Welfare Implications of Non‐scale R&D‐based Growth Models

Non‐scale R&D‐based growth models imply that the decentral and the socially optimal long‐run growth rate coincide. Nonetheless, the distortions inherent in a market economy bias both the R&D investment share and the saving rate. As a result, the level of the balanced growth path may differ substantially between the two types of solution, implying a dramatic loss in welfare. The present paper explores the sources and magnitude of this gap. In addition, the consequences of public policies are examined, distinguishing between isolated policy measures from an overall policy programme.     

Liquidity Effects in Non‐Ricardian Economies

It has often been found difficult to generate a liquidity effect (i.e., a negative effect of monetary injections on the nominal interest rate) in the traditional “Ricardian” stochastic dynamic model with a single infinitely lived household. We show that moving to a non‐Ricardian environment where new agents enter the economy in each period allows such a liquidity effect to be generated.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.     

A Note on the Most‐Favoured‐Customer Pricing Policy

This paper extends the retroactive most-favoured-customer pricing policy examined by Cooper (1986). He showed that the policy enabled both firms in a duopoly to offer higher prices and to enjoy higher profits. This paper introduces a variable into the most-favoured-customer pricing policy. Then, it shows that there is an equilibrium in which the duopolists can further increase their profits.     

Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his or her present-value utility subject to resource constraints. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E21, E61, E91.     

A systemic approach to modelling and estimating demand for money(ies)

This article uses a consumer theory-based systemic approach to model the demand for monetary liquid asset holdings in Chile. We implement the suggestions and caveats of aggregation theory for the estimation of a demand system for liquid assets (monies) in static, dynamic and time-varying parameters setups. Our results are robust and theoretically consistent with consumer theory restrictions, as a system derived from a utility maximizing framework and a quasi concave utility function. In our estimations, we find stability of interest rate elasticities, in contrast to previous related literature. We also document evidence that long (short) maturity rates are associated to less (more) liquid assets.     

HETEROGENEOUS RISK ATTITUDES IN A CONTINUOUS‐TIME MODEL*

We prove that every continuous‐time model in which all consumers have time‐homogeneous and time‐additive utility functions and share a common probabilistic belief and a common discount rate can be reduced to a static model. This result allows us to extend some of the existing results of the representative consumer and risk‐sharing rules in static models to continuous‐time models. We show that the equilibrium interest rate is lower and more volatile than in the standard representative consumer economy, and that the individual consumption growth rates are more dispersed than in the absence of uncertainty.     

Welfare‐ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition

Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12     

Relative risk aversion, relative prudence and comparative statics under uncertainty: The case of (μ, σ)‐preferences

From the expected‐utility approach, relative risk aversion being smaller than one and relative prudence being smaller than two emerge as preference restrictions that fully determine the optimal responses of decisions under uncertainty to certain shifts in probability distributions. We characterize the magnitudes of relative risk aversion and relative prudence in terms of the two‐parameter, mean‐standard deviation approach. We demonstrate that this characterization is instrumental in obtaining comparative static results in the two‐parameter setting. We further relate our findings to the results in the expected‐utility framework.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

Introducing Time‐to‐Educate in a Job‐Search Model

Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD countries. Some countries exhibit high youth unemployment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the difficulty facing young people trying to integrate into the labour market. At the same time, education is a time‐consuming process, and enrolment and dropout decisions depend on expected duration of studies as well as on job prospects with and without completed degrees. One way to model entry into the labour market is by means of job‐search models, where the job arrival hazard is a key parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job. Standard models of job search and education assume that skills can be upgraded instantaneously (and mostly in the form of on‐the‐job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a time‐consuming process, a concept which we call time‐to‐educate, during which an individual faces the trade‐off between continuing education and taking up a job.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

Optimally eating a stochastic cake: a recursive utility approach

In this short paper, uncertainties on resource stock and on technical progress are introduced into an intertemporal equilibrium model of optimal extraction of a non-renewable resource. The representative consumer maximizes a recursive utility function which disentangles between intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion. A closed-form solution is derived for both the optimal extraction and price paths. The value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution relative to unity is then crucial in understanding extraction. Moreover, this model leads to a non-renewable resource price following a geometric Brownian motion.     

