解决农村义务教育投入保障中的制度缺陷——对中央转移支付作用及事权体制调整的思考

财权与事权不匹配的矛盾是解决农村义务教育投入保障中的最大难点,受财力制约和宏观政策引导缺位的影响,地方投入为主的财政制度很难为义务教育发展提供全面、长远的支持。针对学界期望通过创新或完善中央转移支付制度解决农村义务教育投入的观点,本文提出不同看法:单纯依靠转移支付制度的改进来解决农村义务教育的地区差异和保障农村义务教育的公共投入是不可能的,只有在事权体制上做大的调整,将农村义务教育事权上划中央政府和财政,才是解决该问题的最佳选择。本文尝试通过建立计量模型,从保障农村义务教育投入中的制度缺陷的视角构建框架,为农村义务教育事权体制改革寻求另一个解决方案。     

Fiscal leadership and central bank design

Abstract.  This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.     

An independent central bank faced with elected governments

The literature argues that the benefits of an independent central bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. Few of the attempts to measure these correlations actually allow for a changing fiscal role. Yet, when an independent authority handles monetary policy, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain instruments in the hands of elected governments. We find that, so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises that becomes stronger as preferences diverge. We also find that the establishment of a conservative central bank encourages more divergent preferences among the public (as reflected in the government that is elected). The election of more interventionist governments then makes it harder for either authority to reach its own preferred objectives, unless cooperation is possible.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.     

Agglomeration,migration cost and intergovernmental transfers

The purpose of this article is to investigate the central government redistribution policies across local governments that affect regional agglomeration. Though full agglomeration is efficient, in many cases factor mobility is imperfect and the full agglomeration is not realized. This article analysed whether or not the central government should adjust the distribution of populations through local governments. The result is as follows: If individuals are relatively mobile, the central government can improve the aggregate income. In this case, when the private production and public sector are small, the central government should transfer from the productive regions local government to low-productive regions.     

Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker–firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.     

Decentralisation of active labour market policy: The case of Swedish local employment service committees

Decentralisation of decision-making in labour market policy may increase efficiency, since local authorities have first-hand knowledge about local labour market problems. However, decentralisation may also be associated with fiscal externalities generating misallocation. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of a Swedish pilot programme in 1996, which strengthened the role of the local authorities in labour market policy in certain regions. Our econometric findings do not indicate any increase in geographical lock-in of the unemployed, but decentralisation seems to spur local initiatives in the form of projects organised by the municipalities and increase targeting on outsiders in the labour market. The latter result is consistent with the hypothesis that municipalities used their increasing influence in order to improve municipal budgets at the expense of the central government.     

When Does an Inflation Target Yield the Second Best?

It is shown that an inflation target does not establish the second best if the central bank is independent and the government collects seigniorage revenues. To eliminate excessive inflation and ensure that stabilization is efficient, society should combine an optimal inflation target with a central bank that attaches less weight to inflation stabilization than the public does.     

Effective timing of tourism policy: The case of Singapore

In this paper, we examine the effective timing of economic policies actions in the tourism industry of a small open economy such as Singapore. The effective timing of policy actions is an open challenge issue to researchers and also a much needed rule of thumb to policy makers and private agents. This paper aims to (a) derive the influencing factors of a tourism demand function and (b) identify the time impact of these factors, thus, allowing the formulations of effective policy actions, by both, governmental tourism authorities and private tourism agents in Singapore. Our findings suggest that tourism government authorities and private tourism agents in Singapore should choose the timing of their actions depending upon the anticipated factor changes and their estimated impact. That is, if exchange rate variability is anticipated then policy actions should start at least twelve months prior to the start of the tourist period. If, a keen price competition is expected to prevail then the best timing of policy actions is nine months ahead the tourism period. If income improvements in origin countries could be expected, then a rather shorter timing action of six months would be available to tourism authorities and private agents in Singapore.     

Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.     

An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Central Bank Intervention and Exchange Rate Volatility: Some Australian Evidence

Arguably, market stability is one of the primary reasons behind government intervention in the foreign exchange market. Whether or not the authorities achieve this goal is an empirical matter and testing of this issue is made difficult by the fact that government intervention and exchange rate volatility may be jointly determined. In this paper, the extent to which volatility drives intervention is considered using PROBIT analysis. The results suggest that while support for the hypothesis exists, volatility on its own does not to provide enough information to allow us to accurately forecast government intervention. A modified GARCH model is then tested which incorporates the impact of government intervention in the mean and conditional variance equation. The evidence presented suggest that the dynamics of market are different on the days where the central bank is active in the market.     

