed and generalize several previous studies on multitask principal–agent problems with a limited liability constraint.     

上市公司财务欺诈行为的经济学分析

本文从上市公司投资方与管理层之间的信息不对称,分析了管理层的道德风险问题,通过对现行会计审计制度进行分析后发现,注册会计师的行为仍然存在道德风险。认为通过适当增加信息成本可以在一定程度上改变信息弱势,即只有增加信息成本而不是压缩才能解决信息不对称带来的问题。且上市公司和旧车市场等因信息不对称所产生的问题都可以得到解决。     

Moral hazard,debt overhang and capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of managerial moral hazard on the debt overhang of a firm by constructing a contingent claims model in which the manager faces costly effort. Using a calibrated capital structure model, we show that the costs of debt overhang become more serious in the presence of managerial moral hazard. Such costs even account for more than half of the total agency costs at a high level of cash flow. Moreover, in contrast to the results of Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the leverage ratio and investment opportunities of a firm, which is caused by managers’ moral hazard. Finally, by considering this moral hazard, we also show the coexistence of low leverage ratios and high credit spreads, which explains the phenomenon of “low debt levels and high credit spreads” observed in practice.     

Rules for a lender of last resort: An historical perspective

The Federal Reserve was established in 1913 to be a lender of last resort. Paul Warburg, its principal architect had in mind that a U.S. central bank would follow Bagehot׳s strictures ‘to lend freely at a penalty rate’ in the face of a scramble for high powered money. Yet the Federal Reserve Act never spelled out how the Fed was supposed to act as an LLR. This omission came to the fore in the Great Contraction 1929 to 1933 when the Fed failed to prevent four banking panics which turned a serious recession into the Great Contraction. Reforms in the 1930s corrected some of the Fed׳s failures but clamped down on financial activity for 40 years. The financial crisis problem returned in the 1970s with financial liberalization. The Fed abandoned Bagehot׳s strictures and adopted the ‘Too big to fail’ doctrine and ‘creative ambiguity’. This policy shift contributed to moral hazard and created new threats to financial stability with the rise of the ‘shadow banking system’. The subprime mortgage crisis prompted the Fed to take unprecedented LLR activities which have opened up a Pandora׳s box of perils. The Fed has moved away from rules based policy in its LLR function.     

Optimal insurance under moral hazard in loss reduction

This study investigates the optimal insurance when moral hazard exists in loss reduction. We identify that the optimal insurance is full insurance up to a limit and partial insurance above that limit. In case of partial insurance, the indemnity schedule for prudent individual is convex, linear, or concave in loss, depending on the shapes of the utility and loss distribution. The optimal insurance may include a deductible for large losses only when the indemnity schedule is convex. It may also include a fixed reimbursement when the schedule is convex or concave. When the loss distribution belongs to the one dimensional exponential family with canonical form, the indemnity schedule is concave under IARA and CARA, whereas it can be concave or convex under DARA.     

Optimal insurance contract under VaR and CVaR constraints

This study endogenously develops an optimal insurance contractual form for maximizing insured expected utility under VaR and CVaR constraints. We find that CVaR constraint does not affect the contractual form, but may increase minimum insurance premium requirement. Additionally, when the VaR constraint is binding, the optimal contract is a double deductible insurance. However, if the contract is restricted to a regular form (both indemnity schedule and retained loss schedule are continuously nondecreasing) for avoiding moral hazard problem, the optimal contract is a piecewise linear deductible insurance. Finally, we provide intuitive comparison between this study result and relevant studies.