对公共预算改革与政府会计改革协调推进的思考

预算改革的实质是一种政治改革.现阶段公共预算改革应对新增重大项目预算部分引入绩效考核指标并进行网上公开,而政府会计改革应对含有绩效指标预算部分采用权责发生制核算.通过这两部分协调一致的改革.形成社会舆论对政府重大项目预算效率的压力,由此产生政府的部分公共责任,即产生一种政治责任.随着改革的发展,这种协调改革应逐步扩展到基本支出预算部分,完成政府向责任政府的转变.     

地方政府信息服务模式改革思考

文章分析了社会转型变革中服务型政府建设目标和政府信息服务的内涵、实质与实现。基于社会经济文化发展目标与发展环境,认为政府信息服务模式改革应是“十二五”经济社会改革和创新发展的重要方面。地方政府信息服务模式改革应该体现超前、便民特色,寻求和创建地方政府信息服务特有模式,同时提出建设政府信息集成共享公共服务平台等铜陵市政府信息服务模式改革主要建议项目,服务“十二五”大建设与大发展。     

A Win–Win–Win Tariff–Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Taking into account non‐constant marginal costs, this paper considers the effects of a tariff cut combined with a consumption tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. We show that welfare, government revenue, and market access can all improve with this policy reform under decreasing marginal costs. This result may provide a theoretical rationale for the above policy reform, which is guided by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.     

The Washington Consensus revisited: a new structural economics perspective

The Washington Consensus reform resulted in economic collapse and stagnation in many transition economies and “lost decades” in other developing countries in 1980s and 1990s. The paper provides a new structural economics perspective of such failures. The Washington Consensus reform failed to recognize that many firms in a transition economy were not viable in an open, competitive market because those industries went against the comparative advantages determined by the economy’s endowment structure. Their survival relied on the government’s protections and subsidies through various interventions and distortions. The Washington Consensus advised the government to focus their reforms on issues related to property rights, corporate governance, government interventions, and other issues that may obstruct a firm’s normal management. Without resolving the firms’ viability problem, such reforms led to the firms’ collapse and an unintended decline and stagnation of the economy in the transition process. This paper suggests that the viability assumption in neoclassical economics be relaxed when analyzing development and transition issues in socialist, transition, and developing economies.     

政府会计改革影响因素研究述评——基于利益相关者动机与制度因素视角

政府会计改革是一项复杂的系统工程,它受到多种因素的影响.利益相关者的动机将直接驱动政府会计改革的实施,但又会受制于一国制度环境因素的影响.利益相关者动机与制度因素共同决定了政府会计改革的方向与程度.本文从利益相关者动机与制度因素影响的视角,从预算约束与财政透明度、绩效评价与成本计量,以及资产管理与债务风险防范等角度评述了政府会计改革影响因素的研究.     

School Finance Litigation, Tax and Expenditure Limitations, and Education Spending

Since the early 1970s, litigation in many U.S. states has led to education finance reform. Over the same period, many states have imposed new tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on local governments. The imposition of a TEL may alter how local and state education expenditures change subsequent to court-mandated decreases in spending inequality. Similarly, the effectiveness of TELs in limiting local education expenditures may be influenced by reform. To better evaluate the effects of reform and TELs on education spending, this article considers them jointly and finds that reform has a negative effect on local own-source education expenditures only in the presence of TELs. In the absence of court-ordered reform, TELs decrease own-source expenditure, but the effect is less pronounced than when TELs are present with reform. When both are present, state government spending on education is higher. Also TELs and court-ordered reform independently increase state government spending on education. (JEL H72 , I22 )     

‘Flattening’ tax evasion?

We analyze the response of tax evasion to the introduction of a flat tax in several transition economies. Using a novel estimator based on household level data, we show that in most of the countries studied there was no discernible effect on the measured size of unreported income following a flat tax reform. This may imply that decreases in marginal tax rates may frequently have been accompanied by a parallel deterioration in attitudes towards public services and the government in general. The countries that show a response to the flat tax reform appear to be those where satisfaction with government services increased.     

我国公立医疗机构按病种收费研究

我国医疗改革已进行了几十年,政府已尽到了最大努力,但收效并不如意,看病难、看病贵的问题依然存在,我国医疗改革如何深入进行？这是一个摆在党和政府面前的一个难题。一个带有方向性治本性的改革方案,那就是我国公立医疗机构实行按病种收费。为此,文章首先设计了一个按病种收费系统完整实施方案,全面深入剖析了其重要意义,预测了实施中可能出现的问题,提出了对策建议。     

奖章与陷阱:渐进转轨中的腐败

中国在1970年代后期开始推进以市场化为导向的改革战略，国民经济和社会福利得到迅速的改善和提高，但腐败现象也比较严重；同时，市场化的推进并未能遏制住腐败的扩散，市场化程度较高的地区反而面临着更为严重的腐败现象。通过分析中国的经济转轨过程，本文对此作出了解释。与其他处于经济转轨过程中的经济体相比，中国经济发展所具有的特殊的制度安排既促成了经济的迅速成长，也引发了普遍的腐败问题。它们包括：经济决策的地方分权、双轨制市场化和集体所有的产权形式，这些要素既提高了官员推动经济增长的激励，也促使许多官员以腐败的形式分享经济增长的红利，而以“关系”为基础的社会文化背景、中央政治权威的稳定性有助于减少官员在抽租过程中对经济增长可能产生的负面影响。另外，我们认为，市场化改革对腐败可能产生两方面效应，一方面，市场化通过培育新型的企业家阶层促使大量资源由市场配置，这有助于减少腐败发生的可能性；另一方面．市场化进程通过促进经济增长提高了经济中的租金总量，这成为诱发寻租行为的因素。最终的净效应取决于政府部门的改革。发生在中国的现象可以归结为政府改革的不彻底性。     

