INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS AND DECENTRALISATION IN INDONESIA

A fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relations involving decentralisation and expanded autonomy for provincial and local governments is under way in Indonesia. This paper explores the intergovernmental financial system that preceded the new General Allocation Fund (DAU), with particular attention to the old Inpres development grants. Like Inpres, the DAU attempts to address national development objectives, and can be seen as a logical consequence of reform efforts in intergovernmental finance that began long before the demise of the New Order government in 1998. The use of earmarked Inpres grants enabled the central government to ensure that key sectors such as roads, public health and education received adequate attention throughout Indonesia's diverse regions. Local governments' experience with Inpres should help in implementation of the DAU, yet Law 25/1999which restructures fiscal relations between the various levels of governmentmay actually have increased local reliance on the central government.     

ON-LENDING IN INDONESIA: PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

On-lending to sub-national governments in Indonesia has a long and generally disappointing history. Among other noteworthy problems, an insufficient amount of funds has been channelled through the system vis-à-vis capital fi nancing needs, and loan repayments have proved poor. Aid agencies and government have recently invested substantial resources in attempts to improve the on-lending system; the resultant newly installed regulatory framework for sub-national borrowing is, however, unlikely to improve outcomes substantially. Developing sub-national government access to private capital markets would appear to constitute the way forward, although this will not come quickly or easily. A positive step in the right direction would be for government and aid agencies to embrace the anticipated change and work together to make the transition a successful one, rather than continue to tinker with reforms at the margin of a moribund system.     

SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE DYNAMICS IN INDONESIA

This paper discusses the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia before and during the crisis. It argues that SME productivity has risen substantially, at rates not far from those of larger firms. Case studies indicate that various mechanisms are at work, such as technology diffusion through foreign buyers and subcontracting. The prevalence of SME clusters suggests that they benefit small and medium enterprise development. SMEs are found to have been weathering the crisis better than larger companies, though many have been hit hard too. Being less reliant on formal markets and formal credit, SMEs are able to respond more quickly and flexibly than their larger counterparts to sudden shocks. The paper argues that, rather than providing direct assistance to smaller firms, government should concentrate on creating a business environment conducive to small and medium business growth, and promoting provision of business development services by the private sector.     

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN STATE-OWNED AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN INDONESIA

This paper compares the management of human resources (HRM) in two large, modern sector business organisations, one state-owned and the other privately owned, in the context of the rapidly deregulated Indonesian economy of the mid-1990s. The two organisations differed greatly in the extent to which HRM was able to underpin the efficient management of the organisation. Owing to fundamentally different approaches to recruitment, training and development, employee performance management and remuneration, the state-owned enterprise had far less effective HRM than its private sector counterpart, and could learn a great deal from how the privately owned organisation responded to the challenges presented by deregulation. The findings suggest that firm effectiveness depends significantly on the HRM function, and that the performance of state-owned enterprises tends to suffer as a result of interference in HRM processes by their government owners.     

VILLAGE GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA: THE NEW DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK

The political reforms that began in Indonesia in 1998 have created new opportunities for a revised relationship between state and community, replacing the New Order's centralistic and uniform framework with local-level institutions that are strong and responsive. This paper presents the new legal framework for the democratisation of local-level politics and village institutions. Representative councils have been elected in all Indonesian villages, and the village head is no longer the sole authority in the community. Village governments are provided with far-reaching autonomy and do not need the approval of higher authorities to take decisions and implement policies. However, decentralisation and democratisation are necessary but not sufficient preconditions for developing the countryside and alleviating poverty. An active government and civil society engagement must ensure that regulations are not distorted during implementation, and that ordinary people are included in public policy making and local governance.     

ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN INDONESIA

During 19992000 Indonesia pursued many anti-corruption reforms but appeared to achieve little success in reducing the level of corruption, which remained a high profile problem in all branches of government. This article summarises the reform initiatives carried out since 1998 and offers an explanation for their very limited success. Obstacles to reducing corruption in Indonesia include the economic and political constraints facing the current government and the entrenched nature of corruption. The content of the reform program itself may also contribute to the persistence of the problem. The program consists primarily of moves to introduce monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that are external to particular government organisations. Internal reforms that aim to improve organisational self-discipline have received much less attention. The reform program may thus be inherently incomplete.     

PRIVATE POWER IN INDONESIA

The Asian currency crisis led to the collapse of agreements that Indonesia had negotiated for private electric power only a few years earlier. The ensuing struggle with investors created bad publicity and cost the country several hundred million dollars. As Indonesia in 2007 was designing a new law that would pass the constitutional test and encourage private investors in electric power, it was not clear that officials had fully understood the lessons of the earlier disputes. The original problems lay less in the legal framework than in lack of information about deals elsewhere, in the personal interests of highly placed individuals, and in the institutional structure and procedures for negotiations. The resulting power purchase agreements produced high electricity prices, imbalanced allocation of risks and rewards, and unwillingness to use the most effective defences when disputes arose. Learning from the past should help officials avoid similar mistakes in the future.     

THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA

After the 1997 East Asian crisis, central banks throughout the region tried to reduce the risk of future bank failures by promulgating regulatory reforms. The results in Indonesia have been to concentrate rather than mitigate banking risks, and to decrease the access of low-income households and enterprises to formal financial services, especially in rural areas. The most severe casualties of the ‘reforms’ have been local government-owned micro finance institutions. In the provinces where these institutions have functioned best, they have addressed a market failure by extending coverage to areas not served by conventional financial institutions. Understanding the past performance and potential for replication of these success stories continues to be important because of the substantial gaps that remain in the access of rural Indonesian households and micro enterprises to fi nancial services.