Demography and welfare economics

The focusing on demographic issues as an important part of welfare-economic assessment shifts the evaluative space in the direction of public discussion and social concern. A commoditycentred view of individual success and social welfare is often used in economics. But the linkage between our economic wealth and our ability to live as we would like has strong limits. This is partly because of interpersonal variations between individuals, but also because of variations in public and social arrangements (for example, for public health care, education and social security). The use of demographic perspectives can enrich economic analysis in several ways. In particular a demographically oriented system of evaluation can not only focus on variables that we all value, but it also gives us the freedom to decide what weights would be most appropriate for the exercise in which we might be engaged. The problem of valuation in welfare economics is ultimately a social-choice issue, requiring the use of explicit judgments on which the society can achieve some consensus through political processes.Lecture presented to the annual meeting of the Austrian Economic Association in Vienna, 24 May 1994. The author is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation for the research on which this paper draws.     

Nonprofit organizations, privatization and the mixed economy: A managerial economics perspective

This paper is divided into two parts. The first illustrates the present characteristics and future prospects for the development of the third sector in Italy. It then examines the social context in which the third sector develops not only in Italy but also in the rest of Europe. The theoretical perspective that seems to be the most appropriate to the dimensions the third sector has taken on in most Western countries is that of dynamic complementarity between state agencies, for-profit organizations and nonprofit organizations. In order to foster economic and social innovation, there is a need for collaboration and complementarity of roles among organizations of different types. An economic policy implemented on a rational basis should select its own intervention instruments after building a set of strategic and organizational alternatives, avoiding the exclusive adoption of only one of these, as happened at the time of the almost unlimited provision of state aid to enterprises and with the unproductive rescues of ailing public enterprises.     

The welfare economics of dominant-firm acquisitions

Conclusion The main results of this paper provide some analytic underpinning for a strict horizontal merger policy relating to dominant firms. However, even under standard assumptions, examples have been demonstrated where dominant/fringe firm mergers increase welfare. Most of these examples imply shutting down acquired facilities, a practice regarded as unfavorable evidence by the court in theStandard Oil case; consequently, they do not by themselves seem to offer much hope for raising economies as an antitrust defense. Finally, it should be noted that this paper has considered only single-product economies; economies of scope arising in multi-product (and multi-market) contexts could be large enough to justify dominant/fringe firm mergers⁹.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Economic Policy Office seminar, Antitrust Division, U. S. Department of Justice. The author is grateful to Marius Schwartz, other seminar participants and an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments. M. Daniel Westbrook and Brian Flynn kindly arranged for the calculations reported in Appendix C.     

On the second optimality theorem of welfare economics

To what extent does the second optimality theorem of welfare economics (every Pareto optimal allocation can be repesented as a Walras equilibrium allocation) remain valid when preferences are allowed to be locally satiated? It is always valid for an exchange economy, and is valid for a production economy if there is a consumer who is not locally satiated, but not in general for a production economy where all consumers are locally satiated. A generalized equilibrium is defined, which includes the Walras equilibrium as a special case. Every Pareto optimum can be represented as a generalized equilibrium allocation. Furthermore, every Pareto optimal utility distribution can be realized by a Walras equilibrium allocation.     

The welfare economics of the socialization of commodities

Socialization is defined for the purpose of this paper as the acquisition by the goverment of the total output of a commodity such as medical services and redistribution of that commodity equally to all citizens. Simple general equilibrium models are constructed to show that when decisions are reached by majority rule a commodity is more likely to be socialized the greater the inequality of income in the community and the less diverse the tastes of individuals for that commodity. The interests of producers of commodities are also taken into account, and strategic aspects of voting about socialization are discussed.     

The pareto rule and welfare economics

It is [my] contention... that the wake for all welfare economics is premature, and that welfare economics can be reconstructed with the aid of the concept of demonstrated preference. This reconstruction, however, will have no resemblance to either of the “old” or “new” edifices that preceded it. In fact...our proposed resurrection of the patient may be considered by many as more unfortunate than his demise.     

A reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics

Neoclassical welfare economics takes an outcome-oriented approach that uses Pareto optimality as its benchmark for welfare maximization. When one looks at the remarkable improvements in economic welfare that have characterized market economies, most of those improvements in welfare have been due to economic progress that has introduced new and improved goods and services into the economy, and innovations in production methods that have brought costs down, leading to higher real incomes. Pareto optimality is only peripherally related to actual economic welfare, and no economist would argue that people are materially better off today than a century ago because the economy is closer to Pareto optimality. After analyzing the actual factors that lead to improvements in welfare, this paper suggests a reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics to replace the almost irrelevant outcome-oriented concept of Pareto optimality as the benchmark for evaluating welfare with a process-oriented benchmark based on factors that generate economic progress. The paper then explores some implications of this reformulation.

