Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

The Impact of Publication of Analysts' Recommendations on Returns and Trading Volume

Publication of security analysts' recommendations in the column “Inside Wall Street,” which is published in Business Week, induces abnormal returns on the publication day and the following day. The abnormal returns are robust to the use of alternative samples and methodologies. The publication increases trading volumes for the securities that are recommended to be purchased, but not for securities that are recommended to be sold. The abnormal returns and trading volumes support the view that stock prices do not adjust instantaneously when new information arrives, and that the time pattern of price adjustment depends on the time pattern of the accessibility of the information. The authors find no statistically significant difference between the average abnormal returns that are induced by recommendations that appear at the beginnings of “Inside Wall Street” columns (and are covered more extensively than others) and the average abnormal returns induced by other recommendations.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUBLICATION OF “STOCK HIGHLIGHTS” BY VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY

We examine the reaction of stocks and the response of financial analysts' earnings forecasts to securities recommended as “Stock Highlights” by Value Line Investment Survey. Significant abnormal returns appear around the publication of stock highlights. Stock price responses are relatively efficient and permanent. Using earnings expectation data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, we find analysts raise their forecasts significantly following Value Line recommendations. Near-term forecast revisions are significantly related to stock returns at the time of the recommendations. Thus, an explanation for Value Line's security recommendation success is its ability to generate firm-specific earnings information.     

The “Best Corporate Citizens”: Are They Good for Their Shareholders?

Since 2000, Business Ethics magazine has published a list of the 100 Best Corporate Citizens. Our event study finds significant positive abnormal returns for new companies added to the annual listing on the press release date of the survey, both initially and in subsequent survey releases. Over longer holding periods, the top 100 companies consistently outperform the S&P 500, yet are not significantly different from a matched set of companies, with the exception of the initial survey year (2000). However, a rebalancing strategy based on new additions outperforms both the S&P 500 and a matched portfolio.     

Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: The Case of Brokerage House Acquisitions

This paper examines the common stock returns of three groups of bidders that purchased brokerage houses. Only in the cases of horizontal mergers, one brokerage house purchasing another, are there abnormal returns associated with the purchase. Neither bank holding company bidders nor non-financial bidders gain significantly when purchasing a brokerage house. Bank holding company bidders face considerable regulatory delays, and these economic disturbances may eliminate their gains. Bank holding company expansion into these non-bank activities does not appear, at the time of announcement, to either hurt or benefit them; hence, this expansion does not appear to further the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.     

The coverage assignments of financial analysts

Previous studies document that forecast accuracy impacts analyst career outcomes. This paper investigates the influence of forecast accuracy on coverage assignments. I show that brokerage houses reward accurate analysts by assigning them to high-profile firms and penalise analysts exhibiting poor accuracy by assigning them to smaller firms. The coverage of high-profile firms increases the potential for future compensation linked to investment banking and trading commissions. In addition, covering such firms increases analysts' recognition from buy-side investors, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of obtaining broker votes and votes for the Institutional Investor star ranking. Overall, my results indicate that high forecast accuracy leads to increased future compensation.     

Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Stock Prices and the Supply of Information

We develop a model in which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price provides an incentive for brokers to produce research reports on firms with low share prices. Stock splits therefore affect the attention paid to a firm by investment analysts. Managers with favorable private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm's shares in order to reveal the information to investors. We find empirical evidence that is consistent with the major new prediction of the model, that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely related to its share price.     

An Analysis of the Recommendations of the “Superstar” Money Managers at Barron's Annual Roundtable

We examine the performance of common stock recommendations made by prominent money managers at Barron's Annual Roundtable from 1968 to 1991. To avoid survivorship bias, we examine the performance of recommendations by all the participants. The buy recommendations earn significant abnormal returns of 1.91 percent from the recommendation day to the publication day, a period of about 14 days. However, the abnormal returns are essentially zero for one to three year postpublication day holding periods. Thus, an individual investing according to the Roundtable recommendations published in Barron's would not benefit from the advice.     

