Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.      

Local public goods and private suppliers: Musical suburbs replayed

This paper deals with the existence of private market suppliers in a standard local public goods model. The result of this modification can be a cycling process instigated by rich households rather than poor households. The theoretical model provides empirical implications for capitalization studies and policy implications for the provision and financing of local public goods including education.     

Decentralization and the Decline of the Central City: A Case Study of Demographic and Economic Change in Bridgeport, Conn.

A bstract . The fiscal crisis of particular central cities has been primarily caused by social and economic decentralization within metropolitan regions. This hypothesis is examined through a case study of the Bridgeport, Connecticut metropolitan region. Middle and upper income groups have moved from the central city of Bridgeport to its suburbs while the poor remain. Business and industry have also decentralized. These factors weaken the capacity of the central city to generate sufficient revenue from its declining share of the region's taxable resources. The central city must fund a wide range of services and faces, as all local governments do, increased costs. Because of these fundamental social and economic changes , the central city cannot meet its service commitments. Unless the existing system of public finance is altered, continued decline is inevitable.     

Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games

The theory of decentralized allocation mechanisms introduced by Leonid Hurwicz enabled economists to analyze the implications of requiring an allocation mechanism to perform well over a range of possible economic environments. One of the earliest major results in this theory was the formalization and proof of Hayek’s famous assertion that the competitive market mechanism minimizes the communication needed to achieve Pareto efficient allocations. The informational efficiency theorem spawned a large literature on communication complexity in allocation mechanisms. This paper provides an exposition of some results on the communication required to make equilibria locally stable, and the possibility of eliciting the required communication in allocation mechanisms and games.     

The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions

A general equilibrium model is presented of an economy where mobile and immobile households engage in decentralized market behavior and where immobile households control the expenditure and tax policy of each local government, subject to a local budget constraint. It is shown how central government grant policy (which is a formula with lump-sum, matching, and population elements) affects the general equilibrium of the system determined through market and local political decisions. The welfare effects of grants are discussed, with particular emphasis on distortions that may arise at lower levels of decision making that grants may be useful in (partially or completely) correcting.     

Endogenous household interaction

Most econometric models of intrahousehold behavior assume that household decision making is efficient, i.e., utility realizations lie on the Pareto frontier. In this paper, we investigate this claim by adding a number of participation constraints to the household allocation problem. Short-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least equal to what they would realize under (inefficient) Nash equilibrium. Long-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least equal to what they would realize by cheating on the efficient allocation and receiving Nash equilibrium payoffs in all successive periods. Given household characteristics and the (common) discount factor of the spouses, not all households may be able to attain payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We estimate these models using a Method of Simulated Moments estimator and data from one wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that both short- and long-run constraints are binding for sizable proportions of households in the sample. We conclude that it is important to carefully model the constraint sets household members face when modeling household allocation decisions, and to allow for the possibility that efficient outcomes may not be implementable for some households.     

Spatial agglomeration and endogenous growth

This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with spatial interactions in which a human capital externality is the centripetal force towards agglomeration. The resource cost of transportation is, on the other hand, the main centrifugal force, preventing a city from growing unboundedly. A central feature of our analysis is the dynamic interaction between (perpetual) economic growth and (bounded) city growth. We examine the socially optimal and the decentralized growth rates as well as city sizes. In the decentralized environment, individuals under-invest, whereas cities are under-populated. We show how public policies may enable a decentralized city to attain the socially optimal allocation.     

活动目录域服务在企业计算机管理中的应用

本文主要讲述在企业用户和计算机分散式管理与集中管理的对比,使用windows server2008 R2服务器域控功能实现企业用户计算机的统一管理、计算机日常维护、用户权限与功能分配等方面的应用。     

Capital Is Not Enough: Innovation in Developing Economies

Economic development and social entrepreneurship often conceive of poverty as a resource allocation problem in which a lack of capital prevents the poor from increasing their income through entrepreneurship. This allocative view, however, represents only one possible approach to conceptualizing entrepreneurial opportunity. The alternative discovery‐ and creativity‐based views place a greater emphasis on innovation which implies that superior ideas are also needed if poverty is to be reduced through firm performance. Drawing from a survey of 201 small business owners involved in a microcredit programme in Nairobi, Kenya, we find that the financial, social, human capital–performance relationships are mediated in part by innovation. Further, we find that differentiation‐related innovations lead to better firm performance than novelty‐related innovations.     

