Contract costing in outsourcing enterprises: Exploring the benefits of discrete-event simulation

Outsourcing is a business strategy that has received much attention. An increase in outsourcing has a direct influence on the complexity of supply chain networks and on the number of contracts required to manage a supply chain. Outsourcing contracts may be entered into relatively quickly without a full understanding of the true cost implications. The research described here aims to develop tools based on discrete-event simulation to aid outsourcing companies when costing contracts. Currently available software for this type of application is reviewed. A field study is presented from the electronics sector, describing companies’ needs with respect to contract costing and how simulation could be used in the contract costing process. Simulation approaches are described for different contract costing scenarios. The paper concludes with a case study of a preliminary simulation model that has been developed to test the concept with a specific outsourcing scenario.     

Partnering with Foreign Firms: How Do Chinese Managers View the Governance and Importance of Contracts?

It is a widespread perception that the role of contract in Chinese society is limited because obligations often derive from personal relationships. It is not clear how Chinese managers view the governance and importance of contracts when they deal with foreign counterparts in their joint ventures. To addresses this issue, this study proposes and verifies the governance structure and performance implications of interpartner contracts in a setting of international joint ventures (IJVs). Extant research on IJVs has extensively examined IJV performance but inadequately assessed how this performance is influenced by contractual design. Our analysis of 114 sample IJVs in China suggests that the governance structure of an IJV contract includes four dimensions, namely, issue inclusiveness, term specificity, contingency adaptability, and contractual obligatoriness. Each of these dimensions is validated to be important to IJV formation, interpartner cooperation, and process efficiency as perceived by Chinese managers working in IJVs.     

Toward a social fitness perspective on contract design: Contract legitimacy and influence strategy

The effectiveness of contracts in terms of cooperative efficiency and relational outcomes in interorganizational relationships has become critical in today's volatile markets. However, extant research on the effect of contracts on trust has found inconsistent results, possibility because of its overwhelming focus on an economic fitness perspective at the expense of a social fitness perspective. Drawing insights from institutional theory, we focus on legitimacy building in interfirm contract design, investigate how contract legitimacies (i.e., regulative, normative, and cognitive) influence the effectiveness of interfirm contract design, and further explore the moderating effects of influence strategies that are applied in the process of contract implementation. Using longitudinal field survey data and archival data, this study finds that the three types of contract legitimacy play different roles in influencing compliance and trust and that noncoercive influence strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulative and normative legitimacy better than coercive influence strategies on trust. The findings offer new theoretical and managerial insights into the role of institutional environments in the effectiveness of contract design in manufacturer–distributor relationships.     

浅议集团公司合同管理

合同价格管理在企业管理中有着重要的地位和作用.本文提出要使合同管理更好地为企业管理服务,一是深化"三把关、三统一"制度,实现合同管理的程序化管理;二是全面推行合同监督管理体系;三是灵活运用各种企业合同价格谈判技巧.     

Relationship marketing and contract theory

The theoretical foundation of contracts and their limitations in governing exchange between firms is a current area of research in economics and business. The relationship marketing approach in business-to-business markets focuses on aspects in interfirm exchange that contracts cannot deal with efficiently. However, the ability to use contractual forms of governance where possible is crucial to the enhanced scope of relationship marketing management. We argue that contracts and relationships are complementary and that contracts provide an evolving governance structure for relationships. We examine the evolution of interfirm exchange theories in this framework and illustrate the convergence between contract theory and relationship marketing management, with examples from procurement in the supply chain, capacity reservation contracts, and program management.     

Interaction behaviors in business relationships and heuristics: Issues for management and research agenda

Various empirical studies have evidenced that interaction is a critical process in the development of buyer–seller relationships in business-to-business markets. Research examining the different aspects of interaction processes and the consequences of interaction in business relationships for the development of the businesses involved has tended to black-box the interaction process. Limited attention has been given to how interaction behaviors of individuals arise and the interplay between cognition and behaviors in interaction. At the same time, recent research offers some insights into the use and role of heuristics in contexts analogous to those individual actors face when they interact in business relationships. In this paper we review current research on interaction processes in business relationships as well as on heuristics in the management context and argue that focusing on heuristics used in interaction in business relationships offers valuable insights on how interaction behaviors emerge. In particular, we discuss the notion of heuristics as an “adaptive toolbox,” and how it relates to adaptations in business relationships. We also discuss implications for management and outline a future research agenda.     

