Private Information and the Exercise of Executive Stock Options

This paper finds strong evidence that executives use private information when exercising their stock options. The most informed executives tend to exercise early, do not exercise on the vest date, do not exercise to capture dividends, exercise a high percentage of their options, and exercise when the option is the least in‐the‐money. We also find that exercises around resignation and retirement are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, the operating performance of firms following exercises motivated by private information is significantly worse than that of firms in which the exercises are not motivated by private information.     

American-style Indexed Executive Stock Options

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula represents an instructive example of the usefulness of the change-of-numeraire technique. In the paper's numerical section we implement the valuation formula and demonstrate that not only may the early exercise premium be significant but also that the delta of the American-style option is typically much larger than the delta of the otherwise identical (value-matched) European-style option. Vega is higher for indexed options than for conventional options but largely independent of whether the options are European- or American-style. This has important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts. We finally extend the analysis to cover the case where the option contracts are subject to delayed vesting. We show that for realistic parameter values, delayed vesting leads only to a moderate reduction in the value of the American-style indexed executive stock option.     

Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options

We develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs). For a given increase in the grant-date firm stock price (and a concurrent increase in return volatility), the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive effects of ESOs. If the option is attached to the existing contract without adjusting cash compensation, we suggest that a firm should not always fix the strike price to the grant-date stock price; instead, the strike price should vary with the length of the vesting period. We also show that, compared with at-the-money options, restricted stock generates greater incentives to increase stock prices in some scenarios, especially when equity-based awards are vested early. If the vesting period is long, the firm could grant options instead of restricted stock to maximize incentives.     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

Accelerated Vesting in Takeovers: The Impact on Shareholder Wealth

We study the impact of accelerated vesting of equity awards on takeovers, whereby the restricted stock and/or stock options of the target chief executive officer (CEO) immediately vest and become unrestricted upon the close of the acquisition. We find that takeover premiums are significantly larger when the target CEO receives the benefit of accelerated vesting as compared to target firms with CEO's that continue to vest in their awards after closing the deal. Our evidence suggests that these cash windfalls triggered by accelerated vesting are beneficial to shareholders in completed deals. Accelerated vesting appears to be an efficient form of ex ante managerial contracting.     

Valuing employee reload options under the time vesting requirement

Upon the exercise of an employee stock option, the embedded reload provision entitles the holder to receive additional units of new options from the employer. The number of units of new options received is equal to the number of shares tendered as payment of strike and the new strike is set at the prevailing stock price. The reload provision may be subject to a time vesting requirement, that is, after each exercise, the employee is prohibited from exercising the reload until the end of a vesting period. In this paper, we construct an efficient numerical algorithm that computes the market value of the employee reload options under a time vesting requirement. Also, we explore the analytic properties of the price functions and optimal exercise policies of the employee reload options.     

Are executive stock option exercises driven by private information?

In this study, we investigate the extent to which exercise of executive stock options is based upon private information. Contrary to popular belief, we find that shares are held more than 30 days following over a quarter of options exercised. Partitioning the data, we find weak evidence that decisions to exercise and sell immediately are prompted by bad news and stronger evidence that decisions to exercise and hold for at least 30 days are prompted by good news. Enhancing the power of our tests by considering several factors important to exercise decisions, we find that the higher the opportunity costs of early exercise as measured by the time-value of options, the greater the trading profits to executives. We also find that the greater the disguise provided by incentives to diversify and consume as measured by the depth of options in the money, the greater the trading profits to executives who exercise and sell. Turning to non-exercise decisions, we find that a strategy of holding options rather than shares to exploit good news yields positive abnormal returns consistent with theoretical predictions in the absence of dividends.

Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?

We examine corporate financial and investment decisions made by female executives compared with male executives. Male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives. Further, acquisitions made by firms with male executives have announcement returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female executive firms, and debt issues also have lower announcement returns for firms with male executives. Female executives place wider bounds on earnings estimates and are more likely to exercise stock options early. This evidence suggests men exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared with women.     

