Strategic Bankruptcies and Price Reactions to Bankruptcy Filings

This study investigates whether the stock market differentiates between firms that file bankruptcy petitions for strategic reasons and firms that file bankruptcy petitions for financial reasons. We perform both univariate and regression tests on a sample of 245 firms that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between 1981 and 1996. After controlling for bankruptcy outcome, probability of bankruptcy, firm financial condition, and firm size, we find that, in the period around bankruptcy filing, firms that file bankruptcy petitions for financial reasons have significantly larger stock price declines than firms that file bankruptcy petitions for strategic reasons.     

Credit Contagion Channels: Market Microstructure Evidence from Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy

Immediately after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, many firms disclosed their financial exposure (or lack thereof) to Lehman. This offers a clean setting to test two credit contagion channels through which a financial firm's bankruptcy can affect other firms—“counterparty risk” and “information transmission” channels. Using market microstructure variables to measure the various dimensions of contagion effects, we provide robust evidence supporting the significance of counterparty risk. Firms with exposure to Lehman suffered more severe negative effects—wider bid‐ask spread, higher price impact, greater information asymmetry, and greater selling pressure—than unexposed firms. We find mixed evidence regarding the information transmission hypothesis.     

Bankruptcy Prediction with Industry Effects

This paper investigates the forecasting accuracy of bankruptcy hazard rate models for U.S. companies over the time period 1962–1999 using both yearly and monthly observation intervals. The contribution of this paper is multiple-fold. One, using an expanded bankruptcy database we validate the superior forecasting performance of Shumway's (2001) model as opposed to Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984). Two, we demonstrate the importance of including industry effects in hazard rate estimation. Industry groupings are shown to significantly affect both the intercept and slope coefficients in the forecasting equations. Three, we extend the hazard rate model to apply to financial firms and monthly observation intervals. Due to data limitations, most of the existing literature employs only yearly observations. We show that bankruptcy prediction is markedly improved using monthly observation intervals. Fourth, consistent with the notion of market efficiency with respect to publicly available information, we demonstrate that accounting variables add little predictive power when market variables are already included in the bankruptcy model.     

Predicting Bankruptcy Resolution

This study examines classification and prediction of the bankruptcy resolution event. Filing of bankruptcy is resolved through one of three alternative resolutions: acquisition, emergence or liquidation. Predicting the final bankruptcy resolution has not been examined in the prior accounting and finance literature. This post-bankruptcy classification and prediction of the final resolution is harder than discriminating between healthy and bankrupt firms because all filing firms are already in financial distress. Motivation for predicting the final resolution is developed and enhanced. A sample of 237 firms filing for bankruptcy is used. Classification and prediction accuracies are determined using a logit model. A ten-variable, three-group resolution logit model, which includes five accounting and five non-accounting variables is developed. The model correctly classifies 62 percent of the firms, significantly better than a random classification. We conclude that non-accounting data add relevant information to financial accounting data for predicting post bankruptcy resolution. Further, public policy implications for investors, researchers, bankruptcy judges, claimants and other stakeholders are discussed.     

Bankruptcy probability changes and the differential informativeness of bond upgrades and downgrades

Prior studies have found that stock returns around announcements of bond upgrades are insignificant, but that stock prices respond negatively to announcements of bond downgrades. This asymmetric stock market reaction suggests either that bond downgrades are timelier than upgrades, or that voluntary disclosures by managers preempt upgrades but not downgrades. This study investigates these conjectures by examining changes in firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy (assessed using bankruptcy prediction models) and voluntary disclosure activity around rating change announcements. The results indicate that the assessed probability of bankruptcy decreases before bond upgrades, but not after. By contrast, the assessed probability of bankruptcy increases both before and after bond downgrades. We also find that controlling for potential wealth-transfer related rating actions, which can impact stock returns differently, does not alter our results. Tests of press releases and earnings forecasts issued by firms suggest that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by differences in pre-rating change voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. The results support the hypothesis that downgrades are timelier than upgrades.     

