中国风投谋求海外高质量发展

随着我国创业公司的需求市场趋于饱和,国内项目估值高,竞争加剧,中国风险投资趋于理性化,开始将目光投向拥有深度技术解决方案的海外初创企业,开拓追寻颠覆性创新的海外市场。众所周知,风险投资尤其青睐在软件、医药、通信技术等高科技领域具有领先优势的公司。这是因为高新技术产业本身具有较高的利润,而领先或受保护的高新技术产品或服务可以使风险企业更容易进入市场,在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地。     

EVA在企业价值评价中的应用

作为衡量企业价值管理和绩效考核的一种新型管理模式,经济增加值(Economic Value Added,简称EVA)指标从股东利润最大化的角度重新定义企业利润,同时综合考量了资本的使用效率.将EVA应用到企业价值评价中目的在于激励企业在获得利润增长的同时,注重企业投入资本的经济增加值.这个指标有利于企业在发展业务时更注重实效,更注重长远的利益.     

企业人力资源资本化探析

当今全球经济一体化、知识经济的趋势下,人力资源已成为企业取得和维系竞争优势的关键性资源,但是,要将人力资源从潜在的生产能力转化为现实的生产力,进而转化为人力资本,就必须加强人力资源的开发与管理.企业人力资源资本化将会为企业带来更丰厚的利润并节约企业的经营成本;一个企业只要将人力资源、物质资本、教育培训、人员激励、企业文化建设等手段有效配合起来,就可以大大提高企业劳动生产率,将人力资源真正转变为人力资本,才能为企业创造更多的财富,使企业在市场竞争中立于不败之地.     

信息披露质量与资本市场估值偏误

资本市场估值偏误阻碍了证券市场的健康发展。信息不对称是导致上市公司市场价值长期偏离内在价值的根本原因,因此信息披露行为对资本市场估值偏误的影响值得研究。采用剩余收益模型(RIM)估计上市公司内在价值,在此基础上构建度量资本市场估值偏误的代理变量,并采用KV度量法从总体上考察上市公司信息披露质量,本文检验了信息披露行为对资本市场估值偏误的影响。本文研究发现上市公司市场价值对其内在价值的偏离程度与信息披露质量显著负相关;进一步的研究表明,信息披露修正资本市场估值偏误的主要途径,是降低市值高估公司的市场价值泡沫。     

金字塔层级、内部资本市场与现金持有竞争效应

本文研究了金字塔结构企业集团成员公司距离最终控制人的层级数(后文简称金字塔层级)对其现金持有竞争效应的影响及其机制。结果发现:增加现金持有能够提高企业市场竞争优势,金字塔层级增加弱化了现金持有竞争效应,金字塔层级对现金持有竞争效应的影响在公司外部融资依赖程度较高、所处经营环境竞争较激烈,以及不确定性程度较高时更加明显;中介机制检验表明,金字塔层级增加通过扩大公司在集团内部资本市场的交易规模,弱化了现金持有竞争效应。此外,我们还排除了基于代理理论的替代性解释。本文丰富了现金持有竞争效应方面的研究和金字塔集团经济后果方面的研究。     

经济利润——对传统会计利润的挑战

传统的会计利润忽略了对股权资本的存在,经济利润则考虑了股权投资的机会成本,因而是一个更能全面地衡量经济效益的指标。树立经济利润的理念,并以此作为衡量企业的价值。企业财务战略管理的核心是价值管理,而价值管理则是一套以经济利润为核心的分析指标,可见,经济利润对于企业价值管理和财务战略管理的重要意义。     

从EVA及RAROC角度对投行产品与传统信贷产品的简单比较与分析

<正>EVA(经济增加值)是英文Economic Value Added的缩写,一般译为经济附加值。它是全面衡量企业生产经营真正盈利或创造价值的一个指标或一种方法。传统会计计算企业的最终利润是指税后利润,而EVA原理则认为税后利润并没有全面、真实地反映企业生产经营最终利益或价值,因为它没有考虑资本成本或资本费用。根据现行定义,对于银行而言,EVA=税后净利润-经济资本成本,     

经济利润——对传统会计利润的挑战

传统的会计利润忽略了对股权资本的存在,经济利润则考虑了股权投资的机会成本,因而是一个更能全面地衡量经济效益的指标.树立经济利润的理念,并以此作为衡量企业的价值.企业财务战略管理的核心是价值管理,而价值管理则是一套以经济利润为核心的分析指标,可见,经济利润对于企业价值管理和财务战略管理的重要意义.     

