Broad‐based incentive plans,HR practices and company performance

The purpose of this paper is to further develop our knowledge of the complementarities between broad‐based incentives and human resource (HR) management practices, and their combined impact on company performance. We focus on three HR practices that are expected, separately and in combination, to enhance the effectiveness of broad‐based plans: information sharing, upward communication, and training in team skills. Using a sample of 305 Canadian firms, we find that companies with broad‐based incentive plans have lower levels of upward communication and higher levels of information sharing compared with companies that do not offer incentives to the majority of their workforce. Further, we find that companies with broad‐based incentive plans are more productive compared with companies with no such plans, and the presence of supporting HR practices increases their productivity advantage even further. In particular, upward communication combined with broad‐based incentives has a strong positive relationship with productivity.     

On the effectiveness of individual wage incentive plans in manufacturing firms

This study was designed to investigate individual wage incentive plans (IWIPs) in manufacturing industry. Two sets of hypotheses were formulated. The first dealt with certain characteristics, primarily organizational, that distinguish firms with IWIPs from those that did not introduce such plans. The second proposed certain correlates of the effectiveness of IWIPs.

These hypotheses were tested in a random probability sample (n = 80) of manufacturing firms in Israel. In each firm, at least two management representatives were interviewed. The analyses were all conducted at the firm level.

Firms with IWIPs (n = 60) were found to be larger and older relative to those without such plans. No difference was observed in the extent to which these two groups of firms used other types of wage incentives (e.g. group incentives). The second set of hypotheses was tested only in the subsample of firms with IWIPs. As expected, in this subsample a firm's labour productivity (mean level = 121 per cent) was closely related (r = .44) to the mean premium (36 per cent) that the covered employees received. The technical characteristics of the time study procedure, used to set performance standards for the IWIPs, were found not to be related to the level of either labour productivity or premium paid. These two criteria of IWIP effectiveness were found to be significantly higher in firms wherein the local union initiated the plan (n = 18) relative to the firms wherein management was the initiating party (n = 42). These and related findings are discussed in the broader context of current opinions on the pros and cons of IWIPs.     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

An empirical analysis of the corporate control,tax and incentive motivations for adopting leveraged employee stock ownership plans

This paper examines three motivations for leveraged ESOP adoption: as a takeover defense, as a mechanism for providing incentives to employees and as a vehicle for tax savings. ESOP adoption is more likely for companies with a higher predicted probability of takeover, but ESOP adopters have many characteristics that are different from takeover targets. Companies that adopt ESOPs can be distinguished from non-adopting companies based on characteristics associated with the tax and incentive effects of these plans. The size of the ESOP is shown to depend primarily on the tax and incentive characteristics.     

The values and incentive effects of options on the maximum or the minimum of the stock prices and market index

In this study, we employ the certainty equivalent principle to investigate cost efficiency and incentives of the options on the maximum or the minimum of the stock prices and market index levels. In addition, the options with averaging features are also considered. Numerical results show that options on the maximum are more cost efficient and incentive-efficient than traditional ones. As for options on the minimum, they are more cost efficient than traditional ones only when the weight in the options is not very large. However, options on the minimum also provide stronger incentives to increase stock prices than traditional ones.     

Bargaining over incentive contracts

The incentive contract theory assumes that the principal holds all of the bargaining power. By introducing alternating offers and strategic delay into the nonlinear pricing model, we relax this assumption and analyze an infinite-horizon contract bargaining game. We attain either the “sequential separating equilibrium” or the “simultaneous separating equilibrium”, depending on the parameter values. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and claim that multidimensionality and strategic delay can help resolve the multiple equilibria problem of bargaining theory. When the time between offers approaches zero, either quantity distortion or delay persists.     

Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

The problem of incentives for correct revelation is studied as a game with incomplete information where players have individual beliefs concerning other's types. General conditions on the beliefs are given which are shown to be sufficient for the existence of a Pareto-efficient mechanism for which truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium.     

Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design

This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple noncooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium is introduced to predict the outcome of the contract-design game among principals. Symmetric pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria may not exist in perfectly symmetric environments. In a symmetric Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium in mixed strategies coordination failure may lead to a suboptimal institutional network in which the agents “cheat” their principals. Received: 14 June 1995 / Accepted: 09 August 1999     

Direct and incentive planning within a university

This paper explores appropriate roles of “direct” and “incentive” academic planning in helping universities relate advantageously to the aspect of their environments represented by the instructional and research demands of their constituencies. Adopting these roles requires a university to have flexible, uncommitted resources which are difficult to obtain from program reductions because of the impossibility of administratively valuing a university's programs. The paper presents evidence that at one university these funds can be derived alternatively from improved tuition policy and legislative funding relationships.     

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.     

股权激励与企业业绩——基于伊利集团股权激励实施效果的分析

股权激励被认为是委托代理关系,即降低代理成本长期激励管理层的有效方法,部分企业引进股权激励计划后出现净利润亏损,更引起了人们对股权激励与企业业绩关系的新思考。     

Evaluate health plans

For most benefits administrators, this program probably does not automate a function they are now doing manually, but it does bring a consultant/broker function in-house (although this is only one of many such functions). In some organizations, particularly smaller ones that might skimp on analysis of their health plans before negotiating carrier rate changes each year, it might mean that such analysis actually does take place. But it you are a benefits administrator who has been performing yearly, manual evaluations of your plans, be very careful about trying and demonstrating this software. If you think you might not be granted approval by management to purchase it, you may wish you didn't know how well it works.     

Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility

We generalize de Castro and Yannelis (2018) by taking into account the use of randomization. We answer the following questions: Is each efficient allocation of de Castro and Yannelis (2018) still Pareto optimal? Are all efficient allocations still incentive compatible under the Wald’s maxmin preferences? We provide positive answers and give applications.     

股票期权激励的内在逻辑和要求

文章从股票期权激励制度的定义出发,着重探讨了股票期权激励的内在经济学逻辑及其要求,在此基础上,提出由于目前我国资本市场还难以满足股票期权激励的要求,因此需要对股票期权激励的效果有一个客观清醒的认识。     

Corporate restructuring and incentive effects of leverage and taxes

Recent empirical studies have indicated that mergers are value enhancing, yet the theoretical aspects of merger gains have not been as well explored. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of mergers. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment which are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The trade-off specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, we then consider whether and under what circumstances firm value could be enhanced by a merger. Under a fairly broad set of assumptions it is shown that most firm combinations ‘improve’ investment incentives and increase the value of debt-related tax shields. Mergers between optimally financed firms result in a merged firm that is also optimally financed, but such mergers are not synergistic. Nevertheless, firm value may be increased if mergers are undertaken in tandem with a refinancing program to bring the combined firms from suboptimal to optimal debt levels.     

Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms

We consider a general scheme to construct Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms using a suitable ‘variable mechanism parametrization.’ The key idea is to perturb a given direct mechanism, which might not be truth revealing, introducing sufficient variability as a function of agents’ announcements to generate incentives for truthful revelation. We discuss a variable-price auction in a general setting as an example.     

Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats

We consider a dynamic moral hazard model where the principal offers a series of short-run contracts. We study the optimal mix of two alternative instruments for incentive provision: a performance based wage (a “carrot”) and a termination threat (a “stick”). At any given point in time, these instruments are substitutes in the provision of incentives. We are particularly interested in the dynamic interaction of these two instruments. Both carrot and stick are used more intensively as the agent approaches the end of his finite life. The sharing of the surplus of the relationship plays a key role: a termination threat is included in the optimal contract if and only if the agent’s expected future gain from the relationship is sufficiently high, compared to the principal’s expected future gain. Also, a termination threat is more likely to be optimal if output depends more on “luck” than on effort, if the discount factor is high, or if the agent’s productivity is low. The model, provided that the optimal contract includes a termination threat, essentially provides an alternative explanation for upward-sloping wage profiles even in the absence of full-commitment.     

企业高管激励部分理论综述与实践探讨

以佃农理论、权变理论为主要依据,分析并为企业所有人提供部分科学合理的针对企业经营者---经理的行之有效的激励方法,以期望能够为企业设计及建立合理的高管人员激励机制提供一些思路。