Outcome-based contracts as new business model: The role of partnership and value-driven relational assets

This paper investigates the new business model of outcome-based contracts where the firm is tasked to achieve outcomes of equipment as a service contract instead of the traditional maintenance, repair and overhaul activities (e.g., power-by-the-hour® engine service contract). Through a qualitative study of two outcome-based contracts between BAE Systems, MBDA and the UK Ministry of Defence, we derive three value drivers of information, material and people transformation. Mapping it with transaction cost literature we propose five relational assets based on the value drivers; three value-driven alignments and two partnership inputs. We then study the relationships between the relational assets and contract performance through a quantitative survey by applying the partial least square (PLS) method. Our study shows that behavioral and information alignments are important to achieve outcomes. However, material and equipment alignment (i.e., joint supply chain) does not have a significant effect on contract performance. In addition, perceived control and empowerment mediated the relationship between partnership inputs and value-driven alignments. Our study provides a more integrated view of how various theoretical management domains overlap in the understanding of business models, and contribute to the understanding of value drivers and partnership factors in achieving performance in outcome-based contracts.     

Contract,cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures

This study examines how contract, cooperation, and performance are associated with one another within international joint ventures (IJVs). We argue that contract and cooperation are not substitutes but complements in relation to IJV performance. An IJV contract provides an institutional framework guiding the course of cooperation, while cooperation overcomes the adaptive limits of contracts. Our analysis of 293 IJVs in a dynamic market demonstrates that previous cooperation bolsters contractual adaptability, which in turn nurtures current cooperation between the same partners. We find that contract completeness and cooperation drive IJV performance both independently and interactively. When contracts are more complete, cooperation contributes more to performance. Contract and cooperation differ in their quadratic effects such that the contribution of contract completeness to performance declines as completeness increases but the contribution of cooperation remains linear. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price negotiation under uncertainty

This paper examines supply contract negotiation when buyer's revenue and seller's cost are uncertain. In these circumstances, both the seller and the buyer have an option to determine when to sell and buy, which may influence negotiation outcomes. Thus, we developed a bilateral negotiation model to derive the optimal selling (buying) rule considering the option. Our results show that the options of waiting to sell and to buy (1) narrow the traditional zone of possible agreement and (2) lower the probability of negotiation agreement. It is also shown that impasses can occur due to uncertainty, even when a purchase price is lower than the buyer's future revenue and higher than the seller's future cost.     

Religiosity and psychological contracts in Asian B2B service relationships

The growing significance of Asia in global trade has meant that service organizations within the region need to build robust relationships with customers that may reside in nations with different socio-cultural backgrounds. This paper draws on the theories of social exchange and social capital to examine how Indonesian service providers build B2B relationships with their Asian customers in the region, when the customers are from non-Islamic nations. This study used a survey to collect its primary data. Data from 312 Indonesian firms revealed that Asian cultural-specific concepts of religiosity not only had a positive impact on transactional and relational psychological contracts, but also dampened psychological contract breaches. Only relational psychological contracts had a positive effect on relational capital and relational wellbeing, despite transactional contracts being intrinsic to these relationships. Relational capital helped to reduce psychological contract breaches and improve relationship wellbeing, whereas psychological contract breaches reduced such wellbeing. Our findings significantly extend research on B2B service relationships and offer valuable managerial insights for service decision makers operating in Asia that involves B2B relationships between organizations with specific and different socio-cultural backgrounds.     

IT外包的投资、再谈判机制分析

本文从IT承包商(vendor)和客户(client)的角度考虑去设计最优契约。由于客户方的需要,或者是由于契约的不完全性导致契约经常需要再谈判,而且由于契约修改后的执行问题也可能引起法律诉讼,因此对于如何决定事前的投资、谈判利润分配和契约诉讼的赔偿都是一系列要解决的问题,本文正是根据这些问题的提出而逐步展开的。     

The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance

This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the exclusive agency and exclusive-right-to-sell contracts used in real estate brokerage. The theoretical model predicts that while both contract types will yield the same price, the exclusive agency contract will result in faster sales than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. In the empirical model, we find that houses sold faster under the exclusive agency contract than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. However, houses sold with exclusive agency contracts also sold at a marginally lower price. We also find a slightly greater concession from the listing price at the negotiation stage of exclusive agency listings.     

