The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings

Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run-up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms, but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.     

投资者情绪指数的经验模态分解：基于增发窗口期的实证研究

投资者情绪是资产定价的重要影响因素。针对以往研究不能较好分离投资者情绪不同成分的局限,引入经验模态分解方法,以实现对投资者情绪的分解。以2013年实施增发的上市公司为样本的实证研究结果表明,经验模态分解方法能够有效地分离出投资者情绪的高频和低频部分。其中,低频部分反映了投资者对股市的长期预期,而高频部分反映了窗口期投资者对增发的情绪变化。同时,增发前投资者会对增发事件产生过度反应,而在增发事件完成之后,投资者的过度反应情绪会逐渐调整,并且该调整过程具有非线性特征。     

董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本与上市公司再融资能力

基于公司治理角度,使用2002~2012年沪深引进董事高管责任保险的上市公司为样本,考察了董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本和上市公司再融资能力三者之间的相互关系。研究表明：董事高管责任保险与上市公司的再融资能力负相关,与权益资本成本呈显著正相关关系;权益资本成本在董事高管责任保险和上市公司再融资能力影响机制中发挥中介作用。具体地,投资者因规避责任保险机制庇护下公司高管自利行为可招致的风险,导致上市公司权益资本成本增加,从而降低了公司再融资能力。     

The Timing and Subsequent Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

Companies that have listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange by means of a public offering between 1980 and 1991 have subsequently performed poorly. This long run post issue performance is remarkably consistent with the South African evidence for seasoned rights issuing companies and the international evidence for both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Over the four years post issue, the newly listed companies earned an average return of 18.0% as opposed to 81.5% for a size-matched sample of seasoned companies. This study adds to the increasing body of international evidence suggesting the IPO under performance 'puzzle' referred to by Ibbotson (1975), Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) is not simply sample or country specific.     

Public vs. Private Equity*

Many corporate executives view private equity as a last resort, as expensive capital that should be tapped only by companies that don't have access to presumably cheaper public equity. The reality of private equity, however, is more complex, and potentially quite rewarding, for both shareholders and management. This paper surveys some of the academic work on the costs and benefits of public vs. private equity, contrasting the private equity investment process with its public counterpart and exploring how such a process may add value. The importance of public equity, particularly for very large companies and growth companies with large capital requirements, is indisputable. But as investment bankers and other practitioners have noted, under certain circumstances the public markets effectively become “closed” to some public companies. Moreover, the cost of equity raised in public markets involves much more than the direct costs of underwriters, attorneys, and accountants. Some indication of the indirect costs is provided by the market's typically negative reaction to announcements of seasoned equity offerings. Although the negative reaction averages about 3%, in some cases stock prices drop by as much as 10%, thereby diluting the value of existing stockholders. Most academics attribute this reaction to the informational disadvantage of public stockholders. Private equity is designed in large part to overcome this information problem by replacing the monitoring performed by the typical public company board with the oversight of better informed and more highly motivated owners. A growing body of academic research suggests that private equity investors add value to the companies they invest in, and that the best investors are consistently effective in so doing. What's more, even public companies that tap private equity seem to benefit. As the author found in his own research on PIPES (Private Investment in Public Equity Securities) transactions, even though such securities are issued to private equity investors at a discount to the prevailing market price, the average market response to the announcement of such transactions is a positive 10%. In short, the participation of private equity investors is perceived to create value, and some of this value is shared with the rest of the market.     

Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of initial public offerings in the UK

In contrast to the US practice, rights issues is the predominant method of raising additional equity capital in the London market. the UK evidence for the period 1980-1991 provides no support to the hypothesis that IPO firms deliberately underprice to signal their quality and facilitate subsequent seasoned equity offerings. the level of initial returns is related neither to the size of the issue nor to the price response at the announcement of a rights issue. the results demonstrate, however, that firms with higher first day returns are quicker in returning to the market for additional equity capital. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering follows a period of significant rises in the stock prices of reissuing firms. Such gains are, however, dissipated quickly in the 18 months after the announcement of the seasoned equity offering. the level of underperformance is particularly pronounced for firms that raised relatively small subsequent amounts of capital in relation to funds raised at the initial offering. Thus, the paper documents a pattern of post-issue behaviour which is fundamentally similar for both unseasoned and seasoned equity offerings.     

