Estimating Impact of Formula Apportionment on Allocation of Worldwide Income and the Potential for Double Taxation

The issue of international transfer pricing and the allocation of worldwide income has become increasingly important as the number of multinational corporations (MNCs) has increased. An arm's-length transaction method of transfer pricing is currently the method required to assign worldwide income; however, evidence suggests that MNCs use the transfer-price mechanism to shift income between tax jurisdictions. As a result, a formulary apportionment method, similar to that used by the states, has been suggested as a preferred alternative. This paper develops a simulation model to investigate the impact on U.S. taxable income of MNCs if a formula apportionment model were adopted. Alternative simulation models explore the magnitude of potential for double taxation when two taxing jurisdictions use different formulary models. The results indicate that, in the aggregate, a decrease in U.S. taxable income could be expected. A relatively modest amount of formulary income is likely to be subject to double taxation when foreign jurisdictions weight the sales factor more heavily and income escapes taxation when the U.S. weights the sales factor more heavily. However, the impact for any single MNC could be significant.     

The European Commission's Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States

The European Union Commission has proposed using consolidated base taxation and formulary apportionment to tax the EU-source income of multinational companies. This paper examines US state experience with a similar approach. Despite some positive lessons, especially the need to consolidate income of affiliated companies, lessons are mostly negative, especially regarding the choice of apportionment formula, the use of economic criteria to define the group whose income is to be consolidated, and complexity caused by lack of uniformity. US experience says nothing about using value added to apportion income—an approach that is conceptually attractive, but subject to transfer pricing problems.     

The Revenue Consequences of Using Formula Apportionment to Calculate U.S. and Foreign-Source Income: A Firm-Level Analysis

This paper examines the 1989–1993 publicly available financial reports of 46 U.S.-based multinationals to estimate the revenue implications of implementing a U.S. federal formula apportionment system. Ignoring behavioral responses, we estimate shifting to an equal-weighted, three-factor formula would have increased their U.S. tax liabilities by 38 percent, with an 81 percent increase for oil and gas firms. We find the firms report a lower percentage of their worldwide profits as American profits than their American share of assets, sales, or payroll. The results may be attributed to more profitable foreign operations, tax-motivated income shifting, or measurement error.     

Using Financial Accounting Data to Examine the Effect of Foreign Operations Located in Tax Havens and Other Countries on U.S. Multinational Firms' Tax Rates

This paper investigates the effect tax havens and other foreign jurisdictions have on the income tax rates of multinational firms based in the United States. We develop a new regression methodology using financial accounting data to estimate the average worldwide, federal, and foreign tax rates on worldwide, federal, and foreign pretax book income for a large sample of U.S. firms with and without tax haven operations. We find that on average U.S. firms that disclosed material operations in at least one tax haven country have a worldwide tax burden on worldwide income that is approximately 1.5 percentage points lower than firms without operations in at least one tax haven country. Our results also show that U.S. firms face a 4.4% current federal tax rate on foreign income whether or not they have tax haven operations. Finally, we find that U.S. firms with operations in some tax haven countries have higher federal tax rates on foreign income than other firms. This result suggests that in some cases, tax haven operations may increase U.S. tax collections at the expense of foreign country tax collections.     

Exploring the role Delaware plays as a domestic tax haven

We examine whether Delaware is a domestic tax haven. We find that taxes play an economically important role in determining whether U.S. firms locate subsidiaries in Delaware and that a Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategy lowers state effective tax rates by between 0.7 and 1.1 percentage points, on average. The tax savings represent a 15–24% decrease in the state income tax burden and translate to an increase in net income of 1.04–1.47%. However, we find that the tax benefits of Delaware tax strategies are diminishing over time in response to initiatives by state governments to limit multistate tax avoidance.     

U.S. interest-allocation rules: Effects and policy

In 1986, the U.S. government undertook a significant reform of its income tax system. One important change for U.S. multinational corporations is related to the allocation of interest expense. This work analyzes the impact of the new U.S. interest allocation rules on the investment and financial decisions of U.S. multinationals. We test the effect of these rules on financing behavior using data from a survey of multinationals assembled by Price Waterhouse for this project. We also calculate effective tax rates for investments at home and abroad, taking the interest allocation rules into account.     

Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More Aggressive Income Shifters?

