HEDGING AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER AMBIGUOUS PRICE AND BACKGROUND RISK

This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm that possesses smooth ambiguity preferences and faces ambiguous price and background risk. The separation theorem holds in that the firm's optimal output level depends neither on the firm's attitude towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the underlying ambiguity. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full‐hedging theorem holds and thus options are not used. When these conditions are violated, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean‐preserving spreads. We as such show that options play a role as a hedging instrument over and above that of futures.     

Production and insurance under regret aversion

This paper examines the behavior of a regret-averse producer facing revenue risk. To insure against the revenue risk, the producer can purchase a coinsurance contract with an endogenously chosen coinsurance rate. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the regret-averse producer never fully insures against the revenue risk even though the coinsurance contract is actuarially fair. When the producer is sufficiently regret averse and the loss probability is high, we further show that the regret-averse producer chooses not to purchase the actuarially fair coinsurance contract. Even when purchasing the actuarially fair coinsurance contract is optimal, we derive sufficient conditions under which the regret-averse producer reduces the optimal output level as compared to that without the coinsurance contract. These results are distinct from those under pure risk aversion, thereby making the consideration of regret aversion crucial.     

CROSS‐HEDGING OF EXCHANGE RATE RISKS: A NOTE*

This note studies the optimal production and hedging decisions of a competitive international firm that exports to two foreign countries. The firm faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Cross‐hedging is plausible in that one of the two foreign countries has a currency forward market. We show that the firm's optimal forward position is an over‐hedge, a full‐hedge or an under‐hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated or negatively correlated, respectively.     

BACKGROUND RISK AND THE THEORY OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm under output price risk á la Sandmo when the firm also faces a dependent background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion plus a non-negative association between the output price risk and the background risk are sufficient to ensure a reduction in the firms optimal output upon introduction of the background risk. The paper investigates the impact of a deterministic transformation of the background risk on the firms optimal production decision. It is shown that decreasing absolute risk aversion in Ross' sense is among the sufficient conditions that generate an unambiguous negative comparative static result.     

EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN THE YANO MODEL OF PRICE LEADERSHIP

Abstract. A number of studies have provided a theoretical explanation for the fact that the technologically superior firm becomes a price leader in a duopoly market for a homogeneous product. While previous studies show that the state in which the technologically superior firm becomes a price leader is a Nash equilibrium (superior leader equilibrium), they do not eliminate the possibility that the state in which the technologically inferior firm becomes a price leader is also a Nash equilibrium (inferior leader equilibrium). We demonstrate that an inferior leader equilibrium can be eliminated by the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.     

RISK AVERSION AND FIELD OF STUDY CHOICE: THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITY

Does the choice of field of study depend on individual risk aversion? The direction of the relationship between individual risk attitudes and type of university degree chosen is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, risk averse individuals may prefer degree courses which allow high returns in the labour market; on the other hand, if these degrees expose students to a higher probability of dropping out, those who are more risk averse may be induced to choose less challenging fields. Using data from a sample of students enrolled at a middle‐sized Italian public university in 2009, we find that, controlling for a large number of individual characteristics, more risk averse students are more likely to choose any other field (Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences) rather than Social Sciences. We interpret this result bearing in mind that some of these fields, such as Humanities, involve a reduction in the risk of dropping out, while others (such as Engineering and Sciences) involve a lower risk in the labour market. It also emerges that the effect of risk aversion on degree choice is related to student ability. Risk averse students characterized by high abilities tend to prefer Engineering, while the propensity of risk averse students to enrol in Humanities decreases when ability increases, suggesting that the attention paid to labour market risks and drop‐out risk varies according to student skills.     

INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS,IRREVERSIBILITY OF INVESTMENTS AND FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

In this paper, we analyse the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to improve long‐run welfare when productive investment is irreversible and uncollateralizable and there is no insurance. Only fiat money or government issued bonds provide self‐insurance. We demonstrate that an increase in precautionary savings reduces irreversible productive investment. Hence, subsidies to promote productive but irreversible investment should be financed in such a way that they do not reduce insurance capability. When lump‐sum subsidies are high, a consumption tax is likely to be more redistributive and thus more consumption smoothing than are the other sets of instruments analysed in our model.     

A SIGNALING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PRESSURES

This paper models competitive political pressures as a signaling phenomenon. People participate in collective action in support of or against the status quo, or they abstain. Their actions and abstentions inform the decision of a policymaker who may overturn the status quo in favor of a policy alternative. By providing an informational microfoundation for the widely used reduced-form "pressure production functions" and "political influence functions," the analysis allows me to reexamine the role of the free rider problem in creating a bias towards vocal special interests.
The signaling hypothesis finds empirical support with a study of pro- and anti-Gulf War demonstrations that took place in San Francisco and Kansas City (Missouri) in early 1991.     

