UK Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This paper reports the results of an empirical study of UK analysts' earnings forecasts for 126 firms for the years 1980 and 1981. Six hypotheses regarding the accuracy of these forecasts are tested, with results which both confirm and conflict with prior UK findings. In addition, evidence is found of a greater than generally attributed sensitivity of test results to the measure of accuracy used.     

Rational Expectations and Security Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This paper investigates the rationality of security analysts' forecasts. The forecasts of analysts participating in Lynch, Jones, and Ryan's Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/BE/S) data base are evaluated relative to past values of their own forecast errors, past values of forecasted earnings per share, and quarterly percentage changes in publicly available macroeconomic and financial time series. The publicly available series include the consumer price index, unemployment rate, oil prices, stock prices, gross national product, and corporate profits. The authors conduct a generalized orthogonality test and include only information available to analysts at the time the forecasts are made. The empirical results reject analyst forecast rationality, but not without exception.     

The Relevance of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts in Japan

Abstract:   This study examines the role of financial analysts in equity valuation in Japan by comparing the relevance of financial analysts' earnings forecasts, over financial statement information, to investors' decisions. We find that the value‐relevance of a set of accounting variables is very modest, but the incremental contribution of analysts' forecasts is very significant. This is in line with the expectation that the skill and expertise of analysts are more valuable in markets with poor financial disclosure, such as Japan. We also find that the importance of the financial statements increases over time while the importance of the analysts' forecasts does not change. We also provide evidence of the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu, on the informativeness of accounting signals and earnings forecasts. The results show that the contribution of accounting variables to valuation is lower for keiretsu firms, which supports the exclusionary hypothesis that companies which are a part of keiretsu, disclose less information than do non‐keiretsu companies. The analysts' forecasts are equally important for investors in both types of firms.     

分析师留学经历与盈利预测质量

基于2005-2015年期间的分析师预测数据,本文研究发现,相对于非留学分析师,具有海外留学经历的分析师的预测准确性更低,通过分组检验发现,上述结果主要存在于分析师的从业初期和分析师与企业高管之间不具有社会关系时。进一步研究发现,分析师留学越早,时间越长,其预测准确性相对越低。另外,当企业公开信息质量较高时,海外留学分析师与非留学分析师在预测准确性上的差异消失。由此可见,在我国关系型社会中,海外留学归国分析师在认知和获取私有信息方面存在相对劣势,其并没有提供更高质量的盈余预测。本文的研究发现丰富了有关分析师预测质量的研究文献,同时也为当前规范和提高企业信息披露质量的制度改革提供了资本市场的经验证据。     

Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward 'management' of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.     

Intangible Assets, Information Complexity, and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

Abstract:   We examine the relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and firms' intangible assets, including technology‐based intangibles, brand names, and recognized intangibles. We predict that high information complexity of intangible assets increases the difficulty for analysts to assimilate information and increases analysts' forecast error of intangibles‐intensive firms. We find a positive association between analysts' forecast error and the firm's intangible intensity that deviates from the industry norm. We also find that analysts' forecast errors are greater for firms with diverse and innovative technologies. In contrast, analysts' forecast errors are smaller for biotech/pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms that are subject to intangibles‐related regulation.     

Improving the Precision of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by Adjusting for Predictable Bias

This research demonstrates that publicly-available information can be used to develop estimates of analysts' optimistic bias in earnings forecasts. These bias estimates can be used to produce more accurate forecasts, resulting in significant reductions of both cross-sectional mean forecast error and error variance. When bias estimates are based on past observations of forecast error alone, however, reductions in mean forecast error are smaller, and forecast precision is unimproved. Further tests provide evidence of a significant association between returns and the bias predictable from contemporaneously-available information, suggesting that predictable bias is only partially discounted by market participants. This study has significant implications for researchers and investors. The pricing of predictable bias in analysts' forecasts may add error toinferences which are based on the association between returns and analyst forecast errors, and knowledge of the market's partial discounting of predictable bias may help investors to make more efficient resource allocations.     

