Being private,Big 4 auditors,and debt raising

This study investigates the role of auditor choice (Big 4/Non-Big 4) in debt financing for private and public firms. We find private firms have less access to debt than public firms, and Big 4 auditors support debt raising in both private and public firms. Consistent with private firms facing greater information asymmetry, Big 4 auditors are more important for debt raising in private firms than in public firms. The benefit of appointing Big 4 auditors for private firms' debt raising is greater in the opaque information environment of the global financial crisis. It is also greater when firms are smaller, younger, or have poorer financial reporting quality. We also find evidence consistent with Big 4 auditors mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing debt raising when ownership concentration is higher in private firms.     

Does audit quality matter more for firms with high investment opportunities?

This paper examines the association of firms with high investment opportunities with high quality audits (proxied by Big 5 auditors) and whether that association results in a lower likelihood of earnings management. Firms with high investment opportunities may demand high quality audits for curbing earnings management. This is because they have more flexibility in the provision of discretionary accruals that arises from the attendant operating uncertainty which creates particular monitoring problems. Big 5 auditors will provide high quality audits that will constrain earnings management for firms with high investment opportunities because the risk of losing (and hence the likelihood of maintaining) auditor independence is higher. Results show the following. First, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors than firms with low investment opportunities. Second, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to have more discretionary accruals but this relationship is weaker when they have Big 5 auditors. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests.     

Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper investigates the association between Malaysian politically connected (PCON) firms and the cost of debt. We extend previous research that finds Malaysian PCON firms are perceived as being of higher risk by the market, and by audit firms, by providing evidence that lenders also perceive these firms as being of higher risk. We also find that PCON firms have a significantly (1) higher extent of leverage, (2) higher likelihood of reporting a loss, (3) higher likelihood of having negative equity, and (4) higher likelihood of being audited by a big audit firm. We suggest that PCON firms are charged higher interest rates by lenders as a result of efficient contracting given their higher inherent risks. Additionally, we find that CEO duality present in PCON firms is perceived by lenders as being more risky, and that a higher proportion of independent directors on the audit committee mitigate this perceived risk.     

Short-term debt maturity,monitoring and accruals-based earnings management

Most prior studies assume a positive relation between debt and earnings management, consistent with the financial distress theory. However, the empirical evidence for financial distress theory is mixed. Another stream of studies argues that lenders of short-term debt play a monitoring role over management, especially when the firm’s creditworthiness is not in doubt. To explore the implications of these arguments on managers’ earnings management incentives, we examine a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2006 and find that short-term debt is positively associated with accruals-based earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals), consistent with the financial distress theory. We also find that this relation is significantly weaker for firms that are of higher creditworthiness (i.e. investment grade firms), consistent with monitoring benefits outweighing financial distress reasons for managing earnings.     

Accelerated investment effect of risky debt

In this paper we examine a new effect of risky debt on a firm’s investment strategy. We call this effect “accelerated investment”. It stems from a potential loss of investment option in the event of default. The possibility of default reduces the value of the option to wait and provides equity holders with an incentive to speed up investment. As a result, in the absence of wealth expropriation by a levered firm’s debt holders, its shareholders exercise their investment option earlier than the shareholders of an otherwise identical all-equity firm. This result is at odds with the generally accepted intuition that in the absence of potential wealth transfers and taxes the shareholders of a levered firm would follow the same investment policy as that of an unlevered firm. In addition to providing various illustrations of the accelerated investment effect, we relate its magnitude to the presence of competition for investment opportunities.     

The association between cost of debt and Hong Kong politically connected firms

This paper investigates the association between Hong Kong politically connected (PCON) firms and their cost of debt and find these firms are associated with significantly lower interest rates being charged by lenders compared to other (non-PCON) firms. We compare our results with earlier investigations of Malaysian and U.S. PCON firms and find that our results are consistent with the results of the U.S. but inconsistent with that of Malaysia. Our results suggest that the economic wealth, the extent of political power, and the pervasiveness of firms having political connections could account for the cross-country differences between the cost of debt and PCON firms.     

Limited attention by lenders and small business debt financing: Advertising as attention grabber

Developing predictions by drawing upon the limited attention perspective, we investigate if small firms may use advertising as an attention grabber to increase their opportunities to access debt financing. Using a sample of over a million observations, we find that small firms with higher advertising expenditure are more likely to gain access to debt financing, thus increasing their financial leverage. Our tests show that lenders constrained by a limited attentional capacity are more likely to be attracted by small firms with higher advertising expenditure, and that small firms with financial constraints are not found to use advertisement intentionally to acquire resource.     

Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms

We investigate the impact that bankers on the board have upon a firm's debt ratio, debt to total capital, 1 year subsequent to their appointment. We find that the presence of lending bankers on a firm's board negatively affects the debt ratio, while the impact of non-lending bankers varies with the firm's probability of financial distress. The results suggest that non-lending bankers provide expertise and certification for distressed firms while exercising a monitoring role for non-distressed firms. In contrast, the results suggest that lenders on the board exercise a monitoring role independent of the firm's financial distress. When combined with established findings in the literature, we conclude that there may be two ways to avoid conflict between a board-appointed banker's fiduciary responsibility and the interests of her bank. When the potential for conflict is high, lenders may forgo board positions, while non-lending bankers may merely alter their role on the board.     

The market reaction to debt announcements: UK evidence surrounding the global financial crisis

We examine the stock market response to announcements of public, bank and privately placed debt issuance by large UK firms surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008. Prior to the crisis, we find that stock prices respond positively to announcements of bank debt issuance only. This is restricted to the sub-sample of syndicated bank loans and this is suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal of creditworthiness. We find that abnormal returns on the announcement of bank loans have declined since the financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative borrowing sources. Overall, our results suggest that surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008, bank loans have become less informative as a signal of the creditworthiness of borrowing firms.     

审计师收取客户债务风险溢价了吗?

已有研究发现,公司债务风险越高,审计师收取的审计费用越高;然而,审计费用提高的原因可能是审计投入的增加,也可能是审计师收取客户公司的债务风险溢价。由于缺少审计投入的数据,已有研究无法回答审计师是否收取客户公司债务风险溢价的问题。本文以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,运用我国独到的审计工时数据,就此展开相关问题研究。研究发现,在控制了审计投入之后,客户债务风险与审计费用显著正相关,表明审计师收取了客户公司的债务风险溢价。进一步研究表明,审计师对财务状况较差和治理较差的公司以及非国有企业收取更高的债务风险溢价,规模较小的会计师事务所收取的债务风险溢价高于规模较大的会计师事务所。     

To be or not to be all-equity for firms that eliminate long-term debt

Despite the advantages of debt, a significant number of firms that have an established leverage policy deliberately become all-equity. These firms eliminate a substantial amount of long-term debt as the average firm’s leverage ratio is approximately 30 percent at the year-end prior to debt elimination. Firm-level “shocks” such as CEO turnover and changes in credit ratings cannot explain the dramatic recapitalization decision. Consistent with the tradeoff theory, firms that eliminate debt have lower benefits (less tax shield benefits, agency costs) and higher costs (probability of financial distress, access to capital markets, etc.) of leverage in the three prior years compared to a matched sample. We also find that the factors influencing the decision to eliminate all debt is different from those to significantly reduce leverage or to have very low debt levels. Firms primarily finance the approximately $70 million of average long-term debt eliminated using proceeds from sales of relatively unproductive assets and from equity issues. Interestingly, over half of these firms issue significant amount of new debt within three years of becoming all-equity. Firms with lower liquidity and non-debt tax shields, higher potential overinvestment agency costs, and those that issue equity at the debt elimination year are more likely to relever quickly.     

Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem

We investigate the role of long-term debt in influencing overinvestments by analyzing the pattern of abnormal investments around a new debt offering by unlevered firms. Before being levered when the disciplining role of debt is missing, firms retain excessive amounts of cash. The introduction of debt leads to a dramatic decline in cash ratios and the relation is stronger for firms classified as having poor investment opportunities. For the sub-sample of firms that overinvest in real assets, issuing debt leads to a reduction in abnormal capital expenditures. The decline in overinvestments is explained by debt service obligations that reduce discretionary funds under managerial control. Further, the reduction in overinvestments has a positive impact on equity value. These conclusions hold in other settings where there is a dramatic change in firms’ capital structures providing strong support for the hypothesis that debt reduces overinvestments.     

Interest rate changes and the timing of debt issues

There is much recent interest in the role of market timing in firm financial decisions. Using a large detailed sample of corporate public debt issues, private placements, Rule 144A issues and bank loans over the period 1970–2006, we investigate the relationship between interest rate changes and issues of floating and fixed-rate debt. Our results indicate that both past and future rates are associated with issuance decisions. We examine whether firms are able to lower their cost of capital by anticipating future rate changes, controlling for firm characteristics and market conditions. Our findings suggest that evidence of timing success is dependent on the time interval and type of debt examined. Over the longest time intervals available in our data, we do not find evidence of timing ability for fixed-rate or floating-rate debt issues.     

