Pecking order as a dynamic leverage theory

Static tradeoff theories, which do not explicitly treat the impact of transaction costs, do not explain the policy of asymmetry between frequent small debt transactions and infrequent large equity transactions. Nor do these theories explain why the debt ratio is allowed to wander a considerable distance from its alleged static optimum, or how much of a distance should be tolerated. We offer a class of diffusion models that mimic this behaviour in a stochastic-dynamic framework and are designed to optimize a financing strategy using any static tradeoff theory as input. The models developed reveal the determinants of the size and frequency of equity transactions and the range of values over which leverage variations are tolerated in four generic scenarios. They also yield a new formulation of the cost of capital that recognizes stochastic transaction costs and a penalty for deviation from any static-optimal leverage. Our class of models augments the pecking order theory, provides a flexible quantitative framework for its implementation as a decision tool, and facilitates the formulation of additional hypotheses for its empirical validation. Symmetrically, our results show the importance of dynamic factors in designing and interpreting empirical tests of static tradeoff theories. The results presented have important implications for the role played by static tradeoff theories in a stochastic-dynamic framework. One such implication is that the static-optimal leverage has no direct effect on the firm's leverage policy in this setting. The target leverage for refinancing transactions is different from the static-optimal leverage, and the mean leverage is generally different from both. As a consequence, the latter cannot be used to estimate the former. Another implication is that even when the mean leverage equals the static optimum, mean reversion is not an optimal behaviour and therefore not a legitimate test for the existence of a static tradeoff in a dynamic context. Still another implication is that wide variations in leverage ratios cannot be interpreted as evidence of leverage indifference. It follows that the pecking order theory is consistent with static tradeoff theories and does not require the assumption of leverage indifference.     

Capital structure in an emerging stock market: The case of India

This paper applies two alternative methods of estimation, viz., fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM), to analyse the determinants of the capital structure of Indian firms using a panel of 1169 non-financial firms listed in either the Bombay Stock Exchange or the National Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2008. The results thus obtained are robust across the estimation methods. Among the three alternative theories of capital structure, the pecking order theory and the static trade-off theory both seem to explain Indian firms’ decisions. However, there is little evidence to support the agency cost theory.     

Firms’ histories and their capital structures

This paper examines how cash flows, investment expenditures, and stock price histories affect debt ratios. Consistent with earlier work, we find that these variables have a substantial influence on changes in capital structure. Specifically, stock price changes and financial deficits (i.e., the amount of external capital raised) have strong influences on capital structure changes, but in contrast to previous conclusions, we find that over long horizons their effects are partially reversed. These results indicate that although firms’ histories strongly influence their capital structures, over time their capital structures tend to move towards target debt ratios that are consistent with the tradeoff theories of capital structure.     

On the determinants of SME capital structure in Central and Eastern Europe: A dynamic panel analysis

The purpose of this paper is to test how firm characteristics affect SMEs’ capital structure using a unique dataset of micro, small, and medium-sized firms (SMEs) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We carry out a panel data analysis of 3175 SMEs from seven CEE countries during the period 2001–2005, modeling the leverage ratio as a function of firm specific characteristics hypothesized by capital structure theory. By using the cash flow as an explanatory variable, we test some of the predictions of the pecking order theory. According to this theory, firms with more available internal funds should use less external funding. We do find strong evidence in favor of the pecking order theory, given that there is a negative and significant correlation between profitability and leverage. When we control for other firm specific characteristics such as future growth opportunities, liquidity, sales growth, size and assets structure, the cash flow is found to be a strong determinant of firm leverage. We also argue that the determinants of firm leverage may be considerably different depending on firms’ size and age. The empirical results show that cash flow coefficient remains negative and statistically significant only for medium-sized firms, thus suggesting that larger firms with sufficient internal funds use less external funding than comparable smaller firms. We obtain similar results when we estimate the model by firm age; older firms demonstrate similar behavior as larger firms.     

Do Managers Have Capital Structure Targets? Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs

The two main theories of capital structure—the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory—have opposite predictions about the expected relationship between corporate leverage and profitability. According to the tradeoff theory, companies that earn higher profits will use more debt both to shield their income from corporate taxes and to discipline corporate investment policy. In contrast, the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable companies will borrow less mainly because they have less need to borrow.
Corporate spinoffs provide a unique opportunity to investigate the influence of profitability and other asset characteristics on the design of capital structure. In their study of 98 spinoffs over the period 1979–1997, the authors began by investigating the popular argument that managers routinely assign more debt to subsidiaries than parents in order to leave the parents less encumbered—a possibility they reject after finding that the average leverage ratios of the parents and spunoff units were roughly equal. At the same time, the authors reported large differences in the leverage ratios among both parents and spun-off units, and that the variation was explained primarily by differences in three factors: asset tangibility and the level and variability of cash operating profits. Consistent with the tradeoff theory (but not the pecking order), the study found a significantly positive correlation between a post-spinoff company's cash profitability and its assigned debt load, as well as a negative correlation between debt and the variability of operating cash flow.     

