A bright side of financial constraints in cash management

This paper tests whether financial constraints play a disciplinary role in cash dissipation in the presence of agency problems. We hypothesize that when firms have difficulty raising external funds, empire-building managers of cash-rich firms will be less likely to spend cash on negative NPV projects as compared to unconstrained managers. Empirically, we examine firm performance after cash dissipation and associate it with the degree of financial constraints. We find that cash spending by managers in financially constrained firms is associated with higher future profitability and stock returns compared to cash spending by managers in unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that the positive effect of financial constraints on firm performance is not driven by differences in corporate governance. Financial constraints actually substitute for good governance in disciplining managers. We find that corporate governance improves the efficiency of cash dissipation in unconstrained firms, but not in constrained firms. Likewise, financial constraints' disciplinary effect is found to be concentrated in firms that are poorly governed.     

Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone

This paper considers the ownership structure of family firms to determine whether family control alleviates or exacerbates investment–cash flow sensitivity in the Euro zone. We find that family-controlled corporations have lower investment–cash flow sensitivities. Further, our results show that this reduced sensitivity is mainly attributable to family firms with no deviations between cash flow and voting rights and to family firms in which family members hold managerial positions. We also find that second largest shareholders affect family firms' sensitivity and are associated with either monitoring (non-family second blockholders) or collusion (family second blockholders). Overall, family control seems to mitigate investment inefficiencies that derive from capital market imperfections.     

Stock reaction to dividend savings of convertible preferred calls: Free cash flow or price pressure effects?

Calls of in-the-money convertible preferred stock typically induce dividend savings for the firm, since preferred dividends exceed common stock dividends. Prior research finds that these savings are negatively related to stock returns at call announcement and argues that the market expects managers to abuse the increased free cash flow. This paper finds that dividend savings are closely related to call size, suggesting other explanations. Larger calls experience a more negative announcement reaction. Consistent with temporary liquidity effects, there is a price reversal during the conversion period, which is greater for larger calls.     

Debt and equity as optimal contracts

This paper shows the simultaneous optimally of debt and equity contracts in a principal-agent model. The agent (an entrepreneur) has an investment project but does not have the necessary funds to finance it. There is moral hazard in the model, generated by the dependence of the project's expected return on the (unobservable) agent's effort. Key to the optimality of these financial instruments is the nonassignable rent produced by the project and captured by the entrepreneur when the investment is successful.     

Deviation from the target capital structure and acquisition choices

This study finds that managers take deviations from their target capital structures into account when planning and structuring acquisitions. Specifically, firms that are overleveraged relative to their target debt ratios are less likely to make acquisitions and are less likely to use cash in their offers. Furthermore, they acquire smaller targets and pay lower premiums. Managers of overleveraged firms also actively rebalance their capital structures when they anticipate a high likelihood of making an acquisition. Finally, they pursue the most value-enhancing acquisitions. Collectively, these findings improve understanding of how firms choose their capital structures and shed light on the interdependence of capital structure and investment decisions in the presence of financial frictions.     

Return on capital analysis: U.S.-based multinational corporations versus U.S. domestic corporations

We study the difference between U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) and U.S. domestic corporations (DCs) in terms of management efficiency with return on capital as the measure of management efficiency. We use a fixed effect model to account for heterogeneity and/or the time-specific effect and find that MNCs have lower management efficiency than DCs, which holds after we control for the effects of firm size, GDP growth rate, and growth opportunity on management efficiency. One reason for the low efficiency is the MNCs’ inability to manage their assets well relative to DCs. We also find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between return on capital and degree of internationalization, which implies an optimal degree of internationalization. Our result does not confirm the recently proposed three-stage model.     

Announcement effects of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans: An empirical analysis for the Dutch market

This study investigates the announcement effects of offerings of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans using data for the Dutch market. The event study analysis shows that announcement effects of convertible bonds are associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns and that announcements of warrant-bonds are associated with significant positive abnormal returns. These findings are similar to the results for Japanese hybrid debt, as reported by Kang et al. (1995) (Kang, J.K., Kim, Y.C., Park, K.J., Stulz, R.M., 1995. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 257–270) and Kang and Stulz (1996) (Kang, J.K., Stulz, R.M., 1996. Review of Financial Studies, pp. 109–139), but they contrast with studies for the United States that generally find significant negative abnormal returns for convertible bond loans and insignificant negative abnormal returns for warrant-bond loans. Our results cannot be attributed to differences in the corporate governance structures of the Netherlands and the United States. We find that the positive abnormal returns for the warrant-bond loans are caused by the packaging of the announcements with other (good) firm-specific news.     

Monitoring via staging: Evidence from Private investments in public equity

I study the causes and consequences of staging in the setting of private investments in public equities (PIPEs). I find that, in PIPE investments, as in venture capital staging, the staging strategy is used by investors as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Moreover, strategic investors and investors investing alone are more likely to utilize staging. I show also that staging reduces the cost of financing and has positive implications for PIPE issuers’ long-run stock performance.     

Blockholder dispersion and firm value

Multiple blockholder structures are a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. The theoretical literature, however, provides conflicting predictions on whether a single large blockholder or a set of dispersed smaller blockholders is better for firm value. Using U.S. data, we find a negative correlation between Tobin's Q and blockholder dispersion. The findings are robust to a wide variety of model specifications and controls and differ from results for other geographic regions such as Europe and Asia.     

Are small family firms financially sophisticated?

