Managing advertising investments in marketing channels

This paper investigates how should manufacturers optimally allocate resources to retailer-initiated (retailer) advertising through cooperative advertising programs and own (manufacturer) advertising in a bilateral monopoly. Retailer advertising stimulates immediate sales but may also harm long-term (post-advertising) demand, whereas manufacturer advertising aims at building brand equity and stimulates both immediate and long-term sales. A game-theoretic model in which a manufacturer and a retailer set pricing and advertising decisions over a two-period planning horizon is developed to account for the differences between manufacturer and retailer advertising. We characterize equilibrium solutions for four advertising scenarios for the manufacturer, ranging from no investment in any advertising activity to undertaking own advertising and supporting retailer advertising simultaneously. Comparing the two players’ equilibrium strategies and profits across these scenarios, we find that manufacturers should avoid offering exclusively cooperative advertising programs to retailers. When retailer advertising positively influences long-term sales, manufacturers should offer cooperative advertising supports to retailers in addition to undertaking their own advertising. When retailer advertising negatively affects long-term sales, manufacturers can still undertake own advertising and offer cooperative advertising under certain conditions. However, if these conditions are not met, focusing exclusively on own advertising is their best advertising strategy. Retailers also prefer scenarios in which manufacturers advertise, but may choose not to participate in manufacturers’ cooperative advertising programs. This leads to suboptimal outcomes if cooperative advertising programs are not enhanced by additional incentives (e.g., side payments or other services).     

Equilibrium in supply chain network with competition and service level between channels considering consumers' channel preferences

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain network consisting of multiple competing manufacturers, multiple competing retailers and multiple demand markets. Each manufacturer produces and distributes his products via direct e-commerce channel along with traditional physical channel. The manufacturers also provide services for the consumers in both channels, while the retailers only offer offline services to the consumers. On this basis, a dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model with pricing and service decisions are established based on variational inequality theory. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by modified projection and contraction method. Combined with numerical examples, we analyze the impact of three critical factors on the equilibrium states and profits. Some interesting managerial insights are derived. We find that the profits of the manufacturers decrease (increase) in the raw material conversion ratio under single channel case (dual-channel case), while the increase of the raw material conversion ratio always benefits the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network; the service level in each channel is positively correlated with its transaction volume. There are significant inconsistencies among the best combinations of cross-channel price coefficients between two channels for the manufacturers, the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network. The same equilibrium decision (service level, price) or profit may exhibit the opposite changing trend with respect to cross-channel price coefficients under two cases of active e-commerce transaction and inactive e-commerce transaction. When the introduction of e-commerce channel can bring more profits for the whole dual-channel supply chain network, the manufacturers should provide reasonable allocation schemes of profit increment for the retailers to satisfy their participation constraints.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Should manufacturers open live streaming shopping channels?

Live streaming shopping, as a novel sales channel, has caught much attention from researchers and practitioners. Its unique features, such as the commission rate, fixed fee and number of followers of the live streamer, appear different from traditional wholesale-contract sales channels. But few studies have examined the impact of these factors on manufacturers’ opening live streaming shopping channel decisions. To address this gap, we develop game theoretic models to examine whether a manufacturer should hire a live streamer to open a live streaming shopping channel on an e-commerce platform where the manufacturer's direct channel and third-party e-retailer co-exist. We consider the impact of the commission rate, fixed fee and number of followers of the live streamer on the operating decisions and profits of the manufacturer and e-retailer. Then we identify the threshold-conditions where the manufacturer and e-retailer are better off or worse off by opening a live streaming shopping channel. We show that opening a live streaming shopping channel may hurt or harm the manufacturer's profit, depending on the interaction of above three factors. The manufacturer may be willing to open a live streaming shopping channel when the commission rate and fixed fee are both small, or when the commission rate and number of followers are both large and the fixed fee is small. The e-retailer could also benefit from opening a live streaming shopping channel. These insights appear novel in the literature. We further show that opening a live streaming shopping channel could improve the consumer surplus. We extend our model to price competition to verify our main conclusions. These insights may help manufacturers decide whether or not to open live streaming shopping channels and help manufacturers and extant retailers develop optimal operating decisions and improve profits when participating in live streaming shopping.     

