Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare

In this paper, we explore welfare implications of a voluntary export restraint (VER) agreement within a simple model of duopoly with product differentiation and conjectural variations. We assume that the foreign exporter does not sell its product in its own market and that the imposition of a VER makes the domestic firm into a Stackelberg leader. Under these assumptions, it is shown that a VER introduced at the free-trade equilibrium level of export is welfare-improving for the importing country if and only if the foreign exporter is forced to comply with the restraint involuntarily . In other words, it is impossible to benefit home country and foreign country simultaneously by a VER agreement within the class of models we are envisaging. This result holds irrespective of whether firms compete in terms of quantities or prices.     

论反倾销威胁下的出口产业政策

反倾销措施是世界各国普遍采用的一种保护国内产业的合法手段.建立在劳动力密集型产业基础上的中国出口导向型经济,其出口企业所面临的反倾销威胁将是长期而普遍的.文章建立了两阶段Cournot竞争模型对反倾销威胁下出口企业利润最大化行为与出口产业结构以及反倾销参考价格之间的内在联系机理进行了理论分析,并论证了在反倾销威胁下,政府实施以整个出口产业利润最大化为目标、以间接控制出口企业数量为手段的出口产业政策的必要性和可行性.     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.     

Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis

We derive some sufficient conditions for the Suzumura-Ishikawa proposition on voluntary export restraints to hold when their model is extended to a general equilibrium framework. The sufficient conditions are concerned with the magnitude of income effects which play no role in the partial-equilibrium analysis of Suzumura and Ishikawa.     

不完全信息、反倾销威胁与最优出口贸易政策

通过扩展Brander和Spencer(1985)的基本模型,本文首先证明了,在反倾销威胁下,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策要求出口国政府给予低成本企业更高的出口补贴或更低的出口征税,在无效激励机制下必然导致出口企业隐匿自己的真实成本类型,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策失效。在此基础上,本文进一步论证了不完全信息和反倾销威胁下激励相容的最优出口贸易政策,该政策要求出口国政府依据进口国国内要求保护压力的大小,采用不同的出口征税和一次性转移支付政策组合,激励出口企业如实报告成本类型,并使国家整体福利最大化。     

Learning By Doing,Technology Choice,and Export Promotion*

This paper shows that when there is a high degree of learning by doing for a new superior technology (versus no learning by doing for the old inferior technology), there might be multiple equilibria in technology choice and export-market expansion. the inferior technology might be chosen when there is no coordination between the firms and the government. With coordination, Pareto improvement might be possible, with each firm choosing the superior technology and the government undertaking to expand the international market. This idea is demonstrated by a two-period (a learning period and a mature period) model with two firms that have symmetric demand and cost functions.     

The Effects of a Booming Export Industry on the Rest of the Economy*

It is argued that the roles of relative factor intensity and of the degree of factor mobility have been neglected in models of booming export industries. This paper shows that, contrary to popular beliefs. the mineral export boom may result in (a) an expansion of all industries, (b) an increase in the profitability of the traditional tradeables sector, and(c) a fall in the relative price of non-tradeables .     

国际反倾销规则中的贸易保护主义因素分析

差价销售本是一种正常的商业策略,国际反倾销规则中将所有的低价销售行为不区分性质地定义为“倾销”。反倾销规则在替代国价格制度、结构价格制度、累积评估制度、倾销与损害因果关系确定、倾销幅度测算方面存在明显的贸易保护主义倾向。这种制度的代价是损害了反倾销国家的整体利益。     

Vertically Related Markets: Export Rivalry Between DC and LDC Firms*

We present a model of export rivalry in vertically related markets where a DC firm produces a high-quality good as well as a key input utilized by an LDC firm to produce a low-quality export good. the DC firm acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting the price of the input and the quantity of its export good. We show that the DC firm's decision on vertical supply depends on the cost, demand, and quality parameters of both producers, and that the LDC government should tax either its final good exports or its key input imports.     

