Autocracies and regional integration: the Eurasian case

The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, succeeded by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, constituted an important discontinuity in the development of post-Soviet regionalism: while the preceding organisations remained cases of ‘ink-on-paper’ regional integration, in the case of the Customs Union the members actually implemented their commitments. This creates an important theoretical challenge: the literature (which the previous experience of Eurasian regionalism was very much in line with) conjectures that authoritarian states are unable to successfully implement an economic regional integration agreement (RIA). The aim of the article is to explore the conditions under which implementation of economic RIAs by autocracies happens. We argue that the implementation is influenced by the extent of economic, social and political ties between member states, and suggest that, unlike democratic states, which are more likely to implement a RIA where there are strong economic ties, non-democracies are more likely to do so in the case of intermediate economic dependence.     

DEMOCRACY IN REFORMING COLLAPSED COMMUNIST ECONOMIES: BLESSING OR CURSE?

From a political standpoint, post-communists systems include both democratic and non-democratic nations. From an economic standpoint, they include both collapsing and expanding economies. All four logical possibilities exist for post-communist political and economic systems. The Czech Republic is an example of a democratic political system and an expanding economic system. Russia is an example of a democratic political system and a collapsing economic system. China is an example of a non-democratic political system and an expanding economic system. North Korea is an example of a non-democratic political system and a collapsing economic system. The fact that all four logical possibilities exist suggests that democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for good economic performance. However, democracy is certainly a value in itself that requires certain basic institutions, including free and fair elections, the orderly transfer of power to those elected, the rule of law and the separation of powers, and the protection of individual freedoms and basic liberties, including those of speech, press, religion, assembly, property, and economic opportunity. Economic policies, rather than the form of government, determine the results for an economy. Russia and China, the two largest socialist economies, followed very different economic policies and experienced radically different outcomes. The failure of “shock therapy” economic policies for transition to a market economy in Russia is related to its use of the Washington Consensus SLP package of stabilization, liberalization, and privatization, as recommended by the World Bank and the IMF. The success of Deng's economic policies for transition to a market economy in China is related to its rejection of the SLP in favor of the ICG approach of institutions, competition, and government. Other interesting cases are those of the Czech Republic and North Korea. Those nations in which both political and economic reforms have been simultaneously successful, such as the Czech Republic, are generally small, homogeneous European nations with a historic work ethic, with a relatively short period of socialism, and with support from neighboring advanced industrialized nations. There is great difficulty in simultaneously establishing both democracy and a market economy without a very special set of circumstances. Thus, it is necessary to determine a sequence for political and economic reform. Ultimately, however, the ideal of both democracy and a market economy may be attained even in nations without special circumstances and external assistance, with Russia eventually turning its economy around and with China eventually reforming politically into a democratic nation.     

离开威权主义后的演进路径

本文对威权政体进行了新的分类,以此研究政体类型对非民主政体的存续或消亡的影响,以及不同的威权主义政体对民主发展的影响。本文研究结果显示,不同的威权主义政体所面对的民主发展倾向是不同的。因此,威权主义的不同本质应当成为民主的关键前提之一。有限的多党政体是迈向民主体制的主要方式。事实上,这种政体类型已经成为威权主义迈向民主未来的最常见形式：一党体制或军事体制,都有可能先转化为有限的多党政体,再进一步迈向成熟的民主政体。     

Non‐linear geographics and the economics of transition and democratization1

The purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of geography on the transition process in authoritarian political regimes, and to investigate the nature of the links between political change, economic reforms and geographical location. A simple model of transition and democratization is presented wherein we show that the effectiveness of repression by the incumbent elite is a negative function of the distance to the ‘free world’. In consequence, geography has conflicting effects on shifts in political power. This article provides a rationale for the counterintuitive fact that the first authoritarian country to start a transition process towards democratization is not necessarily the one nearest to the free world.     

“政治学的诺贝尔奖”与当代比较政治学的科学追求——亚当·卓沃尔斯基关于民主与发展的研究介绍

亚当·卓沃尔斯基在研究国家经济发展水平与民主转型之间的关系方面做出了杰出贡献,因而获得2010年度约翰·斯凯特政治科学奖。主要贡献表现为以下三方面：第一,就民主体制的生成问题,他的研究打破了在研究民主转型问题上的经济决定论的迷思,并验证了民主体制在生存问题上对经济发展水平的依赖性。第二,就政治体制对经济发展的影响问题,他的研究表明在大规模的跨国比较分析中,看不出不同的政治体制（民主的或非民主的）对经济发展有什么系统的影响。第三,从根本上改变了比较研究的分析思路,把比较政治学分析从过去着重于类别比较分析,提高到重视科学检验一般性理论陈述的境界,而且强调重视选择偏差机制对样本分布的影响,从而科学地分析表象后面深层的因果关系问题。     