Seasoned Equity Issues in a Closely Held Market: Evidence from France

This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France.Even though a rights offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly usingthe relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the announcementof seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and insignificantly negative forpublic offerings. Our results suggest that the adverse selection effect is greater for rights issues thanfor public offerings, due to stronger underwriter certification for the public offerings. We find that theshare price effect is positively related to blockholders take-up renouncements for firms with priorconcentrated ownership. For these firms, the favourable ownership dispersion effect offsets the adverse selection effect.     

Intended Use of Proceeds,Underwriter Quality and the Long‐run Performance of SEOs in the UK

We document that prospectus disclosure of (i) the motives for a seasoned equity offering, and (ii) the choice of underwriter explain the long‐run performance of equity issuers in the UK. Firms citing investment needs show no abnormal performance after the offering and have higher investment rates post‐issue compared to the period before the offering. Issuers that state general corporate purposes and recapitalisation motives underperform, have similar investment rates pre‐ and post‐issue, and their leverage tends to increase after the offering. Further, consistent with the certifying role of underwriters, equity issues underwritten by high‐quality brokers show no evidence of post‐issue abnormal returns, but offerings taken public by low‐quality underwriters exhibit negative abnormal performance. Together, our results document the significant role that prospectus information on the intended use of offering proceeds and on the underwriter play in predicting issuers post‐offering performance in the UK.     

On the marketing of IPOs

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.     

Comovement and investment banking networks

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on The State of Global Private Equity

In this discussion led by Alan Jones, Morgan Stanley's head of Global Private Equity, the University of Chicago's Steve Kaplan begins by surveying 25 years of academic research on private equity. Starting with Kaplan's own Ph.D. dissertation on leveraged buyouts during the 1980s, finance academics have provided a large and growing body of studies documenting the ability of private equity firms to make “sustainable” (that is, maintained over a three‐ or four‐year period) improvements in the operating performance of their portfolio companies, whether operating abroad or in the U.S. Even more impressive, the findings of Kaplan's new study (with Tim Jenkinson of Oxford and Bob Harris of the University of Virginia) suggest that these improvements have been large enough to enable PE funds raised between 1990 and 2008 to deliver returns to their limited partners that have averaged 300 to 400 basis points higher per year than the returns to the S&P 500. And given the “persistence” of PE fund returns—the tendency of the funds of the same PE firms to show up in the top quartile of performers year after year—that Kaplan has documented in earlier work, the performance of private equity seems notably different from that of mutual funds and hedge funds, where there has been little if any consistency in the returns provided by the top performers. Following Kaplan's overview of the research, four representatives of today's leading private equity firms explore questions like the following:

• ? How do the best PE firms, after paying premiums to acquire their portfolio companies and collecting large management fees, provide such consistently high returns to their limited partners?
• ? How did PE portfolio companies perform during the last recession, when many popular business publications were predicting the death of private equity—and what, if anything, does that tell us about how private equity adds value?
• ? What can PE firms do to avoid, or at least limit the damage from, the overpricing and overleveraging that tend to occur near the end of the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to be a permanent feature of private equity?

As Jones notes in his opening comments, the practitioners' answers to such questions “should help investors distinguish between the alpha that the firms represented at this table have generated through active management from the ‘closet beta’ that critics say results when private equity firms simply create what amounts to a levered bet on the public equity markets.”     

Revisiting corporate dividends and seasoned equity issues

Information signaling is regarded as an important motivating factor in corporate payout decisions, particularly with regard to cash dividends and the costly information signaling which they provide. Although Loderer and Mauer (1992) find little evidence to suggest that the announcements of firms’ equity offers are timed to arrive just after dividend declarations as a means of supporting the offer price. Using updated data, we determine that the dividend declaration does have a positive effect on the market reaction to equity offering announcements. We find that the abnormal returns from the announcement of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) were −1.45 per cent for those SEO firms which had already made dividend declarations, whereas the returns for those SEO firms where the equity issue did not immediately follow a dividend declaration were −1.83 per cent. In this study, we interpret the changes in the impact of the dividend declaration on the equity offering announcement using the ‘tax regulation hypothesis’ and the ‘information asymmetry hypothesis’, and find that while our empirical results provide strong support for the latter, they provide only weak support for the former.     

WHAT DETERMINES SEO OFFER‐DAY RETURNS?