Closed-form valuation of American call options on stocks paying multiple dividends

An American call option on a stock paying a single known dividend can be valued using the Roll–Geske–Whaley formula. This paper extends the Roll–Geske–Whaley model to the n dividends case by using the generalized n-fold compound option model. In this way this paper offers a closed-form solution for American options on stocks paying n known discrete dividends. Moreover, the model also offers the critical values of the early exercise boundaries at each ex-dividend date instant, making it easy to define an early exercise strategy. Numerical examples are included to illustrate this approach.     

Employee Reload Options: Pricing, Hedging, and Optimal Exercise

Reload options, call options granting new options on exercise,are popularly used in compensation. Although the compound optionfeature may seem complicated, there is a distribution-free dominantpolicy of exercising reload options whenever they are in themoney. The optimal policy implies general formulas for numericalvaluation. Simpler formulas for valuation and hedging followfrom Black–Scholes assumptions with or without continuousdividends. Time vesting affects the optimal policy, but numericalresults indicate that it is nearly optimal to exercise in themoney whenever feasible. The results suggest that reload optionsproduce similar incentives as employee stock options and sharegrants.     

Valuing executive stock options: performance hurdles, early exercise and stochastic volatility

Accounting standards require companies to assess the fair value of any stock options granted to executives and employees. We develop a model for accurately valuing executive and employee stock options, focusing on performance hurdles, early exercise and uncertain volatility. We apply the model in two case studies and show that properly computed fair values can be significantly lower than traditional Black–Scholes values. We then explore the implications for pay-for-performance sensitivity and the design of effective share-based incentive schemes. We find that performance hurdles can require a much greater fraction of total compensation to be a fixed salary, if pre-existing incentive levels are to be maintained.     

Stock option vesting conditions,CEO turnover,and myopic investment

Corporations have been criticized for providing executives with excessive incentives to focus on short-term performance. This paper shows that investment in short-term projects has beneficial effects in that it provides early feedback about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) talent, which leads to more efficient replacement decisions. Due to the threat of CEO turnover, the optimal design of stock option vesting conditions in executive compensation is more subtle than conventional views suggest. For example, I show that long vesting periods can backfire and induce excessive short-term investments. The study generates new empirical predictions regarding the determinants and impacts of stock option vesting terms in optimal contracting.     

Rational early exercise of call options: Australian evidence

Alpert (2010) develops a detailed analysis of the conditions for rational early exercise of call options in the presence of taxes. Using Alpert’s analysis as the theoretical framework, we examine the early exercise of call options in Australia over the period from 1 January 2001 to 30 June 2008. We find that exercises occurring on the last cum‐dividend trading day can be fully explained by non‐tax reasons, whilst taxation is a potential explanation for a large proportion of the early exercises that occur at other times.     

A Proposal for Expensing Employee Compensatory Stock Options for Financial Reporting Purposes

This article presents an accounting approach for employee stock options based on the insight that the currentperiod compensation expense should reflect only that part of the option value that is earned independent of the obligation of continued employment. Given that the maturity of vested options is typically shortened to 90 days when an employee resigns or is terminated, this method views the employee as owning a 90-day option (even if the stated maturity of the option is ten years) and earning a 90-day extension to that option each quarter as a result of the employee's continued employment. In the case of vested options, the compensation expense in each quarterly accounting period is thus the value of the 90-day extension of the option's maturity. There is no option expense in the quarter when the option is either exercised or expires.
In the case of unvested options, the expected option value at vesting should be estimated quarterly starting at the time of grant and the corresponding estimated expense should be revised and allocated as a pro rata accrual each quarter over the vesting period. The cumulative expense over the entire vesting period will equal the fair market value of the option at its vesting date.
Besides reflecting the economics of the exchange of value for labor involved in stock option grants, this approach has a number of practical advantages:

• •

  The 90-day maturity permits the use of publicly traded options to determine fair market value and makes Black-Scholes and other (lattice) pricing models more reliable.

