How fragile are male labor supply function estimates?

We estimate male wage and nonwage income effects using linear specifications spanning three techniques (ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and random effects), two wage measures (reported hourly wages and average hourly earnings), and sample stratification by pay scheme (salaried versus hourly paid). Our regressions encompass the one-period static and perfect-foresight life-cycle models. The static model implies exogenous random person-specific effects, a negative nonwage income coefficient, and a positive labor supply substitution effect. The life-cycle model implies endogenous individual-specific effects, a positive wage coefficient, and a zero nonwage income coefficient. Neither the one-period static nor the perfect-foresight life-cycle models are implied by the data for salaried workers while the static model is consistent with the data for hourly paid workers if income taxes are ignored.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Effect of the Tax System ON R&D Intensity,Growth, Wages and Consumption Share

We propose a general equilibrium knowledge‐driven (semi‐)endogenous‐growth model with horizontal R&D, which is extended to consider two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and exogenous government expenditure, financed through taxes on financial assets and on labour income, to analyse the implications of the tax system on R&D intensity, economic growth, wage inequality and consumption share in the output. In particular, we show that: (i) taxes have negative influence in the consumption share, being higher the marginal effect of the labour‐income tax; (ii) for any given government expenditure share, an increase (a decrease) in financial‐assets tax decreases (increases) the labour‐income tax; (iii) only the financial‐assets tax affects negatively the R&D intensity and the skill‐premium; thus, to reduce the skill‐premium the financial‐assets tax must increase; (iv) ignoring the effect on wage inequality and on R&D intensity, taxes are substitutes.     

Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies

We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income. The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual's lifetime. One way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age. If tax rates cannot be conditioned on age, a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal, as it can (imperfectly) mimic age-conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, H21.     

Tax reform in a two-class growth model

This paper analyzes the welfare and distributional effects of tax reforms in a two-class model with exogenous labour supply. It extends the empirically calibrated, standard life-cycle model to include both pure life-cycle savers and households with an altruistic bequest motive. The tax reform simulations cover the move from an income to a wage and a consumption tax, respectively. The role of borrowing constraints is studied and a dynamic analysis of tax reforms using a static expectation approach is performed. The simulation results indicate that the two tax reforms have different impacts on the welfare of the two classes: while the pure life-cycle savers are better off with the consumption tax, the altruistically motivated households gain more under a wage tax. The results further show that while the introduction of a consumption tax is distributionally neutral, the move to a wage tax substantially increases income and wealth inequality.     

Progressive taxes and automatic stabilization in an open economy

In a simple model with a fixed exchange rate, more progressive taxes are likely to lead to a fall in the multiplier for autonomous expenditure. The effect on the multiplier for an autonomous wage shock may go either way, and increased progressivity may change the sign of this multiplier. The wage bargaining is modeled as a trade-off between employment and real disposable income. Depending on them weight attached to employment and the way expectations are formed, more progressivity may contribute to stabilize rather than destabilize this wage formation process. Indexation of taxes to imported inflation seems preferable to alternatives.     

Hours risk and wage risk: repercussions over the life cycle*

We decompose earnings risk into contributions from hours and wage shocks. To distinguish between hours shocks, modeled as innovations to the marginal disutility of work, and labor supply reactions to wage shocks, we formulate a life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply. For estimation, we use data on married American men from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Permanent wage shocks explain 31 percent of total risk, permanent hours shocks 21 percent. Progressive taxation attenuates cross-sectional earnings risk, but its life-cycle insurance impact is much smaller. At the mean, a one-standard-deviation hours shock raises lifetime income by 11 percent, a wage shock by 13 percent.     

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.     

Interpreting life-cycle inequality patterns as an efficient allocation: Mission impossible?

The life-cycle patterns of consumption, wage and hours inequality observed in U.S. cross-sectional data are commonly viewed as incompatible with a Pareto efficient allocation. We determine the extent to which these qualitative and quantitative patterns can or cannot be produced by Pareto efficient allocations in models with preference shocks, wage shocks and full information.     

Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative. We also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature. We show that under weak conditions, it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement. The average asset income tax in this system is zero.     

Employment- and growth effects of tax reforms

Since the mid-1990s almost all OECD countries have engaged in fundamental reforms of their tax systems. There is a trend towards higher social security contributions and lower tax rates on personal and corporate income. This paper explores whether these tax policy measures are effective means for reducing unemployment and accelerating economic growth. Using a Pissarides type search model with endogenous growth, we analyze how savings and the incentive to create new jobs are affected by revenue-neutral tax swaps between wage income taxes, payroll taxes, capital income taxes and taxes levied on capital costs. In our framework, cutting the capital income tax (reducing the double taxation of dividend income) financed by a higher payroll tax turns out to be superior, such a policy mix fosters both employment and growth. Most other tax reforms imply a trade-off between employment and growth.     