基于EVA价值管理的财务战略探讨

EVA(经济利润)指的是企业创造价值的能力,需要扣除企业收入中有关生产要素成本.经济利润对以往的利润指标进行一定的修正,一方面将债务成本扣除,另一方面重点分析人力资源、股权资本等机会成本,体现企业发展前景,重在创造企业的创新能力.EVA作为一种全新价值评价方式,能够切实有效的体现出企业创造价值、协调管理人、出资人经营业绩,每个企业都需要基于经济利润制定自身的财务战略.本文首先就EVA与企业财务战略之间的关系进行简单的阐述,进而详细分析了企业财务管理工作存在的各项问题,最后提出了以EVA价值管理为基础的各项有效的财务战略措施.     

行为保险学系列(二十):偏离标准理论的保险定价行为及其解释(上)

在标准保险经济学中,通常根据保险精算原理来阐述保险定价原理,保险价格（保费）等于纯保费（风险成本或期望赔付）与附加保费（管理费用和利润附加）之和。此外,标准经济学也会讨论保险的金融定价模型,包括保险的资本资产定价模型、保险的套利定价模型和现金流贴现定价模型。精算定价的基础是大数定律、中心极限定理和货币时间价值理论,实际上是基于成本的盈亏平衡定价,这正好也符合完全竞争市场状态下的保险定价,在市场均衡状态下,保费收入正好覆盖赔付、管理费用和资本成本,保险公司的经济利润为零。     

解析利润之迹

通过统一资本的外延,可以发现在技术保持不变、完全竞争导致要素收入均等化的条件下,将得到一般利润率取决于资本使用所能够节约的直接劳动的程度这一结论,这使得边际生产力论、剩余价值学说、斯拉法理论在利润问题上不再相互矛盾。在技术进步的前提下,如果技术进步所带来的收益增加超过其成本的增加,则可以产生经济利润。利润之谜因统一资本的外延、区分不同利润理论的前提条件和所解释的利润对象而能够得到解决。     

中国资本产出、资本回报与资本流向之谜--基于劳动力价格扭曲视角北大核心

本文通过建立生产部门的要素买方垄断市场均衡模型,利用1996-2016年中国省级面板数据测算中国劳动力价格扭曲程度,并使用固定效应模型(FE)及面板固定效应的工具变量(IV)估计方法加以分析,从劳动力价格扭曲视角解答了中国资本产出、资本回报与资本流向之谜,即中国经济如何在赶超阶段面临资本深化不断加剧和TFP增长乏力的情况下,依靠劳动力价格扭曲实现低资本产出与高资本回报水平共存,从而维持长期高速资本积累以及优质的资本流向结构。实证研究表明:劳动力价格扭曲降低了资本产出效率,但这并不能掩盖由劳动力向资本方转移的垄断利润对资本回报的直接补贴,因此劳动力价格扭曲对中国维持高资本回报水平起到了重要的支撑作用,并通过高资本回报水平实现了地区资本快速积累,劳动力价格扭曲对资本流向的积极作用还体现在抑制资本"脱实向虚"及吸引外资流入。因此,应正视劳动力价格扭曲在赶超阶段的特殊作用,在矫正扭曲的过程中循序渐进,更积极采取措施规避其对资本回报和资本流向可能产生的不利影响。     

An Alternative View on Regulatory Distortions in a Competitive Financial Services Industry

We present an alternative view on regulatory distortions in the banking industry. We use the duopoly model developed by Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (BDM, 2000), where a bank with low monitoring costs faces a bank with high monitoring costs. We show that when the initial level of the capital requirement is low, an increase of the minimum ratio between capital and total assets causes a higher decrease in profits at the bad bank than at the good bank. This finding contrasts with BDM's theorem 1, which predicts that a regulation imposing an identical increase in production costs on both banks will cause a greater loss in profits at the good bank than at the bad bank. We also look at the impact of an increase in the minimum ratio between capital and total assets on the profits of a representative bank in three other competitive environments identified in BDM. We find that the decrease in the representative bank's profit caused by an increase in the capital requirement is larger when the bank faces competition from an unregulated firm than when it faces a regulated competitor or no competitor at all. This result is consistent with BDM's theorem 2.     