国际石油买卖FOB合同与航次租约的衔接问题

大部分国际石油贸易通过海上运输完成交易,这涉及石油买卖合同与海运租约。这两份合同指向同一笔交易,为实现同一个商业目的;但二者又彼此独立,且签约主体各异,分别受合同法与海商法规制。两份合同紧密联系又相互区别的特征,决定了二者应保持良好的协调性,但是石油贸易商在实务中经常会碰到不易协调的各种困扰。国际石油买卖合同与租约在衔接上的问题包括法律术语借用、装货期限的匹配、船舶滞期费的衔接、提单数量的确认、“安全港口”义务、人为操控计价期、不可抗力、船舶亏舱、法律适用和争议解决、船舶侵权等等问题。本文在分析这些问题的同时尽可能提出应对办法,以期有助于石油贸易商防范和控制二者不匹配带来的法律风险。     

The impact of trust and contract on innovation performance: The moderating role of environmental uncertainty

Research into two important control mechanisms for managing the supply chain relationship - contracts and trust - is on the rise. However, our understanding of how they influence innovation in a firm remains rather unclear. Thus, the primary objective of this study is to examine the individual and interactive effects of contracts and trust on firms' innovation performance and the contingent effects of environmental uncertainty on those relationships in China. The empirical results from a survey of Chinese manufacturing firms indicate that there is a positive relationship between trust and firms' innovation performance, an inverted U-shaped relationship between the use of contracts and firms' innovation performance, and that contracts and trust are substitutes. Moreover, we find that environmental uncertainty enhances the effects of trust, but does not influence the impact of contracts on innovation performance.     

谈谈电力施工企业的合同管理

论述了电力施工企业合同管理的重要意义,阐述了合同管理各个阶段的重点,强调合同管理是施工企业管理工作的重要内容之一,施工企业只有抓好合同管理,降低管理成本,才能增加企业经济效益.     

Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer's optimality

In a manufacturer-retailer system with private retail cost information, we find that a set of incentive-compatible contracts consisting of wholesale and buyback prices can coordinate the channel for any retail cost. We then design two wholesale-buyback contracts by imposing a cutoff point on the retail cost. The first contract maximizes the manufacturer's expected profit while ensuring the channel is coordinated. The second contract assumes the same contractual structure without considering the effect on the channel. Both contracts are exactly solved. We find from numerical study that the manufacturer in the first contract can perform closely to the second one in many cases, and cases exist where both the manufacturer and the channel can do better in the first contract versus the second one.     

Safeguarding or coordinating? Unfolding the dual-function of contracts in manufacturer-distributor relationships

By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes     

Exercising power in asymmetric relationships: The use of private rules

This study investigates the use of private rules in exercising power in asymmetric business relationships. In asymmetric business relationships, the stronger party is likely to be able to dominate and exercise power over the conclusion of contracts and, thereby determine the processes and outcomes of the relationship. The study demonstrates how companies exercise their power in asymmetric relationships through private rules. Private rules are typically expressed in the General Terms and Conditions of Trade (GTCT) of the more powerful actor in a business relationship and are continually adapted to changing business and market requirements. Drawing on an empirical investigation in the German grocery retail business conducted in the years between 2011 and 2013, the present study demonstrates that power is exercised by the stronger parties through intervention–enforcement–sanctioning practices that are codified in private rules. Private rules frame, standardize and legitimize the terms and conditions under which exchanges among counterparts may take place thus institutionalizing the inherent power asymmetry.     

权力视角下的企业契约分解与变迁

本文以权力为逻辑起点,分析了企业契约中控制权的来源及其在不同企业成员之间的配置,本文认为企业控制权倾向于配置给企业成员中有权力的一方,企业契约的签订是双方权力结构的形式化过程。根据契约剩余和控制权配置的不同,可以将企业契约分解为市场契约、科层制契约和关系契约三种不同性质的契约,这一结论在理论上解释了企业契约与市场契约的不同。企业契约的剩余给契约调整提供了空间,在持续交易的过程中权力结构的变化则为契约调整和变迁提供了原动力。但是企业契约变迁具有路径依赖的性质,并且企业制度并不是效率演进的。     

论商品房预售合同的效力

随着经济的发展，住房置业已成为人生的一件大事，预售商品房的出现又为我国房地产市场的法制建设增加了新的内容。通过阐述商品房预售合同的法律性质、合同的有效要件、合同双方的义务及合同的变更等问题，解读预售合同的效力，以帮助消费和企业提高法律意识，减少无效合同的发生，促进房地产市场的健康发展。