An essay on the Life Cycle: Characterizing intertemporal behavior with uncertainty,human capital,taxes, durables,imperfect capital markets,and non-separable preferences

This paper formulates a general characterization of a household's portfolio choice and savings behavior in an environment with uncertain future interest rates, prices, wages, and factors influencing tastes. Savings may be invested in three types of assets: financial assets; human capital, which is non-tradable; and consumer durables, in which investment may be partially irreversible. Risk-return relations determine the optimal allocation of resources across assets at a point in time. The optimal intertemporal allocation of resources is determined by a restriction on the planned growth rate for the marginal utility of after-tax wealth, where growth rates depend on rates of time preference and measures of long-term riskless rates of interest. Given special assumptions, this marginal utility follows a martingale process as a consequence of optimizing behavior. Pricing formulae are developed for evaluating shifts in uncertain future income, wage, and price profiles. The relations characterizing portfolio and savings behavior presented here do not rely on particular distributional assumptions; they account for all forms of uncertainty including wage uncertainty induced by human capital investment; they allow for the non-marketability of assets; and the main results apply for very general functional form assumptions for preferences. In later sections, results are extended to incorporate income taxes and to account for a wide variety of imperfections in asset markets.     

Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods

The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor-income (wage) taxes. We introduce an experimental paradigm in which individuals make real labor-leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this paradigm to test whether a labor-income tax and an equivalent consumption tax lead to identical labor-leisure allocations. Despite controlling for subjects' work ability and inherent labor-leisure preferences and disallowing saving, subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more in response to an income tax than to an equivalent consumption tax. We discuss the economic implications of a policy shift to a consumption tax.     

On the Intergenerational Incidence of Wage and Consumption Taxes

This paper identifies the conditions that determine the intergenerational incidence of wage and consumption taxes. It emphasizes the role of the households' age‐earnings and age‐consumption profiles for an understanding of various intergenerational incidence patterns. Furthermore, the paper considers some political economy implications of the intergenerational incidence of wage and consumption taxes. It demonstrates that the distributional impact of wage versus consumption taxes bears the potential of a conflict between the young and the old on the one side and the middle‐aged on the other.     

Welfare states and unemployment

Summary This paper studies equilibrium unemployment in a search model where the government both provides liberal unemployment insurance and taxes labor at high progressive tax rates. It is shown how progressive income taxation can counteract a high unemployment rate under generous unemployment insurance. In particular, high marginal taxes reduce workers' incentives to switch jobs in response to changing economic opportunities. This lower labor mobility reduces unemployment but at the cost of a less efficient labor allocation.We are grateful to William Dupor, Krishna Kumar, and Ashok Rai for excellent computer programming.     

Taxation when Borrowing is Costly*

The implications for taxation theory of a life-cycle model of consumption incorporating financial transactions costs are derived The equity case for progressive taxation is shown to correspond in a life-cycle setting, to an efficiency case. Individuals prefer a progressive tax system to a proportional one because the tax burden is lower when they are young and face high transactions costs of borrowing. Similarly, an income tax is preferred to a consumption tax. Unlike earlier models based on liquidity constraints, the model presented here involves a financial sector consuming real resources. This permits analysis of the tax treatment of financial services in a consumption tax system. Exemption of financial services will generally be desirable.     

Taxes,Tuition Fees,and Education for Pleasure

The fact that education provides both a productive and a consumptive (nonproductive) return has important and, in some cases, dramatic implications for optimal taxes and tuition fees. Using a simple model, we show that when the consumption share in education is endogenous and tuition fees are unconstrained, the optimal tax/fee system involves regressive income taxes and high tuition fees. A progressive labor income tax system may, on the other hand, be a second‐best response to politically constrained, low tuition fees. Finally, the existence of individuals with different abilities will also move the optimal income tax system toward progressivity.     

The Efficiency of State Taxes on Mobile Labour Income

We model a federation where States levy a tax on the wage income of mobile citizens who shop between States for their preferred tax and public policy package. It is shown that competition between States results in efficient State spending but that the taxes on wage income are inefficient in the sense that mobile taxpayers are allocated inefficiently across States. The implication is that if States tax the wage income of mobile workers, there may be benefits from policy competition (a more competitive federal system) but also costs associated with the inefficiency. The central government can correct for the inefficiency, but this requires a complex system of inter-State transfers that are difficult to implement in practice.     

The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Spain

This paper focuses on the effects of fiscal policy in Spain analysed in a VAR context. Fiscal shocks are found to involve significant effects on GDP, private consumption, private investment, interest rates and prices. Non-Keynesian effects are observed. Moreover, evidence on the channels highlighted in the literature for such effects to arise is found, notably the effects of permanent income on consumption and investment on the demand side, coupled with the response of the equilibrium wage on the supply side affecting entrepreneurial profits and investment. The response of interest rates seems to reinforce both effects. Furthermore, the different readings of spending or taxes do not affect macroeconomic variables homogeneously.     

Macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy shocks in the UK: A DSGE analysis

This paper develops and estimates a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the analysis of fiscal policy in the UK. We find that government consumption and investment yield the highest GDP multipliers in the short-run, whereas capital income tax and public investment have dominating effect on GDP in the long-run. When nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound, consumption taxes and public consumption and investment are found to be the most effective fiscal instruments throughout the analysed horizon, and capital and labour income taxes are established to be the least effective. The paper also shows that the effectiveness of fiscal policy decreases in a small open-economy scenario and that nominal rigidities improve effectiveness of public spending and consumption taxes, whereas decrease that of income taxes.