Beyond welfare economics: some methodological issues

When one wishes to formulate, evaluate and implement public policies, the existence of a plurality of social actors, with interest in the policy being assessed, generates a conflictual situation. How such a conflict should be dealt with? This paper defends the thesis articulated in the following points: (1) Different metrics are linked to different objectives and values. To use only one measurement unit (on the grounds of the so-called commensurability principle) for incorporating a plurality of dimensions, objectives and values, implies reductionism necessarily. (2) Point (1) can be proven as a matter of formal logic by drawing on the work of Geach about moral philosophy. This theoretical demonstration is an original contribution of this article. Moreover, here the distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives is formalised and definitions are provided. Predicative adjectives are further distinguished into the new categories of absolute and relative ones. The new concepts of set commensurability and rod commensurability are introduced too. (3) Weak comparability of values, which is grounded on incommensurability, is proposed as the main methodological foundation of well-being evaluation. Incommensurability does not imply incomparability; on the contrary incommensurability is the only possible way to compare societal options under a plurality of policy objectives. Weak comparability can be implemented by using multicriteria evaluation, which is a formal framework for applied consequentialism under incommensurability.     

Non-monotonic welfare dynamics in a growing economy

In an overlapping generations economy with endogenous income growth, I combine themes from the work of Cooper et al. (2001), Kapur (2005) and Eaton and Eswaran (2009) in order to provide an example of an economy whose welfare dynamics are non-monotonic. Particularly, the evolution of social welfare can be distinguished between two different regimes that arise naturally during the process of economic development. At relatively early stages, status concerns are inactive and welfare increases following the rising consumption of normal goods. During the later stages, however, individuals engage in some type of status competition that does not allow consumption to improve their well-being: their welfare actually declines as successive generations of agents increase labour effort at the expense of leisure.     

Toward a deconstruction of utility and welfare economics

David Gordon is a senior fellow with the Ludwig von Mises Institute.     

The welfare economics of a health plan merger

Recently, two large health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in Minneapolis merged to form a single company with over half of the total Twin Cities HMO enrollment. This paper strongly suggests that the merger will have adverse consequences for consumers. I use a model of health plan rivalry and empirical demand functions to predict that health insurance premiums in 6 Twin Cities firms will rise by as much as 19 percent after the merger. Next, I show how to calculate the loss in consumer surplus in a discrete choice model and predict that the merger will reduce surplus by 4.4% on average. Several objections to these conclusions are considered but, on the whole, the analysis raises serious concerns for public policy toward HMO mergers.     

Social choice and welfare economics under representative government

In his Impossibility Theorem, Arrow demonstrated logically that certain a priori conditions cannot all be satisfied by a rule of social choice. Those conditions, however, are admittedly value judgments, and how ethically impelling they are remains in dispute. To appraise that matter, the theorem is properly seen in a political context, and Arrow himself has seen it so, but he focuses in effect on ‘direct democracy.’ Further clarification may result from reference instead to different forms of ‘representative government.’ The same inquiry may also illuminate another still controversial matter: the import of the theorem for welfare economics.     

Political economy and the closet: heteronormativity in feminist economics

Abstract

Returning to a question raised by M. V. Lee Badgett in the first issue of Feminist Economics, this paper traces the persistence of heteronormativity in feminist economics to assumptions that kinship is organized around conjugal bonds. These assumptions let “the family” stand automatically for a husband, wife, and their children. “Heteronormativity” is not a synonym for heterosexual privilege, but rather names tacit conceptions about what is socially normal, conceptions that make it possible to think of heterosexuals or homosexuals as essential categories of people. Critique of heteronormativity makes visible a pattern of state repression that makes proper citizens by opposing them to improper ones, a process that simultaneously shapes gender, sexuality, citizenship, and race. Such critique opens the opportunity to better understand gender, integrate scholarship on lesbians and gays, link gender analysis more directly to racializing processes, and reopen the category of heterosexuality.     

Pastoral economics within the framework of a social economy

Eucken, in his paradigm of a functionally competitive social market economy, established the basis for a free market economy which institutionalizes concerns for economic and social justice. The Bishops’ Pastoral (and also the Lay Letter) on the U.S. economy approach the concept of a social and just economy from a Christian moral tradition. A community of interests between these two approaches, as well as Donaldson’s synthesis of Nozick’s and Rawl’s theories of justice, causes a moral-economic dialogue and cross fertilization to emerge. The Bishops postulate that the evolution of a just and fair market economy, as the guarantor of freedom, human dignity, and justice, cannot be left to chance but needs to be consciously guided. Therefore, they emphasize the integration of economic theories and policies with notions of “fairness” and “justice,” advocating a holistic approach in viewing the economic system as an organic whole. This paper shows that the broad economic guidelines, which Bishops suggest, fall within the framework of a functional market economy, i.e., a social market economy. It does not deal with the religious and biblical arguments of the Pastoral Letter.