IFRS adoption and analysts’ earnings forecasts: Australian evidence

We study 145 large listed Australian firms to explore the impact of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) adoption on the properties of analysts’ forecasts and the role of firm disclosure about IFRS impact. We find that analyst forecast accuracy improves, and there is no significant change in dispersion in the adoption year, suggesting that analysts coped effectively with transition to IFRS. However, we do not observe the expected relationship between firms’ IFRS impact disclosures in their financial statements issued at the end of the transition year with forecast error and dispersion in the adoption year. The results question the timeliness and usefulness of financial statement disclosure, even in a setting where disclosure was mandated by accounting standards (AASB 1047 and AASB 1) and firms had strong incentives to provide information to analysts.     

Capitalized intangibles and financial analysts

We examine whether firms that capitalize a higher proportion of their underlying intangible assets have higher analyst following, lower dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and more accurate earnings forecasts relative to firms that capitalize a lower proportion. Under Australian generally accepted accounting principles, capitalization of intangible assets has become increasingly ‘routine’ since the late 1980s. It is predicted that this experience leads Australian analysts to expect firms with relatively more certain intangible investments to signal this fact by capitalizing intangible assets. Our results are consistent with this. We find that capitalization of intangible assets is associated with higher analyst following and lower absolute earnings forecast error for firms with a stock of underlying intangible assets. Our tests suggest a weaker association between capitalization and lower earnings forecast dispersion. We conclude that there are benefits for analysts, for management to have the option to capitalize intangible assets. These findings suggest that IAS 38 Intangible Assets and AASB 138 Intangible Assets reduce the usefulness of financial statements.     

Additional Evidence on Analysts’ Decision to Issue Disaggregated Earnings Forecasts: Strategic Biasing

This study examines why analysts issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S. Some recent studies suggest that analysts with superior forecasting ability issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to build reputation in the marketplace and stop forecast disaggregation once their reputation has been established. Based on an analysis of I/B/E/S forecast data for U.S. firms from 1998 to 2008, we find that, in a given year, about 20%–34% of analysts disaggregate for some, but not for all the firms that they follow. This evidence of selective disaggregation by analysts suggests that reputation building alone does not fully explain the decision to disaggregate forecasts. We hypothesize that the decision to disaggregate earnings forecasts is at the firm‐level as well and is systematically related to the analysts’ bias in the issued forecasts. Our findings are that (a) analysts’ overall optimistic bias and forecast errors decrease monotonically with the level of forecast disaggregation, and (b) analysts that selectively disaggregate their forecasts for some firms or who do not persistently disaggregate a given firm's forecasts exhibit more positive bias and larger forecast errors. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the analysts who issue biased forecasts, for example, to curry favour with the management, are less likely to provide disaggregated information as part of the forecast.     

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ANALYSTS’ FORECAST REVISIONS AND EARNINGS COMPONENTS: THE EVIDENCE OF FRS 3

This study examines whether the earnings components as required by FRS 3 help UK analysts to predict firms’ earnings changes by investigating the statistical association between analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ unexpected earnings components. I find that analysts’ forecast revisions made in different time horizons are consistently associated with unexpected earnings components as required by FRS 3. UK analysts are able to incorporate current-year unexpected earnings components into their current and future earnings forecasts even before firms officially release this information. However, empirical results also show that current-year unexpected earnings components are not fully incorporated into analysts’ forecasts of future earnings. Analysts appear to wait for more information releases regarding firms’ future earnings and delay their revisions of future earnings forecasts. This is consistent with the evidence that the cumulative revisions of current earnings forecasts are generally associated with prior-year unexpected earnings components, and the association appears to be stronger as time progresses. Overall, this study provides evidence suggesting that the earnings components as required by FRS 3 help UK analysts to identify firms’ permanent and transitory earnings changes over different forecast horizons. This study also provides strong evidence supporting the informativeness of earnings components for analysts’ forecasts and the information set perspective of FRS 3 that highlights the importance of earnings components in predicting a reporting entity’s future performance.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

How do suppliers benefit from customers’ voluntary disclosure? the effect of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency

We explore whether and how the issuance of customers’ financial forward-looking information affects the investment efficiency of their upstream firms. Using earnings guidance as a proxy for forward-looking information, we find that firms wherein customers disclose earnings forecasts invest more efficiently than those where customers withhold forward-looking information. Our findings hold after controlling for a set of firm characteristics, employing alternative model specifications and measurements, and using the 2011 Thailand flood as a quasi-experiment. Further analyses offer support that the positive impact of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency is stronger for customers issuing more informative, disaggregated, and accurate forecasts and suppliers with weaker bargaining power. We also observe an asymmetric response of suppliers’ investments toward customers’ good-news versus bad-news forecasts. Furthermore, by conducting a textual-based analysis, we find that suppliers’ investment efficiency increases with more embedded supply chain relevant information in customers’ earnings guidance reports. Overall, our findings suggest that suppliers benefit from customers’ earnings guidance to better assess their investment decisions, thereby achieving greater investment efficiency.     

Analyst forecast,accounting conservatism and the related valuation implications

This study investigates whether financial analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and whether it is more difficult for them to forecast earnings for less conservative firms, and then examines the impact of the findings on the return predictability of the value‐to‐price (V/P) ratio. After controlling for the other factors affecting forecast accuracy, such as earnings predictability and information uncertainty, I find that analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and that forecasting earnings is more difficult for less conservative firms. Consequently, the return predictability of the V/P ratio is stronger for more conservative firms, and previously reported return predictability of the V/P ratio is an average across firms with differing levels of conservatism.     

Underlying risk preferences and analyst risk-taking behavior

We investigate the relationship between underlying risk preferences on analysts’ work-related decisions. Specifically, we examine whether facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), an innate personal characteristic that has been linked to financial risk tolerance, is associated with analysts’ stock coverage decisions and the boldness of their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. We find that high-fWHR analysts cover firms with lower earnings predictability, and issue bolder forecasts and recommendations. Our findings shed new light on the black box of analyst decision making, assisting investment practitioners in evaluating the information content produced by different types of analysts and understanding the observed dispersion in analyst forecasts.     

Predicting earnings in a poor information environment

Financial intermediaries, such as analysts, play an important role in providing information to investors. However, a large segment of the market (about 39% of CRSP firms between 1992 and 2009) is not served by financial analysts, leaving investors in a poor information environment. In this paper, we examine whether other publicly available information signals, such as insider trades, institutional holdings, and firms’ stock repurchases, can be used to predict information about earnings for these firms. We find that CFOs’ trading decisions are associated with new information contained in the annual earnings reports for firms with no or scant analyst coverage. In contrast, for firms with multiple analyst coverage, insider trading decisions are not predictive of new information in earnings reports. Our results suggest that some public information signals, such as insider trades, can be used to alleviate the poor information environment faced by investors. However, the market may not have fully priced the information contained in these signals.     

Does location matter for disclosure? Evidence from geographic segments

The segment disclosures of multinational companies provide strategic information. We use the location characteristics of geographic segments to identify the reasons for withholding or disclosing segments. We examine segment data from around the adoption of IFRS 8, a reporting standard that requires firms to reveal more disaggregated information. Consistent with a proprietary cost motive for nondisclosure, we find that segments in regions that are deemed better for business tend to be hidden, while higher entry barriers for a segment are positively related to disclosure. These effects appear to be stronger for firms for which proprietary cost motives are more important. Among the previously unrevealed segments, proprietary costs explain the nondisclosure of segment earnings and other relevant financial information for investors.     

Causal language intensity in performance commentary and financial analyst behaviour

We use automated techniques to measure causal reasoning on earnings‐related financial outcomes of a large sample of MD&A sections of US firms and examine the intensity of causal language in that context against extent of analyst following and against properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find a positive and significant association between a firm's causal reasoning intensity and analyst following and analyst earnings forecast accuracy respectively. Correspondingly, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is negatively and significantly associated with causal reasoning intensity. These results suggest that causal reasoning intensity provides incremental information about the relationship between financial performance outcomes and its causes, thereby reducing financial analysts’ information processing and interpreting costs and lowering overall analyst information uncertainty. Additionally, we find that decreases in analyst following are followed by more causal reasoning on performance disclosure. We also find that firms with a considerable increase of causal disclosure especially attract new analysts who already cover many firms. Overall, our evidence of the relationship between causal reasoning intensity and properties of analyst behaviour is consistent with the proposition that causal reasoning is a generic narrative disclosure quality characteristic, able to provide incremental information to analysts and guide analysts' behaviour.     

