Debt financing,first-mover advantage,and vertical product differentiation

This paper examines the impact of the strategic use of debt financing as a commitment device, in a vertically differentiated duopoly with demand uncertainty. We consider various possible game sequences for two firms with asymmetric financial structures to enter the market. The results show that (i) having access to external debt does not necessarily promote the firm to provide a higher quality product; (ii) strategic debt improves the degree of product differentiation and benefits both firms; and (iii) a firm's optimal debt level is positively related to the first-mover advantage of introducing its product to the market.     

企业债务期限结构配置及其治理对策——湘火矩汽车股份案例

本文认为,债务期限结构错配是我国许多高速扩张企业出现流动性财务危机的主要原因之一,但在现有商业银行信贷期限结构错配和企业债券市场不发达的金融背景约束下,我国企业很难通过增加长期债务的方式来改变债务期限与资产期限错配的问题,唯有通过降低财务杠杆的方法来降低流动性风险。在现有金融市场条件下,企业现实的选择是债务期限结构错配和低财务杠杆,不能采用高财务杠杆方式来实现企业的高速增长,否则很容易陷入财务困境。     

信息披露质量与债务成本——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以深圳证券市场部分A股上市公司为样本,研究了我国上市公司信息披露质量与企业债务成本之同的关系.研究发现,样本公司的债务成本与信息披露质量之间存在显著的负相关关系,也即信息披露质量越高,债务成本越低,而且这一结果是稳健的.此外,企业的市场风险越大,信息披露质量对债务成本的影响程度就越大.     

Corporate financial determinants of foreign direct investment

Financial market incompleteness and (partial) segmentation of financial markets internationally may endow some firms with a financial advantage which can be exploited through foreign direct investment. We argue that this advantage appears as a distinct cost-of-capital effect on FDI, and identify possible channels for such an effect. Using a sample of European firms’ cross-border acquisitions, and controlling for traditional firm-level determinants of FDI, we find strong support for a cost-of-equity effect, whereas the effect of debt costs is indeterminate. Moreover, financial FDI determinants are more important for firms with high knowledge intensity and for firms resident in relatively less financially developed countries.     

Influential ownership and capital structure

This paper explores the relation between ownership structures and capital structures in Russia—an economy with a state‐run banking sector, weak corporate governance, and highly concentrated ownership. We find that firms with the state as controlling shareholder have significantly higher leverage than firms controlled by domestic private controlling shareholders other than oligarchs. Both firms controlled by the state or oligarchs finance their growth with more debt than other firms. Profitability is negatively related to leverage across all types of controlling owners, indicating a preference for internal funding over debt. The results indicate that firms with owners that have political influence or ties to large financial groups enjoy better access to debt. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

企业的负债风险及其控制

在市场经济条件下,企业负债经营是不可避免的.负债经营可以提高企业的市场竞争能力,扩大企业生产规模,使企业得到财务杠杆效益,减少货币贬值的损失,降低综合资金成本.同时,负债经营也增加了企业的负债风险.那么,怎样才能在企业发展和控制负债风险之间寻求一条最佳途径呢？本文先通过对负债经营的主要风险以及负债风险的成因进行分析,然后针对负债经营企业如何防范和控制负债风险提出了几点建议.     

Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.     

Financial fragility,sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs

We show that with intertwined weak banks and weak sovereigns, bank recapitalizations become much less effective. We construct a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks lending to firms and holding domestic government bonds. Bond prices reflect endogenously generated sovereign risk. This introduces a negative amplification cycle: after a credit crisis output losses increase more because higher interest rates trigger lower bond prices and subsequent losses at banks. This further tightens bank leverage constraints, and causes interest rates to rise further. Also bank recapitalizations are then much less effective. Recaps involve swaps of newly issued sovereign bonds for bank equity, the new debt increases sovereign debt discounts, leading to capital losses for the banks on their holdings of sovereign debt that (partially) offset the impact of the recapitalization. The favorable macroeconomic effects of bank recaps on the recovery after a financial crisis are correspondingly lower.     

Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?

We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.     

Estimation of market power in the presence of firm level inefficiencies

“The quiet life hypothesis” (QLH) by Hicks (1935) argues that, due to management’s subjective cost of reaching optimal profits, firms use their market power to allow inefficient allocation of resources. Increasing competitive pressure is therefore likely to force management to work harder to reach optimal profits. Another hypothesis, which also relates market power to efficiency is “the efficient structure hypothesis” (ESH) by Demsetz (1973). ESH argues that firms with superior efficiencies or technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are assumed to gain larger market shares which lead to higher concentration. Ignoring the efficiency levels of the firms in a market power model might cause both estimation and interpretation problems. Unfortunately, the literature on market power measurement largely ignores this relationship. In the context of a dynamic setting, we estimate the market power of US airlines in two city-pairs by both allowing inefficiencies of the firms and not allowing inefficiencies of the firms. Using industry level cost data, we estimate the cost function parameters and time-varying efficiencies. An instrumental variables version of the square root Kalman filter is used to estimate time-varying conduct parameters.     

Private debt, unused credit lines, and seasoned equity offerings

We study a sample of SEOs to examine the impact of private debt and unused credit lines on SEO underpricing and long-run stock and operating performance. We do not find significant effects of private debt financing on SEO underpricing and long-run stock underperformance. However, firms with more bank debt and unused lines of credit exhibit significantly better pre-issue operating performance. Changes in operating performance from the pre-issue year to the post-issue period are negatively related to the size of unused credit lines. Capital spending decreases with the size of unused credit lines in the year prior to SEOs, but increases following SEOs. Our overall evidence suggests that the post-issue operating performance we observed may be a result of overinvestment, which is enhanced by unused credit lines.     

