Income distribution, borrowing constraints and redistributive policies

This paper sheds light on the relationship between income inequality and redistributive policies and provides possible guidance in the specification of empirical tests of such a relationship. We model a two-period economy where capital markets are imperfect and agents vote over the level of taxation to finance redistributive policies that enhance future productivity. In this context, we show that the pivotal voter is not necessarily the agent (class) with median income. In particular, the poor, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution. The effects of an increase in income inequality on the level of redistribution turn out to depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class. Empirical results from a panel of 22 OECD countries provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main theoretical implications.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

Optimal Fiscal Policies,Congestion and Over‐entry*

By shedding light on market imperfections and the congestion of public goods, we show that free entry in a market equilibrium will lead to excessive entry relative to the social optimum. Moreover, by specifying a generalized congestion function, it is also shown that different fiscal policies, including labor income tax, capital income tax and government expenditure, play a distinct role in terms of remedying market distortions. Specifically, optimal income taxes decrease with the degree of market imperfections in order to remove the monopoly inefficiency, while they increase with the degree of congestion in order to remedy the adverse externality caused by congestion distortion. Since a higher degree of increasing returns to an expansion in the variety of intermediate goods is found to intensify the congestion effect of government infrastructure expenditure, the optimal rule of government expenditure proposed by Barro (1990) should be modified.     

Debt Policy Rules in an Open Economy

In a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accumulation, we examine the effects of a debt policy rule under which the government must reduce its debt–GDP ratio if it exceeds the criterion level. To sustain public debt at a finite level, the government should adjust public spending rather than the income tax rate. The long‐run debt–GDP ratio should be kept sufficiently low to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy. Under sustainability and determinacy, a tighter (looser) debt rule brings welfare gains when the world interest rate is relatively high (low).     

Intertemporal Budget Policies and Macroeconomic Adjustment in Indebted Open Economies

This paper analyzes the role of government intertemporal budget policies in a growing open economy including nominal assets in the presence of an upward sloping supply of debt. This introduces transitional dynamics that influence the effects of government policy instruments on economic growth and the long term fiscal liability. It is shown that capital income taxes or a combination of tax‐cum‐expenditure or government expenditure alone can balance the long term intertemporal government budget constraint. However, those results are shown to depend critically upon the extent of distortion in capital flows brought about the upward sloping supply of debt.     

A Political Economy Model of Earnings Mobility and Redistribution Policy

This paper presents a politico‐economic model that includes a mutual link between life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique equilibrium where unskilled, low‐income agents support a low redistribution because of the hope of upward mobility in future. In contrast, the economy attains multiple equilibria when mobility opportunity and risk are low: one is an unskilled‐majority equilibrium defined by low mobility and the other is a skilled‐majority equilibrium defined by high mobility. The paper gives a comparison between the political equilibrium and the social planner's allocation in terms of mobility, and shows that the skilled‐majority equilibrium realizes mobility close to the optimal one.     

Government spending and growth in second-best economies

This paper extends public spending-based growth theory along three directions: we assume a logistic trajectory for the ratio of government expenditure to aggregate income, self-limiting population change, and exogenous technological progress. By focusing on the choices of a benevolent social planner we find that, if the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is sufficiently high, the ratio of consumption to private physical capital converges towards zero when time goes to infinity. Depending on the form of the underlying aggregate production function and on whether, for given production function, technological progress equals zero or a positive constant, our model may or may not yield an asymptotically balanced growth path (ABGP) equilibrium. When there is no exogenous technological progress, an equilibrium where population size, the ratio of government spending to aggregate income and the ratio of consumption to private physical capital are all constant does exist and the equilibrium is a saddle point. In case of positive technological progress numerical simulations show that the model still exhibits an ABGP equilibrium.     

Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

The Political Economy of Social Security in a Borrowing‐Constrained Economy

This paper introduces a three‐income class, overlapping‐generations model with borrowing constraints. The labor income tax for financing pay‐as‐you‐go social security is determined in a majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. When the interest‐rate elasticity of consumption is low, the political equilibrium might be characterized by an equilibrium where the old and the middle‐income young individuals form a coalition in favor of a higher tax rate and greater social security, while the low‐ and the high‐income young individuals favor a lower tax rate and less social security. In this equilibrium, the size of social security is decreased by the mean‐preserving reduction of a decisive voter's wage if he/she is borrowing‐constrained.     

