Revaluations of fixed assets and future firm performance: Evidence from the UK

We find, as predicted, that upward revaluations of fixed assets by UK firms are significantly positively related to changes in future performance, measured by operating income and cash from operations, indicating revaluations reflect asset value changes. Current year revaluations (revaluation balances) also are significantly positively related to annual returns (prices). Relations between revaluations and future performance and prices are weaker for higher debt-to-equity ratio firms, indicating motivation affects how revaluations reflect asset value changes. The relations also are weaker for cross-listed firms and in a more volatile economic time period. Our inferences are robust to controlling for firms' acquisition activity.     

Asset Revaluations and Debt Contracting

The research question investigated is: Do managers of Australian firms use upward asset revaluations to reduce debt contracting costs? Prior research, using sample periods from the 1970s and early 1980s, provides evidence that asset revaluations are used to reduce the costs of debt contracting (see Whittred and Chan, 1992; Brown et al., 1992; Cotter and Zimmer, 1995). However, considerable changes to the institutional set-ting have occurred in the past decade. These institutional changes include increased regulation of asset revaluations and disclosures, changes in the macroeconomic environment, and changes in the Australian debt market. Particularly, there has been a shift in emphasis from public to private debt. The relationship between asset revaluations and debt contracting is examined in the current setting, using refined measures of contracting variables. Interestingly, the results of prior research do not replicate in the current setting. In order to further examine the potential impact of changes to the institutional setting, a series of interviews with chief financial officers is undertaken. The conclusion drawn from this additional analysis is that the relatively closer relationship between firms and their bankers in the current institutional setting has caused many firms to choose footnote disclosure of undervalued assets in preference to recognizing an upward asset revaluation in the balance sheet.     

The impact of debt on market reactions to the revaluation of noncurrent assets

This study provides evidence that noncurrent asset revaluations are differentially considered by market participants based on the level of debt in the capital structure. Contracting theory (e.g. Brown et al., Abacus 28 (1992) 36) implies that revaluations made by firms with high-debt levels may be viewed as being opportunistic, while revaluations for firms with low-debt levels may be viewed as reducing information asymmetry between the firm and capital providers. For a sample of New Zealand firm/years that excludes certain observations with extreme stock returns, we find that revaluations of fixed assets are more value-relevant for firms with low leverage than for firms with high leverage. This suggests that the value relevance of fixed asset valuations depends on management's motivation for making the revaluation. The results of the research should be considered within certain limitations such as a small sample.     

The Case Against Asset Revaluations

The upward revaluation of non-current assets is a common feature of contemporary accounting in Australia. This paper presents a case against the practice. The effects of revaluations are examined and possible reasons why firms revalue are considered. It is argued that asset revaluation is theoretically unsound, being inconsistent with the accounting structure within which it occurs. It is concluded that there are significant costs but few obvious benefits associated with revaluation.     

Fixed Asset Revaluation and Equity Depletion in the UK

UK GAAP has traditionally allowed the write-off of purchased goodwill directly to reserves, resulting in the widespread depletion of book equity. Companies have also been permitted to revalue fixed assets at management's discretion. This study examines whether upward revaluations have been associated with the depletion of book equity and with other costly contracting explanations identified in prior research. Our results provide strong support for the equity depletion hypothesis, both with regard to the decision to revalue and the timing of the revaluations. Indebtedness, liquidity, size and fixed asset intensity are also consistently associated with upward revaluation.     

Fixed Asset Revaluation and Equity Depletion in the UK

UK GAAP has traditionally allowed the write-off of purchased goodwill directly to reserves, resulting in the widespread depletion of book equity. Companies have also been permitted to revalue fixed assets at management's discretion. This study examines whether upward revaluations have been associated with the depletion of book equity and with other costly contracting explanations identified in prior research. Our results provide strong support for the equity depletion hypothesis, both with regard to the decision to revalue and the timing of the revaluations. Indebtedness, liquidity, size and fixed asset intensity are also consistently associated with upward revaluation.     

