国际小额信贷模式运作机制比较研究

国际上公认有成效的四种小额信贷模式在贷款抵押、利率形式及目标客户的选择等运作机制设计上存在差异.通过比较发现以连带责任替代抵押担保、以市场化利率取代贴息利率及采用动态贷款激励是这些模式取得高还款率和绩效的关键.为使小额信贷能在新农村建设中发挥作用,我国应建立以农村信用社为基础、市场化运作的小额信贷模式,把联保机制引入农村经济组织及实施差别利率,实现小额信贷财务持续性、服务穷人与社会效益的平衡发展,最终缓解或消除贫困.     

小额信贷中小组联保担保方式研究

小额信贷是面向农村农民、城市下岗职工等低收入群体以及中小企业的金融服务,对于解决低收入群体和中小企业的资金融通困难具有重要作用,因而对于社会经济进步与发展具有重要意义。对小额信贷中常用的小组联保的担保方式进行研究,并对目前该制度中存在的一些问题提出解决方案与完善建议。     

互联网金融背景下的小额信贷发展分析

互联网金融背景下,小额信贷业发展迅速。金融和小额信贷的交叉融合逐渐密切,成为传统金融业发展的重要补充,为广大的中国金融消费者带来便捷。目前我国小额信贷业仍存在风险管理机制不健全,不正当竞争现象频发,区域发展不均衡,资金来源渠道狭窄等问题。政府应该完善相关法律和监管体系,进一步拓宽融资渠道,加强风险管控机制建设,从而促进不同区域小额信贷业均衡发展。     

我国农村小额信贷存在问题及对策分析

经过多年的探索,我国农村小额信贷取得了很大的成绩,小额信贷和农户联保贷款两种产品已经成为支持三农、受到广大农民欢迎的融资形式,然而,我国农村小额贷款的问题在发展的过程中也十分突出,本文就目前我国农村小额信贷存在问题进行了分析,并提出了相关对策。     

农村小额信贷保险的实践及创新路径——以山东省为例

本文分析了山东省内小额信贷保险的典型模式,并在总结试点经验的基础上,对小额信贷保险发展路径的创新提出以下建议:将小额信贷与农业保险进行结合,尝试引入代位追偿机制规避保险机构的风险,鼓励政府采取保费补贴的方式在财政上给予支持,从而加快小额信贷保险的普及。     

试点地区小额贷款公司效率和可持续性分析

小额信贷是指一定区域内,面向融资弱势群体的小额贷款形式。完善的小额信贷公司应该满足服务弱势群体和保持商业可持续两个条件。本文从信息经济学、现代契约理论以及资金供求等方面分析试点地区小额信贷公司的效率,并针对我国目前小额信贷公司可持续发展的困境,认为应该从明确定位目标群体、加强小额信贷专业技术,防范发展中的风险,放宽金融机构准入标准和促进组织创新等方面推进商业化可持续小额信贷公司发展,以服务农村经济发展的需要。     

小额信贷的核心机制与实践

近年来,小额信贷作为一种有效的扶贫和金融发展的手段已在世界上被愈来愈多的人所接受。本文在探讨小额信贷的含义及其核心机制的基础上,详尽介绍了国际、国内小额信贷模式,最后对推进我国小额信贷试点工作提出了政策建议。     

浅谈小额信贷

小额信贷作为国际公认的一种扶贫制度设计,备受国内外学者的关注。本文阐述了我国小额信贷的发展阶段、正规金融机构小额信贷的运行机制和可持续问题。其中,我国小额信贷的发展阶段包括试验阶段、扩展阶段、制度化建设阶段和商业性小额贷款组织试点阶段;小额信贷的运行机制主要从小组贷款、动态激励两方面来说明小额信贷如何避免信息不对称;可持续问题以村镇银行为例,主要从高风险高成本、资金来源缺乏与政策风险三方面来阐述。     

印度小额信贷危机及其启示

世界最大的小额金融市场之一的印度出现了小额信贷危机;我国小额贷款公司与印度小额信贷机构在设立环境、利率政策、资金来源和贷款对象方面存在差异;我国小额贷款公司应该寻求稳健、创新的可持续发展道路。     

新形势下我国农村小额信贷分析

我国由民间主导的小额信贷还处于起步阶段,同时由于我国特有的复杂的经济社会背景以及经济转轨进程中所造成的体制不确定性,使得我国的农村小额信贷既面临着空前的发展机遇,也存在着诸多困难与风险。鉴于此,国家应该大力发展专业化的小额信贷组织,并及时解决发展中存在的问题,继续促进现有非政府小额信贷的发展,因地制宜创新小额信贷产品和服务,以满足大量缺乏担保抵押的农户的资金需求。     

The challenges of supporting necessity entrepreneurs: Understanding loan officer exit in microfinance

Necessity entrepreneurship can serve as a pathway out of poverty for low-income individuals, with microfinance often providing important financial support. Yet the relational lending strategies common among microfinance institutions may influence loan officer turnover and, in turn, compromise entrepreneurs' access to credit. While there is some reason to suspect that relational lending with poor entrepreneurs will increase retention, we propose that serving the poor may make loan officers more likely to quit: loan officers in commercial microfinance institutions are unlikely to have strong commitments to poverty alleviation and may be taxed by the challenging fieldwork associated with lending in poor areas. Qualitative and quantitative data from a microfinance bank in Latin America support our expectations, showing that exit becomes more likely when loan officers' work involves more poor clients and that the effect is strongest when such work demands intensive fieldwork in low-income areas. Supplementary analyses of trends across the global microfinance industry demonstrate that poor clients have a stronger impact on exit in for-profits than non-profits, suggesting that prosocial motives among non-profit employees may have a buffering effect. Overall, our study reveals how providing services to necessity entrepreneurs can have negative, unexpected consequences for frontline employees.     

