THE EFFECTS OF MANAGERIAL ROLES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN BUDGETARY PARTICIPATION AND JOB SATISFACTION

This study examines the extent to which managerial roles moderate the relation between budgetary participation and job satisfaction. Managerial roles, defined in terms of line versus staff, may serve as a situational variable that assists in explaining the equivocal results found in studies for the association between budgetary participation and job satisfaction. The findings of this study suggest that the link between budgetary participation and job satisfaction is dependent on the role a manager undertakes in an organization. The relation between budgetary participation and job satisfaction was found to be significantly more effective for line managers than for staff managers.     

THE EFFECTS OF SPIN-OFFS ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE

We examine characteristics of firms involved in spin-offs and test whether these spin-offs induce changes in investment incentives and economic performance. We find that firms engaging in spin-offs are larger, more highly leveraged, and have higher asset turnover and lower real asset growth than their industry rivals. We also find that spin-offs generate significant increases in real asset growth and cash flow margin on sales for combined firm measures (spun-off firm plus parent firm). The gains result from increases in real asset growth for parent and spun-off firms, and improvements in cash flow margin on sales for parents. Our evidence is consistent with models in which spin-offs create value by improving investment incentives and economic performance.     

THE INTERVENING EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Prior studies have suggested that the subordinates’ perception of fairness in their organizations’ procedures is related to improvements in the subordinates’ performance. However, the positive relationship between perception of justice and performance may not be a direct one, but is indirect via the intervening variable of participation. It is likely that the importance of maintaining procedural fairness in the organization will lead senior managers (superiors) to select procedures that allow their subordinates more participation privileges in the organization’s affairs because high participative procedures are perceived to be fair. This increase in participation, in turn, is likely to improve the subordinates’ performance. The results, based on a path analytical model and a sample of 83 senior managers, indicate that procedural justice has an indirect effect on performance via participation. On the basis of these results, it is possible to conclude that the importance of procedural fairness in the organization leads to the selection of procedures with high subordinates’ participation, which, in turn, leads to high managerial performance.     

THE EFFECT OF EMPHASIS ON TIGHT BUDGET TARGETS AND COST CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND MARKETING MANAGERS' PROPENSITY TO CREATE SLACK

Extant literature suggests that target setting must be complemented by cost control. There are, however, strong theoretical reasons to suggest that cost control, whilst meaningful for the manufacturing function, may be less effective for the marketing function. Difficulties in setting standards and tracing marketing results (sales) to marketing effort and the discretionary nature of many marketing costs are likely to reduce the effectiveness of cost control in marketing departments. This study examines firstly, whether cost control moderates the relationships between emphasis on tight budget targets and subordinates' propensity to create slack; and secondly, whether these relationships are found in both the manufacturing and the marketing functions. The results support a significant two-way interaction between emphasis on tight budget targets and cost control affecting propensity to create slack for the manufacturing function, but not for the marketing function. Marketing managers' propensity to create slack was found to be associated only with emphasis on tight budget targets. These results are consistent with the theory that differences in manufacturing and marketing can influence the effectiveness of accounting control systems.     

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON PERFORMANCE AND THE USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

Performance information is a key‐element of NPM, but politicians and managers rarely use this information. On the basis of three case studies, this paper seeks to explain the use of the newly developed performance information. The paper argues that there is a distinction between the customer perspective and the citizen perspective on performance. NPM implies a customer and an internal perspective on performance. These perspectives may be relevant to managers, but politicians are primarily interested in a citizen perspective and a financial perspective. Two situations are identified in which governmental organizations more actively use performance information with a customer perspective and an internal perspective (as implied in NPM): (1) a crisis in the organization's internal processes with political and/or financial consequences and (2) loose coupling of the performance reports to politicians and to managers, which stimulates the information use by both politicians and managers.     

SHORT‐TERM EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON OPERATING PERFORMANCE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In this article I use a sample of 178 Czech firms that were in the first wave of voucher privatization to test changes in efficiency and profitability. Based on a previous study's methodology, nonparametric tests reveal that efficiency and profitability decreased immediately following privatization. This is in contrast to earlier studies that find privatization increases these measures. Changes in firms' operations do not vary significantly by size or ownership but do vary by industry type, with nonmanufacturing firms having more positive (or less negative) changes after privatization. Evidence indicates that in spite of the disappointing findings, positive operating performance changes are taking place, such as a decrease in employment. JEL classification: G32, L33, 052     

THE EFFECT OF CEO TENURE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TURNOVER

We analyze the effect of CEO tenure on the relation between firm performance and forced turnover. We find that the performance‐forced turnover relation is conditional on CEO tenure. Our results suggest a constant negative relation between firm performance and forced turnover throughout an inside CEO's tenure. Founders are entrenched early in their careers but held accountable for firm performance later in their careers. We find evidence that outside hires experience a probationary period, followed by a period of apparent entrenchment during their intermediate years that weakens later in their tenure. JEL classification: G34, J63.     

THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION ON SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS AND BANKS

The passage of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 was a legislative response to the plight of the thrift industry. The Act broadened the asset/liability powers of thrifts and granted regulators emergency authority to aid failing institutions. In this paper we analyze the effect of the Act on the market returns of large S&Ls and banks using a two-factor estimating procedure. Single-factor models of depository institutions' returns produce biased estimates and confound the Act's interpretation. Explicit treatment of the event/risk interaction is necessary to avoid ambiguities in the interpretation of the Act's effect on the returns of depository institutions. It is difficult to use capital market data to pinpoint the effect of information flows on complex regulatory changes.     

ON IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MARKET MODEL

Data on 4,087 securities from 1988 to 1990 are used to test the relation between market model R² and trading volume. Eliminating high-volume observations increases R² by about 10 percent, confirming results previously reported. This study indicates that this improvement is possible by eliminating a small number of observations. It also indicates that this relation between R² and volume is unrelated to firm size.     

THE ACTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION

In recent years, boards of directors have become more active and independent of management in pursuing shareholder interests. But, up to this point, there has been little empirical evidence that active boards help companies produce higher rates of return for their shareholders. In this article, after describing the new board activism, the authors argue that past failures to document an association between independent boards and superior corporate performance can be explained by two features of the research: its concentration on periods prior to the 1990s (when most boards were largely irrelevant) and its use of unreliable proxies (such as a minimum percentage of outside directors) for a well-functioning board.
The authors hypothesize that an independent and resourceful board takes steps that require management to increase earnings available to investors. To test this hypothesis, the performance of a sample of large U.S. corporations was examined over the period 1991-1995 using two proxies for the professionalism of each company's board: (1) the letter grades (A+ to F) assigned by CalPERS for corporate governance; and (2) a presence or absence grade based on three key indicators of professional board behavior. Both of these governance metrics were associated in statistically significant ways with superior corporate performance, as measured by earnings in excess of cost of capital and net of the industry average. While acknowledging that such results do not prove causation, the authors conclude that, in the first half of the 1990s, corporations with active and independent boards added significantly more value for shareholders than those with passive, rubber-stamp boards.