Mobile phone termination charges with asymmetric regulation

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles’ market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, ‘collusion’ may well be in line with social welfare.      

Entry and Innovation in Maturing Markets: Virtual Operators in Mobile Telecommunications

In the last few years the mobile telecommunications industry has witnessed the entry of a large number of new service providers. Traditionally, mobile users get their mobile services from the service providers owned by vertically integrated mobile network operators (MNOs). The new entrants do not own a network of their own however, because they use the existing mobile infrastructure, i.e. they are 'mobile virtual network operators' (MVNOs). By granting these virtual operators access to their networks, MNOs actually facilitate the entry of potential competitors for their own downstream service providers. These new entrants might attract additional users by offering competitive services and create extra value with their well-known brand names and other complementary assets. This study focuses on the mobile market of the Netherlands, where competition is intense and MVNOs proliferate. The aim of this research is to improve our understanding of the entry of virtual operators in general, and specifically by explaining why and how virtual operators enter the mobile market and the impact they have on competition in the mobile market.     

Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges

The aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, which allows a new mobile network operator to set higher termination rates than the incumbent operator. We assume that there are two market segments: one in which operators compete on equal terms, with a new technology, and the other in which the entrant is at a disadvantage since the technology it offers is inferior to the incumbent??s. Results show that asymmetric regulation can create favorable conditions that allow the entrant to strengthen its market positioning, and enhance consumer net utilities and social welfare. This highlights the importance of the degree of network asymmetry and the ways in which consumers are split between the two market segments. Lastly, we show that asymmetric regulation can create greater investment incentives for the entrant which could effectively enhance social welfare. These findings can provide useful insights for regulatory policy.     

Fixed-to-mobile call substitution and telephony market definition in Korea

An appropriate market definition is critical in most antitrust cases. In practice, antitrust authorities define economic markets in a deterministic manner with little concern about the risk involved in defining markets incorrectly. In contrast, this article proposes a probabilistic market definition method by which antitrust authorities can establish a statistical confidence level for their intended market-definition judgments. As an application, we examine the likelihood that the fixed-line and mobile telephony services in Korea can compete in the same economic market. Combining critical loss analysis with a hierarchical Bayes model for stated preference data, we find some evidence for the separation of the fixed-line and mobile telephony markets in present-day Korea. After discussing certain possible regulation biases for market definition, we predict that the two markets will converge in the near future as the mobile price premium continues to decrease.     

中国手机电视的运营模式策略探析

中国手机电视业务的出现，加剧了手机发挥效用的环境条件的复杂性。当前中国手机电视运营遇到的问题主要有政策管制缺位及政策支持不力、手机电视接收终端技术不成熟、受众享用成本高、手机电视服务市场缺乏成熟的合作模式、手机电视节目内容严重匮乏、公共手机电视缺位等。政府应对手机电视业务给予政策支持。政府发展公共手机电视，市场发展商业性手机电视，并从传输网络、电视内容、收费模式等方面提出手机电视运营模式的发展方向。     

ENDOGENOUS JOB CONTACT NETWORKS

We develop a model where workers, anticipating the risk of becoming unemployed, invest in connections in order to access information about available jobs that other workers may have. The investment in connections is high when the job separation rate in the labor market is moderate, whereas it is low for either low or high levels of job separation rate. The equilibrium response of network investment to changes in the labor market conditions generates novel empirical predictions. In particular, the probability that a worker finds a new job via his connections increases in the separation rate when the separation rate is low, whereas it decreases when the separation rate is high. These predictions are supported by the empirical patterns that we document for the U.K. labor market.     

企业技术标准形成机制研究——以移动通信为例

从历代移动通信标准的形成过程来看，存在着不同的标准形成机制。本文分析了第一代移动通信的基于市场标准形成机制，第二代的基于市场与委员会混合机制，在此基础上提出了第三代的政府干预下的市场与委员会混合机制，并重点分析了这种机制对标准的形成所发挥的显著作用，探讨了相应的政策含义。     

Identifying the structure of knowledge networks in the US mobile ecosystems: patent citation analysis

With the emergence of smartphones, the paradigm of the mobile ecosystem has changed rapidly. In particular, global mobile firms focus on technological competition when jostling for market position in recognition of the strategic need to secure a strong mobile platform. In this paper, we analyse the network structure of technological knowledge flows in mobile ecosystems using US patent citation information. We find that two subsectors, platform providers and application and software providers, are at the centre of knowledge exchange activity and play a brokerage role as the key knowledge mediator. Then, we categorise mobile firms into five different groups based on the patterns of their network centrality: knowledge keystone players, knowledge-distributing mediators, knowledge-absorbing mediators, catch-up players, and pure knowledge receivers. The categorisation of firms demonstrates that knowledge flows in the mobile industry converge towards a few leading firms, and such patterns are shaping the mobile ecosystem with respect to technological knowledge. The firms categorised as catch-up players have played a brokerage role within their group, while the firms categorised as knowledge keystone players play a brokerage role across different groups.     

Market structure in mobile telecoms: qualified indirect access and the receiver pays principle

Scarcity of spectrum limits the number of competing network operators in mobile telecoms. In the United Kingdom a regulatory review is currently enquiring into the effects of limited competition in the mobile market. The European Commission is also reviewing competition in roaming across mobile networks in Europe. In the UK the industry regulator Oftel claims that the prices for calling mobile phones are too high. We show that such relatively high prices stem from asymmetric incentives. The convention in the UK is for the originating party to pay for a telephone call. If instead the receiver were to pay for some or all of a call, we show that prices of calls to mobiles would be lower. We also argue that qualified indirect access could stimulate more effective competition in mobile telecoms.     