Sell-side analyst heterogeneity and insider trading

This study explores insider trading patterns under different earnings surprises. After controlling for stock market liquidity and earnings announcements returns, we show that insiders sell more aggressively depending on the heterogeneity of analysts whose EPS forecasts are met or beaten to camouflage their trades. Specifically, insiders sell more shares of their company sooner after the publication of earnings when top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten. Consistent with the informed trading literature, insiders strategically select these moments because the stock price impact is low and the legal scrutiny of their trades is minimal. To support this result, we employ an exogenous drop in firms' analyst coverage due to the closure or merger of brokerage houses. Furthermore, in line with the camouflage incentives, by selling after top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten, stock prices adjust slowly to insider trades. Finally, we show that the incentives of insiders to hide their trades are concentrated in opportunistic insiders and members of the top management team, who are more likely to bear the costs of selling shares after positive news.     

Risk,Mispricing, and Value Investing

We evaluate the stock return performance of a modified version of the book-to-market strategy and its implications for market efficiency. If the previously documented superior stock return of the book-to-market strategy represents mispricing, its performance should be improved by excluding fairly valued firms with extreme book-to-market ratios. To attain this, we classify stocks as value or glamour on book-to-market ratios and accounting accruals jointly. This joint classification is likely to exclude stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios due to mismeasured accounting book values reflecting limitations underlying the accounting system. Using both 12-month buy-and-hold returns and earnings announcement returns, our results show that this joint classification generates substantially higher portfolio returns in the post-portfolio-formation year than the book-to-market classification alone with no evidence of increased risk. In addition, this superior stock return performance is more pronounced among firms held primarily by small (unsophisticated) investors and followed less closely by market participants (stock price <$10). Finally, and most importantly, financial analysts are overly optimistic (pessimistic) about earnings of glamour (value) stock, and for a subset of firms identified as overvalued by our strategy, the earnings announcement raw return, as well as abnormal return, is negative. These last results are particularly important because it is hard to envision a model consistent with rational investors holding risky stocks with predictable negative raw returns for a long period of time rather than holding fT-bills and with financial analysts systematically overestimating the earnings of these stocks while underestimating earnings of stocks that outperform the stock market.     

Reputation and Performance Among Security Analysts

Members of the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when forecasts are matched by the corporation followed and by the date of brokerage house issuance. This contemporaneous advantage is complemented by a timing advantage; All-Americans supply forecasts more often than other analysts. Stocks returns immediately following large upward forecast revisions suggest that All-Americans impact prices more than other analysts. However, there is virtually no difference in returns following large downward revisions. Nevertheless, the collective results suggest a positive relation between reputation and performance, and, assuming that All-Americans are better paid, pay and performance.     

Evaluating the information in the federal reserve stress tests

We present evidence that the Federal Reserve stress tests produce information about both the stress-tested bank holding companies and the overall state of the banking industry. Our evidence goes beyond a standard event study, which cannot differentiate between small abnormal returns and large, but opposite-signed, abnormal stock returns. We find that stress test disclosures are associated with significantly higher absolute abnormal returns, as well as higher abnormal trading volume. More levered and riskier holding companies seem to be more affected by the stress test information. We find no evidence that stress test disclosures have reduced the production of private information. After disclosure begins, stress tested firms attract equity analysts without changing analysts’ forecast dispersions or their mean forecast error.     

Analysts’ Momentum Recommendations

We document that the likelihood of analyst recommendations following past stock returns decreased abruptly in 2003, coinciding with the Global Settlement and other regulatory changes designed to restrain analysts’ conflicts of interest. We also document that the likelihood of recommendations following past stock returns is abnormally high for recommendations issued after negative stock returns (but not for those issued after positive stock returns), among inexperienced and inaccurate analysts, among large brokerage houses, and for companies with high share turnover. Moreover, the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns are accompanied by earnings forecast revisions that are larger in magnitude and less accurate ex post. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts with conflicts of interest and limited ability are more likely to base their recommendations on past stock returns. Finally, we document that the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns (especially those that were issued before 2003 and those that are issued after negative stock returns) contribute to existing price momentum by generating incrementally stronger short‐term and long‐term stock returns.     

