航天企业经济增加值评价研究

与自然人企业有着一种内在的自我约束——激励机制不同,公司制企业由于所有权与经营权分离存在着代理问题,即如何使具有独立利益的代理人最大限度地维护委托人的利益。如何准确评价公司的价值,完善财务激励与约束机制,降低代理成本,以实现出资者财富最大化问题,一直困扰着财务管理学者。20世纪90年代初出现的经济增加值（EVA）理论作为评价企业新创造价值的指标,被认为是比较有效地解决了这一问题。     

水利工程监理委托代理中激励约束与参与约束探究

文章对业主与水利工程监理关系中的激励约束与参与约束利用委托-代理理论进行若干拓展研究,激励相容约束(IC)相对于参与约束(IR)更为重要,而且不能满足激励约束的机制为无效机制。业主可通过相应的激励约束措施诱导工程监理努力工作并最终提高工程监理的运作效率,降低"道德风险"的发生概率,研究成果可为工程监理体制机制的完善和发展提供一定理论支持和依据。     

独立董事的激励约束机制探讨

针对独立董事的两项主要任务——保护中小股东利益和增强董事会决策的科学性和专业性，从委托代理关系的角度探讨独立董事的激励约束机制，并提出了相应的激励约束措施和手段，以减少代理成本，使独立董事更好地履行诚信和勤勉义务，在公司治理中发挥应有的作用。     

后勤保障社会化委托代理模式制衡机制的总体设计

本文运用信息经济学的基本原理，对高等院校后勤保障社会化委托代理模式进行了经济学分析，提出委托收益大于代理成本是高校后勤保障社会化委托代理模式的可行条件。分析了高等院校后勤保障社会化委托代理模式运作中存在的“代理人问题”，提出了该模式有效运作的激励约束机制的总体设计。     

信息不对称下建设工程招标代理激励机制研究

在信息不对称条件下,招标代理的实施会存在道德风险等诸多不确定的因素.文章基于委托代理理论和信息不对称情况下最优激励合同的分析,指出信息的不对称性使得对招标代理机构的激励存在一定的缺陷,加大了委托代理双方的风险.针对分析结果,提出了要完善双方的委托代理激励合同,建立招标代理机构收益的可调机制,以及改进招标代理机构的绩效评价机制等建议,从而有效地激励约束招标代理机构.     

建内控制度 避经营风险

随着我国市场化经济的不断推进,内控制度的建立及其完善愈显重要,它不仅是企业防范风险的有效手段,而且是提高国有企业经营管理效率的基本方法,更是降低国有企业代理成本的重要途径,笔者通过对内控制度推进过程中的问题,提出几点建议,如转变观念、加强培训、建立激励约束制度等。     

有效的激励约束机制是现代企业制度建设的重要保障

本文在现代企业管理理论的基础上阐述了现代企业制度离不开有效的企业家激励约束机制,剖析了现代企业家激励约束机制中存在的主要问题,并提出了完善企业激励约束机制的设想。     

地方政府公共事业委托代理型管理方式的建构途径探讨

基于委托代理的地方政府公共事业管理方式创新,需健全地方政府公共事业委托代理运作招投标管理机制,完善地方政府公共事业委托代理运作合同保证制度,创新地方政府公共事业委托代理运作激励约束机制。     

关于我国公务员制度激励策略模型初探

阐述了公务员激励的相关概念、公务员的特征及相关的经济学理论，并对构建公务员激励制度进行了初步的探索。利用经济学的经济人假设以及委托代理理论构建了公务员制度激励策略模型。对我国公务员激励的应对策略提出了构想，指出最佳的激励和约束机制应使代理人在逐步满足个人利益的同时，实现委托人利益的最大化，因为只有这样才能使委托人在监督成本最小时最大限度地遏制代理人的败德行为，可为完善激励政策提供一定的启示。     

股票期权理论及其对我国国企改革的启示

股票期权是当前西方最为盛行的激励机制之一，经过半个世纪的发展，已经相当完善，经实践证明是行之有效的。目前，在我国的国有企业中，产权主体缺位，对经营者的约束软化，造成代理成本很高，因此，把握西方股票期权理论的演进方向，对建立和完善我国国企经营者的激励和约束机制，具有重要意义。     

高成本时代与中国经济转型--兼论节约型经济

最近一段时期，能源、原材料、劳动力和土地的价格不断上升，而国内市场环境还很不完善．国际间的贸易摩擦也在不断增加．所有这些情况导致我国企业一直所依赖的低成本比较优势正在逐步丧失。而在外部成本膨胀的同时．企业的内部成本也没有得到有效控制，因而，在高成本时代来临后，要提高企业的竞争力，政府和企业都必须立即进行新的策略选择。企业要从粗放型生产方式转变为集约型生产方式，逐步引入、消化、吸收技术并最终实现掌握技术优势．通过提高自身的管理水平来节约内部成本。而政府也要尽量给企业创造一个良好的外部市场环境．在发展节约型经济的导向下．积极配合企业转变生产方式，大力发展技术，调整比较优势，并升级产业结构．从以初级产品加工业为主转向机械设备制造业为主。另外，政府还应当立即着手削减企业目前过重的、不合理的税费负担．适当给企业减压。     

