“绿水青山”建设时代退耕还湿问题博弈分析

以博弈论为分析工具,以信息的完备性为分断点,基于退耕还湿政策的有效性趋势,分别从委托-代理与讨价还价两种模型对"绿水青山"建设时代退耕还湿主体的策略选择进行讨论,并从无限重复博弈分析中归纳合作的可能性。研究表明:无论从何种机制进行探讨,农户和政府的合作是必然和有效的;从主体角度分析,推进退耕还湿能促进参与主体互利。因此,建议加大补偿弹性与优化惩罚机制并重、工作透明化与补偿多元化相结合、普及湿地潜在价值以让农户更注重长远利益,为退耕还湿推广和实施、湿地恢复和保护提供理论借鉴。     

OPERATIONAL ACCOUNTING FOR FARM MANAGEMENT

The accounting system of the Farm Management Service Laboratory of Western Australia is discussed. As a point of reference it uses the system approved by the National Workshop on Standardization of Terminology and Procedures in Farm Management Accounting in Australia. The Laboratory's system is expressly designed to provide a continuous flow of information to the farmer for his control, understanding and evaluation, planning and budgeting, and enhancing credit-worthiness.     

A COMMENT ON KLIEVE-MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME

Klieve and MacAulay (1993) (KM) analyse bargaining between the Australian and Japanese Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) industries using game theory. The KM model is a Nash equilibrium with symmetrical information, threat functions and a set of biological constraints. When we attempted to include the New Zealand SBT industry as a player in the KM model, we discovered important shortcomings in it. In this comment, we outline three major shortcomings in the KM model and propose an alternative model of a Nash equilibrium for the SBT industry.     

信息质量、交易成本与农户的销售价格——基于海南、云南466个橡胶种植户的调研数据

利用466个农户的调查数据,以农户行为理论为支撑,研究信息质量、交易成本、农户特征对农户所获得销售价格的影响。研究结果表明:信息质量、生产专业化程度的提高以及高水平的橡胶收入有助于农户获得更高的价格;议价能力、组织化程度与销售价格呈现负相关,销售产品形式、交易对象的选择会在一定程度上影响销售价格;交易环境的熟识度、交易距离的远近以及农户受教育程度对农户所能获得价格的高低没有显著的影响。因此,提出加强天然橡胶市场建设和产业信息技术服务、鼓励农户专业化经营等建议。     

退耕还林工程利益相关者行为动态博弈分析

首先运用利益相关者理论,确定了政府、林管部门和农户为退耕还林工程的主要利益相关者,进而运用动态博弈理论剖析了退耕还林工程期满后主要利益相关者的行为机理,最后通过博弈结果的分析与讨论,得出结论和相关启示。     

Living under value chains: The new distributive contract and arguments about unequal bargaining power

In the 1980s and 1990s, during the high-water mark of Washington Consensus development, rural sociologists and geographers critical of contract farming described contract as a legal fiction—one that imagines formally equal and voluntary relations between large firms and small farmers and hence that functions purposefully to obscure unequal social relations. Today, however, development planners, who argue for contract farming as an integral part of value chain agriculture, describe unequal bargaining power as a problem for rural development to solve. Our article analyzes how proponents have domesticated what was once a radical critique of contract farming—a phenomenon that we suggest tells of value chain development more broadly. Via a qualitative case study of India, we describe how a range of actors—development planners, state officials, and farmers—now all make arguments about unequal bargaining power and yet hold disparate understandings of what bargaining inequalities mean and what reforms should therefore follow. More specifically, we show how and why common reform proposals—for contract regulation and farmer aggregation—remain constrained by the inequalities they would challenge and thus why farmers themselves speak different possibilities to the problem of unequal bargaining power.     

Agricultural extension,trust, and learning: results from economic experiments in Ecuador

Using an artefactual economic experiment and a randomized training intervention in Ecuador we test if trust conditions a farmer’s decision to learn during an agricultural training. We present a simple model of farmer behavior during the agricultural training in order to link play in the laboratory to behavior in the field. We find evidence that farmers who trust agricultural technicians relatively more than community farmers in the trust game learn more during training. The results provide insight into the design of agricultural extension services in Ecuador.     

The economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement

This study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies. Policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention, an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement, and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions. Analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self‐interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient. The analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies, the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income, the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers, the socially optimal income redistribution, and the social welfare from intervention.     