Reliability of Asset Revaluations: The Impact of Appraiser Independence

In this paper we examine whether there are differences in the reliability of asset revaluations made by boards of directors versus independent (external) appraisers. We use a sample of recognized Australian asset revaluations. As a first step we examine the determinants of the choice between director-based revaluations and those undertaken by independent appraisers. We find that independent appraisers are more likely to be used for revaluations of land and buildings and directors are more likely for investments, plant and equipment and identifiable intangibles. We interpret this as evidence of firms harnessing directors' knowledge of asset specificities. We also find that firms with less independent boards are more likely to use independent appraisers. We interpret this as evidence of substitutability between governance mechanisms.As for differences in reliability, we find that revaluations of plant and equipment that are made by independent appraisers are more reliable than those by directors. However, we are unable to detect a difference for other classes of non-current assets. We define reliability in terms of ex-post adjustments of recognized value increases. Reliability is determined by an examination of the extent to which upward revaluations are subsequently reversed.     

Fixed Asset Revaluations and Managerial Incentives

The study attempts to explain why Australian companies revalue their fixed assets, when a revaluation, by itself , has no discernible direct effect on cash flows and is costly to carry out. A revaluation is hypothesised to affect contracting and political costs. It may also help resolve problems associated with information asymmetries, or be used to signal information to investors. The results support the proposition that economic forces help explain the decision to revalue assets.     

Asset revaluations,future firm performance and firm-level corporate governance arrangements: New evidence from Brazil

Using a sample of Brazilian listed firms for the period 1998–2004 we find evidence that revaluations of fixed assets are negatively related to future firm performance, prices and returns. We also find that the decision to revalue is negatively associated with scores on a Brazilian Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) and positively associated with indebtedness and illiquidity. Our results suggest that revaluations of fixed assets in Brazil are not designed to convey information to external users of financial statements but rather to improve equity positions – opportunistic motivations. Our evidence also corroborates the idea that firms that adopt superior voluntary governance arrangements are less likely to engage in actions designed to manipulate their financial statements. These results lend support to the recent amendment to the Company law which eliminated the revaluation option for Brazilian firms despite the current process of IFRS convergence.     

Under the Lender’s Looking Glass

This paper studies the impact of bank monitoring on the risk of US equity REITs. Using a unique, hand-collected data sample of mortgage balances, I show that bank screening and monitoring of REIT assets via utilizing secured mortgage financing (vs unsecured, public debt) lowers the overall company risk of a REIT. At the asset level, screening results in retail and office assets with higher acquisition values and located in primary markets, i.e., more transparent assets, being pledged as collateral. Further, I find evidence consistent with the role of lender monitoring for secured mortgage loans and show that properties located in closer proximity to a REIT’s headquarters are more likely to be pledged as collateral for a mortgage.     

Collateral damaged? Priority structure,credit supply,and firm performance

A unique legal reform in 2004 in Sweden redistributed collateral rights from banks holding floating liens to unsecured creditors without changing the value of assets on firms’ balance sheets. Using a country-wide panel of all incorporated firms, we document that a zero-sum redistribution of collateral rights and the resulting reduction in collateral capacity towards banks contracts the amount and maturity of corporate debt and leads firms to slow investment and forego growth. Altering their allocation of assets, firms reduce particularly those assets with a low collateralizable value for banks and also hoard more cash. However, the reform has no impact on corporate capital intensity or efficiency, suggesting that under these newly binding credit constraints firms simply shrink their operations.     

Loan collateral and financial reporting conservatism: Chinese evidence

We examine the relation between the use of collateral and financial reporting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. In the absence of flexibility in risk pricing through interest rates and strong contract enforcement in China, we find that lenders reduce collateral requirements from more conservative borrowers and that this negative relation is significantly moderated by borrowers’ poor credit quality and low asset tangibility. Our finding that conservatism can result in a tangible benefit in the form of lower collateral requirements indicates that lenders value financial reporting conservatism. However, the benefit from financial reporting conservatism is muted as lenders become more concerned about borrowers’ default risk or ability to pledge tangible assets as collateral against loans.     

Asset Write‐offs in Private Firms – The Case of German SMEs

This paper finds that private firms make the decision to write off, and write off more in terms of total amount, if they are: (i) more profitable, (ii) have more financial debt, and (iii) pay dividends. Our findings are contrary to expectations based on accounting standards and the existing revaluation literature. They are, however, consistent with the codified, high book‐tax alignment economic setting in which sample private firms operate. This includes agency problems faced by private firms’ stakeholders. We use a comprehensive sample of German SMEs reporting in local GAAP, based on the German commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch) in 2003–2006. We view write‐offs as corrections of departures of book values from their underlying economic values, in contrast to upward asset revaluations. This governs our choice of estimation – the tobit regression.     

