Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential second-price auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indifferent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the first object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller's revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net effect on the seller's revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine a special case with asymmetric players who have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline.Received: 12 December 2000, Accepted: 1 May 2002, JEL Classification: D44Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (Grant A000000055) and CNPq. Monteiro acknowledges the financial support from CNPq and the hospitality of CERSEM where part of this paper has been written. We thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Peter Sørensen and two anonymous referees for useful comments.     

Optimal fees in internet auctions

An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.      

Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.     

Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

We provide a unified approach to the problem of existence of optimal auctions for a wide variety of auction environments. We accomplish this by first establishing a general existence result for a particular Stackelberg revelation game. By systematically specializing our revelation game to cover various types of auctions, we are able to deduce the existence of optimal Bayesian auction mechanisms for single and multiple unit auctions, as well as for contract auctions with moral hazard and adverse selection. In all cases, we allow for risk aversion and multidimensional, stochastically dependent types.     

Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions

A well-known myopic bidding strategy fails to support an equilibrium of simultaneous ascending proxy auctions for heterogeneous items when a hard-close rule is in place. This is because, in common with the single-auction case, last minute bidding (sniping) is a best response to naive behaviour. However, a modification to the myopic strategy in which all bidders submit an additional bid in the closing stages of the auction–a practice I call ‘defensive sniping’–is shown to yield an efficient, belief-free equilibrium of such environments. This equilibrium is essentially unique within the class of belief-free, efficient equilibria.     

Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions

Research on bidder collusion in procurement auctions is reasonably successful in unveiling the mechanisms of collusion among the bidders. But it is relatively weak in forwarding effective practical methods of collusion detection before the winner is declared, because they presuppose the knowledge of collusion in specific auctions. Past studies, however, point out the need for working with bid price-to-reserve price ratios rather than bid prices or winning bid prices, to be free from the problem of heteroscedasticity. They also draw an important inference that the set of collusive data are significantly different from the set of competitive data. On the basis of these basic facts, the current paper outlines a seven-step approach to collusion detection. The approach makes rudimentary statistical analysis of bid price-to-reserve price ratios for all the bidders. The analysis comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios. It divides the ratios into two significantly different clusters. The cluster with the higher mean and variance values of the ratios corresponds to collusive bidding with the other cluster corresponding to competitive bidding. The paper proposes the construction of a process control chart to detect occurrence of collusion in an auction immediately after the price bids are opened. The approach is illustrated by applying it to data from procurement auctions for construction projects in a State Department of the Republic of India.     

Online reverse auctions and their role in buyer–supplier relationships

Despite the move in recent years towards supplier partnerships, buying firms need at times to make use of competitive procurement strategies for certain purchases. This study examines the impact of reverse auctions on buyer–supplier relationships through six case studies, analysing primarily the supplier perspective through participant interviews. The authors identify that there are potential benefits for both parties in a reverse auction, which can offer tendering and transactional cost advantages. For buyers, it offers a competitive procurement process. The effect on relationships will depend on the extent to which buyers employ the auction as a price weapon, or whether it is used primarily as a process improvement tool.     

Target-oriented use of strategic sourcing tools: A critical analysis creating process awareness for electronic reverse auctions

The success of an electronic reverse auction (eRA) does not manifest just in price reductions but also in the reduction of transaction costs and costs of the purchasing organization. A dynamic process view allows a better understanding of these dimensions. We illustrate that using the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) concept. The goal of our study is to determine the impacts of eRAs on Total Cost of the Purchasing Function (TCPF). Therefore we analyze the impacts on three different levels: the process step, the transaction, and the tool integration level, enabling process awareness of firms using eRAs.     

Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: A structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions

Recently, several auction models with entry have been proposed: in one model ( and ), bidders are assumed to draw their private values after they decide to enter. In another model ( and ), bidders are assumed to learn their values before their entry decisions are made. The entry cost in the latter model can be interpreted as bid preparation cost, while the entry cost in the former model consists of both costs from information acquisition and bid preparation. Moreover, these two models have different implications for important policies, e.g., the optimal reserve price. In this paper we provide a unified structural framework where the two models can be estimated and distinguished using the Bayesian method. We apply our method to analyze Michigan timber sale auctions.     

在线拍卖中的代理研究综述

在线拍卖站点的不断增加给在线竞买人提出了具大的挑战,竞买人需要从大量的拍卖站点中选择一个恰当的拍卖站点,以保证在满足他们偏好的前提下得到他们希望的物品。不同的拍卖站点采用的拍卖方式和竞价策略是不同的,因此,不同的拍卖站点其竞价代理的设计策略也不同。本文主要对目前在线拍卖代理研究进行综述。     

The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction

The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate Personal Communication Services licenses. In the auction, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a penalty. The penalty is equal to the maximum of zero or the difference between the value of the withdrawn bid on a license and the highest bid after the withdrawal on that license. The withdrawal rule is designed to assist bidders wishing to assemble combinations of licenses who find themselves stranded with an assortment of licenses for which their bids sum to more than their value. This paper reports results of experiments that examine the effect of the withdrawal rule in environments in which losses can occur if packages of licenses must be assembled piecemeal. The experiments demonstrate that there is a tradeoff with using the rule: efficiency and revenue increase, but individual losses are larger. Furthermore, the increased efficiency does not outweigh the higher prices paid so that bidder surplus falls in the presence of the withdrawal rule. Received: 10 October 1997 / Accepted: 10 September 1998     

Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions

We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries lead to inefficient allocations, thereby creating a motive for resale after the auction is over. In our model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner of the auction makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. Our goal is to compare equilibria of the first-price auction without resale (FPA) with those of the first-price auction with resale (FPAR). For the three major families of distributions for which equilibria of the FPA are available in closed form, we show that resale possibilities increase the revenue of the original seller. We also show by example that, somewhat paradoxically, resale may actually decrease efficiency.     

拆分招标的供应商数量研究

许多企业在采购时,常常将整笔业务拆分为两个合同:较大的第一合同和较小的第二合同,通过分批二级价格封闭式招标来选择不同的供应商供货。本文通过建立分批招标模型分析了供应商的投标策略和买方的采购策略,得出了当参加第一合同竞标的供应商数目和第二合同新引入的供应商数目满足一个不等式时,拆分招标的采购成本小于整体招标的采购成本,并且指出了拆分比例对拆分招标的采购成本的影响。     

Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price,sealed-bid auctions with affiliation

Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identified, but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulae and implementing this framework using particular members—the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae. We apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions used by the Michigan Department of Transportation to procure road-resurfacing services, rejecting the hypothesis of independence and finding significant (and high) affiliation in cost signals.     

An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

我国现行工程招投标体系的制度分析

文章基于我国现行的工程招标投标制度,对现行工程体系中的如串标、假资质、工程多层肢解发包等不合理现象运用制度经济学的原理进行分析,认为现行体系可以从竞价、交易成本、委托代理和契约4方面进行分析,并提出相应对策。     

依托现代信息技术构建科学规范的涉诉资产运行机制

本文主要对现阶段我国司法拍卖改革中引入第三方交易平台作为中间机构,以及在改革中引入电子竞价方式处置涉诉资产的现状做了调研;并就文章作者所在单位采取的做法做了利弊得失的分析,并对涉诉资产处置采取竞价的方式提出了建议。     

试论新形势下建设工程施工招标投标的风险与规避

文章指出提高风险管理水平,重视项目决策的研究,对完善建筑市场、提高施工企业的综合实力有着至关重要的作用。