Economic Value Added,Future Accounting Earnings,and Financial Analysts' Earnings Per Share Forecasts

Empirical research to date on the relative effectiveness of Economic Value Added (EVA) and earnings per share (EPS) as measures of firm performance for stock valuation has been mixed. In contrast to prior research, which primarily focuses on the correspondence of these measures with shareholder value and changes therein, we examine their relative effectiveness in predicting future earnings and their role in enhancing the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Our results indicate that EVA contains information that is incremental to EPS in predicting future earnings. In addition, we find that despite this potential for EVA to add incremental value to analysts' forecasts of future earnings, analysts do not use the information in reported EVA appropriately, but appear rather to overweigh it.     

The Quality of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts During the Asian Crisis: Evidence from Singapore

We bring together three disparate strands of literature to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency of security analysts' earnings forecasts in Singapore. We focus specifically on how the increased uncertainty and the negative market sentiment during the period of the Asian crisis affected the quality of earnings forecasts. While we find no evidence of inefficiencies in the pre-crisis period, our results suggest that after the onset of the crisis, analysts (1) issued forecasts that were systematically upward biased; (2) did not fully incorporate the (negative) earnings-related news; and (3) predicted earnings changes which proved too extreme.     

Earnings Surprises in Analysts' Forecasts,Mandatory Disclosure,and Share Repurchases

This paper examines the impact of forecast errors and the mandatory disclosure of repurchase transactions required by 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations on share repurchases. We define forecast errors as the difference between analysts' forecasted earnings and actual earnings. We argue that firms with positive forecast errors imply greater information asymmetry, which may induce them to signal through share repurchases. We show that both the repurchase target and analysts' forecast revision are positively related to forecast errors. Furthermore, these associations are more pronounced in the low disclosure period (1989–2003) where greater information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is found, while increased transparency in the high disclosure period (2004–2006) leads to more significant improvement in long‐term performances for firms with positive forecast errors. The results are consistent with our expectations that the information asymmetry implied in forecast errors, along with a shock change from the introduction of the 2003 SEC regulation, affect both corporate and analysts' behaviour.     

年报风险信息披露有助于提高分析师预测准确度吗?

年报风险信息披露既可能提高信息质量而对分析师预测行为产生积极影响,又可能因增加分析师的风险感知而对分析师预测行为产生消极影响。本文通过文本分析法量化年报风险信息披露,进而探讨其对分析师预测准确度的影响。基于公司层面的证据表明:风险信息披露频率越高,分析师预测准确度越高,而且这种积极影响主要体现在非国有企业、盈余质量较高及公司治理较好组。基于分析师层面的证据表明:风险信息披露频率越高,分析师预测准确度越高,这种积极影响主要体现在非明星、行业专长较低、对公司追踪时间较少的分析师中。这说明我国年报风险信息异质性较弱,有助于提高分析师预测准确度,从而支持了风险信息披露的信息观。本文结论有助于丰富信息披露以及分析师预测文献。     

The Implications of Dispersion in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Future ROE and Future Returns

Dispersion in analysts' forecasts is empirically evaluated by associating dispersion with a firm's future accounting rate of return-on-equity (ROE) and future returns. Forecast dispersion is significantly and negatively associated with future ROE, consistent with the notion that firm disclosures and analysts' information acquisition efforts increase as firm prospects improve. Forecast dispersion is negatively associated with future returns. This appears due to the implications of dispersion for future ROE, and suggests that the market does not immediately assimilate the information contained in forecast dispersion. Dispersion also conveys information about firm-specific risk not captured by beta and firm size.     

Analysts' Forecasts and the Broker Relationship

Analysts' ability to forecast earnings per share has been the subject of considerable debate. A concern highlighted in previous research is the agency problem which may arise when analysts have a close working relationship with the firms for which they are providing forecasts. This paper provides evidence that this relationship does not improve the accuracy of the earnings forecasts, but stimulates optimistic forecasts. In addition, the paper examines whether firm size is a factor in forecast accuracy or bias.     

