Fragmentation, Engel's Law, and Learning

This paper outlines the conditions under which trade is beneficial for a developing country's growth. A developing country suffers from two disadvantages: low income and a comparative disadvantage in the production of modern manufactured goods—goods which allow a high rate of human capital accumulation through learning by doing. Low income together with Engel's law imply that developing countries consume and produce very few modern goods in autarky and hence grow slowly. With international fragmentation of production, a developing country may find comparative advantage in the production of some stages of modern goods despite an absence of comparative advantage in the production of modern goods under “100% local content.” More resources can then be allocated to the modern goods sector leading to greater learning externalities and hence growth under free trade than in autarky.     

IMPROVING THE ANALYTICAL AND DATA FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR FOR NATIONAL GOALS ACCOUNTING*

Provision of “market goods” follows the decision rules of traditional microeconomics; pricing and resource allocation for such goods tend towards Pareto optimality. The provision of “collective goods,” by contrast, depends on political (or quasi-political) collective decision processes; beneficiaries often receive a share of collective goods free of charge or well below average or marginal (private or social) costs. No inherent tendency towards optimality may be presumed and separate analysis of collective goods becomes an essential part of national goals accounting. The national-income-accounts (NIA) distinction between personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and government purchases of goods and services corresponds roughly to a division between market goods bought by the consumer and a major category of “collective goods” (i.e. “public goods” provided by government). However, a significant proportion of PCE represents “collective goods” paid for by government, business, or nonprofit organizations and provided on behalf of the consumer, whereas a part of NIA government purchases represents services paid for by the consumer (i.e. “market goods”). This article develops operationally meaningful distinctions among “market goods,”“collective goods,” and “tied aid” (a mixed category with market-good and collective-good characteristics). These distinctions are determined by the nature of the decision processes–rather than by the characteristics of the beneficiary or the supplier. This classification is related to the national income accounts and major discrepancies are pinpointed. The blurring of the distinction among market goods, collective goods and tied aid is found to be most consequential in the NIA treatment of “education” and “medical care” services. NIA data for these two services are restructured for national goals accounting purposes in order to illustrate both the quantitative importance and the empirical feasibility of classifying benefits by their respective decision processes.     

Productive Capacity, Product Varieties, and the Elasticities Approach to the Trade Balance

Most macroeconomic models imply that faster income growth tends either to lower a country’s trade balance by raising its imports with little change to its exports or to reduce its terms of trade in order to maintain balanced trade. Krugman (1989 ) proposed a model in which countries grow by producing new varieties of goods. In his model, faster‐growing countries are able to export these new goods and maintain balanced trade without suffering any deterioration in their terms of trade. This paper analyzes the growth of US imports from different source countries and finds strong support for Krugman’s model.     

A model of trust in quality and North–South trade

Why do some countries produce higher quality goods than other countries? This paper suggests that one reason is self-perpetuating reputations, modelling the idea with a Klein–Leffler reputation model embedded in a general equilibrium model of trade. Reputation differences are particularly interesting because reputation is a form of “social capital”. Like product differentiation, it can explain why countries might trade even if their technologies and endowments are identical, why firms could profit from exports even if the foreign price is no higher than the domestic one, and why governments like to have “high-value” sectors. Ideally, a developing country would shift its own producers to a high-quality equilibrium; if that is not possible, the next best thing is to import experience goods and substitute to home production of goods for which reputation is not important.     

Externalities,Productivity and Sustained Growth

This paper shows that the existence of endogenous growth, in the closed‐form solution, in a single sector economy with a convex technology in an overlapping generations (OLG) framework, which attempts to fill the current gap in endogenous growth theory. It finds there is an unbounded growth when trade, in the form of knowledge spillover, affects labor productivity through the formation of human capital with self‐education that is not an independent sector but builds the human capital here. This conclusion holds even though there is the “limited income” expressed as the “non‐increasing wage/investment ratio” for each generation. Moreover, it shows the convergence of growth rates for each country, which is unique and constant, while the growth rate per capita negatively relates with each country's population growth rate. Also, there is no “poverty trap” with the introduction of externalities that is different from existing literature.     

