Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

Tariffs,Efficiency Wages and Unemployment

The present model embeds a model of intra-industry trade into a labour market, which is characterised by efficiency wages. It is shown that tariff protection of the import competing, home produced brands, may cause the equilibrium unemployment rate to shoot up and instead of protecting the sector may cause it to contract. This is possible when elasticity of demand is high and firms have less market power and thus, protectionist effect of tariffs may get completely reversed.     

Ranking optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country under uncertainty

Optimal tariffs and quotas are compared for a large country under uncertainty. If the import supply schedule has constant elasticity and is subject to multiplicative uncertainty and domestic demand is random then the optimal policy is a fixed ad valorem tariff. If the supply schedule has constant elasticity but this elasticity is random then the optimal tariff is superior to the optimal quota. If the demand and supply schedules are linear then the optimal quota is superior to the optimal tariff if and only if the supply schedule is inelastic and the degree of uncertainty in the demand and supply schedules is small.     

The effect of the Uruguay round on the intensive and extensive margins of trade

Do tariffs inhibit trade flows by limiting the entry of exporters (‘firm extensive margin’) or by restricting the average volume exported by each firm (‘firm intensive margin’)? Using a gravity equation approach, we analyze how the decrease in tariffs promoted during the 90s by the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreement affected the trade margins of French firms for 57 sectors and 147 countries from 1993 to 2002. Our main contribution is to estimate the elasticity of trade on both margins, controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity of trade flows thanks to a three-dimensional panel and to time-varying tariffs as a measure of variable trade costs. Our results show that the number of firms exporting in a given sector to a given destination is related to the level of tariffs. But they also show that the decrease in tariffs induced by the implementation of the Uruguay Round did not lead more firms to export and that it only induced incumbent exporters to increase their shipments. We control for two problems that may affect our basic specification: tariff changes may be endogenous and zero flows are not included. Our results are confirmed — even when the extensive margin is significant, its magnitude is very small.     

Why labor income shares seem to be constant?

Abstract

The common assumptions that labor income share does not change over time or across countries and that factor income shares are equal to the elasticity of output with respect to factors have had important implications for economic theory. However, there are several theoretical reasons for why the elasticity of output with respect to reproducible factors should be correlated with the stage of development. In particular, the behavior of international trade and capital flows and the existence of factor saving innovations imply such a correlation. If this correlation exists and if factor income shares are equal to the elasticity of output with respect to factors then the labor income share must be negatively correlated with the stage of development. The existence of a labor intensive sector that produces non-tradable goods would explain why labor income share has no correlation with income per capita.     

How Do Exporters React to Changes in Cost Competitiveness?

Various international institutions such as the European Commission, the ECB and the OECD often use unit labour costs as a measure of international competitiveness. The goal of this paper was to examine how well this measure is related to international export performance at the firm level. To this end, we use Belgian firm‐level data for the period 1999 to 2010 to analyse the impact of unit labour costs on exports. We find an estimated elasticity of the intensive margin of exports with respect to unit labour costs between −0.2 and −0.4. This elasticity varies between sectors and between firms, with more labour‐intensive firms having a higher elasticity. The microdata also enable us to analyse the impact of unit labour costs on the extensive margin. Our results show that higher unit labour costs reduce the probability of starting to export for non‐exporters and increase the probability of exporters stopping. While our results show that unit labour costs have an impact on the intensive margin and extensive margin of firm‐level exports, the effect is rather low, suggesting that pass‐through of costs into prices is limited. The latter is consistent with recent trade models emphasising that not only relative costs, but also demand factors such as quality and taste matter for explaining firm‐level exports.     

Factor tariffs and income

This article examines a tariff on an imported factor of production in a small, open economy with two domestic factors. Suppose the imported factor is intensive in export production, and labor in import competing production. The factor tariff would reduce export production and trade, but raise the wage. The flexibility afforded by the three factors raises the possibility that import spending might fall more than the decrease in output. That is, the factor tariff could raise income. Inelastic demand for the imported factor and a high labor share of income favor increased income.     

The environmental effect of trade liberalization: Evidence from China's manufacturing firms

While prior literature on trade liberalisation and the environment has mostly focused on the macroeconomic ramifications, this study explores at the firm level whether and how changes of trade barriers brought about by China's accession to the WTO may impact on its manufacturing firms’ environmental performance. Adopting a difference-in-differences (DID) methodology, we document the effects of tariff reductions on improving firm-level SO2 emission intensity, and the key corporate strategic decisions responsible for delivering the observed results, with robustness tests covering other major pollutants. In response to trade liberalisation, firms are found to increase labour resources for environmental protection and to improve their production processes to reduce emission intensity. This study contributes to the literature by investigating at the level of the operating firm how output and input tariff reductions may impact on environmental performance and uncovering for the first time the specific actions responsible for the results.     

