A compound option approach to model the interrelation between banking crises and country defaults: The case of Hungary 2008

We analyze the Hungarian financial crisis of 2008 in a stochastic framework that advances structural credit risk models for country defaults: by applying compound option theory we consider payments for bailing-out the banking sector together with debt service payments in a joint crisis model. We estimate the model parameters by applying the time series maximum-likelihood approach of Duan (1994) on yield spreads of Hungarian Bonds. We find that difficulties in acquiring funds for debt servicing in combination with high outstanding debt triggered the crisis, rather than problems in the domestic banking sector. The estimated crisis probabilities dramatically rise during 2008.     

A comparative study of the probability of default for global financial firms

This article presents a modification of Merton’s (1976) ruin option pricing model to estimate the implied probability of default from stock and option market prices. To test the model, we analyze all global financial firms with traded options in the US and focus on the subprime mortgage crisis period. We compare the performance of the implied probability of default from our model to the expected default frequencies based on the Moody’s KMV model and agency credit ratings by constructing cumulative accuracy profiles (CAP) and the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). We find that the probability of default estimates from our model are equal or superior to other credit risk measures studied based on CAP and ROC. In particular, during the subprime crisis our model surpassed credit ratings and matched or exceeded KMV in anticipating the magnitude of the crisis. We have also found some initial evidence that adding off-balance-sheet derivatives exposure improves the performance of the KMV model.     

Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis

We use the 2007 asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs. Our model features dilution risk: maturing short-term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders, making runs more likely. The model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs. Results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage, asset values, and asset liquidity, but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch, the strength of guarantees, and asset volatility.     

Consumer credit-risk models via machine-learning algorithms

We apply machine-learning techniques to construct nonlinear nonparametric forecasting models of consumer credit risk. By combining customer transactions and credit bureau data from January 2005 to April 2009 for a sample of a major commercial bank’s customers, we are able to construct out-of-sample forecasts that significantly improve the classification rates of credit-card-holder delinquencies and defaults, with linear regression R²’s of forecasted/realized delinquencies of 85%. Using conservative assumptions for the costs and benefits of cutting credit lines based on machine-learning forecasts, we estimate the cost savings to range from 6% to 25% of total losses. Moreover, the time-series patterns of estimated delinquency rates from this model over the course of the recent financial crisis suggest that aggregated consumer credit-risk analytics may have important applications in forecasting systemic risk.     

The Greek financial crisis: Growing imbalances and sovereign spreads

We discuss the origins of the Greek financial crisis as manifested in the growing fiscal and current-account deficits since euro-area entry in 2001. We then extend a model typically used to explain risk premia to assess the extent to which credit ratings captured these premia. Next, we estimate a cointegrating relationship between spreads and their long-term fundamental determinants and compare the spreads predicted by this estimated relationship with actual spreads. We find that spreads were significantly below what would be predicted by fundamentals from end-2004 up to the middle of 2005; by contrast, since May 2010, actual spreads have exceeded predicted spreads by some 400 basis points.     

Investment horizon,risk, and compensation in the banking industry

This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. We find that banks with short-term investment intensity pay more cash bonus, exhibit higher risk and perform more poorly than banks with longer-term investment intensity. This evidence is broadly consistent with the view that short-term means of compensation encouraged a short-term investment focus, which in turn led to both higher risk and resulted in poorer performance, culminating in the sub-prime crisis. The inverse risk-performance relation suggests pay schemes were incongruent with shareholders’ interest. Moreover, pay arrangements used in banks prior to the subprime crisis exposed banks to the ex-post settling up problem (the clawback problem).     

Nonlinear incentives and mortgage officers’ decisions

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, banks should ensure that their incentive compensation policies appropriately balance long-term risk with short-term rewards. Using daily output data from mortgage officers in a US commercial bank, we test the notion that nonlinear contracts create time-varying incentives for the employees and impose costs on the firm. We provide empirical evidence that mortgage officers greatly increase their output toward the end of each month, when the minimum monthly quota is assessed. This occurs through a combination of reducing the processing time and approving some marginal applications. We also find that mortgages originated on the last working day of the month have a higher likelihood of delinquency.     