基于Nash-Bargaining的区域内水权交易合作议价模型研究

针对江苏省水量水质双缺型水资源冲突问题,基于准市场交易模式,考虑水权交易决策主体各自议价能力,引用合作博弈理论方法,构建区域内跨行业水权交易Nash-Bargaining议价模型,并给出准市场条件下水权交易的最优价格。以江苏省工业、农业之间跨产业水权交易为例开展实例研究,分析交易水量、议价能力对水权交易价格的影响。研究成果表明:水权交易总量与水权交易单价呈现正向相关关系,但水权交易单价存在上限,价格天花板受政府部门调控影响;水权交易能够有效提升江苏省工农业主体的收益,同时交易水量与交易价格的升高均能够有效提升江苏省整体社会福利;在高交易水量情况下,水权交易购买方的议价能力对提升水权交易整体福利具有更强的作用。     

耕地保护中农户行为国内研究综述

研究目的:综述近年来国内有关耕地保护中的农户行为研究。研究方法:文献比较法。研究结果:从耕地与农户间的关系、影响农户耕地保护行为的因素、影响因素驱动下的农户行为结果和激励农户耕地保护行为的方式方法等方面进行归纳与分析。研究结论:正视农户行为对耕地保护十分重要。制定科学合理的耕地保护政策,必须认真对待追求自身利益最大化的农户及其行为。     

气候大会碳排放谈判的博弈分析

联合国气候变化大会是目前全球范围内最为重要的气候环境会议之一,其关注的重点是参与国的碳排放谈判和碳限制。基于博弈的思想,构建出一个气候大会碳排放谈判的博弈模型。并基于该模型,采用中国的相关数据来解释目前的谈判现状。结果发现,这一模型符合IPCC对发展中国家的要求。其次根据对比结果可知,中国目前在碳排放博弈中尚未完全掌握主导权。建议中国在全球碳排放谈判中要坚持以单位GDP碳排放作为减排指标,同时动态调整减排目标和路径。     

Managing logging compensation payment conflicts in Ghana: Understanding actor-empowerment and implications for policy intervention

Forest resources outside permanent forest reserves form a substantial part of the overall natural forest biodiversity resources in Ghana. However, timber exploitation in off-reserve areas has been problematic as loggers and farmers have often been involved in conflicts over payment of crop-damage compensation. The paper examines 81 cases of this conflict which were reconstructed chronologically to investigate patterns of actors’ use of power resources and strategies and their effectiveness. The study employed an actor-empowerment conceptualisation of power and used a two-actor game model for the reconstruction of the conflicts. While several strategies and resources were mobilised and employed by the actors, their effectiveness were context-bound. The paper makes a case for areas where actors’ conflict capabilities could be built, why mediated bargaining can be more effective for managing such local conflict constellations and the need to interlock actor interests for mutual interaction by institutionalising mediated bargaining.     

THE ANALYSIS OF NET FARM INCOME: AN EXAMINATION OF FARM MANAGEMENT SURVEY DATA

The practical significance of the conventional “net farm income” is elusive. It would be useful to have an accepted method of dividing “management and investment income” into its recognised Components—managerial salary and return on tenant's capital. One is a residual if the other can be calculated, and both alternatives are considered. An empirical formula is suggested for estimating the managerial salary which may be imputed to the farmer, taking account of his total turnover, his labour bill and his net farm income. This formula is then applied to Farm Management Survey data, for individual farms and for groups of average, high and low performance (output per £ input). The method may permit closer analysis of relative profitability.     

博弈结构视角下林农合作模式研究——以红豆杉专业合作组织为例

以红豆杉专业合作组织为例,对不同的林农合作模式进行了博弈结构分析,结合实证调查,研究了不同合作模式的优缺点和适用场合并提出了建议。结果表明:完全依靠普通林农很难自发形成合作,相关政策应从促使村干部或能人带动大家合作的角度进行设计;当市场因素成为主要障碍时,公司介入并形成"公司+农户"模式比较有效;针对公司和林农地位不平等的情况,可发展"公司+合作组织+农户"的合作模式;在特定环境下,特别是存在多家公司恶性竞争时,协会能发挥协调作用。     

农民发展权综合评价指数模型的构建及实证分析

[目的]中国农民发展权是农民拥有的公平参与促进经济、社会、文化和政治发展过程并公平分享发展成果的基本人权。但由于涉及权利,概念抽象,学者和公众关注度不高,因此,对农民发展权进行分解,并进行指标数据量化并计算结果,是一个不错的、方便民众了解该权利,并对该权利实现结果有一个整体判断的途径。[方法]运用层次分析法构建农民发展权综合评价指数模型,具体有3个步骤:第一,解析农民发展权内容、构造农民发展权指标体系。第二,借助层次分析软件中的群决策工具完成农民发展权各个中间层指标的赋权。第三,运用该模型,对中国农民发展权进行测度。[结果]从指标值和发展权计算结果看,近10年农民相对市民的发展权不足一半,且并未有所改善。单看农民发展结果类指标数值城乡差距有增大趋势。从农民发展权构成看,政治发展权是短板。[结论]近10年农民发展权处于弱势且未得到保障。政治发展权的短板是农民发展权未得到保障的根源。给予农民更多话语权,财政资金的投入向农民更多倾斜,只有这样才可能降低现有的农民和市民发展结果的差异。     