We examine seasoned equity offering (SEO) initial‐day returns after controlling for the dilution effect from the SEO discount and new shares offered. Contrary to the existing literature that ignores the effect of dilution, we find that initial‐day returns are not consistently positive. Modeling adjusted initial‐day returns, we show that dilution‐adjusted initial‐day returns respond to partial price adjustments reflecting both private and public information. Additional determinants of SEO offer‐day returns include lockup length, discount reversal, prior operating performance, and underwriter reputation. Long‐run tests reveal that adjusted initial‐day returns are not predictive of postissuance long‐term performance.     

Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect

The markets for management buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe have experienced dramatic growth in the past ten years. In the U.K., buyouts accounted for half of the total M&A activity (measured by value) in 2005. And as in the U.S. during the‘80s, the greatest number of U.K. buyouts in recent years have been management‐ and investor‐led acquisitions of divisions of large corporations. In continental Europe, by contrast, the largest fraction of deals has involved the purchase of family‐owned private businesses. But in recent years, increased pressure for shareholder value in countries like France, Netherlands, and even Germany has led to a growing number of buyouts of divisions of listed companies. Like the U.K., continental Europe has also seen a small but growing number of purchases of entire public companies (known as private‐to‐public transactions, or PTPs), including the largest ever buyout in Europe, the €13 billion purchase this year of the Danish corporation TDC. In view of the record levels of capital raised by European private equity funds in recent years‐which, until 2005, exceeded the amounts invested in any given year‐we can expect more growth in private equity investment in the near future. In continental Europe, the prospects for buyouts remain especially strong, given both the pressure from investors to restructure larger corporations and the possibilities for adding value in family‐owned firms. But, as the authors note, today's private equity firms face a number of challenges in earning adequate returns for their investors. One is increased competition. In addition to the increased activity of U.S. private equity firms, local private equity investors are also facing competition from hedge funds and new entrants such as government‐sponsored operators, family offices, and wealthy entrepreneurs. Another major challenge is finding value‐preserving exit vehicles. Although an IPO is an option for the largest buyouts with growth prospects, most buyout investments are harvested either through sales to other companies or, increasingly, other private equity firms. The latter transactions, known as “secondary” buyouts, now account for a significant share of new funds invested by private equity firms across Europe.     

Re‐equitizing Corporate Balance Sheets: Choosing Among the Alternatives

Companies are generally reluctant to issue new equity because it can be expensive capital. Among the largest costs of an equity offering are so‐called “market‐impact” costs. To the extent the typically negative market reaction to a stock offering causes an issue to be underpriced, such underpricing dilutes the value of current shareholders. Despite such costs, many companies—particularly financial institutions—are raising equity capital to “delever” balance sheets that have been squeezed by the credit crunch and economic slowdown. And far from transferring value from existing shareholders, these offerings can preserve and even increase the value of highly leveraged companies by shoring up their capital bases and providing the flexibility to get through a difficult period. According to recent studies, announcements of equity offerings by distressed companies have been accompanied by positive stock returns in excess of 5 %. The challenge for CFOs is to determine why and when issuing equity is the value‐maximizing strategy. The kinds of companies that are most likely to benefit from equity offerings are those that score low on credit metrics, have experienced cyclical declines in operating performance, and have growth opportunities as part of their recovery. There are a number of options for raising equity capital, but no set rules for identifying the optimal one. Nevertheless, the author offers a number of suggestions designed to help CFOs make smarter decisions: Communicate clearly to investors the intended uses of the proceeds from the equity offering and how they are expected to create value; Consider judicious cuts to the dividend to preserve capital; Involve current shareholders to minimize dilution, perhaps by considering a rights offering, and strengthen their commitment; Seek out “smart money” such as private equity or SWFs as long‐term investors; Get the offer size right the first time so a second offering can be avoided; and Monetize volatility in uncertain markets by issuing convertible securities.     

The Growing Blessing of Unicorns: The Changing Nature of the Market for Privately Funded Companies