A Monitoring Role for Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Resolution

Firms that have successfully reorganized under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws of the United States frequently award shares of common stock in the reorganized firm to pre‐bankruptcy shareholders, even though pre‐bankruptcy creditors' claims are not fully satisfied. Using a sample of large publicly traded firms, these deviations from absolute priority (DAPR) are found to be positively related to the severity of agency costs within a financially distressed firm. US bankruptcy laws may exacerbate these agency costs by granting exclusivity to management during the reorganization period. Firms in which outside shareholders are more concentrated have a lower occurrence of DAPR indicating that blockholders provide an effective monitoring mechanism for controlling managerial behavior during reorganization. On the other hand, firms without this monitoring mechanism have a higher probability of DAPR indicating that creditors attempt to control managerial behavior by providing them with some sort of financial compensation via their equity holding in the firm. Finally, the evidence indicates that DAPR can be used to mitigate the hold‐up problem resulting from voting rights granted to both junior and senior claimants of the firm by US bankruptcy laws.     

The Limitations of Bankruptcy Prediction Models: Some Cautions for the Researcher

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate potential problems associated with the use of bankruptcy prediction models in current research. The tests in this study demonstrate the problems that may arise when bankruptcy prediction models are inappropriately applied. This analysis evaluated the Zmijewski (1984) and Ohlson (1980) models using time periods, industries, and financial distress situations other than those used to originally develop the models. The findings indicated that both models were sensitive to time periods. That is, the accuracy of the models declined when applied to time periods different from those used to develop the models. The findings also suggest that the accuracy of each model continues to decline moving from the 1988–1991 to the 1992–1999 sample period. Additionally, Ohlson's (Zmijewski's) model was (was not) sensitive to industry classifications. The findings of this study also suggest that the Ohlson and Zmijewski models are not sensitive to financial distress situations other than those used to develop the models. Thus, the models appear to be more generally useful for predicting financial distress, not just bankruptcy.In sum, the results of this study suggest that researchers should use bankruptcy prediction models cautiously. Applying the models to time periods and industries other than those used to develop the models may result in a significant decline in the models' accuracies. Additionally, some bankruptcy prediction models may be more appropriate for evaluating various forms of financial distress as opposed to just bankruptcy. To avoid erroneous applications of bankruptcy prediction models in the future, it is necessary for researchers not only to understand the uses of prediction models, but also to understand the limitations of the models.     

Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is It Good News or Bad News for Industry Competitors?

A firm under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection may emerge from bankruptcy in a more advantageous competitive position within its industry to the detriment of their industry rivals. Using a sample of 264 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the period 1999-2006, I find that its industry competitors demonstrate negative postemergence long-term equity returns and deteriorating financial performance. Additional tests indicate that this outcome is less likely due to overall industry distress. Competitors tend to be more adversely affected if they are in more concentrated industries, if they have lower credit quality, when a more efficient firm emerges, and when the duration of bankruptcy is longer. This study suggests a need to reconsider Chapter 11's role in promoting competition and allocation of resources given its negative externalities on industry competitors.     

The Enron Bankruptcy: When did the options market in Enron lose it’s smirk?

The Enron Corporation went from a $65 billion dollar market capitalization to bankruptcy in just 16 months. Using statistical techniques for extracting the implied probability distributions built into option prices, I examine the market’s expectation of Enron’s risk of collapse. I find that the options market remained far too optimistic about the stock until just weeks before their bankruptcy filing. I thank Oded Palmon and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. JEL Classification G13 · G14     

A comparison of alternative bankruptcy prediction models

Early models of bankruptcy prediction employed financial ratios drawn from pre-bankruptcy financial statements and performed well both in-sample and out-of-sample. Since then there has been an ongoing effort in the literature to develop models with even greater predictive performance. A significant innovation in the literature was the introduction into bankruptcy prediction models of capital market data such as excess stock returns and stock return volatility, along with the application of the Black–Scholes–Merton option-pricing model. In this note, we test five key bankruptcy models from the literature using an up-to-date data set and find that they each contain unique information regarding the probability of bankruptcy but that their performance varies over time. We build a new model comprising key variables from each of the five models and add a new variable that proxies for the degree of diversification within the firm. The degree of diversification is shown to be negatively associated with the risk of bankruptcy. This more general model outperforms the existing models in a variety of in-sample and out-of-sample tests.     