       
  
  

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

商业银行管理层股票期权激励:特征及其影响因素——基于美国银行业的实证研究

本文以1996～2005年间美国43家代表性商业银行和98家制造业企业为样本,实证分析了商业银行管理层股票期权补偿激励的特征和影响因素。结果表明:商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿比例的变化呈现出先升后降的倒U型趋势,商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿的比例显著地低于制造业的这一比例;管理层股票期权补偿与商业银行成长机会、外部董事比例存在着显著的正相关关系,而与杠杆比率呈显著负相关;资产规模、管理层股票补偿对股票期权补偿水平的影响为负,但不显著;行业管制与管理层股票期权补偿费用的会计处理方法对银行业股票期权补偿有显著的影响。     

American option pricing under the double Heston model based on asymptotic expansion

This paper focuses on pricing American put options under the double Heston model proposed by Christoffersen et al. By introducing an explicit exercise rule, we obtain the asymptotic expansion of the solution to the partial differential equation for pricing American put options. We calculate American option price by the sum of the European option price and the early exercise premium. The early exercise premium is calculated by the difference between the American and European option prices based on asymptotic expansions. The European option price is obtained by the efficient COS method. Based on the obtained American option price, the double Heston model is calibrated by minimizing the distance between model and market prices, which yields an optimization problem that is solved by a differential evolution algorithm combined with the Matlab function fmincon.m. Numerical results show that the pricing approach is fast and accurate. Empirical results show that the double Heston model has better performance in pricing short-maturity American put options and capturing the volatility term structure of American put options than the Heston model.     

American and European options in multi-factor jump-diffusion models,near expiry

We derive a general formula for the time decay θ for out-of-the-money European options on stocks and bonds at expiry, in terms of the density of jumps F(x,dy) and the payoff g ₊: −θ(x)=∫ g(x+y)₊ F(x,dy). Explicit formulas are derived for the standard put and call options, exchange options in stochastic volatility and local volatility models, and options on bonds in ATSMs. Using these formulas, we show that in the presence of jumps, the limit of the no-exercise region for the American option with the payoff (−g)₊ as time to expiry τ tends to 0 may be larger than in the pure Gaussian case. In particular, for many families of non-Gaussian processes used in empirical studies of financial markets, the early exercise boundary for the American put without dividends is separated from the strike price by a nonvanishing margin on the interval [0,T), where T is the maturity date.      

Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R

In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the use of a fair value–based measurement attribute to value employee stock options (ESOs) via Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123-R. In anticipation of FAS 123-R, between March 2004 and November 2005, several firms accelerate the vesting of ESOs to avoid recognizing existing unvested ESO grants at fair value in future financial statements. We find that the likelihood of accelerated vesting is higher if (1) acceleration has a greater effect on future ESO compensation expense, especially related to underwater options, and (2) firms suffer greater agency problems, proxied by fewer blockholders, lower pension fund ownership, and top five officers holding a greater share of ESOs. We also find a negative stock price reaction around the announcement of the acceleration decision. Furthermore, stock returns are significantly negative before the new vesting dates and positive afterward, suggesting that vesting dates could have been backdated.     

THE PROPOSED INTRODUCTION OF FUTURES‐STYLE MARGINING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN AUSTRALIAN COMPARISON

We extend the quadratic approximation method to examine American‐style options traded using futures‐style margining and show that an early exercise premium can exist when the cost of carry is negative. Empirical results based on a reduced form of the model using futures‐style call options traded on the Australian All Ordinaries Share Price Index are consistent with previous research: call option early exercise premiums are economically zero. Full option prices are examined by comparing observed futures‐style with theoretical stock‐style values. We find futures‐style values exceed stock‐style values and argue that the increase results from improvements in liquidity. The findings are particularly relevant given the pending decision at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to introduce a futures‐style system in the United States. JEL classification: G13, C13