Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options

Employees tend to exercise stock options when corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to years with higher tax rates. If firms paid employees the same dollar value in wages instead of stock options, the average annual tax bill for large U.S. companies would increase by $12.6 million, or 9.8%. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the tax function. In addition, profitable firms can realize indirect tax benefits because stock options increase debt capacity. Although tax minimization is probably not the main motive for option grants, firms with larger potential tax benefits grant more options.     

MEASURING CORPORATE TAX RATES AND TAX INCENTIVES: A NEW APPROACH

Taxes play an important but underemphasized role in the valuation of a company and its projects. For example, the authors estimate that the expected tax benefits from interest deductions by all publicly traded U.S. corporations were responsible for almost $1.4 trillion of their total market value of $12.7 trillion in 1991. In the case of RJR's 1989 leveraged buyout alone, the capitalized value of the interest tax shield amounted to several billion dollars (or about 25%) of the company's market value.
This article argues that, to maximize shareholder wealth, the corporate planning process should include a careful analysis of corporate tax incentives. Using several examples, the authors show how earnings variability and major provisions of the tax code interact to affect a company's expected marginal tax rate. After describing the complexities involved in properly calculating corporate tax rates, the article concludes by describing a simulation method the authors have developed to measure a company's effective marginal tax rate and, hence, its tax incentives to use more leverage (or some other means of reducing taxable income).
In furnishing a method for calculating marginal tax rates with greater accuracy, the authors also provide a clue to resolving the capital structure puzzle discussed in the roundtable at the head of this issue. In particular, their recent research corrects earlier studies in the finance literature by showing that when marginal tax rates are measured before financing (that is, based on income before interest expense is deducted), there is a positive relation between debt usage and tax rates.     

Tax shelters and corporate debt policy

We gather a unique sample of 44 tax shelter cases to investigate the magnitude of tax shelter activity and whether participating in a shelter is related to corporate debt policy. The average annual deduction produced by the shelters in our sample is very large, equaling approximately nine percent of asset value. These deductions are more than three times as large as interest deductions for comparable companies. The firms in our sample use less debt when they engage in tax sheltering. Compared to companies with similar pre-shelter debt ratios, the debt ratios of firms engaged in tax shelters fall by about 8%. The tax shelter firms in our sample appear underlevered if shelters are ignored but do not appear underlevered once shelters are considered.     

Debt, Leases, Taxes, and the Endogeneity of Corporate Tax Status

We provide evidence that corporate tax status is endogenous to financing decisions, which induces a spurious relation between measures of financial policy and many commonly used tax proxies. Using a forward-looking estimate of before-financing corporate marginal tax rates, we document a negative relation between operating leases and tax rates, and a positive relation between debt levels and tax rates. This is the first unambiguous evidence supporting the hypothesis that low tax rate firms lease more, and have lower debt levels, than high tax rate firms.     

Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.     

Financial leverage and corporate taxation: evidence from German corporate tax return data

To estimate the impact of profit taxation on the financial leverage of corporations, this study uses a pseudopanel constructed from comprehensive corporate tax return microdata for the period 1998–2001, which saw the introduction of major corporate tax reform in Germany. Financial leverage refers to the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. The endogeneity of the firm-specific marginal after-financing corporate income tax rate is controlled for by an instrumental variable approach. The instrument for the observed marginal tax rate is the counterfactual tax rate that a corporation would have faced in a particular period had there been no endogenous change, triggered by the tax reform, of its financial leverage and tax base. This counterfactual tax rate is derived from a detailed microsimulation model of the corporate sector, based on tax return microdata. The marginal tax rate has a statistically significant and relatively large positive effect on corporate leverage; for firms reporting positive profits, an increase of the marginal tax rate of 1 % would increase the financial leverage by approximately 0.7 %, on average. The debt ratio is less responsive to tax incentives for small corporations and firms facing high economic risks.     

Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.     

Have the tax benefits of debt been overestimated?

We re-examine the claim that many corporations are underleveraged in that they fail to take full advantage of debt tax shields. We show prior results suggesting underleverage stems from biased estimates of tax benefits from interest deductions. We develop improved estimates of marginal tax rates using a non-parametric procedure that produces more accurate estimates of the distribution of future taxable income. We show that additional debt would provide firms with much smaller tax benefits than previously thought, and when expected distress costs and difficult-to-measure non-debt tax shields are also considered, it appears plausible that most firms have tax-efficient capital structures.     

Fiscal incentives, corporate structure and financial aspects of treasury management operations

This paper presents evidence that tax policy affects corporate structure and intra-group financial flows, using a data base of Irish registered firms. How MNC's corporate structure and financial flows react to tax policy is complex. Fiscal incentives play a key role in Irish industrial policy. The paper examines certain financial characteristics of financial subsidiaries (those managing group treasury functions) in Ireland. These characteristics are a tax haven connection, high ratios of revenues to pre-tax profits (in some cases greater than 100%), high intra-group borrowing or lending, large gross assets (in excess of €500 million) and low or zero employment. While these firms pay corporation tax in Ireland (at reduced rates), there is considerable loss to other exchequers. The paper concludes that such tax haven type activities are unlikely to remain a viable part of future industrial policy in Ireland.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

Intraday Price Formation in U.S. Equity Index Markets

The market for U.S. equity indexes presently comprises floor‐traded index futures contracts, exchange‐traded funds (ETFs), electronically traded, small‐denomination futures contracts (E‐minis), and sector ETFs that decompose the S&P 500 index into component industry portfolios. This paper empirically investigates price discovery in this environment. For the S&P 500 and Nasdaq‐100 indexes, most of the price discovery occurs in the E‐mini market. For the S&P 400 MidCap index, price discovery is shared between the regular futures contract and the ETF. The S&P 500 ETF contributes markedly to price discovery in the sector ETFs, but there are only minor effects in the reverse direction.     