Effects of distribution channel structure in markets with vertically differentiated products

This study examines how the structure of distribution channels may influence firms’ quality and price strategies and how they may in turn affect consumer welfare. It treats product quality as a decision variable so that the degree of product substitution becomes endogenous rather than exogenous as in previous studies. We find that, with vertically differentiated firms, the changes in channel structure have asymmetric effects depending on whether they occur in the high-quality channel or in the low-quality channel. The product quality of the high-quality channel decreases when it decentralizes unilaterally. However, product quality of the low-quality channel would increase when it decentralizes. The high-quality manufacturer and its channel suffer more from decentralization in comparison with their low-quality counterparts, and the low-quality manufacturer actually receives greater profits when both channels are decentralized. An important driver behind these asymmetries is the interaction between firms’ pricing incentives in integrated versus decentralized channels and what consumer segments they serve. Our analysis indicates that decentralization may reduce consumer welfare, but decentralization in the high-quality channel hurts consumers more than that in the low-quality channel. Therefore in a competitive environment where firms make both quality and price decisions, channel integration would have significant welfare enhancement effects through the elimination of double marginalization, especially if it happens in the high-quality channel. Moreover, we demonstrate that once quality is endogenized, integration is the only equilibrium of channel structure choices. This suggests that the private incentives of firms may actually benefit consumers but do not have to be in line with the general preference of industry regulation for decentralization.     

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

OBSERVABLE MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION

In this paper we investigate the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives within a circular city model with observable agency contracts. With respect to the case of unobservability studied by Raith (2003 ), we find that optimal managerial contracts provide lower incentives, and that equilibrium expected prices and profits are higher. Changes in competition fundamentals have ambiguous effects, but observable contracts alleviate their impact on incentives. Finally, observability involves three major implications: managerial incentives are higher under price regulation than under competition; prices may increase with the number of firms; consumer welfare may diminish when competition increases.     

The effects of detailing on prescribing decisions under quality uncertainty

Motivated by recent empirical findings on the relationship between new clinical evidence and the effectiveness of detailing, this paper develops a new structural model of detailing and prescribing decisions under the environment where both manufacturers and physicians are uncertain about drug qualities. Our model assumes (1) a representative opinion leader is responsible for updating the prior belief about the quality of drugs via consumption experiences and clinical trial outcomes, and (2) manufacturers use detailing as a means to build/maintain the measure of physicians who are informed of the current information sets. Unlike previous learning models with informative detailing, our model directly links the effectiveness of detailing to the current information sets and the measures of well-informed physicians. To illustrate the empirical implications of the new model, we estimate our model using a product level panel data on sales volume, prices, detailing minutes, and clinical trial outcomes for ACE-inhibitors with diuretics in Canada. Using our estimates, we demonstrate how the effectiveness of detailing depends on the information sets and the measures of well-informed physicians. Furthermore, we conduct a policy experiment to examine how a public awareness campaign, which encourages physicians/patients to report their drug experiences, would affect managerial incentives to detail. The results demonstrate that the empirical and managerial implications of our model can be very different from those of previous models. We argue that our results point out the importance of developing a structural model that captures the mechanism of how detailing/advertising conveys information in the market under study.     

Distribution Channel Relationships: The Conditions and Strategic Outcomes of Cooperation between Manufacturer and Distributor

The purpose of this paper is to carry out an empirical examination of the antecedents of cooperation between manufacturer and distributor. A further objective is to study the levels of satisfaction with the strategic outcomes of such cooperation. We analyze the extent to which cooperation requires not only complementary resources and capabilities of the partners but also goal congruence, trust and relational norms. Cooperation between manufacturer and distributor also involves reciprocal commitment and joint investment in specific assets. Finally, manufacturers and distributors should not only gain satisfaction from the economic, psychological or social benefits of cooperation, but should also gain competitive advantage, profits and strategic outcomes that help to compete in the market more efficiently.     

Financial slack and venture managers' decisions to seek a new alliance

We examine two distinct perspectives to analyze the role of financial slack in the decisions of technology venture managers to seek strategic alliances. According to the capabilities perspective, financial slack provides managers with the ability to maximize the benefits from acquiring missing capabilities through alliance formation, whereas according to the resource dependence perspective, financial slack buffers the managers' motivations to seek alliances as a reaction to external environmental scarcity. Drawing on an experimental design and data on 1632 decisions nested within 51 managers, we find support for a combined perspective demonstrating that managerial discretion in the form of financial slack moderates how internal capabilities and context encourage managers to seek alliances. We discuss implications of our work for the alliance literature.     

