The eurozone: What is to be done to maintain macro and financial stability?

The financial stability of the eurozone depends on its macroeconomic stability and vice versa. We construct a macro DSGE model of the eurozone and its two main regions, the North and the South, with the aim of matching the macro facts of these economies by indirect inference and using the resulting empirically-based model to assess possible new policy regimes that could maintain financial stability. The model we have found to fit the facts suggests that substantial gains in stability and consumer welfare are possible if the fiscal authority in each region is given the freedom to respond to its own economic situation. Further gains could come with the restoration of monetary independence to the two regions, in effect creating a second ‘southern euro’ bloc. Enhanced fiscal flexibility increases fluctuations in debt and deficit ratios to GDP while keeping average ratios stable, maintaining solvency. A reformed Stability and Growth Pact could be limited to monitoring solvency.     

Does inequality lead to a financial crisis?

The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms, and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality, credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates, strong growth, rising credit, asset price booms and crises.     

Is there a bright side to government banks? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.     

The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?

It is high time we rediscovered the role of the financial cycle in macroeconomics. In the environment that has prevailed for at least three decades now, it is not possible to understand business fluctuations and the corresponding analytical and policy challenges without understanding the financial cycle. This calls for a rethink of modelling strategies and for significant adjustments to macroeconomic policies. This essay highlights the stylised empirical features of the financial cycle, conjectures as to what it may take to model it satisfactorily, and considers its policy implications. In the discussion of policy, the essay pays special attention to the bust phase, which is less well explored and raises much more controversial issues.     

What is science’s crisis really about?

Present day reasoning about difficulties in science reproducibility, science governance, and the use of science for policy could benefit from a philosophical and historical perspective. This would show that the present crisis was anticipated by some scholars of these disciplines, and that diagnoses were offered which are not yet mainstream among crisis-aware disciplines, from statistics to medicine, from bibliometrics to biology. Diagnoses in turn open the path to possible solutions. This discussion is urgent given the impact of the crises on public trust in institutions. We ask whether the present crisis may be seminal in terms of drawing attention to alternative visions for the role of Science in society, and its relevant institutional arrangements. We finish by offering a number of suggestions in this direction.     

What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....     

Corporate financial policy: What really matters?

Reliable access to funding, as in Myers and Majluf (1984), is what really matters, but there are nontrivial indeterminacies in how such access is arranged and in the debt, cash-balance, and payout components of financial policy. These inferences are from a corporate “twins” comparison study of the financial policies of Henry Ford at Ford Motor Co. and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. at General Motors Corp. The documented testimony of Ford and Sloan indicates that both focused on funding their business, with debt as a funding tool, not an element of an optimized leverage ratio. Their financial policies differ in five important respects, including (i) the use of debt versus large cash balances to meet funding needs and (ii) a commitment to paying large dividends versus a strong aversion to payouts. The data also point to the importance of the inability of managers to identify optimal policies with reliable precision.     

What can we learn about the market reaction to macroeconomic surprise? Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis

We investigate the impact of macroeconomic surprise and uncertainty on G7 financial markets around COVID-19 pandemic using two real-time, real-activity indexes recently constructed by Scotti (2016). We applies the wavelet analysis to detect the response of the stock markets to the macroeconomic surprise and an uncertainty indexes and then we use NARDL model to examine the asymmetric effect of the news surprise and uncertainty on the equity markets. We conduct our empirical analysis with the daily data from January, 2014 to September, 2020. Our findings indicate that G7 stock markets are sensitive to the macroeconomic surprise and uncertainty and the effect is more pronounced at the long term than the short term. Moreover, we show that the COVID-19 crisis supports the relationship between the macroeconomic indexes and the stock prices. The results are useful for investment decision-making for the investors on the G7 stock indices at different investment horizons.     

The risk of financial crises: Is there a role for income inequality?