The past 15 years have seen the emergence of large infusions of private capital at levels previously accessible only in public markets. One direct effect of these non‐public fundraisings is the spawning of private entities with market valuations reaching $1 billion, thereby achieving the status of unicorns. As the authors reported in an earlier study, by the end of 2015, there were 142 unicorns with an aggregate value exceeding $500 billion. The conviction of many investors and managers at that time was that these companies could best create value by staying private, often by adopting governance structures focused on creating superior operating performance. It was also widely believed that unicorns would remain outside the public markets longer and succeed in attracting even more private capital, thereby enabling their investors to capture a greater share of the increase in company value. In this study, the authors examine how the characteristics and dynamics of “the blessing” have changed in the past five years. Despite the widespread view that the valuations and private financing trend fueling this market were not sustainable, the authors report that by March 2020, the “net” number of unicorns had grown from 142 to 464, a number that doesn't reflect the transformation of over half of the 2015 sample through acquisition or public offering and their replacement by new unicorns. Further, the cumulative market valuation of unicorns more than doubled from $500 billion to $1.37 trillion, representing growth far greater than that in the public equity markets (some 26% per annum, as compared to 9% for the S&P 500) over the same period—and the blessing has become more diversified, both in terms of industry and geographical location. The authors also consider what happens when unicorns “graduate” to a different organizational form by means of an IPO, private buyout, or business failure. Analyzing the 107 firms that departed the sample between 2015 and 2020, the authors report that the average lifespan of a unicorn from its founding date to its exit date has been 9.5 years, indicating that such firms indeed remain privately owned for a longer time than in the past. Additionally, the study finds that the founders and initial investors in unicorns have fared quite well, cashing out their initial investment at almost six times invested capital, on average. These private investment performance metrics have been significantly higher than the returns to public shareholders in the same firms during the post‐IPO period, signifying that unicorn investors have captured much more of the value created in the company's growth phase than public stockholders.     

Dividend Consistency: Rewards,Learning, and Expectations

The fact that many companies have a long track record of consistent dividend increases suggests that managers believe there is some benefit to establishing and maintaining such a pattern. Many companies, for example, follow a perennial policy of increasing the dividend in a particular quarter, maintaining it at the same level for the next three quarters, and then increasing it in the same quarter of the following year. But does the capital market reward companies for maintaining a consistent dividend policy? Do companies with a history of repeated dividend increases earn long‐term positive abnormal returns; and if so, how long do the returns persist? The authors find that companies earned significantly positive abnormal returns following each of the first five annual dividend increases, over and above the positive announcement‐month returns. Nevertheless, the reward decreases as the track record of dividend increases becomes longer. After the first dividend increase, companies enjoy significantly positive returns for the next two years. Companies that increase the dividend in the same quarter of the following year also enjoy significant positive returns, but returns that are smaller (and less statistically significant) than in the case of first‐time dividend increases. And as the dividend‐increase track record further lengthens, the size and statistical significance of the abnormal returns continues to shrink; and after the sixth dividend increase, the abnormal returns in the next twelve months are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In sum, although there is some support for maintaining a consistent dividend policy, the market response diminishes over time, and investors do not earn abnormal returns by buying stocks whose annual dividend has already been increased six or more times.     

Why Do Firms Issue Equity after Splitting Stocks?

This paper examines the motivations of firms that conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) after splitting stocks. We find no difference in equity announcement and issue period returns between these firms and other equity‐issuing firms, suggesting that firms do not split stocks to reveal information and reduce adverse selection costs at the subsequent SEO. However, because investors react positively to split announcements, firms that issue equity after splitting stocks sell new shares at a higher price and raise more funds. We also find that firms split stocks to make the subsequent SEO more marketable to individual investors who are attracted to low‐priced shares.     

Policy uncertainty and seasoned equity offerings methods

Based on a sample of U.S. seasoned equity offering (SEO) during the period 2002–2017, we examine how the choice of equity issuance method changes in response to policy uncertainty. We find that firms subject to high policy uncertainty are less likely to use accelerated offerings rather than other types of traditional seasoned equity offerings. Our results are robust to alternative variable specifications, propensity score matching method, IV approach, and the inclusion of additional controls. Also, the effect of policy uncertainty on accelerated offering decision is weaker for firms with better information environment, earnings quality, and governance structures. Further, policy uncertainty increases the cost of funds and lowers long-run abnormal returns after SEOs for firms subject to high levels of policy uncertainty.     

How an IPO Helps in M&A

An initial public offering (IPO) can often provide a powerful stimulus to private companies seeking to pursue an acquisition-driven growth strategy. Based on a comprehensive analysis of U.S. IPOs, the authors show that newly public companies are prolific acquirers. Over 30% of companies conducting an IPO make at least one acquisition in their IPO year, and the typical IPO firm makes about four acquisitions during its first five years as a public company. IPOs facilitate M&A not only by providing infusions of capital but also by creating ongoing access to equity and debt markets for cash-financed deals. In addition, IPOs create an acquisition currency that can prove valuable in stock-financed deals when the shares are attractively priced. The authors also argue that IPOs improve the ability of companies to conduct M&A by resolving some of the valuation uncertainty facing privately held companies.