Microfinance,subsidies and local externalities

We analyse equilibrium borrowers’ effort and the cost of microcredit loans in the presence of moral hazard, project correlation and subsidies under group lending conditions. Our results show that under the assumption of endogenous effort, project correlation has significant effects on borrowers’ effort only when it is determined by asymmetric (positive or negative) shocks. These findings indicate that the well-known negative effect of within-group (symmetric) project correlation on group lending with joint liability disappears once endogenous effort is taken into account. We also analyse the effects of subsidised lending (and asymmetric correlation) on the relative convenience (in terms of borrowers’ effort) of the alternative (1) between group lending and individual lending with notional collateral and (2) among three different market structures of the microfinance industry.     

On Ethical Violations in Microfinance Backed Small Businesses: Family and Household Welfare

Journal of Business Ethics - The microfinance business model focuses largely on lending to the woman in the household, rather than the man. The belief is that women are more trustworthy borrowers...     

Fair Microfinance Loan Rates

This paper uses a reduced form credit risk model to determine fair lending rates for microfinance loans. A fair lending rate is defined to be that rate which makes the loan have a net present value of zero to the lender, after the inclusion of the lender's costs of issuing and monitoring the loan.     

Benchmarking the financial performance,growth, and outreach of greenfield MFIs in Africa

We use regressions to benchmark African greenfield microfinance institutions (MFIs) relative to other African microfinance providers and find that greenfields grew faster, improved profitability to levels comparable to the top MFIs, and substantially increased their lending to women. Effects were strongest for greenfields that followed a consultant-led model to establish a deep retail banking presence spanning multiple countries, including the creation of extensive branch networks. Though their loan sizes are larger than most African MFIs, indicating less outreach to the poorest market segments, they have achieved rapid gains in financial inclusion on a broad scale for somewhat more affluent clients.     

Group lending and the role of the group leader

This paper investigates strategic monitoring behavior within group lending. We show that monitoring efforts of group members differ in equilibrium due to the asymmetry between members in terms of future profits. In particular, we show that the entrepreneur with the highest future profits also puts in the highest monitoring effort. Moreover, monitoring efforts differ between group members due to free-riding: one member reduces her level of monitoring if the other increases her monitoring effort. This effect is also at play when we introduce a group leader into the model. The individual who becomes the group leader supplies more monitoring effort than in the benchmark case. We empirically test the model using data from a survey of microfinance in Eritrea and show that the group leader attaches more weight to future periods than nonleaders in the group, which may explain why a large part of total monitoring is done by the leader.     

互惠性金融创新:我国农村小额信贷可持续发展研究

运用博弈论、行为经济学对我国农村小额信贷的可持续发展进行分析,从中可以发现小额信贷的可持续发展不仅是基于农户的"理性人"假设,机构与农户之间的"互惠性"也是重要因素之一。其发展的关键在外部环境(宏观、中观、微观层面)的影响而并非农户本身。     

The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions*

Microentrepreneurs have considerable difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. One key reason is that the costs of information about the characteristics and risk levels of borrowers are high. Relationship‐based financing has been promoted as a potential solution to information asymmetry problems in the distribution of credit to small businesses. In this paper, we seek to better understand the implications for providers of “microfinance” in pursuing such a strategy. We discuss relationship‐based financing as practiced by microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the United States, analyze their lending process, and present a model for determining the break‐even price of a microcredit product. Comparing the model’s results with actual prices offered by existing institutions reveals that credit is generally being offered at a range of subsidized rates to microentrepreneurs. This means that MFIs have to raise additional resources from grants or other funds each year to sustain their operations as few are able to survive on the income generated from their lending and related operations. Such subsidization of credit has implications for the long‐term sustainability of institutions serving this market and can help explain why mainstream financial institutions have not directly funded microenterprises. We conclude with a discussion of the role of nonprofit organizations in small business credit markets, the impact of pricing on their potential sustainability and self‐sufficiency, and the implications for strategies to better structure the credit market for microbusinesses.     

State intervention and the microcredit market: the role of business development services

We analyze in this paper how various forms of state intervention can impact microfinance institutions’ lending behavior. Using a simple model where entrepreneurs receive individual uncollateralized loans, we show that, not surprisingly, state intervention through the loan guarantee increases the number of entrepreneurs receiving a loan. However, after modeling business development services (BDS) provided by the microfinance institution, we show that the loan guarantee can have a counterproductive effect by reducing the number of entrepreneurs benefiting from such services. We therefore analyze an alternative policy: BDS subsidization. We show that if BDS are efficient enough and are targeted toward less performing borrowers, then—for fixed government expenditures—such subsidies do better in terms of financial inclusion than the loan guarantee. Moreover, we argue that—under similar conditions—BDS subsidization alone does better in terms of financial inclusion than a mix of policies.