The term structure of illiquidity premia

We investigate the term structure of bond market illiquidity premia and show that the term structure varies greatly over time. Short and long end are strictly separated suggesting that different economic factors drive different parts of the term structure. We propose a stylized theoretical model which implies that current trading needs of investors determine the short end. The long-term risk of being forced to liquidate bond positions determines the long end. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. While short-term liquidation risk captured by asset market volatilities drives the short end, the long end depends on the long-term economic outlook.     

The ADR shadow exchange rate as an early warning indicator for currency crises

We develop an indicator for currency crisis risk using price spreads between American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their underlyings. This risk measure represents the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect after a potential currency crisis or realignment. It makes crisis prediction possible on a daily basis as depreciation expectations are reflected in ADR market prices. Using daily data, we analyze the impact of several risk drivers related to standard currency crisis theories and find that ADR investors perceive higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, trading partners’ currencies depreciate, sovereign yield spreads increase, or interest rate spreads widen.     

The impact of a new term auction facility on Libor–OIS spreads and volatility transmission between money and mortgage markets during the subprime crisis

During the subprime crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve was concerned about widening spreads between overnight interbank lending rates such as the overnight index swap (OIS) and term London Interbank Offer Rate (Libor). Among the tools it used to counter the impact of the crisis, the innovative term auction facility (TAF) attracted much attention. We investigate the impact of the TAF on the Libor–OIS spread. We find that the TAF has clear initial and sustained expectation effects on the three-month Libor–OIS spread, but no real initial or short-term funding effects, which casts doubt on the usefulness of the TAF in reducing risk spreads. Since the subprime crisis also spilled across the interbank, commercial paper, and jumbo mortgage markets, we further examine the lead–lag relation between Libor–OIS, commercial paper, and jumbo spreads and the volatility transmission effects between them. For the period before the crisis, we find that the three markets behave largely independently. For the subprime crisis period, however, we find multidirectional lead–lag relations and one-way volatility transmission between these markets.     

Institutional investment horizon,the information environment,and firm credit risk

We provide evidence that the impact of the investment horizon of institutional investors on the credit risk of U.S. industrial firms is both statistically and economically significant. Ceteris paribus, a one percent point increase in the ownership by short-term (long-term) institutions leads to a 0.188 (.046) percentage point decrease (increase) of a firm’s credit spread during 2001–2011. However, during the financial crisis period of 2007/08, long-term institutional investors tend to reduce a firm’s credit risk, especially when a firm’s risk profile is high. Hence, long-term institutions play an important role in enhancing financial stability during the crisis period by mitigating risk.     

Time-varying rare disaster risk and stock returns

This study provides empirical support for theoretical models that allow for time-varying rare disaster risk. Using a database of 447 international political crises during the period 1918-2006, we create a crisis index that shows substantial variation over time. Changes in this crisis index, our proxy for changes in perceived disaster probability, have a large impact on both the mean and volatility of world stock market returns. Crisis risk is positively correlated with the earnings-price ratio and the dividend yield. Cross-sectional tests also show that crisis risk is priced: Industries that are more crisis risk sensitive yield higher returns.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Misreaction or misspecification? A re-examination of volatility anomalies

Existing research examines the impact of volatility shocks on the relative pricing of long-term vs. short-term options and documents patterns of “short-horizon underreaction” and “long-horizon overreaction” in the options market. These studies, however, rely on implied volatilities derived from specific option-pricing models and are thus subject to model specification errors. In this paper, we show that these anomalous patterns are the result of model misspecification as opposed to market misreaction. We provide evidence that these patterns are consistent with, in both direction and magnitude, inherent biases in the misspecified models. We also apply a model-free approach to re-examine the anomalous patterns and find no evidence of market misreaction.     