This paper examines income shifting of U.S. multinational companies over the past two decades. Domestic and foreign policy makers are increasingly concerned with the effect of income shifting on dwindling tax revenues, however, extant research on income shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises is mixed. We address the disconnect between the academic literature and the policy maker's perceptions by examining the extent of multijurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinational companies. We directly address conflicting results in extant literature and show that using either multiperiod proxies or instrumental variables overcomes weaknesses of annual proxies in this setting. Our tests show that U.S. companies have become more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed. Holding tax rate differences between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions constant, our empirical estimates suggest that our sample of 380 corporations with low average foreign tax rates collectively shifts approximately $10 billion of additional income out of the United States annually during 2005–2009 relative to 1998–2002 due to varying regulatory costs of shifting.     

The Taxation of Capital Gains When the Cash Component of Income Is Taxed

Does an‘income’ as opposed to a‘consumption-type’ or cash flow tax require a separate capital gains tax in addition to a tax on the cash component of income? Contrary to those who have adopted a Fisherian approach to this subject, the answer is shown to be ‘yes’. The misunderstanding arose from the mistaken use of NPVs of tax payments to calculate effective tax rates without controlling for the taxpayer's consumption stream. The absence of a capital gains tax of an‘ideal’ type initially reduces tax liabilities as systematic capital gains are artificially generated. Eventually, the horizontal inequity is converted into a tax-induced investment distortion.     

Made in the U.S.A.? A Study of Firm Responses to Domestic Production Incentives

How do U.S. companies respond to incentives intended to encourage domestic manufacturing? I study the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), which was enacted in the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 and was the third largest U.S. corporate tax expenditure as of 2017. Using confidential data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, I find greater average domestic investment spending of $95.5–$143.6 million, but only within the sample of domestic‐only firms and not until 2010, when the greatest statutory DPAD benefits were available. Additional evidence suggests that U.S. multinational claimants invest abroad rather than in the United States and that the increased investment by DPAD firms is accompanied by a reduction in the domestic workforce, consistent with a substitution of capital for labor. I also show that the delayed investment response is due to firms engaging in other responses first, such as changing corporate reporting to shift income across time and borders. Quantifying the extent of these effects contributes to the literature that studies this tax deduction and informs policy makers as to the effectiveness of both manufacturing incentives and U.S. corporate income tax rate reductions in stimulating real domestic activity.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Corporate Tax Reform

Corporate tax reform has been a controversial issue in the U.S. for several years, particularly as U.S. companies have accumulated cash in lower‐tax overseas subsidiaries, while some have used “inversions” to establish overseas corporate domiciles. Two features of U.S. corporate taxation stand out: 1. U.S. corporate income tax rates are the highest in the industrialized world. The federal rate is 35%; and, when combined with state taxes, it averages 39%, as compared to an OECD average of 24%. 2. U.S. corporations pay U.S. tax on their worldwide income, but can choose to avoid indefinitely corporate tax on foreign profits by not repatriating them. Neither feature is present in most other Western countries, where the norm is a “territorial” system that taxes companies only on their domestic profits. The Trump administration has proposed to cut U.S. corporate tax rates to 20%, thereby bringing them down to the OECD average, and to adopt a territorial tax regime like those found in most other Western nations. In this statement signed by 31 senior financial economists, the authors recommend cutting U.S. corporate tax rates, but retaining the current system of taxing the worldwide profits of U.S. companies (while giving them credit for taxes paid in overseas jurisdictions). Once U.S. rates drop to the international average, the economists point out, U.S. companies would have much less incentive under the worldwide system to use transfer pricing schemes to shift their profits to low‐tax jurisdictions than under the proposed territorial alternative. Indeed, under the current system, if the lower rates under consideration are enacted, the location of a company's business activity (including the firm's underlying intellectual property) would not affect its taxation. Along with lower corporate tax rates, the economists also recommend that Congress limit or remove the corporate option to defer the taxation of offshore profits and provide a schedule for repatriating off‐shore funds, using the inducement of the now lower rates as well as the possibility of a “tax holiday.”     

Decomposition of progressivity and inequality indices: Inferences from the US federal income tax system

Vertical equity is an important criterion in evaluating a tax system. Vertical equity has two elements: progressivity and income equality. In this paper, we analyze the vertical equity effects of the US income tax system during 1995–2006 and show that income inequality increased substantially during the period combined with a significant reduction in real progressivity.     

Tax structure,size of government,and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938

We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.      

Heterogeneity and Government revenues: Higher taxes at the top?

How effective is a more progressive tax scheme in raising revenues? We answer this question in a life-cycle economy with heterogeneity across households and endogenous labor supply. Our findings show that a tilt of the U.S. income tax schedule towards high earners leads to small increases in revenue. Maximal revenue in the long run is only 6.8% higher than in our benchmark – about 0.8% of initial GDP – while revenues from all sources increase by just about 0.6%. Our conclusions are that policy recommendations of this sort are misguided if the aim is to exclusively raise government revenue.     

