The Role of Default Risk in Determining the Market Reaction to Debt Announcements

The stock price reaction to straight debt announcements is examined by differentiating firms on the basis of any subsequent change in their overall default risk. Results indicate that firms that will within six months of straight debt announcements undergo debt rating downgrades experience significant negative abnormal stock returns at the time of the new debt announcements, while firms with bond ratings that are later upgraded exhibit significant positive abnormal returns. Multiple regression analysis shows these results to be robust to the influence of filing size, tax shield effects, relative pre-announcement long-term debt levels, and subordination effects.     

VALUATION EFFECT OF ISSUING NONSUBORDINATED VERSUS SUBORDINATED DEBT

Recent studies analyzing stock market reaction to announcements of straight debt offerings report, in general, insignificant abnormal stock returns. In this study we examine the effect of debt seniority on market reaction. The evidence shows weakly positive abnormal returns upon the announcements of nonsubordinated straight debt offerings. In contrast, announcements of subordinated straight debt offerings induce significantly negative abnormal returns. Our findings generally support the information release hypothesis.     

THE MARKET REACTION TO STRAIGHT DEBT ISSUES: THE EFFECTS OF FREE CASH FLOW

In this paper we measure the market reaction to 937 straight debt issues between 1983 and 1993. We find a negative and significant market reaction to a straight debt announcement. In addition, we find that the market reaction to a straight debt issue is directly related to the issuing firm's level of existing cash and inversely related to the issuing firm's investment opportunities.     

Convertible debt and shareholder incentives

Given equity's convex payoff function, shareholders can transfer wealth from bondholders by increasing firm risk. We test the existing hypothesis that convertible debt reduces this classical agency problem of risk-shifting. First, we derive a measure of shareholders' risk incentives induced by convertible debt using a contingent claims framework. We then document that when risk-shifting incentives are high, the propensity to issue convertible (rather than straight) debt increases and the negative stock market reaction following convertible debt issue announcements is amplified. We further highlight that convertible debt is the only type of security that affects business risk durably downwards. Our conclusions support the agency theoretic rationale for convertible debt financing especially for financially distressed firms.     

New considerations in the announcement effects of privately placed debt

We examine the stock price reaction to announcements of privately placed debt. The results suggest no effect for firms with a public debt rating and offsetting effects for firms without a public debt rating. If the private placement appears to reduce monitoring for a firm without a debt rating, it produces a significantly negative price response. However, if it appears to increase financial flexibility and bargaining power, it produces a positive reaction. Overall, the evidence suggests that private placements of debt are more similar to public bond issues than bank loans in terms of the price reaction at the announcement.     

New evidence on the pecking order hypothesis: the case of French convertible bonds

Convertible bonds (CBs) are an important asset class but their analysis in function of the equity and bond components has received insufficient attention in France. This study investigates the relation between announcement effects and equity components for 141 French CB issues. We use the CB sensitivity to its underlying common stock as a proxy for the equity component. Our results indicate that CB issue announcements imply significantly negative market responses, which are negatively related to the equity component. This result supports the Myers and Majluf (1984) model [Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. J. Financial Econ. 13, 187–221]. A more detailed analysis reveals that the market reaction is significantly positive for the subset of ‘mixed’ CBs. Mixed CB issuers are characterized by high informational asymmetries about investment opportunities compared with informational asymmetries about assets-in-place. This finding supports the revised Myers and Majluf model, which predicts positive announcement effects under certain conditions.     

AN INVESTIGATION OF PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING BY BANK AND NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of announcements of preferred stock issues made by financial institutions. Fixed-rate straight preferred stock and convertible preferred stock issue announcements result in insignificant common share price responses. However, the average stock price reaction to announcements of adjustable-rate preferred stock issues is positive and significant for banking firms. Our findings suggest that banks' common shareholders react positively to adjustable-rate preferred stock issue announcements because such securities provide a relatively low-cost way of increasing the primary capital used to satisfy legal minimum capital requirements without diluting common equity voting rights.     