What do firms do when dividend tax rates change? An examination of alternative payout responses

This paper investigates whether investor-level taxes affect corporate payout policy decisions. We predict and find a surge of special dividends in the final months of 2010 and 2012, immediately before individual-level dividend tax rates were expected to increase. We also find evidence that immediately before the expected tax increases, firms altered the timing of their regular dividend payments by shifting what would normally be January regular dividend payments into the preceding December. To our knowledge this is the first evidence in the literature about changes in the timing of regular dividend payments in response to tax law changes. For both actions (specials and shifting), we find that it was more likely for a firm to respond to individual-level tax rates if insiders owned a relatively large amount of the firm. Overall, our paper provides evidence that managers consider individual-level taxes in making corporate payout decisions.     

The effect of taxes on multinational debt location

We provide new evidence that differences in international tax rates and tax regimes affect multinational firms' debt location decisions. Our sample contains 8287 debt issues from 2437 firms headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in 59 countries. We analyze firms' marginal decisions of where to issue debt to investigate the influence of a comprehensive set of tax-related effects, including differences in personal and corporate tax rates, tax credit and exemption systems, and bi-lateral cross-country withholding taxes on interest and dividend payments. Our results show that differences in personal and corporate tax rates, the presence of dividend imputation or relief tax systems, the tax treatment of repatriated profits, and inter-country withholding taxes on dividends and interest significantly influence the decision of where to locate debt and the proportion of debt located abroad. Our results are robust to firm and issue specific factors and to the effect of legal regimes, debt market development, and exchange rate risk.     

Do personal taxes affect capital structure? Evidence from the 2003 tax cut

Because the personal tax treatments of interest and dividend income likely affect the relative cost of debt and equity financing, a sharp change in tax treatment could affect firms' optimal leverage. This paper examines the effect of the 2003 equity income tax cut on firms' debt usage. Because this tax cut affected only individual investors, we can use a difference-in-differences method to identify the effect of personal tax on firms' leverage. Previous research has found that the 2003 tax cut encouraged dividend payouts and reduced the cost of equity, but it provides no link to equilibrium leverage ratios. We estimate that the tax cut causes the affected firms' leverage to decrease by about 5 percentage points. Furthermore, we show that the effects of the tax cut are stronger for firms with lower marginal corporate tax rates and for firms that are not financially constrained, consistent with our theoretical predictions. Overall, we find strong evidence that personal tax is an important determinant of firms' optimal leverage.     

Nasdaq ex‐day behavior: An out‐of‐sample test

We test various explanations of the ex‐dividend day price anomaly using Nasdaq‐listed firms. Similar to NYSE‐listed firms, on average the prices of Nasdaq‐listed firms drop by less than the dividend amount. However, the average Nasdaq price‐drop is substantially smaller than what existing theories would predict and translates to an imputed dividend tax rate that is double the maximum tax rate. We thus find little support for the tax hypothesis. We also find little support for the short‐term trading hypothesis and various other explanations. The significant disconnect we document between Nasdaq dividends and price changes seems to support the “free dividends fallacy.”     

Corporate tax,capital structure,and the accessibility of bank loans: Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate whether listed firms in China adjust their capital structure in response to an increase in the corporate tax rate. Although theories of capital structure suggest that corporate tax is an important determinant of capital structure, how exogenous changes of the tax rate affect firms’ leverage decisions has not been fully explored. We examine a unique circumstance in which the Chinese government increased the corporate tax rate of firms that had previously received local government tax rebates. The evidence indicates that these firms increased their leverage when the corporate tax rate increased. Further investigation suggests that the adjustment of leverage was mostly driven by firms with a high level of access to bank loans.     

Taxes and Corporate Policies: Evidence from a Quasi Natural Experiment

We document important interactions between tax incentives and corporate policies using a “quasi natural experiment” provided by a surprise announcement that imposed corporate taxes on a group of Canadian publicly traded firms. The announcement caused a dramatic decrease in value. Prospective tax shields partially offset the losses, adding 4.6% to firm value on average, and vary with the tax status of the marginal investor. Further, firms adjust leverage, payout, cash holdings, and investment in response to changing tax incentives. Overall, the event study and time series evidence supports the view that taxes are important for corporate decision making.     

The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

Financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. The present value of distress costs therefore depends on risk premia. We estimate this value using risk‐adjusted default probabilities derived from corporate bond spreads. For a BBB‐rated firm, our benchmark calculations show that the NPV of distress is 4.5% of predistress value. In contrast, a valuation that ignores risk premia generates an NPV of 1.4%. We show that marginal distress costs can be as large as the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000) . Thus, distress risk premia can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively.     

Debt and taxes: Evidence from the real estate industry

Compelling empirical evidence documenting a material effect of corporate taxes on leverage decisions is limited, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for the firm's tax benefit of debt. We examine leverage decisions across taxable and nontaxable real estate firms—firms for which we can measure the relative tax benefit of debt with little error. The tax hypothesis implies that for firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Consistent with this, leverage ratios of taxable real estate firms are higher than their nontaxable counterparts, but the magnitude of this difference is at most one-half of that implied by studies that employ simulated marginal tax rates.     

Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.