Capital incentives and adequacy for securitizations

This paper analyzes the capital incentives and adequacy of financial institutions for asset portfolio securitizations. The empirical analysis is based on US securitization rating and impairment data. The paper finds that regulatory capital rules for securitizations may be insufficient to cover implied losses during economic downturns such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the rating process of securitizations provides capital arbitrage incentives for financial institutions and may further reduce regulatory capital requirements. These policy-relevant findings assume that the ratings assigned by rating agencies are correct and can be used to build a test for the ability of Basel capital regulations to cover downturn losses.     

Ratings based capital adequacy for securitizations

This paper develops a framework to measure the exposure to systematic risk for pools of asset securitizations and measures empirically whether current ratings-based rules for regulatory capital of securitizations under Basel II and Basel III reflect this exposure. The analysis is based on a comprehensive US dataset on asset securitizations for the time period between 2000 and 2008. We find that the shortfall of regulatory capital during the Global Financial Crisis is strongly related to ratings. In particular, we empirically show that insufficient capital is allocated to tranches with the highest rating. These tranches account for the greatest part of the total issuance volumes. Furthermore, this paper is the first to calibrate risk weights which account for systematic risk and provide sufficient capital buffers to cover the exposure during similar economic downturns. These policy-relevant findings suggest a re-calibration of RBA risk weights and may contribute to the current efforts by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and others to re-establish sustainable securitization markets and to improve the stability of the financial system.     

When CEOs adapt: An investigation of manager experience,policy and performance following recessions

We examine changes in corporate policies following recessions during CEO tenures to evaluate the value of learning. CEOs with recession experience demonstrate expertise in risk-shifting strategies that can contribute to higher firm value and performance during subsequent recessions. Specifically, Recession CEOs use conservative capital structure and allocation during expansions, providing excess capacity and financial slack to accumulate additional cash reserves during economic contractions, resulting in lower bankruptcy risk. As a result, Recession CEOs are equipped to raise more capital in recessions, which results in higher asset growth fueled by investments in acquisitions and capital expenditures. We also examine prior recessions and find poor performers learn to invest more and perform better in subsequent contractions. Our results are strengthened through cumulative recession experiences, when downturns are deeper, and at cyclical firms, where economic cycles are most impactful and Recession CEOs are more relevant. Finally, we use time-varying industry downturns, matching, and CEO turnovers for inference. Overall, we offer novel evidence of valuable CEO learning around risk-taking following direct managerial experience as a firm policy determinant across economic conditions.     

Book‐to‐Market Equity,Asset Correlations and the Basel Capital Requirement

This paper examines the effect of book‐to‐market equity (BE/ME) on asset correlations under the Basel capital requirement. We find that BE/ME captures variations in asset correlations after controlling for firm size, default probability and industry effects from 1987 to 2011. Obligors with higher BE/ME exhibit lower asset correlations compared to those with lower BE/ME. Decomposing BE/ME into assets‐in‐place and growth options based on the asset pricing literature shows that obligors with more assets‐in‐place or more fixed assets have higher BE/ME and lower asset correlations than those with more growth options. Overall, our findings suggest that BE/ME is an additional important factor that may improve the estimates of asset correlations and thereby banks’ capital adequacy.     

The impact of working capital management on firm profitability in different business cycles: Evidence from Finland

The recent economic downturn of 2007–2008 has brought renewed focus on working capital policies. In this paper we examine the role of business cycles on the working capital–profitability relationship using a sample of Finnish listed companies over an 18-year period. We find the impact of business cycle on the working capital–profitability relationship is more pronounced in economic downturns relative to economic booms. We further show that the significance of efficient inventory management and accounts receivables conversion periods increase during periods of economic downturns. Our results demonstrate that active working capital management matters and, thus, should be included in firms’ financial planning.     

Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital Requirements, Regulatory Monitoring, and Economic Conditions

This paper develops a structural, dynamic model of a banking firm to analyze how banks adjust their loan portfolios over time. In the model, banks experience capital shocks, face uncertain future loan demand, and incur costs based on their proximity to regulatory minimum capital requirements and the intensity of regulatory monitoring. Implications of the model then are estimated using panel data on large U.S. commercial banks operating continuously between December 1989 and December 1997. The estimated model is used to simulate the optimal bank response to (1) past and proposed changes in capital requirements, (2) changes in regulatory monitoring intensity, and (3) economic downturns. The simulation results are used to shed light on the decline in loan growth and the rise in bank capital ratios witnessed over a decade ago as well as the possible impact of the current proposed modification to capital requirements.     