多层级视角下京津冀科技创新政策府际关系研究

府际关系协调有利于实现创新资源、要素的有效汇聚与整合,进而提升政策有效性。以京津冀为例,构建中央-地方多层级府际关系模型,分析中央政策主体合作网络特征与政策扩散特征、地方政策主体合作网络特征与政策执行特征的相关性。研究发现,中央政府部门间形成了以科技部为核心的核心—边缘网络结构特征;北京市政府部门间呈现出以中关村科技管理委员会为核心的核心-边缘网络结构特征;天津市政府部门间呈现出以天津市科学技术委员会为核心的星型网络结构特征;河北省则没有形成稳定的网络关系。中央政策主体合作网络中的度中心性与政策扩散广度具有相关性;地方政策主体合作网络中介中心性、度中心性与政策执行强度具有相关性。     

农村劳动力转移培训的政策研究

由于在城市就业的农村劳动力缺乏技能,为提高工作和生活水平他们愿意参加培训。但存在的问题是培训费用过高,培训资源相对短缺,培训质量不高等。本文研究了中央政府对农村劳动力培训政策的演变,对比了各地方政府对农村劳动力培训的补贴金额,并同时提出政策措施。     

Municipal Finance in Poland,the Slovak Republic,the Czech Republic and Hungary: Institutional Framework and Recent Development

The recent process of political and economic transition in eastern European countries has not only contributed to the decentralisation of political structure but also significantly enhanced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities in these countries. In this context many similar types of public activities have recently been assigned to local governments, and some taxes were also declared to be local taxes. To be sure, this type of fiscal decentralisation has caused some additional problems, particularly for safeguarding the quality of publicly provided goods and services and for co-ordinating intergovernmental fiscal transfers between the central and local governments. For instance, some criticise that many small-sized municipalities in the transition economies have suffered from financial bottlenecks and have not been able to receive sufficient financial support from the central government. However, such a fiscal devolution trend appears to continue. This study primarily deals with issues surrounding the impact of national fiscal policy and the regulatory framework on local governments' expenditure behaviour and their ability to mobilise necessary revenues under the particular consideration of the institutional and administrative co-operation with the central government and of the less well-developed financial market in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

基本养老保险筹资权行使主体的确定及其理论依据

基本养老保险筹资权的行使主体的确定问题,应从中央与地方政府财权划分的角度进行分析。我国地方政府行使基本养老保险筹资权存在不合理性,应建立由中央政府统筹的基本养老保险制度。     

Risk in supply response: an econometric application

The impact of risk aversion on supply response is empirically estimated for selected field crops in California. As indicators of risk aversion the following surrogate variables are used: variance of past prices and yields, adjusted price to reflect the role of government support price over the market price and the dummy variables indicating price expectations. In general, the econometric estimates show a negative impact of risk aversion measured by the surrogate variables and this has implications for welfare gains resulting from price support policies aimed at stabilization.     

Privatisation in transition from central planning to a market economy in Czecho-Slovakia

Conclusions The success of privatisation is closely linked to the success of the transition policy. The lack of a capital market impairs any prospect of successful privatisation. The effects of macroeconomic stabilization policies on privatisation is controversial. Inflation may discourage investments in privatisation. Failure of competition policies may create private monopolies. Management incompetence may bring about PEs failures.One conclusion can be drawn from this picture: privatizing is a very complex undertaking. Its success requires very complex political efforts aimed at improving efficiency, competitiveness and modernization of Czecho-Slovak enterprises.     

国家人口计生委被合并与生育政策调整

在今年国务院机构改革中,国家人口计生委和卫生部合并成新的国家卫生计生委,成立32年的国家人口计生委结束了独立存在,这无疑是我国人口计生工作历史上的重大事件。如何认识这次合并?人们对这次合并的态度传递出怎样的信息?新的国家卫生计生委在计生工作上面临怎样的挑战?地方人口计生委和卫生部门是否都要合并?对这些问题进行了探讨。     

#br# 不对称信息环境下的金融集权与分权*——基于中央政府视角的研究

近年来地方政府在金融管理和金融风险处置上的作用日益被强调,但中央与地方政府的金融管理权责却模糊不清。本文从中央政府的视角,从信息、道德风险以及金融外部性三方面来分析金融管理的集权与分权问题。研究发现在金融集权的模式下,由于地方政府的隐性干预,一国可能会处于高度的金融抑制状态。在金融分权情境下,地方状态信息对一项金融政策制定越重要、信息甄别成本越大,中央向地方政府授权的价值越大,同时中央对地方政府的道德风险容忍度越高。而当引入金融外部性,尤其是金融风险极易跨区域传染的特性时,有着强大的行政控制力和丰富的宏观金融工具的中央政府在协调地区间金融溢出效应,控制系统性金融风险方面相比地方政府具有比较大的优势。因而,本文认为在金融分权的情境下,政策性金融权力的下放并不是一个绝对的放与不放的问题,而是一个金融适度分权问题,即合理地将一系列的政策性金融权力配置给中央与地方政府,寻求最优金融分权结构,守住不发生区域性、系统性金融风险的底线。