厂商的最佳预算模型

本文研究了最佳预算模型,利用库恩-塔克定理提出了确定最佳预算的方法,本文的结果指明了"零结算"可以导致预算"拥挤"的可能性。     

THE EFFECTS OF ABANDONMENT OPTIONS ON INVESTMENT TIMING AND INTENSITY

This paper examines how the presence of an abandonment option affects the timing and intensity of a firm’s investment. We develop a continuous‐time model wherein a firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring an investment cost at that instant. The amount of the investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the firm at the investment instant. The project generates a stream of stochastic revenue flows with a concomitant stream of constant cost flows, both of which increase with the investment intensity. We show that allowing the firm to make an irreversible decision to abandon the project does not affect the firm’s optimal investment intensity if the investment cost is totally reversible. Otherwise, the option to abandon the project induces the firm to choose a lower level of investment intensity. Furthermore, we show that the presence of the abandonment option pushes down the firm’s optimal investment trigger, thereby hastening the undertaking of the project.     

ON THE CONCAVITY AND QUASICONCAVITY PROPERTIES OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS

Concavity and quasiconcavity have always been important properties in financial economics particularly in decision problems when an objective function has to be maximized over a convex set. Both properties have mainly been used as purely technical assumptions. In this paper, we link concavity and quasiconcavity of a utility function to the basic concepts of risk aversion, prudence, risk vulnerability and temperance. We show that concavity means the agent is more risk vulnerable than prudent. In particular, we can see when a function is both concave and quasiconcave and when it is only quasiconcave.     

ON THE USE OF FIRM FIXED EFFECTS AS A PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE FOR ANALYZING LABOR MARKET MATCHING

The present note evaluates the performance of firm fixed effects as a productivity measure when identified from wage regressions with two‐way fixed effects in matched employer‐employee data. This setting is frequently applied to study the matching between workers and firms. Exploiting wage and production data from a large administrative German data set, I find that the correlation between firm fixed effects (FFE) and total factor productivity is close to zero. Once TFP is used, the matching pattern is positive assortative, whereas the two‐way fixed effect technique yields the opposite result.     

Directional measurement of technical efficiency of production: An axiomatic approach

This contribution revisits the debate on the axiomatic properties satisfied by various radial versus non-radial measures of technical efficiency in production. This issue arises whenever isoquant and efficient subset of technology diverge and hence traditional radial measurement does not comply with Koopmans' definition of technical efficiency. This axiomatic approach to technical efficiency measurement is revisited within the framework of the more recently introduced directional distance function. This analysis provides the opportunity to define some new directional efficiency measures.     

AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF LEARNING UNDER AMBIGUITY: THE CASE OF CLINICAL TRIALS*

This article presents a two‐dimensional structural model of learning under ambiguity in the context of clinical trials. Clinical trials offer an ideal environment to study learning under ambiguity. The randomization process found in these studies leaves patients uncertain to their actual group assignment. Therefore, patients cannot immediately attribute changes in health to the experimental drug. The article proposes the use of “learning instrumental variables” to simultaneously update patients’ beliefs of the treatment effect and group assignment. Patient learning is found to be faster when observable side effects are incorporated to account for the uncertainty in group assignment.     

Housing and relative risk aversion

This paper derives closed-form and numerical solutions for relative risk aversion in a standard consumption-based model enriched with housing. The presence of housing enables the household to hedge against unexpected shocks and may decrease relative risk aversion. In addition, housing may generate state-dependent, time-varying risk aversion.     

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TOURISM, EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF HONG KONG

Abstract.  The present paper uses a dynamic open-economy model with wage indexation to examine the impact of tourism on employment and welfare. Both short-run and long-run situations are analysed. It is well known that tourism converts non-traded goods into tradable goods. An increase in the demand for a non-traded good raises its relative price, which results in an expansion of the non-traded sector at the expense of the traded goods sector. This output shift raises labour employment in the short run. However, in the long run, the higher relative price leads to higher wages, resulting in a negative impact on labour employment. If the output effect is dominant, the expansion in tourism raises employment and welfare. However, under realistic conditions tourism may lower both labour employment and welfare due to rising costs. These results are demonstrated by simulating a dynamic model for the case of Hong Kong.     

基于区域学习的企业竞争优势--基于1,639家中小企业问卷调查与分析

企业竞争优势不仅和企业R&D投入水平、科技人员比例等有关,而且和各种与创新活动有关的主体之间的合作与学习有关.在对1,639家企业问卷调查的基础上,建立了包括区域学习、R&D投入等因素在内的企业竞争优势评价模型.结果显示,企业竞争优势不仅取决于要素成本的高低和资金的多少,而且还取决于本地是否具有知识的吸收、转化和创新能力,企业之间的技术合作与联系,企业与大学、科研院所、市场中介组织、政府等的合作与联系对企业竞争优势的影响并不比企业R&D投入小.依据不同经济发展水平所建立起来的模型表明,区域学习对企业竞争优势的影响具有区域差异性,经济越发达的区域,企业竞争优势的提升对区域学习的依赖性越强.     

OPTIMAL TRANSITION DYNAMICS IN THE LEONTIEF TWO‐SECTOR GROWTH MODEL WITH DURABLE CAPITAL: THE CASE OF CAPITAL INTENSIVE CONSUMPTION GOODS*

We present results on undiscounted optimal policies in the Leontief two‐sector growth model with durable capital. Unlike the results with a labour intensive consumption goods sector, we show that a monotonic optimal programme is only one special case out of many richer possibilities of transition dynamics. Depending on the initial capital stock, and a key parameter ζ that could be interpreted as a marginal rate of transformation of capital between today and tomorrow, an optimal programme may converge to a period‐two cycle; and even when it converges to the golden rule stock, it can do so (damped) cyclically or with a “jump”.