基于法律视角的欧盟金融机构破产机制研究

为了应对金融危机,欧盟出台了一系列金融救市措施,而这些措施却给欧洲经济发展带来长期的风险,传统的金融机构大而不倒的理念正在更新,制定金融业的破产机制就成为完善市场的必然选择。本文详细阐述了欧盟金融机构破产机制产生的背景及主要内容,并针对我国现状提出改进破产评判标准、完善破产相关法律等建议。     

Phoenix rising: Legal reforms and changes in valuations in Finland during the economic crisis

Finland experienced an extremely severe economic depression in the early 1990s. As a part of the government's crisis management policies, significant new legislation was passed that increased supervisory powers of financial market regulators and reformed bankruptcy procedures significantly decreasing the protection of creditors. We show that the introduction of these new laws resulted in positive abnormal stock returns. The new laws also lead to increases in firms’ Tobin's q, especially for more levered firms. In contrast to previous studies, our results also suggest that public supervision of financial markets fosters rather than hampers financial market development.     

On the Efficiency of Bankruptcy Law: Empirical Evidence in Spain

The current economic crisis is showing one of the main problems that many companies in financial distress have to face, namely, the impact of bankruptcy law in relation to companies and firms. This paper aims to analyze the bankruptcy law ex‐ante efficiency when companies are in financial distress. To test it out, two research questions are submitted: (i) Is solvency, the criterion used in the Spanish law, the best one to assess the relative significance of the main indicators, which determine bankrupt firms? (ii) Is the Spanish bankruptcy law efficient according to solvency or are there better criteria? To answer them, a logistic regression model is conducted. The sample embraces 1,387 firms in Spain, the data being obtained from 12 Commercial Justice Courts complemented with financial information. The main conclusion is that the solvency criterion is adequate to classify bankrupt companies although currently Spanish Bankruptcy law is not as efficient as it could be. Additionally, the relevant companies' indicators, which explain the financial distress procedure, are presented. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Industry Structure and Ripple Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements

The market structure of an industry plays an important role in determining the stock market performance of surviving firms during intra-industry bankruptcy announcements. On evaluating the announcement effects of a survivor sample from each of two industries with very different market structures, namely the airline industry and the railroad industry, we find that the airline sample received significant abnormal returns (positive ripple) while the railroad sample experienced significant abnormal losses (negative ripple). Furthermore, the differences of the abnormal returns from the two samples also are statistically significant. These findings demonstrate support for the market structure hypothesis (MSH), but cast doubt on the contagion effect hypothesis (CEH).     

The Economic Impact of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy versus Out‐of‐Court Restructuring

Companies in financial distress have usually been able to choose between working out an agreement with their creditors (“private restructuring”) or entering into more expensive and lengthier formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. But 2015 rulings in two cases by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York may force distressed firms to enter Chapter 11 rather than seek negotiated out‐of‐court settlements. Using a large sample of U.S. companies that experienced financial difficulty during the period 2006–2014, the authors found that the companies that filed for bankruptcy and went through Chapter 11 proceedings experienced significantly more job losses and reductions of economic output than companies achieving out‐of‐court restructurings, both overall and on a per‐case basis. The authors' estimates of the overall losses in output associated with Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases ranged as high as 2.3% of 2014 GDP, as compared to at most 0.3% of GDP in the case of out‐of‐court negotiations. At the same time, the authors estimate that as many as 2.2 million job losses were attributable to cases involving bankruptcies while the out‐of‐court cases were associated with the loss of at most about 300,000 jobs. But, as the authors concede, these findings are exaggerated by a clear self‐selection bias—one that stems from the well‐documented tendency of more fundamentally profitable, and hence more solvent, companies to choose private restructuring over bankruptcy. Despite this limitation, the study provides a useful point of departure for future studies that aim to quantify the costs to the U.S. economy of limiting or removing the option of companies with valuable operations but the “wrong” capital structures to work out their financial difficulties outside of the bankruptcy court.     

