A simple model of vertical search engines foreclosure

By means of a simple model with consumers' search, the paper analyzes a monopolistic general search engine incentives to bias organic and sponsored search results in order to favor an integrated website. In the model, manipulation takes place whenever the general search engine places prominently its own vertical search engine instead of the most relevant for consumers. The main finding is that the incentives to manipulate search results are stronger in the organic search case. In the sponsored search case the general search platform internalizes the impact of manipulation on profits, since the less a prominent vertical search engine is relevant to consumers, the lower is the price-per-click that the general search engine can charge.     

Search and price dispersion in online grocery markets

Consumers often purchase multiple products at a time from retailers, creating multi-product incentives for search. In this paper we consider how product variety affects consumer search intensity and the dispersion of prices in multi-product retail markets. We employ online grocery pricing data from four large retailers in the UK to estimate search costs and equilibrium price dispersion for food products under circumstances where: (i) consumers search for single products; and (ii) consumers search for multiple products at once. We compare estimates in each case between a model in which utility increases with product variety and a model in which utility is not a function of variety. Relative to our preferred specification with variety effects in utility, we find estimates of both search cost and search frequency to be biased upwards in single product settings when variety effects are ignored; however, we find estimates of search costs are biased upwards while search frequency is biased downwards in multi-product settings when variety effects in utility are ignored.     

Vertical contracts in search markets

This paper studies a simple model to underline the importance of consumer search for understanding wholesale contracts between manufacturers and retailers. The model has one manufacturer and two retailers who compete in a homogeneous goods market where the wholesale contract is unobserved by consumers. If the manufacturer is in the position to offer two-part tariffs, the model without search either does not have an equilibrium wholesale contract (if retailers hold passive beliefs) due to the well-known opportunism problem or it is characterized by the absence of a fixed fee (when retailers hold symmetric beliefs). With consumer search, an equilibrium wholesale contract always exists (even if retailers hold passive beliefs) overcoming the opportunism problem and is always characterized by some fixed fee. If the manufacturer offers linear wholesale contracts, the differences between the models with and without consumer search are less pronounced, but remain even if the search cost vanishes. Thus, the vertical contracting literature cannot simply ignore search costs by saying that they are probably small and can therefore be neglected.     

Estimation of Search Frictions in the British Electricity Market

This paper studies consumer search and pricing behavior in the British domestic electricity market following its opening to competition in 1999. We develop a sequential search model in which an incumbent and an entrant group compete for consumers who find it costly to obtain information on prices other than from their current supplier. We use a large data set on prices and input costs to structurally estimate the model. Our estimates indicate that consumer search costs must be relatively high in order to rationalize observed pricing patterns. We confront our estimates with observed switching behavior and find they match well.     

Ordered search in differentiated markets

This paper presents an ordered search model in which consumers search both for price and product fitness. I construct an equilibrium in which there is price dispersion and prices rise in the order of search. The top firms in consumer search process, though charge lower prices, earn higher profits due to their larger market shares. Compared to random search, ordered search can induce all firms to charge higher prices and harm market efficiency.     

Search algorithm,repetitive information,and sales on online platforms

A prominent feature of online sales is that buyers rely on the search tools offered by platforms to process information when searching for products. We develop a model that captures how the search algorithm affects buyers’ search processes, which further influences market equilibrium and welfare. If a platform adopts a highly unequal search algorithm, buyers are likely to obtain repetitive information about a small group of sellers, which causes buyers to consider fewer options and suppresses competition. By using data from food delivery platforms, we provide empirical evidence that markets with less equal distributions of store rankings in search results have higher average prices and more concentrated sales. We suggest that regulators should restrict search algorithms from showing repetitive information.     