不完全竞争市场上的贸易和产业政策——以合成橡胶行业为例的经验分析

战略性贸易政策理论研究不完全竞争市场的贸易政策和产业政策。本文将该理论作为分析框架，以合成橡胶行业为分析对象，使用2003年的数据对我国在该行业实施贸易政策和产业政策进行经验分析。文章分析比较了4种不同的政策或政策组合，即自由贸易政策、进口关税政策、生产补贴政策、进口关税与生产补贴结合使用。研究发现，相对于自由放任政策，各种干预政策可增加国民福利，但幅度不大；而干预政策对不同行业厂商利润和政府收入的影响则要大得多，并使合成橡胶的数量和价格发生明显变化。最后，笔者考察了进口关税政策在多期的实施效果。研究结果支持传统幼稚工业保护论：贸易保护程度应随时间减弱，并且政策将在多期中不断降低厂商的市场力量。     

国际贸易中出口关税政策调整的效应分析——以俄罗斯提高原木出口关税为例

贸易大国出口关税政策的调整具有福利效应、收入效应和需求弹性效应。本文以俄罗斯原木出口关税政策调整为例,利用经济学理论分析了国际贸易中的准垄断效应和需求弯曲效应,拓展了对国际贸易中效应问题的认识。     

What's the Point of Reciprocal Trade Negotiations? Exports,Imports, and Gains from Trade

This paper explains why trade‐policy makers may prefer reciprocal trade negotiations (RTN) to unilateral tariff reductions (UTR) for economic reasons. It answers puzzles like ‘Why WTO reciprocity?’ and strengthens the unnecessarily weak case made for the WTO by those who downplay or dismiss benefits from foreign tariff reductions (FTR). RTN is superior to UTR because it provides economic benefits that UTR cannot – namely, FTR benefits which are clearer than potentially important UTR benefits: Whereas each policy offers efficiency gains, any terms‐of‐trade effect of UTR generally detracts from these gains, while any terms‐of‐trade effect of FTR is typically beneficial (especially for a small price‐taking country) with this benefit augmenting FTR's efficiency gains. Moreover, benefits from reductions in foreign barriers may come from several sources; they are not solely the result of terms‐of‐trade improvement – or economies of scale (the two benefits already noted in the literature, though often dismissed). For example, with foreign NTB elimination, possible home benefits are shown even with rising costs and terms‐of‐trade deterioration. RTN is also superior to UTR because, by eliminating protection in either NTB or tariff form, RTN provides an escape from not only a terms‐of‐trade prisoners’ dilemma, but many other previously unrecognised prisoners’ dilemmas, including one in international rent transfers, and several others with no economies‐of‐scale or terms‐of‐trade motivation. Of course, if superior RTN is not an option, UTR may well be desirable. If reciprocity is an option, but only in a narrower CU or FTA form, such reciprocity may still be superior to UTR, or it may be inferior; theory cannot unambiguously rank these.     

Infant industry protection with oligopoly and learning-by-doing

I use a simple two-period learning-by-doing model to examine optimal home country protection policy. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988), 246–68), the home government will impose an import ban to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, a protective tariff often provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these cases, the first-period dynamic tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer ‘profit shifting tariff’. Protection in the form either of a tariff or an import ban encourages the home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. In addition to dynamic profit shifting, protection can bc valuable because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting consumers in the future. Furthermore, the home firm can have an incentive to price below cost if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.     

Trade liberalization,division of labor and welfare under oligopoly

Incorporating explicitly division of labor into a two-country general oligopolistic equilibrium model, we examine the effects of trade liberalization on firm productivity and welfare. We show that a tariff reduction increases the firm productivity of the trading industries but decreases that of the non-trading industries. An expansion of the trading industries, in contrast, decreases the firm productivity of both the trading and non-trading industries. We then find that a tariff reduction necessarily reduces welfare while the welfare effect of expansion of trading industries is ambiguous.     

Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods

This paper describes strategic tariff choices within the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) using CES preferences. The optimum tariff schedule is uniform across goods and inversely related to the import demand elasticity of the other country. In the Nash equilibrium of tariffs, larger economies apply higher tariff rates. Productivity adjusted relative size (≈ GDP ratio) is a sufficient statistic for absolute productivity advantage and the size of the labor force. Both countries apply higher tariff rates if specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost is low. A sufficiently large economy prefers the inefficient Nash equilibrium in tariffs over free trade due to its quasi-monopolistic power on world markets. The required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing in transportation cost. I discuss the implications of the static Nash-equilibrium analysis for the sustainability and structure of trade agreements.     