Who's in charge of the central city? The conflict between efficiency and equity in the design of a metropolitan area

A circular metropolitan area consists of a central city surrounded by a suburb. Households sort over the two jurisdictions based on public service levels and their costs of commuting to the metropolitan center. Using numerical simulations, we show that (1) there typically exist two equilibria: one in which the poor form the voting majority in the central city and the other in which the rich form the majority in the central city; (2) there is an efficiency vs. equity trade-off as to which equilibrium is preferred; and (3) if the central city contains only poor households, equity favors expanding the central city to include rich households. The third result arises not because of a fiscal subsidy from rich to poor households induced by a property tax but rather because of a change in house price capitalization.     

The welfare foundations of regional planning: General equilibrium and Pareto Optimality in a spatial economy

This paper is an attempt to define the conditions of a Pareto Optimum in a spatial economy. The conditions for an optimal allocation of commodities and factors are determined in either a centralized or a decentralized economic system.     

江阴市城镇贫困人口医疗服务利用情况调查研究

目的:了解江阴市城镇贫困人口的医疗服务利用情况,提出改善城镇贫困人口医疗服务利用情况的建议。方法:采用问卷调查的方式,对江阴市324户城镇贫困居民进行入户调查,共计925人。结果:江阴市城镇贫困人口的两周就诊率为42.2‰,未就诊比例为64.4%,年住院率为6.2%,未住院比例为29.6%。贫困居民医疗服务利用相对不足,医疗保障水平有待提高。结论:通过开展健康教育,完善医疗保障制度、医疗救助制度,深入开展社区卫生服务等方面改善贫困人口医疗服务利用情况。     

Extreme risk spillovers between crude palm oil prices and exchange rates

This study is the first attempt to examine the extreme risk spillovers between Malaysian crude palm oil (CPO) and foreign exchange currencies of the three largest CPO importers: India, the European Union and China throughout the global financial crisis. Using daily data of three currencies, CPO spot and futures from 2000 to 2018, our results show: First, before the crisis, the unexpected change in foreign exchange rates is the primary driver of risk spillover to the CPO market. Second, during the crisis, the extreme movement of CPO spot returns is dominant in the Malaysian exchange rates relative to the euro. Third, after the crisis, the spillover flows from the CPO market to the foreign exchange market. Overall, our findings show the importance of CPO pricing dynamics in mitigating foreign exchange risk over the crisis period. This paper contributes to the extant literature by recognizing the effect of risk spillover on the targeted foreign exchange rate for portfolio allocation.     

Decentralized allocation of resources among many producers

We reconsider the question of allocating resources in large teams using decentralized procedures. Our assumption on the distribution of procedures is that it approximates a given undelying distribution in producers space; thus we relax prior approaches which utilize replicas or iid samplings. We examine when solving the allocation problem for the underlying distribution yields an appropriate solution to the specific sample. We then show how market- like mechanisms may be used to get a decentralized decision process which is asymptotically optimal.     

Diversity,Choice and the Quasi‐market: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education Policy in England*

This article investigates the extent to which exam performance at the end of compulsory education has been affected by three major education reforms: the introduction of a quasi‐market following the Education Reform Act (1988); the specialist schools initiative introduced in 1994; and the Excellence in Cities programme introduced in 1999. Using a panel of schools for all state‐funded secondary schools in England (1992–2006), we find that only about one‐third of the improvement in school exam scores is directly attributable to the combined effect of these three major education reforms. The distributional consequences of the policy, however, are estimated to have been favourable, with the greatest gains being achieved by schools with the highest proportion of pupils from poor families.     