A Price Dispersion Equilibrium in a Spatially Differentiated Housing Market with Search Costs

An equilibrium model of search in a spatially differentiated rental housing market is formulated that predicts both rent dispersion and equilibrium vacancies. The equilibrium rent distribution is determined on the landlord's (rental supply) side given tenants' search strategies. Then tenants' optimal search strategy, denned by the share of the market a tenant searches, is determined given the costs and benefits of search and the distribution of landlords' rents. The equations of supply and demand for rental units are then combined to derive a costly information, free-entry Nash equilibrium in the market rents. Finally, the sensitivity of equilibrium vacancies and rents to changes in search costs and other exogenous parameters is explored.     

Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets*

This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.     

Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search Versus Auction

We propose a model of mechanism choice in the disposition of real estate assets where we consider two alternatives: a search market and an auction. Within the search framework, we derive an equilibrium whereby buyers incur search costs and sellers incur holding costs for the period during which the property is not sold. In the auction alternative, the seller joins an existing pool of sellers in undertaking a multiple–object auction and pays a commission upon sale. Buyers and sellers freely choose their mechanisms, which in equilibrium are optimal given each group's conjectures about the mechanism choice of their counterpart. In equilibrium, an agent cannot benefit from deviating from his choice and each agent's beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome. It is shown that (a) buyers with high search costs will choose auctions because the auction payoff imposes an upper bound on buyers' gains from search, and (b) prices at auctions will be higher. Using vacant lot sales data and a method–of–moment estimator which accounts for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, we estimated a hedonic regression to detect the price effect. It was determined that, on average, lots sold for $1.44 per square foot more in auctions than in the search market, as predicted by our model.     

Organizational learning in high-technology purchase situations: The antecedents and consequences of the participation of external IT consultants

Typically, research on organizational learning has been conceptual in nature. In a departure from this tradition, we develop and test a structural model of organizational learning in the context of the purchasing of an expensive and complex product in the information technology (IT) area. The key focus of our research is the participation of external IT consultants and our model links seven explanatory constructs that are consistent with the process school of thought in organizational learning. More specifically, two organizational variables-formalization, strategic importance-and two individual-level variables-stakeholding, prior experience-are viewed as antecedents of consultant participation. In contrast, we view internal search effort, external search effort, and organizational learning as consequences of consultant participation. As predicted, all four antecedent variables affected consultant participation. Moreover, we found that, while consultant participation had a positive impact on internal search effort and organizational learning, its impact on external information search effort was negative.     

Information search in complex industrial buying: Empirical evidence from Brazil

This study develops and tests a model of information search in complex buying. We incorporate three categories of influences of organizational, personal and situational factors that affect information searching efforts. A sample of 96 of the largest Brazilian firms reported their use of the various influences in the decision to purchase integrated business management systems. Findings show that formalization of the organization is a key driver of information search efforts. Situational characteristics of importance, novelty and bargaining power increased the level of information search. Also, conformity of the purchasing agent and organizational centralization reduce information search efforts among the sampled Brazilian firms.     

Nonsequential search equilibrium with search cost heterogeneity

We generalize the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) to the case where an arbitrary finite number of firms sells a homogeneous good to buyers who have heterogeneous search costs. We show that a price dispersed symmetric Nash equilibrium always exists. Numerical results show that the behavior of prices and consumer surplus with respect to the number of firms hinges upon the nature of search cost dispersion: when search costs are relatively concentrated, entry of firms leads to lower average prices and greater consumer surplus; however, for relatively dispersed search costs, the mean price goes up and consumer surplus may decrease with the number of firms.     

When Does Search Openness Really Matter? A Contingency Study of Health‐Care Innovation Projects