Some Effects of Reducing Excess in Infrastructure Charges on the Export Coal Industry*

Excess rail freight and port charges on the Australian export coal industry amount to over 10 per cent of export prices and represent a form of ad valorem tax. Efficiency and distributional effects of removing the excess charges are assessed using a quantitative commodity model and a qualitative general equilibrium assessment. Removal of the excess charge would increase production by 29 per cent by the year 2000, slightly reduce upon prices and generate national efficiency gains of over $150 million a year. The mining industry and the Federal government gain and the State governments lose     

The Voluntary (Private) Production of Public Goods,the Gains From Trade,and Comparative Advantage*

Any (finite) number of privately produced public goods are incorporated into a general trade-theory model of private goods and factors. Postulating Cournot-Nash behavior, a necessary condition for gainful trade is derived. Potential trade gains are related to the law of comparative advantage in private goods and the change in the underproduction of public goods. A sufficient condition is also proven. Trade gains/losses are compared for more or less populous economies. All the results have analogues in the literature on imperfect competition and/or increasing returns to scale.     

Asset Ownership and the Threat to Sell

In this paper the effects of selling assets are examined in a property rights model à la Grossmann, Hart and Moore. The possibility of selling an asset gives its owner a bargaining tool which can strengthen his bargaining power under certain circumstances. This offers a form of protection against opportunistic behavior in the hold-up problem, which has not yet been considered in the literature on property rights. With this model it is possible to give a rationale for unconditional joint ownership. Moreover, an explanation for privatization, outsourcing and the existence of passive outside owners can be derived within the model.     

论制度变迁的成本约束

制度变迁的关键是成本约束,这是制度本身产生的根本性要求。制度变迁是成本和收益相权衡和比较的产物,制度设计和安排必须充分考虑到制度变迁的成本和收益,减少制度变迁的阻力,提高制度运行的效率。     

Threat and morale effects in the theory of wages

This paper constructs a simple general equilibrium model in which ‘threat’ and ‘morale’ effects influence the determination of union and non-union wage rates. A widely taught and well-known conclusion of conventional theory, namely that a rise in the union wage will also raise non-union wages, is shown to be incorrect: the model predicts exactly the opposite. A new version of the morale effect is also suggested.     

Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

We investigate the effects of heterogeneity and incomplete information on aggregate contributions to a public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism. The non-linear laboratory environment has three-person groups as partners under varying conditions of information and communication. Bergstrom, Blum and Varian predict that increasing heterogeneity will have no effect on aggregate contributions in a no-communication environment. Ledyard conjectures a positive effect of incomplete information, a negative effect of heterogeneity, and a positive interaction of heterogeneity and incomplete information. We find that incomplete information has a small but significant negative effect. Heterogeneity has a positive effect on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with communication. In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions (endowment and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single dimension (endowment or preferences) has little effect. In the communication environment we find the reverse. We also find a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. Thus we reject the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian invariance result and provide mixed evidence on Ledyard's conjectures.     

进口技术外溢、出口相似度与我国出口商品结构优化

笔者研究发现,对发达国家总体而言,进口技术外溢通过进口渗透率来促进出口商品结构优化;而对于G7国家,从其进口产生的技术外溢本身就能促进我国出口商品结构优化,进口渗透率并不是必要的因素.国内研发投入的提高能促进我国出口商品结构的优化.     

Does the Commercialization of Voluntary Organizations ‘Crowd out’ Voluntary Work?

This article examines the relationship among voluntary labour supply and commercial income for Norwegian sport voluntary organizations. Empirical results using cross–sectional data on voluntary sport organizations in Norway and on their members show a decrease in voluntary work from an increase in commercial income. Voluntary work and commercial income appear as substitutable resources. Nevertheless, the results have to be differentiated according to the professional situation of the volunteers.
A crowding out effect between voluntary work and commercial resources is at play for non–professionally active individuals whereas professionally active individuals seem to be indifferent to the level of commercial resources in deciding whether to volunteer or not.     

强制性会计变更与自发性会计变更之相关性研究

研究结果表明，我国强制性会计变更与自发性会计变更具有相关性。在强制性会计变更为调减利润的年度，我国自发性会计变更部分抵消了强制性会计变更的影响；具有特殊目的的上市公司会逆当年强制性会计变更方向而进行能实现其特定目的的自发性会计变更。     

信用风险、出口信用保险和出口贸易关系的研究

文章基于厂商理论对信用风险、出口信用保险与最优出口量之间的关系进行理论分析,论证了信用风险对出口贸易的负面效应,以及政府支持的出口信用保险对外贸出口的推动效应;并通过对中国的出口规模和进口国国家信用之间的关系进行实证检验,验证了信用风险的负面贸易效应,阐明了对于信用评级下调的发达市场以及绝对信用评级较低、人均收入较低的新兴市场,中国不仅需要而且必须加强发挥出口信用保险的功能。