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer’s responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.     

Retailer voluntary investment against a threat of manufacturer encroachment

To elucidate supply chain cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer, this study examines a model in which the retailer makes voluntary investments to reduce the marginal production cost of the manufacturer. The manufacturer is allowed to introduce a direct selling channel in addition to the indirect channel through the retailer (i.e., manufacturer encroachment), which however dampens the retailers’ investment incentives. The retailer can leverage its voluntary investments as a means of deterring manufacturer encroachment. We demonstrate that manufacturer encroachment is strategically deterred when the retailer’s cost-reduction technology is sufficiently effective. This strategic encroachment deterrence encourages the retailer to invest more, but it narrows the variety of channels from which consumers can select. When the latter effect dominates the former effect, consumer surplus declines with strategic encroachment deterrence.

     

Manufacturer rebate and channel coordination in O2O retailing

Many manufacturers are opening their own online channels due to the growth of e-commerce leading to intensive channel competition with their offline retailer partners. This research proposes an innovative coordination mechanism to lessen channel competition and help enhance the profits of all parties. First, two strategic mechanisms (i.e. a manufacturer rebate to offline consumers and the quantity discount) are proposed and studied. Our results show that although a manufacturer rebate offered to offline consumers helps mitigate the online-to-offline (hereafter O2O) competition conditionally, a quantity discount, unexpectedly, cannot be used to mitigate channel competition effectively. A new mechanism - the combination of the manufacturer rebate to offline consumers combined with a quantity discount to retailers – is developed to lessen channel competition. We find that compared to the first two mechanisms, the combination mechanism, surprisingly, provides a significant advantage in creating greater profits for the entire supply chain. Furthermore, compared to the benchmark O2O model, the combination mechanism also helps create a Pareto situation and thus is an optimal mechanism to be used to mitigate channel competition effectively.     

How Do Franchise Ownership Structure and Strategic Investment Emphasis Influence Stock Returns and Risks?

Franchisors seek to maximize firm value by managing investments both in tangible and intangible assets and in the mix of company and franchised outlets, yet little is known about how investors respond to shifts in these strategic decisions. Our goal is to assess the impact of these decisions on shareholder value within franchise systems through panel-data models. Specifically, we provide evidence on how investors in publicly traded franchises evaluate both the ownership structure and the strategic investment emphasis between intangible assets (e.g., brand) and tangible assets (e.g., plant and property). We find that an increase in the proportion of franchised units is negatively associated both with stock returns and idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, an increase in the emphasis on strategic investments in intangible assets is positively associated both with stock returns and idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, strategic investment emphasis moderates the strength of the effect of franchise ownership structure when firms franchise internationally. Overall, this research provides a novel empirical examination of franchising economics and has managerial implications for franchised channel structure.     

The Power of Innovativeness in Manufacturer–Retailer Relationships

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Retailers often challenge manufacturers through aggressive store brand policies and severe listing constraints. This study investigates manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers.

Methodology/approach: Using data from 277 senior managers of Swiss and German consumer goods manufacturers and analyzing these data with structural equation modelling, the authors test hypotheses about the impact of manufacturer innovativeness on manufacturer–retailer relationship characteristics (i.e., retailer dependency, store brand aggressiveness, and listing constraints).

Findings: The study demonstrates that manufacturer innovativeness enhances retailer dependency, which in turn positively affects overall manufacturer performance. This relationship can be explained further: By increasing retailer dependency, manufacturers suppress retailers’ store brand aggressiveness and attenuate retailers’ listing constraints. Store brand aggressiveness affects overall manufacturer performance through listing constraints.

Research implications: Identifying levers such as innovativeness that assist manufacturers in fostering their power over retailers provides a new mode for understanding how manufacturers can influence the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. The study provides support for the approach/inhibition theory of power on the inter-organizational level. Organizations with increased power are assumed to have approach-related tendencies and act in goal-consistent manner, whereas organizations with reduced power are assumed to develop the tendency to pursue inhibition-related actions, e.g., attending to threats. Furthermore, this study identifies channel relationship characteristics such as retailer dependency as a mediating path between manufacturer innovativeness and performance.