Group-Affiliated Analysts’ Strategic Forecasts During a Year: Evidence from Korea

In examining the family-controlled business groups in Korea, prior literature shows that group-affiliated analysts’ forecasts are optimistically biased. This article investigates whether the group-affiliated analysts strategically time the level of accuracy and bias in their forecasts for the same group-affiliated firms due to the change in information asymmetry in the market. The results show that the group-affiliated analysts issue more accurate and less optimistic earnings forecasts for the affiliated firms when the level of information asymmetry is low; particularly, in April, which is right after annual earnings announcements.     

The Effect of CEO Extraversion on Analyst Forecasts: Stereotypes and Similarity Bias

In an experiment with professional analysts, we study their reliance on CEO personality information when producing financial forecasts. Drawing on social cognition research, we suggest analysts apply a stereotyping heuristic, believing that extraverted CEOs are more successful. The between‐subjects results with CEO extraversion as treatment variable confirm that analysts issue more favorable forecasts (earnings per share, long‐term earnings growth, and target price) for firms led by extraverted CEOs. Increased forecast uncertainty leads to even stronger stereotyping. Additionally, personality similarity between analysts and CEOs has a large effect on financial forecasts. Analysts issue more positive forecasts for CEOs similar to themselves.     

Mandatory CSR disclosure and analyst forecast properties: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Based on a quasi-natural experiment that mandates a subset of listed firms to issue standalone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, we examine whether mandatory CSR disclosure improves analysts’ information environment. We focus on two properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts: forecast error and forecast dispersion. We find that the mandatory issuance of standalone CSR reports is related to less forecast error and less dispersed forecasts, and the effect varies with the firm-level information environment and province-level marketization. Additional tests show that the improvement in forecast properties is mainly driven by CSR reports that i) are of high quality and ii) contain more long-term-oriented information than other CSR reports. Our findings provide evidence that mandatory CSR disclosure plays an important informational role for financial analysts.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival

This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.     

Earnings Forecasts and the Information Contained in Spinoff Announcements

This study examines spinoff announcements in conjunction with financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings. The analysis shows that spinoff announcement abnormal returns are significantly related to the firm's information environment as proxieci by financial analysts’ earnings prediction errors. The findings also indicate that analysts significantly increase their short-term earnings forecasts in response to spinoffs, but do not significantly revise their long-term earnings forecasts. However, the earnings revisions are not significantly different across prediction error groups, which confirms that spinoff-related abnormal returns cannot be attributed solely to expected performance gains.     

Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?

We examine whether analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate when they also issue cash flow forecasts. We find that (i) analysts’ earnings forecasts issued together with cash flow forecasts are more accurate than those not accompanied by cash flow forecasts, and (ii) analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect a better understanding of the implications of current earnings for future earnings when they are accompanied by cash flow forecasts. These results are consistent with analysts adopting a more structured and disciplined approach to forecasting earnings when they also issue cash flow forecasts. Finally, we find that more accurate cash flow forecasts decrease the likelihood of analysts being fired, suggesting that cash flow forecast accuracy is relevant to analysts’ career outcomes.     

“Big Bang” Accounting Reforms in Japan: Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy Declines as the Japanese Government Mandates Japanese Corporations to Adopt International Accounting Standards

The mandated adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) for Japanese corporations did not result in improved earnings that forecast predictability. These findings contradict the research findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas’ (2003) research findings support the need for mandating the adoption of IAS. They found that Japanese managers were “manipulating” reported earnings by managing the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. Adoption of IAS decreases the availability of this practice and it was and is expected to increase disclosure and transparency. Increased disclosure and transparency are expected to decrease financial analyst forecast errors, which did not decrease for 139 firms examined in this study for the timeframe of 1999–2002. This research finding does not support the idea that adoption of IAS improves financial information used in decision making relative to forecasting earnings. Assuming that increased predictability indicates higher quality reported earnings and enhanced usefulness of financial information, the mandated adoption of IAS did not result in these. Assuming that adoption of IAS in Japan increased the level of transparency and disclosure by Japanese firms, which made it harder for Japanese firms to manage their earnings in order to meet the managerial earnings forecasts that these firms must make. Thus, after the adoption of IAS in Japan, forecast errors for managerial forecasts of earnings increased. This evidence is new to the literature.