Dynamic credit default swap curves in a network topology

Systemically important banks are connected and their default probabilities have dynamic dependencies. An extraction of default factors from cross-sectional credit default swap (CDS) curves allows us to analyze the shape and the dynamics of default probabilities. In extending the Dynamic Nelson Siegel (DNS) model to an across firm multivariate setting, and employing the generalized variance decomposition of Diebold and Yilmaz [On the network topology of variance decompositions: Measuring the connectedness of financial firms. J. Econom., 2014, 182(1), 119–134], we are able to establish a DNS network topology. Its geometry yields a platform to analyze the interconnectedness of long-, middle- and short-term default factors in a dynamic fashion and to forecast the CDS curves. Our analysis concentrates on 10 financial institutions with CDS curves comprising of a wide range of time-to-maturities. The extracted level factor representing long-term default risk shows a higher level of total connectedness than those derived for short-term and middle-term default risk, respectively. US banks contributed more to the long-term default spillover before 2012, whereas European banks were major default transmitters during and after the European debt crisis, both in the long-term and short-term. The comparison of the network DNS model with alternatives proposed in the literature indicates that our approach yields superior forecast properties of CDS curves.     

The risk of financial intermediaries

This paper reconsiders the formal estimation of bank risk using the variability of the profit function. In our model, point estimates of the variability of profits are derived from a model where this variability is endogenous to other bank characteristics, such as capital and liquidity. We estimate the new model on the entire panel of US banks, spanning the period 1985q1–2012q4. The findings show that bank risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and accelerated quickly thereafter up to 2007. We also establish that the risk of the relatively large banks and banks that failed in the subprime crisis is higher than the industry’s average. Thus, we provide a new leading indicator, which is able to forecast future solvency problems of banks.     

What factors determine dividend smoothing by US and EU banks?

Using a relatively large sample of European and US banks for the period 1998–2016, we investigate the determinants of bank dividend smoothing based on agency, asymmetric information and risk‐shifting theories. We show that dividend payout ratio smoothing practices were implemented on both continents before and after the crisis of 2007 and were more strongly pronounced for EU banks. Our findings mostly support agency‐based explanations of bank dividend behavior as evidenced by higher payout ratio smoothing for banks with higher (initial) dividend payouts, lower ownership concentration, public banks, and banks with lower growth opportunities and weaker investor protection. Evidence in favor of asymmetric information explanations is stronger for EU countries, where smaller (more opaque) banks appear to smooth more. In both continents, banks that rely more heavily on equity issuances are found to smooth dividend payout ratios more, suggesting that banks aim at improving access to equity markets. We also provide evidence in support of risk‐shifting, as evidenced by the persistence of dividend payout ratio smoothing in the crisis years and higher dividend smoothing for banks under greater regulatory pressure. Additional analysis using a time series partial adjustment model for dividend levels provides evidence supporting the prevalence of dividend smoothing and the suggested theoretical explanations.     

Long-term foreign exchange risk premia and inflation risk

As highlighted by recent literature, long-term foreign exchange risk premia (FRP) of a currency pair tend to covary negatively with short-term real interest rate differentials (RIRD) of the pair. We fit an affine term structure model for 9 major currencies against the US dollar and estimate two components of this covariance: the real risk premia (RRP) component and the inflation risk premia differential (IRPD) component. We find that the IRPD component is significantly negative for all currency pairs in our sample. We propose a macro-finance model to understand the types of shocks that generate such covariance.     

Official Demand for U.S. Debt: Implications for U.S. Real Rates

We estimate a structural term-structure model of U.S. real rates, where arbitrageurs accommodate demand pressures exerted by domestic and foreign official investors. Official demand affects rates by altering the aggregate price of duration risk, and thereby bond risk premiums. Although foreign central banks' demand contributed to reduce long-term real rates mainly in the years prior to the global-financial crisis, the Federal Reserve's demand lowered rates during the quantitative easing period. Overall, the two-factor model, augmented to account for changing liquidity conditions, offers a good representation of real rates during the 2001–16 period; however, we flag some caveats and possible extensions.     

Macro-finance VARs and bond risk premia: A caveat

At the turn of the century, US and euro area long-term bond yields experienced a remarkable decline and remained at historically low levels despite rising short-term rates (the so called “conundrum”). Estimating macro-finance VARs and no-arbitrage term structure models, many researchers find that the decline in long-term rates was primarily driven by an unprecedented reduction in risk premia. I show that this result might be an artefact of the class of models employed to study the phenomenon.