Internal debt and welfare

This paper analyzes how multinational firms' internal debt financing affects high-tax countries. It uses a dynamic small open economy model and takes into account that internal debt impacts both the multinational firms' investment decisions and the government's tax policy. The government has incentives to redistribute income from firm owners to workers. If the government's redistributive motive is not too strong, internal debt reduces welfare in the short term by decreasing tax revenues. However, debt financing stimulates capital accumulation and exerts a positive long-term welfare impact.     

Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages*

In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low‐skilled, whereas the high‐skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high‐skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low‐skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self‐selection constraint, which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.     

Public Expenditure,Environment, and Economic Growth

This paper attempts to develop a model of endogenous growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure in the presence of congestion effect of private capital and environmental pollution. We analyze the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in the steady‐state equilibrium when the level of production of the final good is the source of emission. Government allocates its income tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. In the steady‐state equilibrium, optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is less than the competitive output share of the public input; and this ratio varies inversely with the magnitude of the emission‐output coefficient. The steady‐state equilibrium appears to be a saddle point; and the market economy growth rate is not necessarily less than the socially efficient growth rate in the steady‐state equilibrium.     

Capitalists,workers, and the burden of debt

Abstract

This paper analyzes the burden of debt in a growth model that combines overlapping generations of workers who save for life-cycle reasons and dynastic agents who save for bequest reasons (‘capitalists’). Ricardian Equivalence prevails, but capitalists regard the debt serviced out of taxes on workers as net wealth. In the long run, the Cambridge Theorem holds: the relationship between the rate of profit and rate of growth is determined by the capitalist saving function, independently of worker or government saving. Two alternative closures are considered. Under exogenous growth constrained by a fully employed labor force, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the distribution of income but permanent effects on the distribution of wealth. Under endogenous growth constrained by a fully utilized capital stock, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the growth rates of the components of wealth and permanent effects on the level and distribution of capital.     

Income inequality,unemployment, and poverty in Nigeria: a vector autoregressive approach

The main features of poverty are low levels of consumption and income, a fact‐of‐life in most African countries. This paper analyzes the fundamental trends of per capita income, government capital expenditure, the human development index, and the rate of unemployment in the Nigeria. A vector autoregressive model finds that: A reduced unemployment rate improves human development and consequently reduces poverty. As growth in public capital expenditure rises, unemployment falls and the human development index improves. Therefore, infrastructure‐based policies, which initially reduce unemployment, will also improve the living conditions of Nigerians in the end.     

Fiscal sustainability,volatility and oil wealth

Whether fiscal policy is sustainable depends on a government’s future revenue and expenditure streams, both of which are highly uncertain. In commodity‐rich countries, this problem is intensified by unpredictable and volatile commodity prices. We show how spending rules for oil income and non‐oil primary deficits interact and influence the stochastic distribution of future debt stocks and demonstrate the variance reducing impact of feedback rules for primary deficits in a case study of oil‐and‐gas exporter Azerbaijan.     

The trade-off between public debt reduction and automatic stabilisation

This paper addresses the basic tradeoff between the stabilisation properties of budgets and the sustainability of long run fiscal positions. The modeling framework consists of a simple non-monetary endowment economy with overlapping generations, extended to account for stochastic endowments and borrowing constrained households. A benign government chooses the optimal degree of responsiveness of net taxes to individual incomes and an optimal measure of long-run public debt in order to smooth households' consumption across states of nature. In the presence of a deficit constraint for the government, the results point to the desire for lower debt levels than those currently prevailing in European Union countries in order to enable a more effective hedging of personal income uncertainty by means of more active automatic fiscal stabilisers. The optimal degree of automatic stabilisation and debt reduction is conditional on the characteristics of economic cycles.     

On the effects of macroeconomic policy in a maximizing model of a small open economy

This paper investigates the effects of government policies in a small open economy. Determination of the exchange rate and the effects of macroeconomic policies on the balance-of-payments accounts are examined in a model of infinitely lived, utility-maximizing agents who have perfect foresight. Residents of the country and the government borrow and lend in a world capital market which constrains them to live within their means. The dependence of consumption, leisure, and real-balance holdings on the present discounted value of government expenditure and real debt is demonstrated. Government policies must be dynamically consistent.     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE GOVERNMENT DEBT IN THE PERPETUAL YOUTH MODEL

The overlapping‐generations model of Blanchard, based on a constant probability of death, is used to study the maximum level of government debt consistent with the existence of a steady state equilibrium. In both a small open and a closed economy it is shown that maximum sustainable debt robustly occurs where the consumption of individual households reaches zero, the limit of its feasible range. Taxation absorbs all of the household's labour income here. In a closed economy, at this point the real interest rate also hits a ‘ceiling’ given by a simple combination of preference parameters and the death probability.