基于中央选择性控制的试验——中国改革“实践”机制的一种新解释

关于中国改革机制有众多的解释,新近提出的试验说被视为切中改革实践的一种理论。本文从内容到方法论层面对试验说进行评析,在此基础上提出替代性解释：试验是基于中央选择性控制的。中央对怎么改革并不预先设定一个原则和目标,而是通过对试验的不确定态度,实现对地方的选择性控制。改革过程中,除了维护政治权力秩序（地方服从于中央）的意识非常清晰之外,对怎么改革并没有明确的意识。实践的形式可以多种多样,至于采用哪种形式完全取决于中央的需要及对中央的功效如何,在根源上则受制于整个权力体系结构所受的约束。基于中央选择性控制的试验有利于中央化解危机但又不失对秩序的控制权,但客观上却使得试验难以充分发挥和推广,最终趋于同质化。     

中国经济改革模式:基于路径依赖理论的视角

路径依赖理论告诉我们:经济转型是个复杂的历史过程,这一过程存在路径依赖,初始的政策失误可能导致整个经济转型的失败.中国未来经济改革的指导原则是:中国应该根据自己的国情制定符合自身发展道路的制度;政府在没有认清决策产生的经济后果以前,应该充分收集信息,严格评估政策结果,防止经济改革被过早地锁定到错误的轨道上.     

政府角色定位与企业改制的成败

由产权不清和政府寻租导致的企业家努力水平低下是造成乡镇企业经营困难的根本原因 ,企业改制是解决这一问题的主要手段。但是 ,如果改制仅仅局限于所有权易手 ,不去触动地方政府事后寻租的权力基础 ,不形成对产权的有效保护 ,那么考虑到政府的事后寻租 ,企业家仍然不会提供高水平的努力。只有进行政府机构改革 ,使企业家确立政府不会事后寻租的信念 ,企业家的激励问题才能真正得到解决。本文通过构造一个两阶段不完全博弈信号传递模型 ,解释了造成改制后地区间经济绩效差异的原因 ,阐明了机构改革是政府传递改制决心、企业家识别政府类型的关键信号。而是否进行政府机构改革则决定了改制的成败     

对财税体制改革在全面深化改革中发挥支撑作用的思考

公共财政是推动变革的核心力量,随着国家职能的转变,公共财政也必须转变.如果财税体制改革滞后,则会影响其他改革进程;如果财税改革能适应时代的要求,则会在全面深化改革中起支撑性作用.本文认为,在全面深化改革中财税体制改革发挥支撑作用所应遵循的三个原则是处理好政府与市场的关系、集权与分权的关系以及整体规划与稳步推进的关系;而财税体制改革发挥支撑性作用的三项主要工作是调整政府间收入分配,强化预算管理和加强相关领域的改革研究,重视监督机制建设.     

A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians

This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the attribution of accountability hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically. So doing, the central government does a dirty deed to the local ones, for a very cheap cost. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms that some local politicians expected to be the fall guys, bearing the brunt of the costs of the reform.     

分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。     

Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition

When two markets are vertically related, the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels. This paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations. We consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them. In order to mitigate pollution, the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant. We show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax. We further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax. We argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government, it will certainly increase social welfare.      

国外政府科技计划总体布局与组织管理相关问题探析

科技计划是一国政府利用财政经费组织实施研发活动的重要方式。目前,科技计划管理改革已成为我国科技体制改革的突破口,其中,国家科技计划的优化布局和组织管理是改革的重要内容。国外政府在科技计划管理的组织实施方面拥有较长的历史,在科技计划总体布局、组织管理和经费安排等方面均有许多值得我国借鉴的做法和经验。对国外政府在科技计划总体布局和组织管理上的主要做法进行了分析,并就值得借鉴的一些经验进行了讨论。     

RENT SEEKING AND TAX REFORM

Tax reform can either increase or reduce the amount of rent seeking, depending essentially on what is done. If tax reform involved eliminating special treatment of special groups and using the money saved either to lower the general tax rate or to discontinue government activities that most people would be better off without, then it would reduce the amount of rent seeking. Savings may, however, be used to reduce the degree of generally beneficial government activity. This is rather apt to increase the amount of rent seeking in the long run.     

西方国家行政改革实践及发展模式探究

西方国家的行政改革实践始于20世纪70年代末,改革基本上围绕着私有化、缩减政府规模、削减公共开支、转变政府职能等目标展开,所采取的具体措施也基本以绩效控制、私有化、政府再造和公共服务市场化等手段为主。结合西方国家行政改革的实践经验和未来发展模式,可将西方行政改革的模式归纳为四种:市场式政府模式、参与式政府模式、弹性化政府模式和解制型政府模式。     

SEIGNIORAGE, DOMESTIC DEBT, AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA

This paper describes the institutional features of China's hybrid economy that have allowed the government to earn high levels of seigniorage. It quantifies both the financial benefits and implicit costs to the government of extracting seigniorage from the economy. The analysis, which is based on the inside/outside money model of Gurley and Shaw (1960), indicates that seigniorage earnings in the period 1987—1994 were large, but were earned at the cost of a rising implicit government debt and potential future inflation. The paper also outlines how the Chinese government's ability to earn seigniorage in the future may decline as the economy becomes fully monetized and as reform alters the economy's unique institutional structure.