Assisted Self-help Housing in Mexico: Advocacy, (Micro)Finance and the Making of Markets

This article examines forms of housing finance that offer poor households opportunities for sourcing resources for construction work through non-mortgage microloans. In Mexico, these housing microfinance schemes have recently been incorporated into national housing policies. On a global level, the past 10 to 15 years have seen the emergence of institutional investment in microfinance. I reflect on these processes in this article by bringing critical accounts of financial inclusion in development studies and the debate on financialization within urban studies and beyond into dialogue. I combine micro- and macro-scale perspectives to examine how households become financial clients and how finance gains influence by expanding capitalist markets into the informal housing sector. This discussion is based on policy review and document analyses and an empirically grounded account of an assisted self-help housing case study. In the article I draw on three focal concepts—risk, debt and marketization—to highlight the ambivalences of the expanded access to finance for poor households engaged in self-organized building practices. These ambivalences emerge from the multiplicity of operational logics and motivations in the field of housing provision for the poor, and the profoundly conflicting rationalities of financial- and social-sector actors.     

Inequality and catching-up under decreasing marginal impatience

This paper examines how endogenous time preference interacts with inequalities in economic development. We consider two distinct groups of households with intrinsic inequality (e.g., capitalists and workers), and show that (i) under decreasing marginal impatience (DMI), an unequal society may be preferable for poor households than an egalitarian one in which every household owns an equal share of asset; (ii) poor households tend to benefit more under DMI than CMI (constant marginal impatience) from positive shocks; (iii) inequality exhibits a sharp inverted-U shape as more people become rich, which should be good news for developing countries in catching up; and (iv) a tax on capital income reduces poor households’ income when the fraction of the rich is sufficiently small. We also examine immigration and discuss capital mobility.     

Extending the Resource‐Based Approach to Livelihoods: An Urban Application to Turkish Gecekondu Households

This article critically examines the existing conceptualizations of and explanations for the socioeconomic behaviour of poor households in order to lay the foundations of a new model designed to extend the existing resource‐based approach to livelihoods. The proposed model groups ‘household responses to poverty’ into four key types: income generation, income allocation, consumption and investment. In explaining household responses and their poverty outcomes, it focuses on the role of different resources beyond income (e.g. social capital), along with the wider structural forces and household characteristics that influence the availability and benefit delivery capacity of these resources. The new model is shown to provide a theoretically more sophisticated framework with greater explanatory power and empirical applicability.     

What drives equity market non-participation?

This paper produces endogenous equity market non-participation in an economy with uninsurable labor income risk and heterogeneous skill levels. Prudence and impatience generate stationary household wealth levels that depend on income. Skill, and therefore labor income, heterogeneity leads to wealth heterogeneity, with high skill households accumulating high wealth and low skill households accumulating low wealth. A HARA class utility with subsistence consumption requirement generates decreasing RRA with respect to household wealth. Consequently, low skill households also have significantly higher local RRA. In addition low skill households have less human capital and therefore have lower diversification demand for stocks. Low wealth, high RRA and low diversification demand predicts that low skill households do not hold stocks in the face of a moderate ownership cost. In addition, the model predicts a humped lifecycle wealth accumulation pattern and a humped lifecycle stock allocation pattern. I also find that stockholders exhibit a greater aggregate willingness to supply risky capital during the expansion phase of a business cycle, despite the lower conditional equity premium.     

The allocation of public funds in a hierarchical educational system

This paper studies the dynamic effects of allocating public funds between basic and advanced education. Holding the size of total public education funds fixed, I identify the effects of their composition on aggregate efficiency and (in)equality. First, since basic education is a prerequisite for attending advanced education, there exists a lower bound on funding it: allocation policies below this lower bound are strictly Pareto dominated. Whether a corresponding lower bound on funding advanced education exists or not depends on the development stage of the economy and the size of total public funds. Secondly, while an allocation policy favoring basic education generates the usual redistribution from top to bottom, one favoring advanced education may result in reverse redistribution from bottom to top. Last, through the inter-generational link, short-run allocation policies may have long-run effects. A simple rule-of-thumb is that for an economy in its early development stage, focusing on basic education for sufficiently long duration is the only way out of polarization and low aggregate efficiency, contrary to the actual policies pursued by many of the less developed economies.