Practical implications: Managers need to strengthen the firm’s innovative capacity to enhance the performance of their companies. By developing the capability to provide radical innovations, manufacturers are able to enhance their performance not only directly but also indirectly by strengthening the manufacturer’s position with regard to retailers. This study underscores the relevance of innovativeness for strengthening the manufacturer’s position in its relationship with retailers that avoids problems with aggressive store brands and constrained listing conditions.

Originality/value/contribution: This study proposes manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers.     

Dual Control of Salesforce in Partially Integrated Channels

A manufacturer using a partially integrated channel (PIC) dispatches its own salesforce to the retailers that it sells through. The manufacturer salesforce in a PIC is simultaneously subject to controls by the manufacturer and the retailer, which we call dual control. Despite its increasing prevalence, how dual control influences salesforce performance remains understudied. We develop a discriminating alignment framework through two steps to answer this question. The first step examines the influence of a controller on the efficacy of a control mechanism. The efficacy of a control mechanism varies with the party that exerts control. The second step expands this logic to dual control. The performance effect of dual control is equivocal: It may have a positive, negative, or no influence on salesforce performance depending on discriminating alignment. To improve salesforce performance, a manufacturer’s control and a retailer’s control must compensate for each other’s weaknesses. Empirical tests based on matched dyadic data of dual control of salesforce by apparel manufacturers and retailers support our predictions with considerable theoretical and managerial implications.     

The right metrics for marketing-mix decisions

This study addresses the following question: For a given managerial, firm, and industry setting, which individual metrics are effective for making marketing-mix decisions that improve perceived performance outcomes? We articulate the key managerial takeaways based on testing a multi-stage behavioral framework that links decision context, metrics selection, and performance outcomes. Our statistical model adjusts for potential endogeneity bias in estimating metric effectiveness due to selection effects and differs from past literature in that managers can strategically choose metrics based on their ex-ante expected effectiveness. The key findings of our analysis of 439 managers making 1287 decisions are that customer-mindset marketing metrics such as awareness and willingness to recommend are the most effective metrics for managers to employ while financial metrics such as target volume and net present value are the least effective. However, relative to financial metrics, managers are more uncertain about the ex-ante effectiveness of customer-mindset marketing metrics, which attenuates their use. A second study on 142 managers helps provide detailed underlying rationale for these key results. The implications of metric effectiveness for dashboards and automated decision systems based on machine learning systems are discussed.     

Exclusive dealing without territory exclusivity in multichannel systems: managing channel conflict and driving commitment

The exclusive dealing literature suggests that manufacturers should protect exclusive dealers (ED) from intrabrand competition by assigning exclusive territories (ET). We consider ED systems without ET and investigate how manufacturers can enhance ED channel outcomes, such as the ED’s level of commitment to the relationship, by strategically managing its downstream communication efforts with ED and non-ED channels. We show that these cross-channel communication efforts (i.e., the quality of communication between the manufacturer and non-ED resellers in the ED reseller’s territory) are important drivers of relationship conflict and commitment for ED resellers, while playing a limited role for non-ED resellers. These results underscore the need for manufacturers to understand the perspectives and behaviors of each individual channel within a multichannel system and manage their different distribution channel types as an integrated system. We find support for our hypotheses in a sample of 672 observations corresponding to different ED and non-ED resellers selling a manufacturer’s product-line across several European countries.     

Consumer and Retailer Promotions: Who is Better Off?

The long-term effects of promotions on sales are increasingly linked to the supposed shift of economic power within channels from manufacturers to retailers. However, formal knowledge about how they influence channel decisions under different promotional arrangements and the distribution of channel profits remains very sparse. In this paper, I develop two 2-period models to investigate the impact on channel decisions and profits of manufacturer-controlled and retailer-controlled promotions targeted at consumers. My findings indicate that retailers always invest in retailer promotions, while manufacturers may find it optimal to not invest in consumer promotions. Economic power shifts from manufacturers to retailers when consumer promotions significantly expand the baseline demand in the long-term. Otherwise, manufacturers remain more powerful. Trade promotions or other profit-transfer mechanisms may be indispensable in easing conflicts over who should undertake promotions, especially when these promotions substantially increase future sales.