Is fixed-mobile substitution strong enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony? Evidence from the Austrian markets

In this paper, we estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and national calls services for private users as well as cross-price elasticities to mobile services using time series data from 2002 to 2007 from the Austrian markets. Using instrumental variable estimates and considering cointegration, we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation.     

The future of mobile shopping: The interaction between lead users and technological trajectories in the Japanese market

This paper uses the concepts of lead users and technological trajectories and the current status of mobile shopping in Japan to forecast the future of mobile shopping. In interviews with more than 100 Japanese and foreign firms between 2000 and 2005, the author investigated the impact of a number of technological trajectories on mobile shopping applications that are suggested to be promising ones based on the behavior of lead users. Push-based Internet mail and other key services that are not yet available in Western markets were the initial drivers of the market for mobile shopping in Japan between 2001 and 2003. Currently, the fastest growing market for mobile shopping in Japan involves the integration of mobile sites with other media such as magazines and radio and television programs where these other media compensate for the small screens of mobile phones. This paper forecasts the impact of improvements along a number of technological trajectories on the integration of mobile sites with other media.     

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IN WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL ROAMING: TOWARDS A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET?*

Despite a general trend of lower charges for mobile calls, in Europe, prices for international roaming calls have remained at levels that are surprisingly high. The apparent reluctance of mobile network operators to lower roaming tariff is generating many antitrust concerns. This paper presents in a two‐country two‐firm framework the functioning of the current system governing wholesale international roaming agreements based on interoperator tariffs. The focus is on the role of traffic management; thanks to the emergence of traffic direction techniques, mobile network operators are allowed to select the roaming partner. We show that, unless these techniques do not allow for perfect control on traffic flows, traffic management does not improve the market's efficiency. In line with the regulatory mechanism recently adopted by the European Commission, we show that a simple price cap mechanism may restore partial efficiency in the wholesale market. We also show that although cross‐border cooperation at the wholesale level is Pareto efficient, it will not emerge as an equilibrium of a two‐sided matching game.     

Beyond mobile number portability: measuring consumer preferences for service portability in Japan's mobile phone market

Japan's mobile phone market has been oligopolized by three incumbents who are seeking vertically integrated business models, which may prevent competitors from using platform layers to provide original services. We conduct two types of conjoint analysis to measure consumer stated preferences and draw two main conclusions from the analyses. First, the average consumer is willing to pay more than JPY 2000 (US $20) to increase mobile service portability. Second, the average consumer's willingness to pay corresponds to JPY 100–200 (US $1–2) per song for securing music download platforms. A dilemma exists in consumer preferences for service portability in Japan's mobile phone market, namely the choice between free mobile service portability and convenient music download platforms.     

废旧手机产生量测算方法比较研究

分别采用市场供给模型、时间梯度模型和消费使用模型对2005～2010年我国大陆废旧手机的产生量进行了测算和比较。结果显示,不同模型测算结果之间存在较大差异,市场供给模型和时间梯度模型的测算结果比较接近,均远小于消费使用模型测算的结果,三种模型测算的2010年我国大陆废旧手机产生量分别为1.47亿、1.34亿和4.30亿部。总体上看,我国大陆废旧手机的产生量巨大且快速增长,但要准确测算还需要加强对模型活动数据和参数的调查和分析。     

Productivity change and its determinants among leading mobile operators in Europe

The European mobile telecommunications industry has seen increased competition and market saturation in recent years, so improving productivity will become crucially important for mobile operators in the near future. This study adopts a bootstrap Malmquist index approach to estimate productivity change among a sample of 23 of Europe's leading mobile operators over the 2008 to 2009 period. Using a second-stage regression, this article also analyses the determinants of productivity changes in terms of regulation, competition and ownership structure. The results show that mobile companies operating in countries that have recently joined the EU have a positive association with productivity change, in contrast to their counterparts in South-East Europe. Concerning market competition, the leading mobile operators that experience higher productivity changes operate in more concentrated markets. The results also indicate that international mobile operators perform better in terms of productivity change than their national equivalents. Finally, some of the implications of the findings for mobile operators’ management and policymakers are provided.     

Performance comparison of two diffusion models in a saturated mobile phone market

This research examines a performance comparison of the Lotka–Volterra (LV) and extended Bass models in the saturated mobile phone market of the Republic of Korea. A three species LV model is developed and applied to Korean mobile phone service providers in terms of competitive impact. Fitting the historical data of the Korean mobile communication service market, the results show that the goodness of fit of the three species LV model in the case of competition among three companies is better than that of the extended Bass model. The advantages and disadvantages of the two models are discussed based on the results of empirical tests.     

Upstream regulation in mature network industry: evidence from Nordic mobile telecommunications markets

This article investigates the effects of upstream regulation that aims to create niches and attract new type of entrants on the competitive environment of downstream markets. Using unique cross-country data of Nordic mobile telecommunications markets, we show that upstream regulation leads to (i) increases in both number and aggregate market share of service-based providers in the downstream market, (ii) an increase in the number of service-based providers, thus increasing their aggregate market share, but no opposite direction of results and (iii) a lower retail price level, proxied by average revenue per user. Our findings imply that upstream regulation may be able to achieve better outcomes when the policy objectives are to revitalize mature network industries and to enhance consumer welfare.