Trade liberalization in the bio‐economy: coping with a new landscape

Multilateral trade liberalization has made little progress over the last period, but preferential agreements have multiplied. Recent economic literature helps understand the current negotiation game. New economic and political conditions, in particular the gaining influence of emerging countries, make a multilateral agreement more difficult. Developed countries have given up many of their bargaining chips in previous rounds of negotiation and their remaining agricultural tariffs are not sufficient for extracting the concessions from emerging countries on services, procurement, and intellectual property that would make an agreement possible. The risk of a more fragmented world calls for a revised negotiation agenda and a change in the status of developing countries. Research issues are outlined in order to help revitalize the Doha negotiation agenda.     

Agriculture–nutrition linkages in farmers’ communication networks

To date, little is known about how information flows within farmer groups and how extension interventions could be designed to deliver combined information on agriculture and nutrition. This study uses unique network data from 815 farm households in Kenya to investigate the structure and characteristics of agricultural and nutrition information networks within farmer groups. Dyadic regressions are used to analyze the factors influencing link formation for the exchange of agricultural and nutrition information. In addition, we apply fixed‐effects models to identify the characteristics of central persons driving information exchange in the two networks, as well as potentially isolated persons, who are excluded from information networks within their farmer groups. Our results show that nutrition information is exchanged within farmer groups, although to a limited extent, and mostly flows through the existing agricultural information links. Thus, diffusing nutrition information through agricultural extension systems may be a viable approach. Our findings further suggest that group leaders and persons living in central locations are important drivers in the diffusion of information in both networks and may thus serve as suitable entry points for nutrition‐sensitive extension programs. However, we also identify important heterogeneities in network characteristics. In particular, nutrition information is less often exchanged between men and women, and some group members are completely isolated from nutrition information exchange within their farmer groups. We derive recommendations on taking these differences in network structure and characteristics into account when designing nutrition‐sensitive extension programs.     

Information sharing as a safeguard against the opportunistic behavior of South African Karoo Lamb farmers

Misconduct in global meat supply chains are omnipresent and even more so in differentiated chains where credence attributes such as origin and taste are used to differentiate the product. By definition, these attributes signal asymmetric information which implies that in the presence of bounded rational individuals with conflicting interests, misconduct in the form of opportunistic behavior is bound to prevail. Increased information exchange through farmer networks is, however, expected to reduce opportunistic behavior. In the case of a differentiated meat product, such as Karoo Lamb, the article studies the farmer‐abattoir transaction with the purpose of recommending strategies that can be implemented to reduce the farmer's tendency to behave opportunistically. The article employs the PLS approach to SEM and reveals a significant negative relationship between information shared and opportunistic behavior. The results indicate significant positive relationships between trust in the abattoir and information shared as well as between farmer networks and information shared. These results are indicative of the support provided to the information shared construct by higher levels of trust between farmers and abattoirs and established farmer networks. It is, therefore, recommended that differentiated meat supply chains, through their various associations, concentrate their efforts to promote information sharing by building stronger, trust centered relationships and by supporting farmer networks.     

SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation?

In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power.     

当前我国农民创业者投资行为分析

本文从进入投资、投资数量、投资方向、再投资、投资合作等方面分析农民创业者创业投资行为的规律性,并为农民创业者营造良好的投资创业环境的制度安排提出一些建议。农民创业者是否进入投资是创业机会、项目收益、环境创业动力、创业者心理习惯与外在示范效应等因素综合作用的结果;总体上,农民创业者初次投资的数量等于他储蓄的数量;农民创业者选择投资方向包括模仿他人、外部引导、自主选择、感性投资等途径;农民创业者再投资过程是一个经验不断固化的过程,是一个不断寻求经营博弈合作的过程,是农民创业者不断成长的过程;农民创业者投资合作决策大致经历创业初期的合伙投资倾向、再次尝试创业投资阶段的单独投资倾向和投资成熟阶段的重新合伙投资倾向三个阶段;应从优化创业经营环境、提高农民创业者自身素质方面促进农民创业者成长。