TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.     

Did capital infusions enhance bank recovery from the great recession?

This paper investigates the long-run recovery experience of US banks that received capital infusions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Based on a dynamic recovery model, our results show that recovering CPP banks tended to be in better financial condition than other CPP banks. Long-run event study analyses of common stock prices reveal that, in the quarter after repayment of TARP funds, CPP banks experienced economically large and significant buy-and-hold wealth gains of 14%, equivalent to approximately $329 billion. We conclude that TARP was successful in fostering bank financial and stock price recovery.     

Safer ratios,riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid

Using novel data on bank applications to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate riskier loans and shift assets toward riskier securities after receiving government support. However, this shift in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and, therefore, remains undetected by regulatory capital ratios, which indicate improved capitalization at bailed-out banks. Consequently, these banks appear safer according to regulatory ratios, but show an increase in volatility and default risk. These findings are robust to controlling for credit demand and account for selection of TARP recipients by exploiting banks? geography-based political connections as an instrument for bailout approvals.     

Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk

We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.     

The implications of TARP: Evidence from bank performance and CEO pension benefits

This study examines the effect of compensation restrictions introduced by the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of 2008 on the performance of banks and their compensation structures. It documents significant performance improvement among TARP banks that experienced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) resignations after their banks accepted TARP funds. The improvement is most significant in the year following CEO resignation. In addition, TARP banks that kept their CEOs show a significant increase in CEO pensions post-TARP. TARP banks that did not experience CEO resignations, thus, appear to substitute pension increases for their CEOs to mitigate the TARP-induced decrease in conventional forms of compensation. Further analysis on all banks without CEO resignations shows that TARP banks have significantly higher increase in pension benefits post 2009 than banks that chose to decline TARP funds. The evidence shows that increased pension arrangements play a significant role in CEOs’ decisions to remain in their roles despite the constraints imposed by TARP.     

The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking

One of the largest responses of the US government to the recent financial crisis was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). TARP was originally intended to stabilize the financial sector through the increased capitalization of banks. However, recipients of TARP funds were then encouraged to make additional loans despite increased borrower risk. In this paper, we consider the effect of the TARP capital injections on bank risk-taking by analyzing the risk ratings of banks’ commercial loan originations during the crisis. The results indicate that, relative to non-TARP banks, the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks but decreased at small TARP banks. Loan levels also moved in different directions for large and small banks and, in supporting evidence, these effects are evaluated based on loan size and TARP repayment. For large banks, the increase in risk-taking without an increase in lending is suggestive of moral hazard due to government support. These results may also be due to the conflicting goals of the TARP program for bank recapitalization and bank lending.     

The light and dark side of TARP

This paper empirically investigates the impact of the first announcement of TARP, the announcement of revised TARP, respective capital infusions under TARP–CPP and capital repayments on changes in shareholder value and the risk exposure of supported US banks. Our analysis reveals a light and a dark side of TARP. While announcements as well as capital repayments may provoke positive wealth effects and a decrease in bank risk, equity capital injections to banks are observed to be a severe impediment to restore market confidence and financial stability. Furthermore, while TARP announcements and capital injections may increase systemic risk, no significant effect on systemic risk is found for capital repayments.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

The Economic Consequences of Banks’ Derivatives Use in Good Times and Bad Times

In a sample of 335 commercial banks, we do not detect a systematic effect on bank values from derivatives use in either the high growth period of 2003–2005 or the low growth period of 2007–2009. These findings apply to all types of derivatives including credit default swaps. Our results suggest that banks take a more balanced approach and restrict their derivative activities to providing derivative services for customers and risk management. We also find that the market disciplined banks significantly for taking TARP funds, indicating that receiving TARP funds was a signal that the banks were financially distressed. Lastly, we cannot discern valuation effects resulting from derivatives use even in large and poorly capitalized banks that are more likely to take risk-shifting opportunities. Collectively, we find no compelling evidence supporting the widespread allegation that derivatives use increased banks’ speculating behaviors and significantly contributed to the loss of value during the subprime mortgage crisis.     