Bankruptcy probability changes and the differential informativeness of bond upgrades and downgrades

Prior studies have found that stock returns around announcements of bond upgrades are insignificant, but that stock prices respond negatively to announcements of bond downgrades. This asymmetric stock market reaction suggests either that bond downgrades are timelier than upgrades, or that voluntary disclosures by managers preempt upgrades but not downgrades. This study investigates these conjectures by examining changes in firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy (assessed using bankruptcy prediction models) and voluntary disclosure activity around rating change announcements. The results indicate that the assessed probability of bankruptcy decreases before bond upgrades, but not after. By contrast, the assessed probability of bankruptcy increases both before and after bond downgrades. We also find that controlling for potential wealth-transfer related rating actions, which can impact stock returns differently, does not alter our results. Tests of press releases and earnings forecasts issued by firms suggest that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by differences in pre-rating change voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. The results support the hypothesis that downgrades are timelier than upgrades.     

FIRM PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY TYPE IN SEASONED OFFERINGS: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE SIGNALING MODELS

In this paper we examine the long-term performance of publicly traded firms that issue straight debt, convertible debt, or common stock. Declines in firm performance following issuance are consistent with declines in firm value at announcement and issuance, and suggest that convertible debt and common stock are substantially equivalent. This study is consistent with the pecking-order and Miller-Rock models, but inconsistent with the leverage-signaling model. Despite a significant decline following issuance, firms issuing common stock or convertible debt perform better, on average, than the industry before, at, and after issuance. This is consistent with younger, riskier, higher-growth firms being the predominant issuers of common stock and convertible debt.     

The Intra-Industry Transfer of Information Inferred from Announcements of Corporate Security Offerings

This study investigates the extent to which information inferred by investors from initial announcements of corporate security offerings affects share prices in the capital markets. The empirical tests measure the response in the common stock prices of both firms announcing a security offering and non-announcing firms operating in the same industry. Small but significantly negative abnormal returns are shown by industry shares upon initial announcements of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt public offerings. Such an industry response indicates that share prices incorporate an inside assessment of factors relevant to the valuation of an industry subset of firms.     

Stock Index‐linked Debt and Shareholder Value: Evidence from the Paris Bourse

French banks and non‐financial companies issue index‐linked debt whose value at maturity is indexed to the CAC 40 or to a basket of European indices. This paper examines stock announcement effects associated with these bonds on three dates: the date the issuer's General Assembly decides future capital needs, the publication in the journal of the COB (the stock market board), and the issue date. We find the issuance of index‐linked debt has significant positive announcement effects on the issue date, which we attribute to its market‐completion property. In order to examine further whether market completion is at play, we decompose the value of the bond at issue into its straight bond and option values. We determine that the bonds are overvalued again supporting market completion.     

Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?

We examine the influence of corporate governance quality on firms' choice between convertible debt, straight debt, and equity using a Western European sample of security offerings made between 2000 and 2010. We find that weaker firm-specific and country-specific corporate governance quality increases firms' likelihood of issuing convertible debt instead of straight debt and common equity. We also find that stockholder reactions to convertible debt announcements are more favorable for firms with weaker corporate governance. Our results suggest that corporate governance quality is a significant security choice determinant, with firms using convertible debt as a substitute for high quality governance mechanisms.     

The (un)informative value of credit rating announcements in small markets

This work examines the information value of local Israeli credit rating announcements. This matter is also important to other small markets, in which a debt issuer may take advantage of a “rating shopping” process or choose to avoid a rating procedure altogether, because the agencies do not carry out unsolicited rating. We analyze the bond and equity markets response to various rating announcements at different time periods. We find that except for downgrades in 2008–2009 the rating announcements have no information value. It seems that generally the market internalizes most of the information prior to the rating announcements.     