Social memory,evidence, and conflict

This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory — a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in a game of conflict characterized by the possibility of mutually destructive “all out war” that yields catastrophic consequences for both sides. Each country is inhabited by a dynastic sequence of individuals. Each individual cares about future individuals in the same country, and can communicate with the next generation of their countrymen using private messages. Social memory is based on these messages, and on physical evidence — a sequence of imperfectly informative public signals of past behavior. We find that if the future is sufficiently important for all individuals, then regardless of the precision of physical evidence from the past there is an equilibrium in which the two countries engage in all out war with arbitrarily high frequency, an outcome that cannot arise in the standard repeated game. In our construction, each new generation “repeats the mistakes” of its predecessors, leading to an endless cycle of destructive behavior.Surprisingly, we find that degrading the quality of information that individuals have about current decisions may “improve” social memory. This in turn ensures that arbitrarily frequent all out wars cannot occur.     

Local Import Competition in a Lumpy Country

This paper examines the effects of a fall in the price of an imported good in a region of a country that is specialized in producing that good. The context is a “lumpy country” model in which factors are unable to move between locations, although in this case I assume that only labor is immobile, and that the other factor, capital, is perfectly mobile between regions. With mobile capital, the lumpy-country equilibrium can be anywhere in the factor-price equalization set, but my focus is on a region that initially produces only one good, on the border of that set. When the price of that good falls due to import competition, it would be possible for both factors to reallocate partially into production of the other good, but I assume instead that some capital simply leaves the region, so that it continues to produce only the same good that it did before. The result of this is a fall in the real wage of labor, just as under Stolper-Samuelson assumptions. I then look at production also of a non-traded good, and find that the same import competition that cheapened the traded good also cheapens the nontraded good. The result is that the region shrinks, losing capital and producing less of both goods unless the substitution in favor of the nontraded good expands its consumption out of a smaller income.     

Rhodes,Mugabe and the Politics of Commemorative Toponyms in Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT

This paper is based on former Zimbabwean President Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s ninety-third birthday celebrations. It uses and goes beyond the said ceremony to interrogate the politics of commemorative toponyms in post-independence Zimbabwe. The event took place on 25 February 2017 at a school whose name Rhodes Estate Preparatory School (REPS) was changed to Matopos Junior School prior to the celebrations. The methodological framing of this discussion consists of a critical reading of the media’s representation of the name change and the debates that followed. Reference is specifically made to two Zimbabwean newspapers, The Patriot, which featured the story on 2 March 2017 under the heading “Rhodes ‘legacy’ finally put to rest” and the ZimEye’s story of 26 February 2017 headlined “Mugabe removes Rhodes.” Theoretically, the paper is framed within the critical approach to toponymy that interprets commemorative place-nomenclature as political arenas which could be used to think through issues of history and memory. In particular, it is argued in this paper that in post-independence Zimbabwe, place names, especially commemorative toponyms, are political spaces par excellence which we can use to study not only the country’s colonial history but also its postcolonial realities.     

Public infrastructure for production and international trade in a small open economy: a dynamic analysis

This paper develops a dynamic trade model with a stock of public infrastructure, which has a property of “unpaid factor of production”. We show that a country with a smaller (larger) labor endowment tends to become an exporter of a good whose productivity is more (less) sensitive to the stock of public infrastructure. We also show that after the opening of trade, the labor-scarce country becomes unambiguously better off but the labor-abundant country may become worse off. Overall, these results contrasts with those obtained in the case of public intermediate goods with a “creation of atmosphere” property.     

Adam Smith and the “rich country–poor country” debate: eighteenth-century views on economic progress and international trade

Despite his emphasis on economic development, Adam Smith did not participate in the contemporary “rich country–poor country” debate. Some see the absenteeism as a deficiency, while others assume that Smith propounds a theory of uneven development and agrees with the divergence argument. In this article, Smith's own theory is expounded and related to the contentious points of the “rich country–poor country” debate. It is concluded that Smith's theory does not fit easily into the categories of this debate. He rather takes up a third position, being neither a proponent of pure convergence nor of pure divergence.     

NATIONAL TREATMENT AT THE WTO: THE ROLES OF PRODUCT AND COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY*

This paper analyzes the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) national treatment (NT) clause in a two‐country model where quality of goods and/or market size are heterogenous across countries. When market size is symmetric across countries, a reciprocal NT agreement (i) benefits the high‐quality country, (ii) hurts the low‐quality country, and (iii) delivers higher aggregate world welfare. However, such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high‐quality country's market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small (i.e., goods are sufficiently alike). The qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined.     

