Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare

In this paper, we explore welfare implications of a voluntary export restraint (VER) agreement within a simple model of duopoly with product differentiation and conjectural variations. We assume that the foreign exporter does not sell its product in its own market and that the imposition of a VER makes the domestic firm into a Stackelberg leader. Under these assumptions, it is shown that a VER introduced at the free-trade equilibrium level of export is welfare-improving for the importing country if and only if the foreign exporter is forced to comply with the restraint involuntarily . In other words, it is impossible to benefit home country and foreign country simultaneously by a VER agreement within the class of models we are envisaging. This result holds irrespective of whether firms compete in terms of quantities or prices.     

论反倾销威胁下的出口产业政策

反倾销措施是世界各国普遍采用的一种保护国内产业的合法手段.建立在劳动力密集型产业基础上的中国出口导向型经济,其出口企业所面临的反倾销威胁将是长期而普遍的.文章建立了两阶段Cournot竞争模型对反倾销威胁下出口企业利润最大化行为与出口产业结构以及反倾销参考价格之间的内在联系机理进行了理论分析,并论证了在反倾销威胁下,政府实施以整个出口产业利润最大化为目标、以间接控制出口企业数量为手段的出口产业政策的必要性和可行性.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.     

Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis

We derive some sufficient conditions for the Suzumura-Ishikawa proposition on voluntary export restraints to hold when their model is extended to a general equilibrium framework. The sufficient conditions are concerned with the magnitude of income effects which play no role in the partial-equilibrium analysis of Suzumura and Ishikawa.     

Dynamics of Export Market Entry and Exit*

We apply discrete time duration models to explain the duration until new plants start to export and the duration until exit from the export markets, using data on Finnish manufacturing plants. Plants that are large, young, highly productive, and with high‐capital intensity are likely to enter the export market earlier and to survive in the export market longer. Foreign ownership increases chances of export entry, especially for small and low human capital plants, and decreases the risk of export failure for large, high‐productivity plants. The upper and lower tails of the productivity distribution are represented by plants that start exporting and those that are exiting, respectively.     

The Threat Effect of Active Labour Market Programmes*

In this paper, we estimate the threat effect of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) for a sample of unemployed men in Denmark. Threat effects of such programmes capture the impacts of a system of ALMPs prior to actual participation. Rational economic agents make search decisions based on the expected discounted value of unemployment, and the perceived risk of future participation in programmes may affect job‐search behaviour early in the unemployment spell. We find a strong and significant threat effect, which is shown to reduce average unemployment duration by two and a half weeks.     

不完全信息、反倾销威胁与最优出口贸易政策

通过扩展Brander和Spencer(1985)的基本模型,本文首先证明了,在反倾销威胁下,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策要求出口国政府给予低成本企业更高的出口补贴或更低的出口征税,在无效激励机制下必然导致出口企业隐匿自己的真实成本类型,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策失效。在此基础上,本文进一步论证了不完全信息和反倾销威胁下激励相容的最优出口贸易政策,该政策要求出口国政府依据进口国国内要求保护压力的大小,采用不同的出口征税和一次性转移支付政策组合,激励出口企业如实报告成本类型,并使国家整体福利最大化。     

The Cyclical Effects of Incremental Export Subsidies*

The Crawford Committee on structural adjustment in Australia recommended a subsidy to be paid on the excess of manufacturing export revenues over the average of some number of previous years. Schemes, of this nature have been used in New Zealand. Pakistan, Singapore and elsewhere, and may produce a regular cycle in exports and in domestic prices and quantities. A subsidy-induced cycle is unlikely to be avoided in most Australian manufacturing export industries, except under conditions of rapid inflation or productivity -growth. The cyclical pattern can be avoided, at some cost to the Treasury, by setting the subsidy base at some fraction of actual past performance.     

Export variety and economic growth in East European transition economies*

Utilizing panel data for 14 East European transition economies, we discuss the link between product variety and growth. The empirical work relies upon some direct measures of product variety calculated from 5‐digit OECD trade data. On balance, the results suggest that the growth patterns of the East European transition countries may be best represented by Ventura's (1997 ) model of outward orientation and integration with the world economy.     

Learning By Doing,Technology Choice,and Export Promotion*

This paper shows that when there is a high degree of learning by doing for a new superior technology (versus no learning by doing for the old inferior technology), there might be multiple equilibria in technology choice and export-market expansion. the inferior technology might be chosen when there is no coordination between the firms and the government. With coordination, Pareto improvement might be possible, with each firm choosing the superior technology and the government undertaking to expand the international market. This idea is demonstrated by a two-period (a learning period and a mature period) model with two firms that have symmetric demand and cost functions.     

The Effects of a Booming Export Industry on the Rest of the Economy*

It is argued that the roles of relative factor intensity and of the degree of factor mobility have been neglected in models of booming export industries. This paper shows that, contrary to popular beliefs. the mineral export boom may result in (a) an expansion of all industries, (b) an increase in the profitability of the traditional tradeables sector, and(c) a fall in the relative price of non-tradeables .     

国际反倾销规则中的贸易保护主义因素分析

差价销售本是一种正常的商业策略,国际反倾销规则中将所有的低价销售行为不区分性质地定义为“倾销”。反倾销规则在替代国价格制度、结构价格制度、累积评估制度、倾销与损害因果关系确定、倾销幅度测算方面存在明显的贸易保护主义倾向。这种制度的代价是损害了反倾销国家的整体利益。     

State-Federal Resource Tax Rivalry: The Queensland Railway and the Federal Export Tax*

This paper presents a stylized account and analysis of the implications of the intergovernmental tax rivalry which arises between the Queensland and Federal governments in their efforts to tax resource rents. In particular, coal is taxed explicitly through the Federal export levy and implicitly through the Queensland railways ‘excess rail freight’. A game-theoretic environment thus arises. It is shown that if each government sets its tax rate optimally in reaction to the other government's tax polity, then less revenue is generated at a higher deadweight cost. The optimal cooperative solution is compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium and the resulting welfare gains are identified.     

Vertically Related Markets: Export Rivalry Between DC and LDC Firms*

We present a model of export rivalry in vertically related markets where a DC firm produces a high-quality good as well as a key input utilized by an LDC firm to produce a low-quality export good. the DC firm acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting the price of the input and the quantity of its export good. We show that the DC firm's decision on vertical supply depends on the cost, demand, and quality parameters of both producers, and that the LDC government should tax either its final good exports or its key input imports.     

Some Effects of Reducing Excess in Infrastructure Charges on the Export Coal Industry*

Excess rail freight and port charges on the Australian export coal industry amount to over 10 per cent of export prices and represent a form of ad valorem tax. Efficiency and distributional effects of removing the excess charges are assessed using a quantitative commodity model and a qualitative general equilibrium assessment. Removal of the excess charge would increase production by 29 per cent by the year 2000, slightly reduce upon prices and generate national efficiency gains of over $150 million a year. The mining industry and the Federal government gain and the State governments lose     

The Voluntary (Private) Production of Public Goods,the Gains From Trade,and Comparative Advantage*

Any (finite) number of privately produced public goods are incorporated into a general trade-theory model of private goods and factors. Postulating Cournot-Nash behavior, a necessary condition for gainful trade is derived. Potential trade gains are related to the law of comparative advantage in private goods and the change in the underproduction of public goods. A sufficient condition is also proven. Trade gains/losses are compared for more or less populous economies. All the results have analogues in the literature on imperfect competition and/or increasing returns to scale.