Consumer Expenditures and Home Production at Retirement – New Evidence from Germany

Abstract. This paper investigates consumer expenditures of German households pre‐ and post‐retirement. The widely observed distinct drop in spending upon retirement entry poses an empirical puzzle since life cycle theory predicts smoothing of the marginal utility of consumption over time. As one explanation, I explore the role of home production as a substitute for consumer expenses. Taking a combined look at consumer expenditures and time use pre‐ and post‐retirement, I find a significant drop of about 17% of pre‐retirement expenses at retirement which coincides with an increase in time spent on home production of an additional 89 minutes per day, accounting for 21% of average home production.     

Residual Claims in Co‐operatives: Design Issues

This paper examines issues in the design of a co‐operative member's contractual relationship with the other agents (including the remaining members) using organizational economics. The paper assumes that the central defining characteristic of a co‐op is the residual claim specification. Agency theory identifies certain inherent problems of the co‐op form, the horizon problem, common property problem, and non‐transferability. Non‐transferability both reduces the incentive to monitor and imposes limits on portfolio diversification. This paper argues that features such as claim incompleteness and non‐transferability are not inherent to the co‐op but may be transaction‐cost economizing. The paper also argues that the pre‐emptive payoff feature by which the residual claimants (the co‐op members) also become fixed payoff agents can affect the risk of other agents, and is an important determinant of co‐op risk. A co‐op may have more than one potential residual claim base. Five generic design choices are available for handling possible multiple claim bases: battleground, pre‐specified allocation, limited return, alignment, and fixed payoff. The paper uses the design of residual claims in sugar co‐ops to show how a co‐op can partly overcome some of the problems identified by agency theory. This illustration ties together the issues of claim incompleteness and non‐transferability, pre‐emptive payoff, and multiple claim bases.     

Optimal credit rationing in not‐for‐profit financial institutions*

We examine the dynamic optimization problem for not‐for‐profit financial institutions (NFPs) that maximize consumer surplus, not profits. We characterize the optimal dynamic policy and find that it involves credit rationing. Interest rates set by mature NFPs will typically be more favorable to customers than market rates, as any surplus is distributed in the form of interest rate subsidies, with credit rationing being required to prevent these subsidies from distorting loan volumes from their optimal levels. Rationing overcomes a fundamental problem in NFPs; it allows them to distribute the surplus without distorting the volume of activity from the efficient level.     

An Axiomatic Foundation of the Multiplicative Human Development Index

The aggregation formula in the Human Development Index (HDI) was changed to a geometric mean in 2010. In this paper, we search for a theoretical justification for employing this new HDI formula. First, we find a maximal class of index functions, what we call quasi‐geometric means, that satisfy symmetry for the characteristics, normalization, and separability. Second, we show that power means are the only quasi‐geometric means satisfying homogeneity. Finally, the new HDI is the only power mean satisfying minimal lower boundedness, which is a local complementability axiom proposed by Herrero et al. (2010).     

Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non‐stationary Time Preference and "Hyperbolic" Discounting

Despite recent interest in hyperbolic discounting, there has been little discussion of exactly what property of time preferences is instantiated by hyperbolic or quasi‐hyperbolic functional forms. The paper revives an earlier proposal in Prelec (1989) that the key property is Pratt–Arrow convexity of the log of the discount function, which corresponds to decreasing impatience(DI) at the level of preferences. DI provides a natural criterion for assessing the severity of departure from stationarity in that greater DI is equivalent to more choices of dominated options in two‐stage decision problems, as well as greater convexity of the log of the discount function. Inefficient choices may arise as intentional precommitments, or as unintended reversals of preference by “naïve” agents.     

Real estate investment: Market volatility and optimal holding period under risk aversion

This paper deals with real estate portfolio optimization when investors are risk averse. In this framework, we examine an important decision making problem, namely the determination of the optimal time to sell a diversified real estate portfolio. The optimization problem corresponds to the maximization of a concave utility function defined on both the free cash flows and the terminal value of the portfolio. We determine several types of optimal times to sell and analyze their properties. We extend previous results, established for the quasi linear utility case, where investors are risk neutral. We consider four cases. In the first one, the investor knows the probability distribution of the real estate index. In the second one, the investor is perfectly informed about the real estate market dynamics. In the third case, the investor uses an intertemporal optimization approach which looks like an American option problem. Finally, the buy-and-hold strategy is considered. For these four cases, we analyze in particular how the solutions depend on the market volatility and we compare them with those of the quasi linear case. We show that the introduction of risk aversion allows to better account for the real estate market volatility. We also introduce the notion of compensating variation to better measure the impacts of both the risk aversion and the volatility.