Given the growing popularity of the open innovation model, it is increasingly common to source knowledge for new product ideas from a wide range of actors located outside of organizational boundaries. Such open search strategies, however, might not always be superior to their closed counterparts. Indeed, widening the scope of knowledge sourcing at the ideation stage typically comes at a price given the substantial monetary and nonmonetary costs often incurred in the process of identifying, assimilating, and utilizing external knowledge inputs. Considering both the benefits and costs of search openness, the authors develop a project‐level contingency model of open innovation. This model suggests that search openness is curvilinearly (taking an inverted U‐shape) related to new product creativity and success. They hence assume that too little as well as too much search openness at the ideation stage will be detrimental to new product outcomes. Moreover, they argue that the effectiveness of open search strategies is contingent upon the new product development (NPD) project type (typological contingency), the NPD project leader (managerial contingency), and the NPD project environment (contextual contingency). To test these propositions empirically, multi‐informant data from 62 NPD projects initiated in the English National Health Service (NHS) were collected. The econometric analyses conducted provide considerable support for a curvilinear relationship between search openness and NPD outcomes as well as for the hypothesized contingency effects. More specifically, they reveal that explorative NPD projects have more to gain from search openness at the ideation stage than their exploitative counterparts. Moreover, the project‐level payoff from search openness tends to be greater, when the project leader has substantial prior innovation and management experience, and when the immediate work environment actively supports creative endeavors. These findings are valuable for NPD practice, as they demonstrate that effective knowledge sourcing has much to contribute to NPD success. In particular, pursuing an open search strategy might not always be the best choice. Rather, each NPD project is in need of a carefully tailored search strategy, effective leadership, and a supportive climate, if the full value of external knowledge sourcing is to be captured.     

How constraints and knowledge impact open innovation

Laursen and Salter (2006) examined the impact of a firm's search strategy for external knowledge on innovative performance. Based on organizational learning and open innovation literature, we extend the model hypothesizing that the search strategy itself is impacted by firm context. That is, both ‘constraints on the application of firm resources’ and the ‘abundance of external knowledge’ have a direct impact on innovative performance and a firm's search strategy in terms of breadth and depth. Based on a survey of Swiss‐based firms, we find that constraints decrease and external knowledge increases innovative performance. Although constraints lead to a broader but shallower search, external knowledge is associated with the breadth and the depth of the search in a U‐shaped relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Seller curation in platforms

This article explores why market platforms do not expel low-quality sellers when screening costs are minimal. I model a platform market with consumer search. The presence of low-quality sellers reduces search intensity, softening competition between sellers and increasing the equilibrium market price. The platform admits some low-quality sellers if competition between sellers is intense. Recommending a high-quality seller and this form of search obfuscation are complementary strategies. The low-quality sellers enable the recommended seller to attract many consumers at a high price and the effect of the recommendation is strengthened as low-quality sellers become more adept at imitating high-quality sellers.     

Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*

Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.     

Costs and Pricing of Home Brokerage Services

This paper explores a simple economic search model, and various brokerage cost assumptions, to derive brokerage pricing implications for three dimensions of the home transaction: (1) level of home price, (2) new relative to existing home sales, and (3) co-op relative to non-co-op sales. The model incorporates time-on-market (the price-time tradeoff) as an important element in home brokerage (search)
It is argued that relative search cost differences imply that commission rates will be lower (1) on sales of higher-priced homes, (2) on sales of new relative to existing homes and (3) on non-co-op relative to co-op sales. A main contribution of the paper is the presentation of considerable supporting evidence showing variation in actual home brokerage commission rates according to these three variables.     

POSTING MULTIPLE PRICES TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER PRICE SEARCH*

In a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search, some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier: either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes. This leads to added monopoly power for these firms, and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher. There is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers, both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour. However consumers might search more or less with multiple prices. The implications for the price‐setting equilibrium, competition policy and recent judgements are considered.     

Optimal Pricing Strategy in the Case of Price Dispersion: New Evidence from the Tokyo Housing Market

We adopt a multistage search model, in which the home seller's reservation price is determined by her or his opportunity cost, search cost, discount rate and additional market parameters. The model indicates that a greater dispersion in offer prices leads to higher reservation and optimal asking prices. A unique dataset from the Tokyo condominium resale market enables us to test those modeled hypotheses. Empirical results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the standard deviation of submarket transaction prices results in a two‐tenths of a percent increase in the initial asking price and in the final transaction price. Increases in the dispersion of market prices enhance the probabilities of a successful transaction and/or an accelerated sale.