Financial analysts and price discovery

We show that whether or not a bank/brokerage firm has top‐rated financial analysts and high Wall Street Search rankings for their research is significantly related to that firm's contribution to price discovery, the process by which information is incorporated into stock prices. Our study relates cross‐sectional characteristics of the quality of brokerage research, the asymmetric information environment, and order flow volume to a microstructure measure of price discovery developed by Granger and Gonzalo. We measure analysts’ research quality with an industry‐specific ranking by institutional investors, with an opinion survey of trading desk personnel, and with the number of top 3 analysts across all industries employed by the bank/brokerage firm.     

The determinants of analyst-firm pairings

This paper explores the determinants of observed analyst-firm pairings. We adopt an analyst/brokerage house perspective that allows us to examine not only firm-level characteristics as in prior research, but also attributes of the analyst and the analyst’s brokerage house that may drive these pairings. Our empirical analyses provide two primary insights. First, analyst characteristics such as industry expertise and relative experience, and brokerage house characteristics such as continuity of coverage, are associated with the decision to follow a firm. Second, there is substantial variation in the association between firm, analyst, and brokerage house characteristics and the decision to follow a firm; this occurs across individual analysts as well as across different types of brokerage houses. Overall, our results provide further insights into the factors leading to observed analyst-firm pairings, and indicate that these factors vary across analysts and their brokerage houses – suggesting richer associations than the average firm-level relationships documented by prior research.     

Investment analysis and the adjustment of stock prices to common information

In this article we are concerned with the effect of the numberof investment analysts following a firm on the speed of adjustmentof the firm's stock price to new information that has commoneffects across firms. It is found that returns on portfoliosof firms that are followed by many analysts tend to lead thoseof firms that are followed by fewer analysts, even when thefirms are of approximately the same size. Many analyst firmsalso tend to respond more rapidly to market returns than dofew analyst firms, adjusting for firm size. This relation, however,is nonlinear, and the marginal effect of the number of analystson the speed of price adjustment increases with the number ofanalysts.     

Stock index adjustments and analysts’ forecast optimism: A quasi-natural experiment on the CSI 300 Index

As stock index adjustments comprise a basic system of capital market, their potential influence on analysts’ earnings forecasts is worthy of research. Based on a research sample of 23 adjustments to the CSI 300 Index from June 2007 to June 2018 and the backup stocks announced during the same period, this study examines the impact of additions to stock index on analysts’ forecast optimism using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The research results show that after stocks are added to the stock index, analysts’ earnings forecast optimism about these stocks increases significantly. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that this increase is more significant when the market is bullish, institutional ownership is low, the ratio of listed brokerage firms is low, star analyst coverage is low, firms show seasoned equity offering activity, the ratio of analysts from the top five brokerage firms ranked by commission income is high, and the analysts’ brokerage firms are shareholders. However, analyst-level tests find that analysts’ ability helps to reduce the impact of additions to stock index on earnings forecast optimism. Furthermore, additions to stock index significantly increase analyst coverage and forecast divergence. Economic consequences tests find additions to stock index significantly increases stock price synchronization, which is partly mediated by analysts’ earnings forecast optimism. This study enriches the literature on the impact of basic capital market systems and analyst behavior. The findings suggest that investors should rationally evaluate analysts’ earnings forecasts for stocks added to the stock index and obtain further information from various channels to improve asset allocation efficiency.     

Internal control material weakness, analysts’ accuracy and bias, and brokerage reputation

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW hereafter) on sell side analysts. We find that ICMW reporting firms have less accurate analyst forecasts relative to non-reporting firms when the reported ICMWs belong to the Pervasive type. ICMW reporting firms have more optimistically biased analyst forecasts compared than non-reporting firms. The optimistic bias exists only in the forecasts issued by the analysts affiliated with less-highly-reputable brokerage houses. The differences in accuracy and bias between ICMW and non-ICMW firms disappear when ICMW disclosing firms stop disclosing ICMWs. Collectively, our results suggest that the weaknesses in internal control increases forecasting errors and upward bias for financial analysts. However, a good brokerage reputation can curb the optimistic bias.