Could macroeconomic factors such as income inequality be the real root cause of financial crises? We explore a broad variety of financial and macroeconomic variables and employ a general-to-specific model selection process to find the most reliable predictors of financial crises in developed countries over a period of more than 100 years. Our in-sample results indicate that income inequality has predictive power beyond loan growth and several other financial variables. Out-of-sample forecasts for individual predictors show that their predictive power tends to vary considerably over time, but income inequality has predictive power in each forecasting period.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Perceived vs actual financial crisis and bank credit standards: Is there any indication of self-fulfilling prophecy?

We link senior banks loan officers’ responses regarding their decisions for bank credit standards, from successive surveys from the European Bank Lending Survey to investigate two important issues. First, we examine the relationship between bank credit standards (CS) and perceived and actual financial crisis. Second, we investigate whether the notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy is applicable in the case of the 2008 financial crisis. In particular, the second main research question that we try to answer is whether the perceived crisis (as implied by the Google search query “financial crisis”) contributed to the acceleration of the outburst of the actual crisis. We find that both perceived and actual financial crisis affect senior bank loan officers’ credit standards, with the actual crisis having the greatest impact. These results are consistent both in the short and in the long run. Finally, by putting forward a binary choice model we find sufficient evidence to support the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy notion.     

Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting quality?

As a result of the global financial crisis (GFC), several audit clients were able to negotiate lower audit fees for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the PCAOB has expressed concern that lower audit fees might lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality and financial reporting quality. This study examines the relation between audit fee cuts and banks’ financial reporting quality. Specifically, we focus on earnings management via loan loss provisions (LLP), the relation between current period LLP and future loan charge-offs, i.e., LLP validity, and the timely recognition of loan losses. For banks audited by Big 4 auditors, we find that income-increasing abnormal LLP are decreasing in audit fee cuts and LLP validity is increasing in audit fee cuts. For banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors, LLP validity is higher for banks that received a fee cut of more than 25% relative to other banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We do not observe an association between timely loan loss recognition and cuts in audit fees except for banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors and exempt from internal control audits where a fee cut of more than 25% is associated with less timely loan loss recognition. Overall, the findings suggest that Big 4 auditors constrained earnings management via LLP in banks that received cuts in audit fees. Our findings have important implications for regulators, investors, and others.     

What health care cost crisis?

Managed care has inherent limitations that, perhaps out of desperation for some degree of control of health care costs, we tend to disregard. A better understanding of the "crisis" and a host of new strategies become apparent when we separately consider the health care elements and cost elements of the crisis. Managed care is essentially palliative in that it eases symptoms without curing conditions. While this is not a call for the abandonment of managed care, it is a warning that our efforts will prove futile if we do not also address other fundamental elements of impaired health.     

Global financial crisis, extreme interdependences, and contagion effects: The role of economic structure?

The paper examines the extent of the current global crisis and the contagion effects it induces by conducting an empirical investigation of the extreme financial interdependences of some selected emerging markets with the US. Several copula functions that provide the necessary flexibility to capture the dynamic patterns of fat tail as well as linear and nonlinear interdependences are used to model the degree of cross-market linkages. Using daily return data from Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) and the US, our empirical results show strong evidence of time-varying dependence between each of the BRIC markets and the US markets, but the dependency is stronger for commodity-price dependent markets than for finished-product export-oriented markets. We also observe high levels of dependence persistence for all market pairs during both bullish and bearish markets.     

What do financial intermediaries do?

This paper presents evidence that the traditional banking business of accepting deposits and making loans has declined significantly in the US in recent years. There has been a switch from directly held assets to pension funds and mutual funds. However, banks have maintained their position relative to GDP by innovating and switching from their traditional business to fee-producing activities. A comparison of investor portfolios across countries shows that households in the US and UK bear considerably more risk from their investments than counterparts in Japan, France and Germany. It is argued that in these latter countries intermediaries can manage risk by holding liquid reserves and intertemporally smoothing. However, in the US and UK competition from financial markets prevents this and risk management must be accomplished using derivatives and other similar techniques. The decline in the traditional banking business and the financial innovation undertaken by banks in the US is interpreted as a response to the competition from markets and the decline of intertemporal smoothing.