Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

Estimation of investment costs in fish processing plants

Investment costs for fish processing plants are hereby presented along with a detailed analysis of different types of processes in relation to economies of scale.The cost-capacity factor for fish industry is estimated as 0.84, except for fish meal plants where the cost-capacity factor is 0.61.It is also discussed how technology, capacity and location in developed and developing countries can affect investment costs for fish processing plants, while cost-capacity factors remain unchanged.The concept of minimum limit for industrial capacity is included. Investment costs for minimum size plants or plants below minimum size are even greater than what would correspond to the correlation line. This is due to the need to incorporate one or more oversized pieces of equipment.     

Capital investment and employment in the information sector

Estimation of the employment effects of changes in capital investment is a standard tool in public policy debates. Typically, such predictions are based on employment multipliers derived from Input–Output analysis. In this paper, we measure the employment effects of changes in capital investment in the U.S. information sector by econometrically estimating an “employment multiplier” from historical data. The estimated multiplier is 10 information sector jobs for each million dollars in expenditure, and perhaps 24 new jobs per million dollars invested across the entire economy. Employment multipliers derived from the Input–Output methodology average about 16 jobs per million, but the multiplier includes jobs outside the information sector. Including employment spillovers, our estimates suggest the multipliers from Input–Output models are plausible. We also note that information sector jobs have substantially higher median earnings than the private sector average, so the economic significance of changes in information sector employment are greater than might first appear. Our findings may be useful in debates over changes in industry regulation that could affect investment.     

Foreign direct investment,information technology and economic growth dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa

The research assesses how information and communication technology (ICT) modulates the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth dynamics in 25 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980–2014. The employed economic growth dynamics are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, real GDP and GDP per capita while ICT is measured by mobile phone penetration and internet penetration. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. The study finds that both internet penetration and mobile phone penetration overwhelmingly modulate FDI to induce overall positive net effects on all three economic growth dynamics. Moreover, the positive net effects are consistently more apparent in internet-centric regressions compared to “mobile phone”-oriented specifications. In the light of negative interactive effects, net effects are decomposed to provide thresholds at which ICT policy variables should be complemented with other policy initiatives in order to engender favourable outcomes on economic growth dynamics. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.     

Production costs, scope economies, and multi-client outsourcing under quantity competition

Two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi-client outsourcing (MCO) phenomenon. Analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers’ high in-house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor. Under certain conditions, if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously, collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria; if both firms make decisions sequentially, collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of MCO with regard to diverse market parameters. Finally, it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when MCO occurs. This research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls, supply chain cities, and the China price.     

Property rights and international investment in information technology services

Many modern information technology services are increasingly being produced in a host country to serve clients in an offshore location. As a result, the internationalization of service functions is beginning to resemble that of their more traditional manufacturing counterparts. This paper examines the role of formal and de facto property rights protection in the offshore location choice of information technology services. I also explore the role of a firm's global subsidiary network and its experience with similar property rights regimes. Using investment data based on 152 firms and their international information service investments between 2002–2006, the empirical results highlight the role of de facto property rights protection and related experience in location choice.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal prize-rationing strategy in all-pay contests with incomplete information

A contest organizer (e.g., a government regulatory agency) is endowed with the capacity to provide unlimited homogeneous prizes (e.g., medals) that he can use to incentivize contestants to exert productive effort in an all-pay auction with incomplete information. Each agent, at most, wins one prize. We study the optimal number of prizes the organizer should grant in order to induce maximal expected total effort or expected highest effort from agents. Both are single peaked under mild regularity conditions. When players’ abilities follow a family of beta distributions, expected highest effort maximization requires a smaller set of prizes to be awarded; for both goals, the optimal number of prizes weakly increases when the pool of contestants expands or contestant quality improves.     

Multistage bilateral bargaining model with incomplete information—A fuzzy approach

The study proposes the implementation of an intermediation model in supply chains, integrating game theory and fuzzy logic, to represent the characteristic aspects of a bilateral bargaining with incomplete information where supplier–customer relationships are indirectly managed by a third party agent.The choice of combining these theories comes out from the necessity of smoothing the peculiar elements of the two analysis tools that, in describing real situations, present many potentialities of reciprocal adaptation. The scope is to combine a formal structure that could figure out the interrelations among actors involved in a strategic decisional context, with a mathematical elaboration of natural imprecision, uncertainty and incompleteness of data and information.The model derives from the theoretic foundation of Spulber [1999. Market Microstructure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK] and Rubinstein [1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–109] that, compared to the classical framework of asymmetric information and bid-spread problem by Harsanyi [1967. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. I. The basic model. Management Science 14, 159–182], describe the process through the definition of new parameters such as bargaining power and breakdown probability. The contribution to the research is enriched by fuzzyfication process of data, considering Qi et al. [2005. Design retrieval technology of fuzzy customer requirements. In: World Congress on Mass Customization and Personalization] experiences, to build a framework that could transform inputs from the transaction, agents and market in an output that could regulate the possible concessions and the opportunity of accepting or refusing an offer.     

Games with incomplete information: A simplified exposition with inventory management applications

In most existing literature in supply chain management it is assumed that the players possess complete information about the game, i.e., the players' payoff (objective) functions are assumed to be common knowledge. For static and dynamic games with complete information, the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium are the standard solution concepts, respectively. For static and dynamic games with incomplete information, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium, respectively, are used as solution concepts. After presenting a brief review of the static and dynamic games under complete information, the application of these two games in inventory management is illustrated by using a single-period stochastic inventory problem with two competing newsvendors. Next, we illustrate the Bayesian Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution concepts for the static and dynamic games under incomplete information with two competing newsvendors. The expository nature of our paper may help researchers in inventory/supply chain management gain easy access to the complicated notions related to the games played under incomplete information.     