The wisdom of crowds: Mutual fund investors’ aggregate asset allocation decisions

We find that the aggregate asset allocation decisions of US mutual fund investors depend on economic conditions. Both anticipated economic downturns and periods of turmoil lead investors to direct flow away from risky equity funds and towards lower-risk money market funds. These patterns are markedly stronger for investors in low cost and low turnover funds relative to investors in high cost and high turnover funds, consistent with sophisticated investors being more sensitive to changing conditions. Benchmarked against a buy-and-hold strategy, these asset allocation strategies reduce risk without degrading the risk-return trade-off. Our evidence suggests that individual investors, often dismissed as noise traders, collectively react to economic signals in a sensible manner when determining asset allocations.     

Restructuring Using Operating Asset Exchanges: Issues and Evidence

This study examines restructuring in which a firm divests an operating asset in exchange for another operating asset. Since liquidity, capital structure, and distributional issues are not immediately associated with tax‐free asset‐for‐asset exchanges, they are well suited for examining the competing hypotheses related to divestitures. We find that the abnormal returns associated with asset exchanges are generally smaller than those associated with other divestiture restructurings except when indications of value are provided. Our analysis identifies positive valuation effects for firms undertaking focus‐enhancing exchanges, but a dominating consideration is whether the value of the units traded is indicated.     

Loan loss accounting and procyclical bank lending: The role of direct regulatory actions

I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regulatory forbearance. This regulatory action mechanism expands on prior research that has focused on the effect of loan loss recognition on regulatory capital adequacy during economic downturns.     

Do Pro‐Diversity Policies Improve Corporate Innovation?

Using new product announcements, patents, and patent citations as measures of corporate innovation, we find that corporate policies that promote more pro‐diversity cultures, specifically treatment of women and minorities, enhance future innovative efficiency. This positive effect is stronger during economic downturns and in firms that are more innovative, value intangibles and human capital more highly, have greater growth options, have higher cash flow, and have stronger governance. Pro‐diversity policies also increase firm value via this stimulating effect on innovative efficiency. Our results suggest a channel through which workforce diversity may enhance firm value.     

Credit supply and corporate capital structure: Evidence from Japan

In this paper we examine how financial constraints, especially fluctuations in the supply of credit, affect the capital structure of 1537 publicly listed Japanese firms from 1980 to 2007, in a data set with 33,000 observations. It is one of the first studies to do so and is inspired by the recent studies of Leary (2009) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Japan was selected due to the extreme credit supply fluctuations observed during the last 30 years. It thus offers an ideal natural experiment to test the impact of credit supply on corporate capital structure. In particular, in our panel data study we investigated the impact of the asset bubble in the 1980s and the credit crunch of the late 1990s on corporate capital structure decisions. The results of this paper show, among other findings, that financial policy decisions are indeed influenced by monetary conditions and the supply of credit. In particular, smaller sized firms face financial constraints, especially during economic downturns.     

The impact of capital account liberalization measures

In this paper we analyze whether capital account liberalization leads to higher asset prices. Based on a sample of 242 non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand at the time of the announcement of the relaxation of capital control in Thailand on January 29, 2007, we find positive and significant abnormal returns on Day −2, Day 1, and Day 3 relative to the announcement day. Our findings suggest that capital account liberalization favorably affects stock prices of firms, though the effect varies across industries. From a public policy perspective, our results suggest that liberalizing capital account by relaxing capital control measures could improve firm value in the short-term, which may, in turn, boost the level of economic growth in the long run. In addition, the results show that there is a significant fall in the mean beta in the post-liberalization period, thereby implying the lower cost of capital.     