滨州市纺织业发展现状分析

面对全球经济略有回暖,人民币升值带来的劳动成本的增加及产生的一系列问题,对滨州市纺织业所面临的挑战及压力做了充分细致的阐述。从长远来看,走环保绿色的可持续发展道路是企业得以长期生存的命脉所在;加大国内与国外市场开发是企业长期利润来源的保障。在机遇与挑战并存的宏观经济条件下,能否与上游供应商及下游销售商建立完整的产业链,也是企业能否提高利润、降低成本的关键所在。     

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a synthesis of agency and transaction costs perspectives.     

幸福感、社会资本与代理成本

幸福感是社会学和经济学领域关注的热点问题,但较少研究幸福感对公司治理行为影响的经济后果。本文运用中国A股上市公司的经验数据,在对幸福感与代理成本的关系进行理论分析的基础上,首次检验了幸福感与代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:地区幸福感能够显著降低地方政府控制上市公司的代理成本,与之相反,地区幸福感加剧了民营控制上市公司的代理成本,并从幸福感的社会资本视角对地区幸福感与代理成本的关系进行了解读。本研究在一定程度上增进了企业代理成本问题的研究积累,研究结论对国民福利的公共政策和企业员工福利计划的制定具有一定的启示意义。     

乙二醇生产现状及市场分析

分析了国内外乙二醇的生产消费现状及市场前景。从总体上看，世界乙二醇的生产能力已出现了过剩的态势，而我国乙二醇产品的自给率只有约28．0％，因此我国除进口乙二醇以及对现有乙二醇生产装置进行挖潜改造以外，应积极采用先进技术扩大装置的生产规模，以降低生产成本，提高产量和质量，增强我国乙二醇在国内外市场中的竞争力，从根本上缓解我国乙二醇的供需矛盾。     

Temporary Agency Work and Firm Competitiveness: Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms

This paper addresses the relationship between the utilization of temporary agency workers by firms and their competitiveness measured by unit labor costs, using a rich, newly built, dataset of German manufacturing enterprises. We conduct the analysis by applying different panel data models while taking the inherent selection problem into account. Making use of dynamic panel data models allows us to control for firm‐specific fixed effects as well as for potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. The results indicate an inverse U‐shaped relationship between the extent that temporary agency workers are used and the competitiveness of firms.     

非煤企业煤炭板块组织架构设计优化

近年煤炭行业形势较好,较多的非煤企业进入煤炭行业,因此牵涉到企业对于煤炭板块在整个公司定位,本文通过对国内部分企事业的调查研究,结合相关企业的情况及管理方式的发展趋势,提出了非煤企业煤炭板块组织框架先进的模式,该模式减少管理层级,降低管理成本,提高管理效率。     

Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts

We study diversificsation within the real estate industry because of its relative transparency: portfolio management of assets with well-defined market prices. Diversification is over property types and geographical regions. The major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue nonfocusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, are predominantly privately controlled and use dual-class shares extensively. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs.     

Managerial Incentives: Implications for the Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts

In the face of informational asymmetry, REIT equity investors may bear the costs of agency. Hence, it is in shareholders' interests to pay incentive fees to induce managers to utilize their superior information and to take suitable actions that reduce these costs. In this paper, the relation between financial performance and fees paid, and between fees paid and contractual incentives, are examined to determine whether equityholder interests are being served by the decisions of REIT managers. The data reveal that fees paid and financial performance are positively related, indicating that financial performance is at least partially endogenous with respect to managerial action. Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the industry fee structure has changed over the period in a manner that appears to have reduced the agency costs borne by equityholders, and by the end of the sample period the fees paid in general seem to reflect incentives that are consistent with the wealth maximization goal of equityholders.     

Corruption in PPPs,incentives and contract incompleteness

We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete contracts entail state-contingent clauses that compensate the contractor for shocks unrelated to his own effort. By improving insurance, those contracts reduce the agency cost of moral hazard. When the contractor has private information on revenues shocks, verifying messages on shocks realizations is costly. Incomplete contracts do not specify state-contingent clauses, thereby saving on verifiability costs. This makes incomplete contracts attractive even though they entail greater agency costs. Because of private information on contracting costs, a public official may have discretion to choose whether to procure under a complete or an incomplete contract. When the public official is corrupt, such delegation results in incomplete contracts being chosen too often. Empirical predictions on the use of incomplete contracts and policy implications on the benefits of standardized contracts are discussed.