Intra-Industry Capital Structure Dispersion

Why do firms in some industries exhibit very similar debt ratios, while firms in other industries do not? This paper examines the dispersion in leverage ratios among firms within an industry, and relates this dispersion to industry characteristics. We find that more concentrated industries and industries where the use of leasing is more intense exhibit greater intra‐industry dispersion. We also document greater dispersion in industries where firms use less incentive compensation, sit more insiders in their boards, are older, and have larger capital expenditures in relation to their assets.     

Distressed exchange,bargaining power,and prior capital structure

Financially troubled companies often make Distressed Exchange (DE) offers to its creditors, to postpone costly bankruptcy reorganization. We derive the optimal terms and timing of a DE offer consisting of debt reduction and an equity stake in the restructured firm. The DE terms and timing are affected by shareholder bargaining power, with greater shareholder bargaining power resulting in earlier DE offer, smaller debt reduction and smaller equity stake. The impact of shareholder bargaining power is greater when bankruptcy cost is larger and tax rate is higher. We also show that renegotiability of debt increases ex-ante firm value and results in a higher optimal leverage ratio. Both firm value and optimal leverage ratio are decreasing functions of shareholder bargaining power.     

Beyond symbolic and substantive: Strategic disclosure of corporate environmental information in China

Under increasing regulatory pressure to disclose environmental impacts, corporate environmental information disclosure (EID) is becoming more prevalent. However, the motives for EID and disclosure approaches (i.e., symbolic or substantive) remain controversial. Using a sample of data for 742 listed manufacturing firms in China across 3 years, we provide evidence to show that the level of EID is significantly positively associated with a firm's advertising intensity and that firms in moderately competitive industries have a higher propensity for adopting an EID‐based differentiated strategy than firms in stronger or weaker competitive industries. We also find that firms that are more sensitive to environmental issues strategically understate their environmental impact when directly facing consumers. Our results suggest that the implementation of corporate EID is strategic and that firms have strong market motives, even under regulatory pressure to demonstrate legitimacy. We discuss this study's contributions to research on EID theory and implications for strategic EID management.     

Product–market flexibility and capital structure

Many companies have the ability to adjust their product's price and/or quantity in response to changes in the marketplace. We show that this product–market flexibility or market power, hitherto ignored in the contingent-claim modeling literature, can potentially have a significant effect on the corporate capital structure decision. When the firm is operating at full capacity, product–market flexibility is not important, hence market power has a negligible effect on optimal capital structure. However, when operating below capacity, product–market flexibility becomes important and market power has, in general, a positive effect on optimal debt level and optimal leverage ratio. This is consistent with available empirical evidence. Numerical results indicate that the effect of product–market flexibility on optimal debt level and optimal leverage ratio can potentially be large enough to be economically significant, hence it should not be ignored as a determinant of capital structure.     

Contraction flexibility,operating leverage,and financial leverage

This study investigates the impacts of contraction flexibility and operating leverage on financial leverage from the perspective of the agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders. In a continuous-time real option framework, we demonstrate that shareholders’ contraction flexibility may have an adverse effect on financial leverage, and that the substitution relation between operating leverage and financial leverage is persistent or pronounced in the presence of contraction flexibility. The evidence from Chinese listed firms not only supports our theoretical predictions well, but also offers a method to examine the agency conflict hypothesis. We suggest that the high proportion of bank loans or long-term debt in total liabilities can help levered firms alleviate the agency problem arising from contraction decisions.     

The debt-equity financing decisions of U.S. startup firms

We examine the debt-equity decisions of startup firms using the Kauffman Firm Survey, the largest database of U.S. startups launched in 2004. To control for sample selection bias and the correlation among financing decisions, we employ a Bivariate Probit-Tobit model. Our results show that several firm characteristics such as growth prospects, firm size, tangible assets, and selling products, as well as owner characteristics such as net worth, experience, education and ethnicity explain the debt-equity decisions in the startup year. In addition, for firms that use debt, we document traits that explain the use of a particular type of business versus personal debt. Larger firms use more business debt, whereas home-based and growth firms use more personal sources of debt. Immigrants, owners who lack work experience and those who invest more time in the business tend to rely more on personal sources of debt.     

Determinants of the stock price reaction to leveraged buyouts

This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout activity through the use of an abnormal return premium from the time of the first announcement through the final trading day. Consistent with the free. cash flow theory, firms with either high free cash flow or low Tobin’s q have higher abnormal returns. However, the returns to firms with both high free cash flow and low Tobin’s q are lower than firms with just one of these characteristics. Firms which substantially increase leverage and management buyouts with high insider ownership prior to the buyout have lower abnormal returns. Firms with lower risk, and therefore greater debt capacity, have higher abnormal returns.     

Balance sheets, exchange rate policy, and welfare

We evaluate the welfare implications of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a small open-economy model that incorporates the financial accelerator coupled with liability dollarization. We solve the model up to a second-order approximation which allows us to rigorously address the relationship between uncertainty and welfare. We identify leverage and debt-to-GDP ratios above which an exchange rate peg is welfare superior to a flexible exchange rate regime. The results indicate that emerging market countries with even moderate levels of foreign currency-denominated debt may find it beneficial to stabilize their exchange rates.     

Determinants of the stock price reaction to leveraged buyouts

Abtract  This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout activity through the use of an abnormal return premium from the time of the first announcement through the final trading day. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, firms with either high free cash flow or low Tobin’s q have higher abnormal returns. Howerver, the returns to firms with both high free cash flow and low Tobin’s q are lower than firms with just one of these characteristics. Firms which substantially increase leverage and management buyouts with high insider ownership prior to the buyout have lower abnormal returns. Firms with lower risk, and therefore greater debt capacity, have higher abnormal returns.