Optimal revenue-raising trade restrictions under uncertainty

A country seeks to achieve a fixed expected revenue by restricting trade when it faces uncertainty about domestic demand for a good and about foreign supply. If the uncertainty in the demand and supply functions is multiplicative then the policy which maximises domestic expected surplus is a fixed schedule of tariffs depending only on world price. Under additive uncertainty the ranking of ad valorem tariffs and quotas depends systematically on the targeted expected revenue and the degree of uncertainty in demand and in world price but a specific tariff is superior to both these policies.     

Trade policy in a “super size me” world

When a foreign monopolist sets a single market clearing price for its product, the sign of the optimal tariff is determined by the extent of pass through (also known as the terms of trade effect). However, when a foreign monopolist employs a second degree price discrimination mechanism in the domestic market the calculus of welfare maximization is very different. While there are still terms of trade effects from the imposition of a tariff, the existence of such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the sign of the optimal tariff. Instead the distribution of valuations within the population is the key determinant of the nature of policy intervention. This result differs significantly from the uniform price case and is driven by the incentive compatibility constraint which places the distribution of types at the center of the analysis. If there is a relatively large fraction of high valuation types in the population, then domestic information rents may be increased by subsidizing imports thereby increasing the consumption of the low valuation types and moving the incentive constraint in favor of the high valuation types. However, if the share of high types in the population is relatively small then the increase in information rents will also be small but the fiscal implications of a subsidy will be large. Consequently, the optimal policy will be to impose a trade tax.     

Trade policy under firm-level heterogeneity in a small economy

We explore the effect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model of firm-level heterogeneity and product differentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and the demand schedules for its exports (a “small economy”). We first establish that welfare can be decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tariff allows our small economy to deal with two distortions that we identify and thereby reach its first-best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint effect on the other three terms (terms of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tariff improves welfare in spite of the fact that productivity falls.     

MARKET STRUCTURE,CAPITAL INFLOWS,AND HOME WELFARE

The welfare implications of foreign capital inflows in an economy with an imperfectly competitive product market and a capital-intensive import-competing sector are analyzed. If the market structure is exogenous with a fixed number of firms, then a capital inflow improves welfare of the host country. However, if the market structure is endogenous, then a capital inflow tends to be immiserizing because it increases entry and reduces per firm output, thus driving firms up their average cost schedule. In addition, the welfare implications of capital inflows in the presence of trade restrictions are also studied, generating some new insights.     

Trade Liberalisation and the Wage Skill Premium in Korean Manufacturing Plants: Do Plants’ R&D and Investment Matter?

This paper examines the effects of output and input tariff reductions on within‐plant wage skill premium in Korean manufacturing plants. We find evidence that output tariff reduction interacts differently with plants’ R&D and investment behaviours, respectively, to affect wage skill premium. More specifically, output tariff reduction increases wage skill premium mostly in R&D‐performing plants while reducing it mostly in plants making positive facility investments. While there is weak evidence that input tariff reduction increases wage skill premium, no such interactive effects are found. One story behind our results is that, although both R&D and facility investments may respond to changes in profit opportunities due to output tariff reductions, R&D raises the relative demand for the skilled workers while facility investment, an activity of increasing production capacity, raises the relative demand for the unskilled workers.     

Regional Trade Agreements versus Global Trade Liberalisation: Implications for a Small Island Developing State

This study undertakes an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of two forms of regional trade agreements vis‐à‐vis global trade liberalisation on a small island country, using Fiji as a case study. In order to capture the feedback effects of such a complex set of policies, we employ a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Fijian economy to investigate (i) the impact of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), (ii) the impact of PICTA, the Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (PACER), and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), (iii) the impact of full tariff liberalisation (i.e. tariff removal only), and (iv) the impact of full trade liberalisation, with removal of both tariff and non‐tariff barriers. While PICTA consistently provides the least benefits across a range of macroeconomic indicators including real output, welfare, trade volumes and employment, full trade liberalisation involving the removal of tariff and non‐tariff barriers provides the greatest benefits compared to the other scenarios in terms of real output. However, the latter scenario is outperformed by PICTA, PACER, the EPAs and full tariff liberalisation in terms of welfare effects, trade volumes and employment. The policy implications hold important lessons for developing countries considering trade liberalisation.