The Effect of Volume of Intrafirm Transfers on Market Metrics

In this paper, we examine the relationship between international intrafirm area transfers and market metrics as measured by market-to-book value and systematic risk. Intrafirm transfers – the amount that multinational corporations charge one another for the transfer of goods, intellectual property, and services – have become an increasingly important issue for policymaking, managerial, financial, and tax purposes. This paper also examines whether international intrafirm intergeographic area transfers are attributed to corporate tax. We find that firms with a sizable volume of international intrafirm transfers have higher systematic risk than comparable firms without these transfers. We show cross-sectionally that firms engage in international transfers have a higher market-to-book ratio, suggesting that transfers add value through their effect on earnings and taxes. Consistent with Mills and Newberry (2003) and Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998), we document that U.S. (global) income tax is positively (negatively) related to intrafirm transfers, implying that U.S. multinational firms shifted taxable income to the United States from 1995 to 1999.     

The effects of standardized tax rates,average tax rates,and the distribution of income on tax progressivity

This study examines the changes in US individual income tax progressivity over the 1986–2003 period using the indexes developed by [Kakwani, N.C., 1976. Measurement of tax progressivity: An international comparison. Economic Journal 87(March), 71–80]. Although progressivity over this time frame has generally been studied in the literature, we provide additional insights by decomposing the changes in index values to account for the effects of concurrent changes in the standardized tax rates, average tax rates, and the income distribution. The decomposition should prove to be particularly useful when different summary indexes lead to conflicting conclusions about progressivity changes, as is often the case. From a policy standpoint, we show that it is the standardized tax rates, a derivative of the legislated tax rates, which need to be monitored and managed to offset the negative progressivity effects of increasing before-tax income inequality.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues*

The European Commission proposes to replace the current system of taxing corporate income using separate accounting by a two‐step ‘consolidation and apportionment’ procedure. This paper uses a large set of unconsolidated firm‐level data to assess the likely impact on corporate tax revenues in each member state. Taking pre‐tax profit as given, overall tax revenues would be likely to drop by 2.5 per cent if companies could choose whether to participate. By contrast, if they were forced to participate, total tax revenues would be likely to increase by more than 2 per cent, leaving some European countries ‐ most notably, Spain, Sweden and the UK ‐ better off. We investigate how sensitive these results are to the apportionment factors used.     

Company Tax Reform in the European Union

The European Commission recently proposed to move towards a consolidated tax base for European multinational companies, to be allocated across EU member states through a system of formula apportionment. This paper argues that while the Commission's blueprints for company tax reform may reduce existing problems of transfer pricing, they will also create new distortions as long as existing tax rate differentials are maintained. The paper also investigates the changes in international tax spillovers which will occur as a result of a switch from the current system of separate accounting to formula apportionment. The final part of the paper discusses whether more conventional corporate tax harmonization should still be a long term policy goal for the EU and presents quantitative estimates of the efficiency gains from harmonization.     

Foreign Exchange Risk,Hedging, and Tax-Motivated Outbound Income Shifting

Although outbound income shifting to low-tax jurisdictions provides tax savings, it is often accompanied by nontax costs. In this study, I examine whether foreign exchange (FX) risk constrains tax-motivated outbound income shifting by U.S. multinational corporations. My findings indicate that exposure to greater currency volatility is associated with less outbound income shifting, and this effect is stronger for firms with foreign affiliates using foreign functional currencies. I also investigate whether hedging facilitates outbound income shifting. Consistent with hedging lowering costs associated with exchange rate volatility, I find that U.S. firms that use more currency derivatives tend to shift more income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. Overall, these findings suggest that FX risk is an important cost of outbound income shifting.     

Federal income tax laws that cause individuals’ marginal and statutory tax rates to differ

This article presents a “phaseouts table” as a tax educational tool. The table compiles and summarizes the phaseouts of and limitations on deductions, credits, exclusions from income, and allowed contributions for individual U.S. federal income taxpayers in 2013. Phaseouts can cause individual taxpayers’ marginal tax rate (MTR) to be higher than their statutory tax rate (STR) (i.e., “bracket” based on taxable income). For each phaseout, the table includes how the phaseout works, the adjusted gross income (AGI) range for the phaseout, and the related formula to compute MTR, given STR. The table is appropriate for any course that covers either U.S. federal income taxation of individuals or tax planning. (The phaseouts table is updated annually and is available upon request from the author.) The remainder of the article is a teaching resource, explaining how to compute the specific impact on MTR of each of several example phaseouts. Together, the phaseouts table and article enable U.S. tax instructors to assist students in learning about phaseouts in an integrated, comprehensive manner.