Are the benefits of debt declining? The decreasing propensity of firms to be adequately levered

We observe a persistent increase in the percentage of firms with little or no debt in their capital structure over the last three decades. The fraction of firms with less than five percent debt in their capital structure increases from 14.01 percent in 1977 to 34.42 percent in 2010 while the percentage of all-equity firms increases 200 percent over the same period. We find that even after controlling for firm- and industry-specific variables that are relevant to capital structure policy, there is a deficiency in firms' propensity to be levered. Additionally, the deficiency is increasing over time and by 2010 the percent of firms that are nearly all-equity is twice the predicted level. Our findings are robust to different methodologies, specifications, and time periods. Overall, these results suggest that the well-documented benefits of leverage are less valuable over the sample period and that the determinants of firms' capital structure decisions have evolved since the 1970s.     

Convertible debt and investment timing

In this paper we provide an investment-based explanation for the popularity of convertible debt. Specifically, we demonstrate the ability of convertible debt to alleviate and potentially totally eliminate the underinvestment problem of Myers (1977). A conversion feature induces shareholders to accelerate investment. This effect arises from the incentive of equity holders to accelerate the issuance of new equity, used to finance investment, since by investing early shareholders dilute the value of convertible debt holders by reducing their proportional claims to the firm's cash flows. Since the underinvestment effect and the accelerated investment effect work in opposite directions, convertible debt allows to mitigate or completely eliminate the debt overhang problem. In addition, we show that by choosing the right combination of straight debt and convertible debt, shareholders can, for a wide range of overall debt levels, commit to the investment strategy of an all-equity firm.     

Financial reporting quality,debt maturity and investment efficiency

This study, conducted with a sample of Spanish listed companies during the period 1998–2008, examines the role of financial reporting quality and debt maturity in investment efficiency. The results show that financial reporting quality mitigates the overinvestment problem. Likewise, lower debt maturity can improve investment efficiency, reducing both overinvestment and underinvestment problems. We further find that financial reporting quality and debt maturity are mechanisms with some degree of substitution in enhancing investment efficiency: firms with lower (higher) use of short-term debt, exhibit higher (lower) financial reporting quality effect on investment efficiency.     

International evidence on economic policy uncertainty and asymmetric adjustment of audit pricing: Big 4 versus non‐big 4 auditors

By investigating the association between economic policy uncertainty and audit fees using data from eight countries, this study examines whether and how Big 4 auditors reinforce their advantages over non‐Big 4 auditors through audit pricing. We find that both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 auditors reduce their audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases. However, while non‐Big 4 auditors adjust audit pricing asymmetrically as economic policy uncertainty changes, i.e., the magnitude of decline in audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases exceeds the magnitude of rise when economic policy uncertainty decreases, Big 4 auditors regulate their audit pricing in a symmetric manner. Further analyses reveal that: (1) the asymmetric pricing of non‐Big 4 auditors mainly exists in countries where Big 4 auditors have dominant market share, (2) Big 4 auditors provide higher‐quality audits when economic policy uncertainty increases and (3) many firms in better financial condition turn to Big 4 auditors during uncertain years. Our findings suggest that the symmetric audit pricing helps Big 4 auditors maintain a favorable position in the audit market.     

Determinants of debt: Empirical evidence on firms in the district of Santarém in Portugal

In recent decades, the theme of the capital structure and its determinants has caused some controversy and aroused great interest in the financial domain. Several theories and studies have emerged applying to this domain. This study aims to test the explanatory power of the determinants of debt which have the greatest support in the financial literature, size, growth, business risk, profitability, tangibility and non-debt tax shields and its validity in accordance with the theories of capital structure, on firms in Santarém's district. The sample contains financial data of 6184 firms for the period 2008–2012. The results indicate that firms in Santarém's district in Portugal have a high level of debt, using mainly short-term debt. The growth and profitability have proved to be determinants of debt, confirming the Pecking Order Theory.     

CEO contractual protection and debt contracting

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contractual protection, in the forms of CEO employment agreements and CEO severance pay agreements, is prevalent among S&P 1500 firms. While prior research has examined the impact of these agreements on corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspective, there is little research on the impact from debt holders’ perspective. We find that, compared with other loans, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection on average contain more performance covenants and performance-pricing provisions. This effect increases with CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and opportunities, but it decreases with CEOs’ preference for and opportunity of enjoying a quiet life. Furthermore, for loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection, debt holders include stricter covenants, charge a higher interest rate and use a more diffuse syndicate structure. Collectively, these results shed light on the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting.     

Board monitoring and covenant restrictiveness in private debt contracts during the global financial crisis

We examine the association between board independence and restrictiveness of covenants in U.S. private debt contracts around the global financial crisis (GFC). We show that board independence is associated with less restrictive covenants suggesting lenders willingness to delegate some monitoring of firms with independent boards. More nuanced analysis between the pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods shows mixed results and we suggest that, during the GFC and its aftermath, lenders place more emphasis on ex ante screening relative to ex post monitoring. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence on covenant use and lenders choices in periods of credit rationing.