Risk changes and external financing activities: Tests of the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure

We provide new insight into the relevance of the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure by examining firms’ external financing activities following risk changes. Consistent with the prediction of the dynamic trade-off theory but inconsistent with the pecking order theory, we find that firms issue equity following risk increases and debt after risk decreases, even when we narrowly focus on financially unconstrained firms. However, the results do not hold for firms with high market-to-book assets ratios, indicating that in this case, external financing activities are better captured by other factors than those explicitly considered in the trade-off theory, such as market timing. Our results are robust to a variety of risk measures including stock return volatility, default probability, implied asset volatility, and adjusted Ohlson (1980) scores.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

The Impact of Financing Surpluses and Large Financing Deficits on Tests of the Pecking Order Theory

This paper extends the basic pecking order model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers by separating the effects of financing surpluses, normal deficits, and large deficits. Using a panel of US firms over the period 1971-2005, we find that the estimated pecking order coefficient is highest for surpluses (0.90), lower for normal deficits (0.74), and lowest when firms have large financing deficits (0.09). These findings shed light on two empirical puzzles: 1) small firms, although having the highest potential for asymmetric information, do not behave according to the pecking order theory, and 2) the pecking order theory has lost explanatory power over time. We provide a solution to these puzzles by demonstrating that the frequency of large deficits is higher in smaller firms and increasing over time. We argue that our results are consistent with the debt capacity in the pecking order model.     

Information asymmetry and firms’ credit market access: Evidence from Moody's credit rating format refinement

I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms’ credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms’ ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ real outcomes.     

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.     

Credit Ratings and Capital Structure

This paper examines to what extent credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions. The paper outlines discrete costs (benefits) associated with firm credit rating level differences and tests whether concerns for these costs (benefits) directly affect debt and equity financing decisions. Firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. This behavior is consistent with discrete costs (benefits) of rating changes but is not explained by traditional capital structure theories. The results persist within previous empirical tests of the pecking order and tradeoff capital structure theories.     

The pecking order,debt capacity,and information asymmetry

We quantify the empirical relevance of the pecking order hypothesis using a novel empirical model and testing strategy that addresses statistical power concerns with previous tests. While the classificatory ability of the pecking order varies significantly depending on whether one interprets the hypothesis in a strict or liberal (e.g., “modified” pecking order) manner, the pecking order is never able to accurately classify more than half of the observed financing decisions. However, when we expand the model to incorporate factors typically attributed to alternative theories, the predictive accuracy of the model increases dramatically—accurately classifying over 80% of the observed debt and equity issuances. Finally, we show that what little pecking order behavior can be found in the data is driven more by incentive conflicts, as opposed to information asymmetry.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

What Drives Security Issuance Decisions: Market Timing,Pecking Order,or Both?

We study market timing and pecking order in a sample of debt and equity issues and share repurchases of Canadian firms from 1998 to 2007. We find that only when firms are not financially constrained is there evidence that firms issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued (undervalued) and evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower postannouncement long‐run returns. Similarly, we find that only when firms are not overvalued do they prefer debt to equity financing. These findings highlight an interaction between market timing and pecking order effects.     

Do modified audit opinions have economic consequences? Empirical evidence based on financial constraints

We present a framework and empirical evidence to explain why, on average, 11% of listed firms in China received modified audit opinions (MAOs) between 1992 and 2009. We argue that there are two reasons for this phenomenon: strong earnings management incentives lower firms’ financial reporting quality and soft budget constraints weaken the information and governance roles of audit opinions. We find that firms’ financial constraints eased after receiving MAOs, which suggests that MAOs have limited economic consequences. Further analysis shows that this phenomenon predominantly exists in government-controlled firms and firms that receive MAOs for the first time. We also find that MAOs have not influenced financial constraints after 2006. Finally, we find that MAOs did not affect borrowing cash flows from banks until 2005, suggesting that MAOs did not start affecting bank financing until that year. We also find that firms receive more related-party financing after receiving MAOs. Our results indicate that a limited effect on bank financing and increased related-party financing reduce the effect of MAOs on financial constraints.     

The impact of assets-in-place on corporate financing and investment decisions

In a dynamic setting with asymmetric information we consider firms’ debt-equity choice and investment timing. We extend recent research by adding an abandonment option and assets-in-place and we show that these extensions make debt more attractive. This implies, e.g., that mature firms (with larger assets-in-place) mainly use debt financing, whereas young high-growth firms (without assets-in-place) frequently use equity financing and signal their type by early investment. Simulation analyses confirm this and our model is thus able to explain empirical patterns which contradict the static pecking order theory.     

Capital structure decisions: Evidence from deregulated industries

Deregulation significantly affects the firms’ operating environment and leverage decisions. Firms experience a significant decline in profitability, asset tangibility and a significant increase in growth opportunities following deregulation. Firms respond by reducing leverage. Deregulation also significantly affects the cross-sectional relation between leverage and its determinants. Leverage is much less negatively correlated with profitability and market-to-book and much more positively (negatively) correlated with firm size (earnings volatility) following deregulation. These results are consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory of capital structure. Also consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory, those firms that are more likely to be above their target capital structure issue significantly more equity in the first few years following deregulation.     

Information asymmetry,information dissemination and the effect of regulation FD on the cost of capital

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital.     

Do Portuguese private firms follow pecking order financing?

This paper tests for pecking order behavior in medium-sized private Portuguese firms. In contrast to the usual split between internal funds, debt, and external equity, we separate debt into four components – cheap trade credits (CTC), bank loans (BL), other loans, and expensive credits (EC). We use breakpoint tests to identify when firms switch between funding sources by examining the change in each funding source based on the financing deficit remaining after the previous pecking order funding source has been used. Our tests indicate that Portuguese companies generally move from lower cost to higher cost financing sources, but they do not exhaust each type of debt before moving on to the next funding source in the pecking order. Such behavior is consistent with a loose interpretation of pecking order financing, but not a strict interpretation of the theory. Instead, Portuguese firms may be balancing pecking order financing with a need to maintain some degree of financing flexibility.