A New Method for Estimating the Effects of Fuel Taxes: An Application to Thailand

This article proposes a new methodology for estimating the impactof fuel price and tax changes on the general price level andthe distribution of income and applies a model to Thailand usingdata for 1975–76 and 1981–82. Because the modelallows for pricing under international competition where taxincreases must be partially absorbed in reduced factor incomerather than always being passed on in higher consumer prices,the results are significantly different from those generatedby the more conventional cost-plus pricing rule. The inflationaryimpact of fuel tax changes is slight because of both the opennessof the economy and the low energy intensity of manufacturingand other production in Thailand. In contrast, taxes on importsengender price increases not only for imports but also for goodswhich substitute for imports. The model also indicates thatthe net effects of taxes on petroleum products (other than kerosene)are progressive in their distributional impact, relative toa tax on imports or consumption. A main policy conclusion ofthe study is that fuel taxes could be used to increase bothequity and allocative efficiency without inducing significantinflationary responses. It follows that in the current circumstancesof falling world oil prices, developing countries could generaterevenues needed for structural adjustment by increasing fueltaxes to maintain domestic petroleum price levels.     

Economic Instruments to Improve UK Home Energy Efficiency without Negative Social Impacts*

The research examined how to use economic instruments to reduce carbon emissions from the UK housing sector without causing negative impacts on the poorest households. Carbon taxes would worsen the problem of fuel poverty. Compensation mechanisms involving the tax and benefit system were examined, but found not to be entirely effective because of the enormous range in the existing energy efficiency of homes. Exemptions for low‐income households were examined, but found impractical to target. It was concluded that the best way to use economic instruments was through a scheme involving energy audits and surcharges to council tax and stamp duty for homeowners who failed to make cost‐effective energy efficiency improvements within a specified time, with grants and loans to assist low‐income households. After the implementation of such a scheme for 10 years, it would be practical to introduce a targeted carbon tax.     

间接税亲贫性与代内归宿——穷人从减税中获益了吗?

税收工具作为财政扶贫机制中的重要一环,在推进精准扶贫、精准脱贫上发挥着重要作用。本文基于CFPS2012入户调查数据和中国2012年投入产出表,运用微观模拟方法测算出家庭的间接税负,在此基础上,借鉴衡量经济“涓滴效应”的亲贫增长指数,构建了识别和测度税制“亲贫性”的数量方法,评估间接税的减税政策能否自发惠及穷人,进一步测算家庭不同年龄层的间接税负代内归宿。结果显示:间接税整体上不具有“亲贫性”,其中增值税的“亲富性”最强,减税能让穷人比富人获益更多;儿童、成人以及老人均是间接税的负税人,贫困家庭抚养小孩而承担的间接税负比重高于非贫困家庭,赡养老人而负担的间接税负比重低于非贫困家庭。据此本文认为,继续推动大规模的间接税减税政策、采取差别化的增值税和消费税减免策略、逐步形成以直接税为主的税制结构,是改变间接税"亲富性"和强化税收扶贫职能的有效措施。     

Multiple taxes and alternative forms of FDI: evidence from cross-border acquisitions

This paper explores the role of tax instruments in affecting foreign direct investment (FDI), paying particular attention on their effect on two forms of FDI strategy, ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’. Applying a decomposition of FDI strategies to the universe of cross-border mergers (the dominant form of FDI) over the period 1999–2010, it emerges that taxes have a much more nuanced effect on FDI than frequently suggested; while corporate taxes affect FDI negatively, the tax elasticity varies depending on the FDI strategy (with vertical FDI being in general more responsive), the exact measure of taxation, and international tax considerations (double taxation, withholding taxes). Sales taxes also affect FDI, but only horizontally.     

Capital structure and international debt shifting

This paper presents a model of a multinational firm's optimal debt policy that incorporates international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm's indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our empirical results show that a foreign subsidiary's capital structure reflects local corporate tax rates as well as tax rate differences vis-à-vis the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries, although the overall economic effect of taxes on leverage appears to be small. Ignoring the international debt shifting arising from differences in national tax rates would understate the impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%.     