We study the drivers of financial sophistication in small family firms. Sophistication is defined as the use of non-basic financial products such as options, swaps, debt restructuring, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset with detailed information on 187 Italian family firms. We find that the main drivers of financial sophistication are: (1) the generation that currently owns the firm; (2) the presence of a non-family CFO; and (3) the existence of a non-family shareholder. We analyze the impact of these factors on the following four classes of non-basic financial products: corporate finance, cash management, corporate lending and risk management. Our results can be used to determine the characteristics of financially sophisticated family firms and whether their corporate governance and ownership structure increase the use of non-basic financial products.     

Firm- and country-level determinants of corporate leverage: Some new international evidence

This research analyzes the determinants of capital structure across 37 countries. Institutional arrangements matter for capital structure decisions; however, firm-level covariates drive two-thirds of the variation in capital structure across countries, while the country-level covariates explain the remaining one-third. The observed relationships between the country-level determinants and leverage provide strong support to the predictions of both the trade-off and the pecking-order theories. Country-level determinants serve as substitute mechanisms for the firm-level, industry-level, and macroeconomic determinants by moderating their marginal impact on leverage.     

On the acquisition of equity carve-outs

We examine the role played by the parent’s motive in undertaking a carve-out; the parent’s post-IPO influence over the carved-out subsidiary; and anti-takeover provisions and industry structure of a carve-out on its acquisition likelihood and its acquisition premium. We find that the probability and hazard of a carve-out acquisition increase when the parent’s objective is to unlock the value of a subsidiary and when the parent and the subsidiary are tied with a product-market relationship. We also find that the post-IPO parent ownership significantly affects the acquisition likelihood and the level of acquisition premium. Additional analyses examining the post-IPO carve-out status suggest that the product-market relationship and post-IPO parent ownership increase the probability of re-acquisition.     

Are there monitoring benefits to institutional ownership? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

We provide new evidence on the monitoring benefits from institutional ownership by analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on stock price and operating performance following seasoned equity offerings, a setting where the effects of monitoring are likely to be especially important. We find that announcement returns are positively and significantly related to total and active institutional ownership levels and concentration. Post-issue stock returns are positively and significantly related to the contemporaneous post-issue changes in total and active institutional ownership and the concentration of their shareholdings. Operating performance improvements are also related to institutional monitoring in the one, two, and three years following the equity issue. Our results continue to hold even after accounting for the possibility that institutional investors have an informational advantage that enables them to identify and invest in subsequently better performing firms. We also empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by institutions buying past winners and selling past losers as a way to window-dress their portfolio holdings.     

Incorporating the dynamics of leverage into default prediction

A firm’s current leverage ratio is one of the core characteristics of credit quality used in statistical default prediction models. Based on the capital structure literature, which shows that leverage is mean-reverting to a target leverage, we forecast future leverage ratios and include them in the set of default risk drivers. An out-of-sample analysis of default predictions from a hazard model reveals that the discriminative power increases substantially when leverage forecasts are included. We further document that credit ratings contain information beyond the one contained in standard variables but that this information is unrelated to forecasts of leverage ratios.     

Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks

During mergers and acquisitions, the CEOs of the acquiring firms are likely to cancel the deal if the market does not react favorably to its announcement. Using a sample of French acquisition announcements during the period from 2000 to 2005, this paper studies the conditions in which CEOs are more willing to listen to investors. Furthermore, according to the strong networks developed through French elite schools' alumni and board ties, the well-connected CEOs are more likely to complete any deal in spite of a negative market reaction to acquisition announcements.     

Does shareholder approval requirement of equity compensation plans matter?

This paper studies the impact of the 2003 SEC Regulation requiring shareholder approval of all equity-based executive compensation plans on executive compensation policies and practices at S&P 500 firms. Following the 2003 Regulation, firms with shareholder approved equity plans in place or those with strong performance, while not those with non-approved plans or weak performance, increase their equity compensation proposal submission activity. The quality of equity compensation proposals improves in the after-regulation period, and shareholders exhibit greater scrutiny and monitoring of executive compensation through increased voting rights. We find a decline in the equity pay component while an increase in the cash component of total executive compensation after the 2003 Regulation and also provide evidence that the 2003 Regulation contributes to this change in compensation structure.     

Partial adjustment toward target capital structures

The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year.     

Determinants of the guarantee circles: The case of Chinese listed firms

China's external capital market has been developing rapidly since the establishment of its stock markets. However, financing from the internal capital market, especially through the guarantee system provided by other associated firms (the guarantee circle), remains significant for some Chinese firms. We analyze the importance associated with the guarantee system in China with a focus on the macro and micro determinants that affect Chinese firms' participation in the guarantee circle. Our findings suggest that both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors have significant impact on a firm's involvement in the guarantee circle. Firms in regions with higher economic growth, less developed banking system and worse legal protection are more likely to receive guarantee from firms associated with the controlling shareholders. On the other hand, firms controlled by the state are less likely to receive guarantee but more likely to provide guarantee, while firms with alternative financing sources are more likely to provide guarantee. Firms within a complex group with more pyramidal layers are more likely to get involved in the guarantee circle, either as a guarantor or a guarantee. Our findings have implications to general guarantee systems with the presence of agency and moral hazard problems.     

Are liquidity and corporate control priced by shareholders? Empirical evidence from Swiss dual class shares

Stadard asset pricing models generally exclude corporate control and liquidity considerations as joint explanatory factors of the stock price formation process. This empirical study investigates their influence on Swiss Bearer and Registered share prices issued by the same firm. It is shown that the statistical properties of both shares' returns differ without implying profitable arbitrage opportunities. A multifactor model of the ‘premium’ between Bearer and Registered stock prices is then proposed and tested. The results show that the freely negotiable equity book value, the existence of dominant shareholder positions and ownership transfer regime changes are significant variables in explaining the dual class share price differential.