Regulatory risk,investment, and welfare

This paper assesses the allocative and distributional effects of uncertain regulatory constraints on rate of return, on price, and on competitive entry. A profit-maximizing firm responds to rate-of-return risk by substituting variable factors for sunk investment, but expands capacity when faced with either price risk or entry risk. Investors gain from the elimination of regulatory risk, a result that parallels Peltzman's contention that regulators could raise investor wealth by reducing risk. Consumers benefit from price and entry risk, but only under severe restrictions on tastes and technology. An inherent feature of government intervention, regulatory risk should be taken into account when comparing alternative policies for regulating (or deregulating) an industry.     

Network investment,access and competition

This paper analyzes the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, it is shown that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of investment, but to a wider roll-out compared to a market in which such contracts cannot be offered. In comparison to such ex-post contracts, ex-ante contracts lead to an even wider roll-out, but to a less frequent duplication of investments. Ex-ante contracts in particular, but also ex-post contracts, can be used to dampen competition.     

On platforms,incomplete contracts,and open source software

We analyze investment incentives for a firm A owning a software platform and an application and a firm B deciding whether to develop a new application for the platform. While B's entry helps the success of the platform, B fears ex post expropriation by A and is hence reluctant to enter and invest. We show that different platform governance structures prevalent in the Information and Communication Technology industry (integrated, proprietary, standardized, open source platform) serve to balance investment incentives for the platform and for the applications.     

Corporate Governance and returns on information technology investment: evidence from an emerging market

Prior studies have reported mixed findings on the impact of corporate information technology (IT) investment on firm performance. This study investigates the effect of corporate governance, an important management control mechanism, on the relation between IT investment and firm performance in the Taiwanese electronics industry. Specifically, we explore board independence and foreign ownership, which have increasingly become salient factors concerning corporate governance in emerging markets. We address their roles across firms of different sizes and in industries where degrees of competitiveness run a wide gamut. Our results show a positive moderating effect of board independence on the IT investment‐firm performance relation, especially when competition intensifies. Furthermore, we find that the greater the foreign ownership in small firms, the more positive the IT investment‐firm performance relation, suggesting that foreign investors may bring IT expertise to help small firms reap the benefits of using IT. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information

This paper studies the incentive to delegate recruitment. The owner decides whether or not to delegate recruitment to senior employees who are better able to evaluate candidates but may avoid recruiting the best candidates as they threaten their seniority. We find that senior employees will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to candidates' ‘type’. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment although ‘tenure’ may still be offered to elicit the ‘type’ of the recruit. If additional information asymmetry is present, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure is offered to ensure that the best candidate is selected.     

Synergy,coordination costs,and diversification choices

Sharing common inputs across business lines can potentially generate synergy that justifies related diversification. The pursuit of such synergy through diversification is, however, fundamentally driven by the indivisibility of inputs between firms. Following Penrose's insight, I argue that to realize this synergy, a firm needs to actively manage the interdependencies between different business lines, which, in turn, increases its coordination costs. The coordination costs may increase faster than synergy and set a limit to related diversification. This is particularly salient when the firm's existing business lines already have complex interdependencies among them. I test these arguments on a dataset of U.S. equipment manufacturers for the period 1993 to 2003. The results show that a firm is more likely to diversify into a new business when its existing business lines can potentially share more inputs with the new business; however, the firm is less likely to diversify into any new business when its existing business lines are complex. Importantly, the firm's likelihood of diversifying into a new business decreases more with the complexity in the firm's existing business lines if they share more inputs with the new business. These results suggest that increasing coordination costs counterbalance the potential synergistic benefits associated with related diversification. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Implementing: Alternatives,costs, and benefits

This essay provides a conceptual framework for thinking about the problem of implementing (i.e. getting things done) as part of the larger process of managing. We shall isolate some alternative approaches to that implementing problem and briefly examine the underlying beliefs, the accompanying technologies, and the attendant costs/benefits of those alternatives. We shall then make a few suggestions about appropriate alternatives for the decade ahead.     

Regulatory legacy,VoIP adoption,and investment incentives

The introduction of VoIP telephony raises concerns about current regulatory practice. Access regulation has been designed for PSTN and the liberalization of the PSTN market. This paper explores the effects of access regulation of PSTN networks on consumers’ adoption of a new technology in the form of VoIP. It also discusses the link between access regulation and the incentives to invest in VoIP.     

Market structure,opportunity costs,and tax avoidance

There have been several studies examining the relationship between an industry's market structure and its ability to affect political outcomes. These studies have assumed that political outcomes are likely to be influenced by a variety of traditional market structure characteristics, but these studies have ignored the impact of differences in the opportunity cost of lobbying that undoubtedly exist across industries. A model is developed that directly incorporates the opportunity cost of lobbying for tax breaks. Using data on tax avoidance rates in 1963, it is then suggested that in industries with high opportunity costs of lobbying, fewer tax benefits were received.     

Customer capabilities,switching costs,and bank performance

Customers develop switching costs when they invest time and effort to develop capabilities required to optimally use a given product. Such capabilities are likely to be firm specific and cannot be transferred perfectly to competitors' product offerings. Customers who face switching costs are likely to remain with the same firm and consume complementary products that meet their needs. Thus, firms can achieve competitive advantage by exploiting customers' switching costs. In this paper, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms can benefit from customers' switching costs is contingent upon the firms' internal cross‐selling capabilities. We use online banking data to test our hypotheses and find that customers' switching costs contribute to banks' profitability only in the presence of high levels of internal cross‐selling capabilities. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.