Stock Returns and Operating Performance of Securities Issuers

We examine long‐run stock returns and operating performance around firms’ offerings of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt from 1985 to 1990. We find that pre‐issue abnormal returns are positive and significant for stock issuers, but not for convertible and straight debt issuers. The post‐issue mean returns show that common stock and convertible debt issuers experience underperformance during the post‐issue periods, but straight debt issuers do not. Consistent with these results, common stock issuers experience the best pre‐issue operating performance among all three types of issuers, and operating performance declines during the post‐issue periods for common stock and convertible debt issuers. Using a new approach in linear model estimations to correct heteroskedasticity and to adjust for finite sample, we find a positive relation between post‐issue operating performance and issue‐period stock price reactions. The results suggest that future operating performance is anticipated at the issue and that securities issues provide information on issuers’ future performance.     

A SEQUENTIAL SIGNALING MODEL OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT ISSUE AND CALL POLICIES

This paper offers a new explanation for why some risk‐averse firms may prefer to issue callable convertible debt. Here, the convertible debt issue and call policies are integrated into a unified financing policy. It is then shown that for firms with relatively low unsystematic risk, convertible debt issuance followed by an appropriate in‐the‐money signaling call policy reduces more unsystematic equity risk than equity, callable straight debt, or their combination. The model is modified to incorporate asymmetric information at the issue stage to explain the stock price behavior at announcements of convertible debt sales.     

Risky Debt,Investment Incentives,and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium

The agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information. The incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context. In a sequential equilibrium of the model, a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment. The incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market. This anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium. Some empirical implications of the model for bond rating, debt covenants, and bond price response to investment announcements are explored.     

Are All Rivals Affected Equally by Bond Rating Downgrades?

We use revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts to examine how the bad news associated with a bond rating downgrade gets transferred from the downgraded company to its rivals. In general, we find that stock analysts revise their earnings expectations downward for rivals of companies with downgraded debt. However, the significance of the revision is limited to rivals of downgraded companies with non-investment grade debt only. For the rivals of companies with investment grade debt, we find no significant forecast revisions. We hypothesize that this differential impact is due to differing levels of market visibility. This is consistent with our finding that downgraded companies with non-investment grade debt are followed by significantly fewer stock analysts. Apparently not all rivals are affected equally by bond rating downgrades.     

THE IMPACT OF CREDITWATCH PLACEMENT ON EQUITY RETURNS AND BOND PRICES

This paper examines the equity returns and bond prices of firms around the dates of their placement on CreditWatch by Standard and Poor's. Bond prices and equity returns for companies listed on CreditWatch are compared with a set of firms whose debt was rerated during the same time period but were never placed on CreditWatch. The evidence indicates no market reaction when firms are listed on CreditWatch with subsequent rating affirmations, but a significant reaction exists in those cases where the listing was followed by downgradings. Furthermore, the bond market does not appear so efficient as the stock market since relative bond prices continue to decline as long as seven months after a rating change.     

The Effect of Bond Rating Changes and New Ratings on UK Stock Returns

This is the first study to use daily data from a major capital market outside of the US to examine the role of corporate bond and commercial paper rating changes on common stock returns. Using data published by Standard and Poors' credit rating agency between 1984 and 1992, we examine the impact of new credit ratings, credit rating changes and Credit Watch announcements on UK common stock returns. We find significant negative excess returns around the date of a downgrade and positive returns close to the date of a positive CreditWatch announcement. Hence, the financial markets would appear to place some importance on rating agency pronouncements in the UK. New ratings, whether short or long-term, have no significant impact on returns. We also attempt to quantify the impact of a new credit rating upon firm cost of capital through measures of conditional volatility and systematic risk. However, we find only weak evidence to suggest that a stock's cost of capital is reduced after a long-term credit rating is awarded for the first time.     

Short‐selling pressure and last‐resort debt finance: evidence from 144A high‐yield risk‐adjusted debt

This study examines why non‐financial publicly traded firms knowingly issue wealth destroying Rule 144A debt, which is associated with a negative announcement return and a higher yield. We provide a plausible ‘demand‐side’ explanation (i.e. last‐resort debt financing) for the motivation for issuing such debt. We also provide evidence as to what drives this negative reaction. Our findings suggest that the negative market impact is mainly driven by short‐selling pressure from convertible bond arbitrageurs.