Bankruptcy,absolute priority,and the pricing of risky debt claims

In practice, there are substantial deviations from the doctrine of ‘absolute priority’, which governs the rights of the firm's claimholders in the event of bankruptcy. To determine whether or not the possibility of such deviations is reflected in the prices of the firm's securities, this study examines the risk and return characteristics of financial claims against firms in court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings. Debt claims against bankrupt firms are indeed ‘risky’, exhibiting levels of systematic risk similar to that of common stocks in general. While some of the findings are anomalous, the data are generally consistent with the view that the capital market ‘properly’ prices risky debt claims to reflect both their risk characteristics and the possibility of departures from the doctrine of absolute priority.     

区块链时代破产法的机遇与挑战

区块链与破产法在维系市场主体信用方面相得益彰,区块链能够提升破产程序运转效率,实现破产程序信息披露透明,维护破产结果的公平公正。区块链资产的价值具有较大波动性,判定破产界限存在反复。区块链资产包括数据资产和数据信息两部分,识别破产财产需要区分对待。数字货币承载着价值资产和货币流通的双重角色,破产财产的定性应当审慎选择。     

Bankruptcy and Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Korea and the United States

Using a simple z-score bankruptcy model, this article explores the relationship between bankruptcy threshold and institutions. The z-score threshold for bankruptcy is found to be higher in countries with stronger institutions. To test this claim, a cross-section data set of 86 Korean firms and 60 US firms from 1991 to 2001, extracted from a panel data set, is used. The empirical finding that the z-score bankruptcy threshold in the United States (which has better quality of institutions than does Korea) is higher than that in Korea is consistent with the prediction of the model. Additionally, having examined bankruptcy laws of the two countries, it is found that filing a petition for bankruptcy is easier and debtors rights are better protected in the United States than in Korea, which suggests that the bankruptcy laws of Korea and the United States may be partially responsible for the difference in the z-score threshold for bankruptcy.     

Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Using a sample of seventy-two firms that adopted fresh start reporting upon their emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, I test whether management estimates of fresh start equity values are misstated and whether such misstatements are related to characteristics of individual firms' bankruptcy process. I predict that the reported fresh start value reflects a tension between managerial incentives to promote the acceptance of the plan of reorganization, and incentives to enhance future reported performance. I test whether the tendency to overstate the fresh start equity value is increasing in factors affecting the acceptance of the reorganization plan (i.e., bankruptcy claimants' relative bargaining power) and decreasing in factors affecting postbankruptcy reported performance (i.e., the probability of future losses). I find that, relative to the market value of equity immediately after emergence from Chapter 11, the fresh start equity value is, on average, understated by about 4%. The difference between the fresh start equity value and market value also exhibits significant cross-sectional variation (an average absolute error of 11%). Consistent with my first prediction, the misstatement is increasing in the relative bargaining power of junior claimants. In contrast to my second prediction, the misstatement is also increasing in the likelihood of future reported losses. This result suggests that firms that are more likely to experience postbankruptcy financial distress are more concerned with obtaining acceptance for their plan than with the effects of the fresh start equity value on postbankruptcy performance. Finally, I document that the misstatement in the fresh start equity value is negatively related to whether firms have undergone prepackaged bankruptcies, and positively related to replacement of a prebankruptcy CEO.     

Corporate Bankruptcy and Managers' Self-Serving Behavior

We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.