The optimal mix of taxes on money,consumption and income

We determine the optimal combination of taxes on money, consumption and income in transactions technology models where exogenous government expenditures must be financed with distortionary taxes. We show that the optimal policy does not tax money, regardless of whether the government can use as alternative fiscal instruments an income tax, a consumption tax, or the two taxes jointly. These results are at odds with recent literature. We argue that the reason for this divergence is an inappropriate specification of the transactions technology adopted in the literature.     

Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU

The integration of European financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near-perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes. The years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results. Instead of the dreaded “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, the UK lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of France, Germany and Italy, while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries. The UK increased its labor tax marginally, but the other countries increased theirs sharply. This paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic, Neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices, wealth distribution and fiscal solvency. Tax competition is modeled as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to European data. The calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes. The solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, there is no race to the bottom and the Nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes. In contrast, if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition over capital taxes triggers a “race to the bottom,” but this outcome entails large welfare gains. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments.     

The welfare comparison of corrective ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition

The ad valorem versus unit tax debate has traditionally emphasized tax yield. On this criterion, ad valorem taxes outperform unit taxes in terms of welfare for a wide range of imperfect competition settings including Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition. However, in a number of policy fields such as environmental, health, and trade economics, policy makers use taxes to reduce the production/consumption volume in an industry, i.e., to correct an externality rather than to improve tax yield. This paper compares the two tax instruments with respect to equal corrective effect in a Dixit–Stiglitz setting with love of variety, entry, exit, and redistribution of tax revenues. We find that unit taxes lead to more firms in the industry, less output per firm, less tax revenue, but higher welfare compared to ad valorem taxes.      

The effects of tax policy on financial markets: G3 evidence

We investigate the effects of various tax policy innovations on stock market returns. By using a vector autoregressive model that controls for the mutual causality between fiscal policy and financial market performance, we test whether financial markets serve as a transmission mechanism for tax policy innovations. Our findings indicate that indirect taxes have a larger effect on market returns than do labor taxes. Further, corporate tax innovations do not have any statistically significant effect on stock returns. We consider that this finding is a result of a firm's ability to switch between equity financing and bond financing.     

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Customer Markets

We present a model in which some goods trade in “customer markets” and advertising facilitates long‐lived relationships. We estimate the model on U.S. data and find a large congestion externality in the pricing of customer market goods. This motivates the analysis of optimal policy. Under a complete set of taxes, fiscal policy eliminates the externalities with large adjustments in tax rates on customer markets goods, while labor tax volatility remains low. Constraining the instruments to the interest rate and labor tax, the optimal labor tax displays large and procyclical fluctuations, but monetary policy is little changed compared to a model with no customer markets.     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

完善结构性减税政策的着力点与路径选择

根据目前我国所面临的新形势、新任务,完善结构性减税政策的着力点应该放在三个方面:针对特定税种进行有增有减的调整,促进税制结构的优化;针对特定群体实行减税或增税政策,实现税收负担的公平;将结构性减税与经济结构调整对接,助推经济结构的优化。立足于这三大着力点,完善结构性减税政策的基本路径选择为:推进增值税扩围改革;调整消费税;减免部分进口环节税收;实行综合与分类相结合的个人所得税制;进一步完善企业所得税优惠政策;深化个人住房房产税改革;全面推广资源税;研究开征环境保护税等新税种。     

中国间接税与直接税的比例关系研究—— IMF政府财政数据支持的解释

利用国际货币基金组织提供的政府财政数据,将世界各国(地区)的税制结构分成六种类型,并对中国间接税比重进行横向比较。结果发现：当前我国基本属于“间接税为主”的税制模式,尽管中国间接税比重在可控范围内,但是已经高于世界经验水平。如果税制结构得不到改善,将逐渐偏离世界发展一般经验规律。在分析影响间接税规模的影响因素基础之上,提出构建与本国经济发展相适应、与宏观经济目标一致的“双主体”税制结构;逐步降低间接税比重、提高直接税比重;提高税收征管水平等政策建议。     

International tax competition: do public good spillovers matter?