Corporate lobbying,political connections,and the bailout of banks

Political involvement has long been shown to be a profitable investment for firms that seek favorable regulatory conditions or support in times of economic distress. But how important are different types of political involvement for the timing and magnitude of political support? To answer this question, we take a comprehensive look at the lobbying expenditures and political connections of banks that were recipients of government support under the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). We find that politically-engaged firms were not only more likely to receive TARP funds, but they also received a greater amount of TARP support and received the support earlier than firms that were not politically involved.     

Interest on bank reserves and optimal sweeping

A key rationale offered by the Federal Reserve for the payment of interest on reserves was to remove the incentive for banks to operate sweep accounts. Sweeping shifts funds from transactions deposits subject to reserve requirements to non-reservable deposits. This paper extends a conventional banking model to analyze sweeping behavior. Sweeping responds positively to increases in bank loan rates and reserve ratios and negatively to increases in the interest rate on reserves or exogenous increases in bank equity. Sweeping generates greater responsiveness in lending to changes in loan rates or the interest rate on reserves and lower responsiveness to changes in reserve ratios or equity than in its absence. Empirical analysis of an explicit condition that we derive suggests that, with an unchanged reserve requirement, the Fed could eliminate sweeping by setting the interest rate on reserves to no less than approximately 4% points below the market loan rate.     

HOW DID THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES?

We analyze changes in lending by U.S. banks to businesses from 1994 to 2011. We find that lending to businesses, and in particular to small businesses, declined precipitously following onset of the financial crisis. We also examine the relative changes in business lending by banks that did, and did not, receive Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds from the U.S. Treasury, and find that banks receiving capital injections from the TARP failed to increase their small-business lending. Finally, we find strong and significant positive relations of both bank capital adequacy and profitability with small-business lending.     

US government TARP bailout and bank lottery behavior

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.     

Information disclosure in credit markets when banks’ costs are endogenous

In this paper we develop a model of information disclosure among banks based on an endogenous interest rate for externally placed debt. Banks with private credit information are given an opportunity to disclose information prior to competing for borrowers. While disclosure eliminates a bank’s information advantage over its competitors, disclosing information creates a new advantage for the bank in terms of a lower cost of external funds. We find that the incentive for a bank to disclose information is inversely related to the bank’s capital ratio and positively related to the number of other banks that disclose information.     

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

STATE DEPENDENCY OF BANK STOCK REACTION TO FEDERAL FUNDS RATE TARGET CHANGES

We investigate the effects of changes in the federal funds target rate on bank stock returns through an event‐study analysis. We examine the state dependency of such effects and focus on the surprise elements of policy changes derived from the federal funds futures market. Although we confirm an inverse relation between bank stock returns and changes in the federal funds target rate previously supported in the literature, we find that bank stock returns only respond to surprise or unexpected changes in the federal funds target rate. We also find that such responses are conditional on the context in which policy changes take place.     

Company name fluency,investor recognition,and firm value

Research from psychology suggests that people evaluate fluent stimuli more favorably than similar information that is harder to process. Consistent with fluency affecting investment decisions, we find that companies with short, easy to pronounce names have higher breadth of ownership, greater share turnover, lower transaction price impacts, and higher valuation ratios. Corporate name changes increase fluency on average, and fluency-improving name changes are associated with increases in breadth of ownership, liquidity, and firm value. Name fluency also affects other investment decisions, with fluently named closed-end funds trading at smaller discounts and fluent mutual funds attracting greater fund flows.     

Understanding the rise and decline of the Japanese main bank system: The changing effects of bank rent extraction

This paper shows how main bank rent extraction affects corporate decisions about investment and financing during financial regulatory reform. Our model predicts that limited loanable funds can initially contain main bank controlled overinvestment, even when new equity is available to the firm. Abundant funds facilitate overinvestment to the detriment of firm profitability. A shift of control rights back to the firm due to financial deregulation produces an “equity for upside potential and bank debt for downside risk” bias against the banks. A stock market and real estate boom in Japan made it harder than ever for the banks to diversify risk. The insights from this analysis help explain why Japan’s main bank system was beneficial in the (capital constrained) postwar period but became harmful during the (capital abundant and even bubbly) 1980s, and why the adverse shocks of the post-deregulation 1990s had such severe effects on the banking system.