The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival

This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.     

财务分析师盈利预测的投资价值:来自深沪A股市场的证据

本文研究了中国股票市场上财务分析师的盈利预测信息对投资者是否有价值。我们发现,可以利用公开的盈利预测制定可获利的套头交易策略。套头交易的回报率不仅在统计意义上显著大于零,而且在经济意义上也是显著的。这些结果不受不同的检验方法影响,也无法为我们所考虑到的风险因素所解释。本文的发现说明了中国的股票市场尚未达到Fama(1970)意义上的半强式有效,投资者在投资决策时可以利用分析师的盈利预测以提高其投资的回报。此外,本文的结果也有助于回答中国的财务分析师是否具有专业胜任能力这一颇有争议的问题。     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

High-Technology Intangibles and Analysts' Forecasts

This study examines the association between firms' intangible assets and properties of the information contained in analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that analysts will supplement firms' financial information by placing greater relative emphasis on their own private (or idiosyncratic) information when deriving their earnings forecasts for firms with significant intangible assets. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the consensus in analysts' forecasts, measured as the correlation in analysts' forecast errors, is negatively associated with a firm's level of intangible assets. This result is robust to controlling for analyst uncertainty about a firm's future earnings, which we also find to be higher for firms with high levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles. Given that analyst uncertainty increases and analyst consensus decreases with the level of a firm's intangible assets, we also expect and find that the degree to which the mean forecast aggregates private information and is more accurate than an individual analyst's forecast increases with a firm's intangible assets. Finally, additional analysis reveals that lower levels of analyst consensus are associated with high-technology manufacturing companies, and that this association is explained by the relatively high R&D expenditures made by these firms. Overall, our results are consistent with financial analysts augmenting the financial reporting systems of firms with higher levels of intangible assets (in terms of contributing to more accurate earnings expectations), particularly R&D-driven high-tech manufacturers.     

Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts

Recent literature has used analysts' earnings forecasts, which are known to be optimistic, to estimate implied expected rates of return, yielding upwardly biased estimates. We estimate that the bias, computed as the difference between the estimates of the implied expected rate of return based on analysts' earnings forecasts and estimates based on current earnings realizations, is 2.84%. The importance of this bias is illustrated by the fact that several extant studies estimate an equity premium in the vicinity of 3%, which would be eliminated by the removal of the bias. We illustrate the point that cross‐sample differences in the bias may lead to the erroneous conclusion that cost of capital differs across these samples by showing that analysts' optimism, and hence, bias in the implied estimates of the expected rate of return, differs with firm size and with analysts' recommendation. As an important aside, we show that the bias in a value‐weighted estimate of the implied equity premium is 1.60% and that the unbiased value‐weighted estimate of this premium is 4.43%.     

Analysts' Incentives and Street Earnings

We examine whether analysts' incentives are associated with street earnings. Because prior research argues that analysts' incentives to promote stocks increase in the extent to which the stock exhibits glamour characteristics, we predict that analysts are more likely to make income-increasing adjustments in determining street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks. We find that analysts are more likely to exclude expense items from street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks and that excluded expense items help predict future earnings for glamour stocks but not for value stocks. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' self-interest influences street earnings and this self-interest leads to street earnings that are less useful in predicting future earnings for glamour stocks.     

Dispersion of Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and the (Option Model) Implied Standard Deviations of Stock Returns

This study examines whether the information implied by simultaneous levels of option and stock prices (specifically, the implied standard deviation of returns) reflects other contemporaneously available information. The independent contemporaneous measure considered is the observed dispersion (across several financial analysts), at a point in time, in the forecasts of earnings per share for a given firm. The results indicate that implied standard deviations clearly reflect the contemporaneous dispersion in analysts' forecasts incrementally, i.e., beyond the information contained in the historical time series of returns.