A cost-benefit analysis of capital requirements adjusted for model risk

Capital adequacy is the key microprudential and macroprudential tool of banking regulation. Financial models of capital adequacy are subject to errors, which may prevent from estimating a sufficient capital base to absorb bank losses during economic downturns. In this paper, we propose a general method to account for model risk in capital requirements calculus related to market risk. We then evaluate and compare our capital requirements values with those obtained under Basel 2.5 and the new Basel 4 regulation. Capital requirements adjusted for model risk perform well in containing losses generates in normal and stressed times. In addition, they are as conservative as Basel 4 capital requirements, but they exhibit less fluctuations over time.     

The second moment matters! Cross-sectional dispersion of firm valuations and expected returns

Behavioral theories predict that firm valuation dispersion in the cross-section (“dispersion”) measures aggregate overpricing caused by investor overconfidence and should be negatively related to expected aggregate returns. This paper develops and tests these hypotheses. Consistent with the model predictions, I find that measures of dispersion are positively related to aggregate valuations, trading volume, idiosyncratic volatility, past market returns, and current and future investor sentiment indexes. Dispersion is a strong negative predictor of subsequent short- and long-term market excess returns. Market beta is positively related to stock returns when the beginning-of-period dispersion is low and this relationship reverses when initial dispersion is high. A simple forecast model based on dispersion significantly outperforms a naive model based on historical equity premium in out-of-sample tests and the predictability is stronger in economic downturns.     

Capital structure decisions: Evidence from deregulated industries

Deregulation significantly affects the firms’ operating environment and leverage decisions. Firms experience a significant decline in profitability, asset tangibility and a significant increase in growth opportunities following deregulation. Firms respond by reducing leverage. Deregulation also significantly affects the cross-sectional relation between leverage and its determinants. Leverage is much less negatively correlated with profitability and market-to-book and much more positively (negatively) correlated with firm size (earnings volatility) following deregulation. These results are consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory of capital structure. Also consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory, those firms that are more likely to be above their target capital structure issue significantly more equity in the first few years following deregulation.     

Intangible capital,volatility shock,and the value premium

This paper extends the canonical, neoclassical investment‐based asset‐pricing model through the incorporation of intangible capital and the formulation of a joint productivity distribution with economic uncertainty shocks at the firm level. The distinctive evolutionary dynamics of intangible capital as opposed to that of physical capital mitigate the negative impact of temporary uncertainty shock on production and serve well to explain the value premium with modest assumptions. The value premium is unconditionally positive, but the realized value spread plummets to negative after major transient second‐moment shocks, for example, the Loma Prieta Earthquake and the 9/11 terrorist attack.     

Extending the Basel II approach to estimate capital requirements for equity investments

Under the Basel II banking regulatory capital regime the capital requirements for credit exposures are calculated using the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) approach. The capital requirement is taken to be the contribution of an exposure to the unexpected loss on the bank’s diversified portfolio. Here we extend this approach to calculate capital requirements for equity investments. We show that in the case when asset values have a normal distribution an analytical formula for the unexpected loss contribution may be developed. We show that the capital requirements for equity investments are quite different to those of credit exposures, since equity investments can suffer substantial loss of value even when the underlying company has not defaulted.     

A perfect storm in the financial market

This study provides a model explaining how small changes in asset prices may disrupt an entire financial market. Based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), our model implies that during a market crash, asset price changes affect the relative distribution of the CAPM betas of individual assets and force all tradable assets to co-move. Using US stock market data, our empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions. Overall, the study aids understanding of the price patterns of assets during substantial market downturns, such as financial crises.     

Firm growth type and capital structure persistence

We find that growth type (identified by a two-way sort on firm initial market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility) can parsimoniously predict significantly dispersed and persistently distinct future leverage ratios. Growth type is persistent; growth-type-sorted cross-sections of corporate fundamental variables (such as tangible versus intangible investment style) are also meaningfully persistent. As economic and market conditions improve, low growth type firms are keener to issue new debt than equity, whereas high growth type firms are least likely to issue debt and keenest to issue equity. These findings demonstrate that firms rationally invest and seek financing in a manner compatible with their growth types. Consistent with a generalized Myers–Majluf framework, growth type compatibility enables distinct growth types and hence specifications of market imperfection or informational environments to persist. Growth type is apparently a fundamental factor for capital structure persistence.     

Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?

We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.