Three macroeconomic syntheses of vintage 1937: Hicks,Haberler, and Lundberg

Abstract

The 1920s and 1930s were years of intensive debate about economic dynamics and stabilisation policies. There was a large variety of explanations of cycles and depressions, and Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) was pitched against them. In 1937, followed three different attempts to provide synthetic expositions of macroeconomic theory that would deal with the Keynesian challenge: Hicks’ Mr. Keynes and the “Classics”, Haberler's Prosperity and Depression, and Lundberg's Studies in the Theory of Economic Expansion. This paper compares those 1937 syntheses and contrasts them with the “Neoclassical Synthesis” and the current “New Neoclassical Synthesis”.     

National Border Effects: Location, Not Nationality, Matters

A recent literature documents the downward impact of national borders on trade. This paper probes the relative importance of two potential sources of border effects: (1) pure locational factors, such as transport costs and tariffs; and (2) an inherent disadvantage for a firm selling in a foreign market. I am able to make this decomposition by using data on the local sales of foreign affiliates of US multinational enterprises, on US bilateral exports, and on domestic sales by host‐country firms. The “border effect” arises almost entirely from locational factors. If a firm establishes and sells from a subsidiary located in the foreign country, its local sales are about on a par with those of domestic firms in that market.     

EU Banks Rating Assignments: Is There Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries?

We model EU countries' bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and slope heterogeneity. Our aim is to assess whether “old” and “new” EU countries are rated differently and to determine whether “new” ones are assigned lower ratings, ceteris paribus, than “old” ones. We find that country‐specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” ones, after controlling for financial variables we also discover that all countries have significantly different intercepts, confirming our prior belief. This intercept heterogeneity suggests that each country's rating is assigned uniquely, after controlling for differences in financial factors, which may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, we find that ratings may respond differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables across countries. Typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less sensitive to the latter for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries.     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Economic Growth Evens Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys

In spite of the great U‐turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has fallen in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the “very unhappy” and the “perfectly happy.” Lower happiness inequality is found both between and within countries, and between and within individuals. Our cross‐country regression results suggest that the extension of various public goods helps to explain this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylized fact arguably comes as a bonus to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries.     

The roles of relative prices,interest rates,and bequests in the consumption function

This paper investigates the roles of relative prices, interest rates, inflation expectations and bequests in the determination of consumer expenditures for four goods in the U.S. The framework employed is a life-cycle extension of the Linear Expenditure System, in which relative prices, wealth, labor income, the nominal interest rate, and anticipated rates of inflation for each good are major arguments. The results provide strong empirical support for the expenditure system employed and suggest a significant role for relative prices and for the bequest motive in shaping saving decisions. We also find that expenditure decisions respond to both interest rates and anticipated inflation in a “Fisherian” fashion, but that the interest elasticity of saving is quite low and of uncertain sign. Our model also provides an estimate of the consumer's “horizon,” defined in the sense of Friedman.     

Multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences

This article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries. Under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization, we show that (1) a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods, enabling it to provide more public goods; (2) the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost; (3) each country obtains an identical utility increment; and (4) the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country. All results are derived based on well-known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels.     

Adding links,adding persons,and adding structures: Using Sen's frameworks

Abstract

This essay is a comment on “Sen on Freedom and Gender Justice,” by Mozaffar Qizilbash, which appeared in Feminist Economics Volume 11, Number 3, November 2005.

Building on the 2003 double special issue of Feminist Economics entitled “Amartya Sen's Work and Ideas,” this paper responds to the review essay by Mozaffar Qizilbash. It identifies and illustrates various possible evaluations of a theoretical system, including that it has acknowledged strengths, unrecognized strengths, remediable gaps or failings, or structural faults. The paper then looks at Sen's system as a theoretical basis for “human development”– in particular in relation to personhood, emotions, and psychological interdependence – and argues that it points in directions required for economic and social analysis, including towards theories of care, but is not itself a sufficient treatment. The paper suggests deepening Sen's system by connecting to other important languages of analysis concerning the structuring of attitudes, emotions, felt well-being, public reasoning, and politics.     

The Heckscher–Ohlin model and the network structure of international trade

This paper estimates for 28 product groups a characteristic parameter that reflects the topological structure of its trading network. Using these estimates, it describes how the structure of international trade has evolved during the 1980–2000 period. Thereafter, it demonstrates the importance of networks in international trade by explicitly accounting for their scaling properties when testing the prediction of the “Heckscher–Ohlin” model that factor endowment differentials determine bilateral trade flows. The results suggest that factor endowment differentials increase bilateral trade in goods that are traded in “dispersed” networks. For goods traded in “concentrated” networks, factor endowment differentials are less important.