We study the impact of public good spillovers on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries with different levels of productivity. We show that international public good spillovers, by reducing the tax gap between countries, strengthen the agglomeration of firms in the most productive country. Then we carry on a welfare analysis. We first assume that governments are engaged in a redistributive tax policy. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the tax level in the high-productivity country is inefficiently high while it is inefficiently low in the other country. A different conclusion emerges when tax revenues are recycled in a public good provision: taxes are inefficiently low in both countries and public good spillovers increase the global welfare. Finally, for a given amount of total tax revenues, public good provision in the high-productivity country is inefficiently high compared to its level in the low-productivity country.     

MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition

Despite big gains from easing restrictions on international labor mobility, liberalizing migration flows is not pursued unilaterally or negotiated among countries in a way that international trade negotiations are pursued. Among several key explanations is the fiscal burden imposed by immigration on native-born. The paper focuses on a central tension faced by policy makers in countries that receive migrants from lower wage countries. Such countries are typically high productivity and capital rich, and the resulting high wages attract both skilled and unskilled migrants. A generous welfare state may attract low-skill migration deter skilled migration, since it is likely to be accompanied by higher redistributive taxes. Assuming that a group of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, the analysis demonstrates that tax competition does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to higher taxes than coordination. There exists a fiscal externality (fiscal leakage) that causes tax rates (on both labor and capital), and the volume of migration (of both skill types), to be higher in the competitive regime than in the coordinated regime.     

The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization

This paper establishes a parallelism between indirect tax harmonization when taxes are levied according to the destination principle and its counterpart when taxes are imposed on an origin basis. Using a simple two-country model of international trade it is argued that, under normal circumstances, indirect tax harmonization under the origin principle, considered as a movement of domestic taxes toward an appropriately designed average tax structure, is potentially Pareto improving. It is also shown that if the initial position is a Nash equilibrium, there are exceptional situations under which the above-mentioned reform may generate an actual Pareto improvement, so that both countries improve their welfare without any need for a compensating international transfer.     

Is Tax Harmonization Useful?

It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on international tax competition that an inefficient provision of public goods can only be avoided, if taxes are sufficiently coordinated. In this paper we use a model where governments use commodity and factor taxes in the tax competition game. We show that governments will always choose a second-best efficient tax structure in the Nash equilibrium if they have access to a residence-based capital tax and either a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax. Moreover, we show that tax competition need not foreclose third-best efficiency in a world with a restricted tax policy toolkit.     

我国慈善捐赠税收政策体系的完善研究

近年来,我国慈善捐赠事业不断发展,但与之相关的慈善捐赠税收政策较为分散,尚未形成完整的政策体系。梳理我国慈善捐赠相关税收政策法规发现,我国慈善捐赠税收政策体系目前存在较多问题亟待解决。进一步完善我国现行慈善捐赠税收政策体系,需要借鉴国际经验,从全局考虑,统筹规划各税种的税收优惠政策,使各税种的优惠政策和税收征管共同作用,充分保障捐赠者和受赠者权益,从而更好促进我国慈善捐赠事业发展。     

Free trade taxation and protectionist taxation

The goal of this paper is to seek new insight regarding international tax policy by recasting it in parallel with the theory of international trade. This is accomplished by defining a free trade taxation regime as one that is consistent with an efficient worldwide allocation of capital, and evaluating within this perspective various aspects of tax policy, such as value-added (axes, integration, income shifting, and the choice of worldwide or territorial system of taxes.Compatibility with free trade is not the only standard against which to judge an international tax system. Nevertheless, as national economies become more integrated the importance of international taxation for the efficient functioning of capital markets will become a central policy issue.     

Some Equity and Efficiency Considerations of International Tax Competition

The paper uses a dynamic 2-country equilibrium model with imperfections in the labour market calibrated for the US and EU economy to investigate dynamic efficiency and equity aspects of international tax competition. We focus on tax policy where governments can only decide on the levels of corporate and labour taxes, given a constant share of government consumption and transfers in GDP and a constant VAT rate. We find that the welfare effect of a tax shift from capital to labour depends heavily on the distortionary nature of labour taxes. In contrast to existing results we find substantial positive international spillover effects of corporate tax reduction in one country, with long term gains outweighing short term losses. Results are very different, however, if one goes beyond the representative agent framework. According to our results, a tax switch is most likely not Pareto improving since net wages tend to decline in both regions even in the long run.