The Relevance of Asset Revaluations over an Economic Cycle

The results of tests reported in this paper show that asset revaluations accounted for in accordance with AAS 10/AASB 1010 provide information that is consistent with the information set used by investors in pricing the shares of a sample of Australian listed firms. The "value relevance" of asset revaluations occurs in periods of both rising and declining asset prices.     

Corporate real estate's impact on the takeover market

This article explores the issues and problems associated with corporate real estate ownership as viewed through the takeover market. The perception held by managers is that corporate real estate assets are unique, specialized assets. This perception conflicts with financial theory which states that the market values all corporate assets based only on their expected future cash flows. Thus corporate real estate assets are priced according to their cash flows and are like other corporate assets. This study tests the hypothesis that corporate real estate is a specialized asset by examining the impact real estate assets have on the takeover market. The study uses a logit regression model in order to attempt to predict which firms become takeover targets. If corporate real estate in general is a specialized asset, then real estate is expected to be an important variable in predicting takeover targets. Although the logit model has little predictive accuracy, results from the prediction model suggest that corporate real estate plays a significant part in determining the likelihood of a firm's becoming a takeover target. The greater the real estate holdings, the greater the likelihood of a firm's becoming a takeover target.     

Cash holdings and real asset liquidity

This paper examines the relationship between the ability of a firm to sell its real assets and its cash holdings behavior. A substitution effect exists between the size of cash balances and the liquidity of a firm’s real assets when access to external capital markets is limited. Among financially constrained firms, higher asset liquidity is related to lower cash holdings. Additionally for financially constrained firms, the market value of cash is lower for firms with higher asset liquidity.     

Motives for fixed-asset revaluation: An empirical analysis with Swiss data

This paper investigates the economic motives of fixed-asset revaluations of Swiss listed companies. We provide international insights on revaluation motives, particularly in a stakeholders' regime, over a period which is characterized by significant changes of the accounting standards relative to fixed-assets valuation. We also test the impact of international stakeholders on the choice of whether to revalue assets. Results from pooled data show positive associations between revaluation and both the proportion of foreign sales and leverage, and a negative association with the investment opportunities. These findings suggest that revaluation is used as a device to improve creditors' and foreign stakeholders' perceptions of the financial health of the firm and thereby improve the firm's borrowing capacity. Cross-sectional results show that although leverage has declined over the periods investigated, interest rates have become lower for firms that revalue upward their fixed assets (compared to non-revaluers), emphasizing the debt-costs hypothesis.     

Collateralizing liquidity

I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why financial assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects with nonobservable returns. Since holding these assets allows firms to raise these funds, investing firms value the asset more than noninvesting ones. When assets are less than perfectly liquid and investment opportunities are persistent, collateralized debt minimizes asset transfers from investing to noninvesting firms and thus is optimal. Frictions in asset markets lead to an illiquidity discount and a collateral premium, which increase with the asset’s illiquidity.     

FINANCING INNOVATIONS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICES

The last two decades have seen a stream of innovation in financial markets, especially in corporate bonds. Some of these innovations—notably, hybrid debt—have provided firms with more flexibility in designing cash flows on borrowings, allowing them to match cash flows on financing more closely to cash flows on assets. In so doing, the use of such innovative securities has increased corporate debt capacity and hence firm value.
But if such changes have been mostly good news for corporate treasurers, the relentless torrent of innovation has sometimes resulted in firms issuing these new securities for the wrong reasons. Some have done so to take advantage of loopholes in the way ratings agencies and regulatory agencies define debt and equity—and others to exploit perceived pricing anomalies—without considering the effect of such securities on the firm's overall risk profile. In this context, it is worth noting that as corporate bonds have become more complex, investment bankers have made themselves indispensable to the process by providing pricing as well as selling support. This article aims to help managers distinguish when financing with complex securities serves their company's interests, and when it can end up hurting them.     

Outside Equity

Equity financing is modeled when cash flows and asset values are not verifiable. Investors have enforceable property rights to the firm's assets, but cannot prevent insiders (managers or entrepreneurs) from capturing cash flow. Insiders must coinvest and pay in each period a dividend sufficient to ensure outside investors' participation for at least one more period. Intervention by the investors must be limited by an agreement with insiders or by costs of collective action. Basic models are extended to show why firms go public and why agency costs necessarily arise when the act of investment is not immediately verifiable.