The Empirical Average Cost of Capital: A New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Corporate Funds

The authors develop a new way to measure the cost of capital, called the empirical average cost of capital (or “EACC”), which is consistent with existing methods of calculating the weighted average cost of capital, but uses information from the firm's financial statements and requires fewer and less subjective inputs. The authors’ model relies on the concept of economic profit while using data from the period 1990‐2012 on net operating profits and total capital to estimate the EACC at both the individual company and industry‐wide levels. Estimates of the EACC and rolling quarterly forecasts of future net operating profits for a single company, McDonald's, for its related industry, and for 57 other U.S. industries are compared to five conventional “textbook” estimates of the weighted average cost of capital published by Ibbotson Associates. The authors find that the EACC yields forecasts of future net operating profit after taxes that compare favorably to those of the five published measures of the weighted average cost of capital, as well as the average and median of these measures.     

Beta Geared and Ungeared: Further Analysis of the Case of Active Debt Management

This paper extends previous work by Appleyard and Strong (1989) concerned with the implications of an active debt management policy (ADMP) for de-gearing a geared firm's equity beta. First, alternative derivations of the ADMP beta de-gearing formulae for an MM perfect capital market with corporation tax and for a world with corporation and personal taxes are presented. These derivations do not require the assumption of level perpetuity expected cash flows and therefore indicate a broader basis for the ADMP beta de-gearing formulae than previously demonstrated. Secondly, possible investor valuation errors from use of a PDMP (passive debt management policy) valuation methodology to value firms pursuing an ADMP are analysed in the context of an MM perfect capital market with corporation tax. Given constant (or zero) growth in the firm's expected unlevered cash flows, this analysis indicates that degearing errors from use of the PDMP beta de-gearing formula will only be associated with valuation errors if there is a change in the firm's target debt ratio and that the significance of such valuation errors will be largely dependent on the expected growth rate.     

Personal Taxation in Firm Market Valuation: Theory and Test*

In this paper, I extend Ohlson's 1995 firm market valuation model to incorporate personal taxes: the taxes on dividends and the taxes on capital gains. Without personal taxes, firm market value can be expressed as the present value of future benefits received by the shareholders (dividends, in this case). With personal taxes, the benefits received by the shareholders should be classified into three categories (due to their different tax treatments): dividends, share repurchases, and new share issues (i.e., contributed capital). The extended model shows the effects of personal taxation on firm market valuation: retained earnings are valued less than contributed stocks, both dividends taxes and capital gains taxes affect retained earnings valuation and firm market value, and firms choose cash distribution methods (paying dividends and repurchasing shares) to increase their retained earnings valuation, therefore increasing their market value. An empirical test using a sample from the Disclosure Select Canada and Financial Post Card data bases for the years 1995‐98 supports these personal tax effects.     

Allocate Capital and Measure Performances in a Financial Institution

This paper provides a model for allocating capital and measuring performances for financial institutions. The methodology relates the economic valuation of the balance sheet to the market value of the firm. In so doing, each business unit is evaluated on an economic basis, and the capital allocated to these units is related to the risk premiums that the market demands. The paper's results have broad applications for corporate managers, risk managers, and other market participants in managing financial institutions to increase shareholders' value.     

Entering a new market: Market profitability and first-mover advantages

We analyze a firm's investment problem when it faces preemption risk and profits are convex in market profitability. In a setup where firms have asymmetric profit convexity, which we relate to firm quality, we show that this has interesting effects on valuation and the order of entry. The interplay between profit convexity and market growth impacts whether a high-quality or a low-quality firm is the first mover. We relate the first-mover advantage to patents; we find that patents expedite investments and increase the incentives for high-quality firms to become first movers. Furthermore, even with a persistent first-mover advantage we show that first-mover advantages in terms of firm value are either over- or underestimated. Thus, our model sheds light on why empirical studies find mixed support for the existence of a first-mover advantage.     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.     

Market competition,earnings management,and persistence in accounting profitability around the world

We examine how cross-country differences in product, capital, and labor market competition, as well as earnings management affect mean reversion in accounting return on assets. Using a sample of 48,465 unique firms from 49 countries, we find that accounting returns mean revert faster in countries where there is more product and capital market competition, as predicted by economic theory. Country differences in labor market competition and earnings management are also related to mean reversion in accounting returns—but the relation varies with firm performance. Country labor competition increases mean reversion when unexpected returns are positive but slows it when unexpected returns are negative. Accounting returns in countries with higher earnings management mean revert more slowly for profitable firms and more rapidly for loss firms. Thus earnings management incentives to slow or speed up mean reversion in accounting returns are accentuated in countries where there is a high propensity for earnings management. Overall, these findings suggest that country factors explain mean reversion in accounting returns and are therefore relevant for firm valuation.