Alliances versus Federations: An Extension of Riker's Analysis of Federal Formation

This essay explores the distinction between federations and alliances and asks the question: When will states choose to federate rather than ally? William Riker argues that a necessary condition for a federal state's formation is that those offering the federal bargain must seek to “expand their territorial control, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement.” This argument, though, does not tell us why states sometimes respond to threats by forming federations and at other times by forming alliances. Here we address this issue directly and use a formal model of alliance formation to illustrate our arguments. Briefly, that model assumes states have initial endowments of military and economic resources, where economic resources enter utility functions directly and military capability influences preference only insofar as it determines a state's ability to counter or make threats. State can divert economic resources to military spending, and alliances, in turn, are self-enforcing coalitions designed to augment a state's offensive or defensive capabilities. Federations, which serve the same ends as alliances, are coalitions that need to be enforced by the “higher authority” established when the federation is formed. Our assumption is that states form federations in lieu of alliances if and only if (1) a stable alliance partition does not exist or, if one exists, it is dominated by an unstable partition and (2) if the cost of the loss of sovereignty to each state in the federation is offset by the gains from joining it, relative to what that state secures as its security value.     

The Role of Culture,Historicity, and Human Agency in the Evolution of the State: A Case Against Cultural Fatalism

I examine how the nature of the state and its relationship to its people are determined and evolve. I bring together differing contributions of traditional institutionalism to further an emerging evolutionary-institutionalist discourse concerning the role played by culture and historicity, on one hand, and by individual actions and awareness, on the other, in shaping and reshaping the nature of the state. Such discourse is significant in understanding that, although inherited culture plays an important role in influencing the character of the state in a given society, the future of the state is not fully determined by its history. In equal measure, it depends on the volition of individuals who purposefully amend the state’s institutions through rearranging power distribution. Using Russia’s authoritarian state as a case in point, I demonstrate how this emerging evolutionary-institutionalist discourse can circumvent ideological misuse of the institutionalist paradigm in non-democratic societies.     

Making Economic Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: The First Two Decades

After three decades of rapid economic growth during the authoritarian Soeharto era, followed by the deep but relatively short‐lived Asian financial crisis, Indonesia transitioned rapidly to democratic and decentralized governance. We examine policy‐making processes and economic outcomes during the first two decades of this new era, leading up to the 2019 national elections where it was widely conjectured that Indonesia might follow the global trends of authoritarian rule and illiberalism. We conclude that, thus far, Indonesia has navigated the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule quite successfully. Compared to the Soeharto era, growth has been somewhat slower, inequality has risen, and policy reform is slower and generally incremental. But living standards continue to rise and all major political players have elected to operate within the new democratic parameters. Macroeconomic management has continued to be effective. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for complacency: there is a large outstanding reform agenda, and the economy is not providing enough economic opportunities for the better‐educated senior secondary and tertiary graduates entering the workforce.     

How Not to Write a Constitution—The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties

The member states of the European Union have negotiated two treaties intended to advance political union—Maastricht in 1992 and Amsterdam in 1997. This article critiques both treaties for their failures on both procedural and institutional questions. It suggests that the costs for member states of reaching a constitutional bargain can be reduced by emphasising decentralised arrangements for Europe and that a constitutional opportunity remains.     

Economic growth in a politically fragmented world

I explore the effects of economic and political integration on economic growth in a model of vintage human capital and sequential intergenerational bargains. Adoption of a new technology raises not only the productivity but also the bargaining position of the future generations, creating a bias for the current generations to preserve the current technology. Economic integration (i.e., the sharing of frontier technology among countries) promotes growth if there is a diversity in human capital distribution or a coordination failure across countries. On the other hand, political integration (i.e., the merging of countries into a single bargain) promotes stagnation as it eliminates the diversity and coordination failures.     

Creative destruction on the Chechen frontier?

The economic performance of Chechnya is examined for the first time using an aggregate stochastic frontier production function method. The 15 sectors of the economy are found to be quite inefficient in the use of capital and labour to produce aggregate output. Extensive growth is likely to continue though at a lower rate as federal subsidies from Moscow end. Intensive growth is unlikely given the lack of foreign investment and the authoritarian political system. Some evidence for the emergence of a market economy is found, suggesting that Kadyrov has overseen an economic transition.     

Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections

Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections? Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes? How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights? These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.     

Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Elite fragmentation,natural resources and economic growth

A broad literature suggests that political regimes matter for the growth effect of natural resources. However, while several studies have concentrated on the difference between democracies and autocracies in this respect, an important topic overlooked so far is the differences between varieties of authoritarian regimes. This study uses the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on economic growth in the short run. We find that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher costs of fights over rents due to higher political uncertainty.     

Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development

Why do African and Middle Eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet USA, Australia and Norway seem blessed? A growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions. This paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system. The model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies. It also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes. I test the model's predictions using fixed-effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support.     

The Southeast Asian Economies in the Age of Discontent

This paper investigates the effects on and responses of five middle‐income Southeast Asian economies to the current global environment of authoritarian populism, the retreat from economic liberalism, and the appeal of anti‐globalization movements. While the political histories and institutional capabilities of the five – Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – vary greatly, these economies have a history of at least moderately fast economic growth for extended periods, and of increasing regional and global economic integration. We argue that most of the factors behind the discontent with globalization in the rich economies are not present to the same degree in these countries, and that there has therefore been no major retreat from the economic policy settings that have underpinned their past economic success. However, there are no grounds for complacency. Economic growth is slowing in some of the countries, economic insecurity remains widespread, and the development of durable independent institutions has lagged economic growth.     

Short- and long-term relation between economic development and government spending: the role of quality of institutions

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending considering an international database over the 1996–2012 period. By using indicators on the level of country control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, the paper analyses the economic performance-public spending nexus controlling for the quality of the institutions. The empirical evidence supports the existence of the Wagner’s law, showing that, in the short-run, public spending positively reacts to a positive shock in national income, with a lower magnitude for democratic countries. In the long run, the error-correction model shows the convergence between public spending and national output occurring less quickly for non-democratic, low-income and to a smaller extent for non-OECD countries. Institutional quality, such as effort in controlling corruption and the presence of regulations that permit and promote private sector development, may help reducing the amount of per capita public spending and making it more productive. Higher expenses in compositional amenities such as public services for the elderly may explain why public spending per capita will increase the most in economies with a higher share of the population that need healthcare facilities.     

休克疗法与制度移植:新的争论以及1806年后普鲁士和西南德国改革的启示

经济学界关于休克疗法和渐进主义的争论又有了新的发展,这一次是有关发展中和新兴国家的。法国大革命及其对其他欧洲国家的影响,已经作为一个历史案例,在讨论大爆炸改革策略的优缺点时被屡屡提及。文章为1806年后普鲁士和西南德国改革之间的比较提供了一个特别有趣的历史案例研究,这到目前为止并未得到应有的重视。这个案例研究将揭示社会转型过程中经济和政治之间的深层次互动,因而对不同的经济改革策略的评价不能也不应该脱离对政治初始条件的考量。从最近的改革经验来看,一个特别有趣的发现是,普鲁士可能提供了第一个政府被东易北容克(East-Elbian Junkers)俘获的历史案例。     

Beyond Patrimonial Plunder: The Use and Abuse of Coconut Levies in the Philippines

This article re-examines a case of corruption that was perpetuated during a period of authoritarian rule in the Philippines: the subversion of ‘coconut levies’, a tax on coconut production imposed by strongman President Ferdinand Marcos from 1971 to 1982. Literature on the case has formed the basis for locating the political origins of the country’s struggles with long-run economic transformation in terms of the extent of ‘rent-seeking’ and articulations of ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in this middle-income developing economy. The article interrogates how extant analyses of the case have explained associated malign developmental outcomes with reference to institutional design and governance conditions. It forwards a re-interpretation that focuses on the distributional contest underpinning levy mobilisation, including the types of state-engineered privileges contested, and how access to these were politically determined and regulated during and after the Marcos period. This approach, in which developmental possibilities of rent-creating state interventions are not universally denied but considered with reference to configurations of power and structures of political bargaining, will be shown to address limitations of preponderant analyses and bear relevance to developing countries where, because of structural reasons, neo-patrimonialism may be endemic but rent-creating state interventions cannot be discounted as instruments for promoting economic development.     

Understanding political−economic development in the American South

We propose an empirical strategy to adjudicate between competing explanations of political–economic development in the American South. This strategy evaluates the dynamic relationship between partisan control of representative institutions and economic performance, both before and after major partisan realignment forces and economic conditions had structurally transformed the American South. The political–economic development of low‐capacity Southern states since the early 1980s reflects a “virtuous cycle” of rising income growth and partisan balance of state legislatures mutually reinforcing one another. These findings reconcile conflicting claims regarding the catalytic nature of political–economic development coevolution in the American South and have broader implications for the study of comparative political–economic development.     

The poverty of democracy in Latin America

This paper reviews recent Latin American presidential elections as a means of examining the quality of democracy in the region. Its principal hypothesis is that, notwithstanding the claims of mainstream analysis, the (re)introduction of formal democratic procedure has not represented a meaningful advance in authentic, broad-based political and economic enfranchisement of the region’s working class and peasant majorities. In many cases the so-called democratic transition has merely disguised the adaption of previously authoritarian mechanisms of social control.