Effects of Tightening Smoking Regulations on Take‐up and Cessation of Smoking

We use a nationally representative Australian panel survey that allows us to track individuals’ smoking behaviour from 2001 to 2003, a period during which new tobacco regulations came into effect in four of the eight state and territory jurisdictions. We exploit this variation in regulations over time and across jurisdictions to produce estimates of the effects of tighter smoking regulations on smoking behaviour within the year the regulations were introduced. Although increased (non‐pecuniary) costs of smoking will almost certainly have some negative effects on smoking, our analysis suggests that effects on smoking rates in the short term are negligible.     

Japanese manufacturing facing post-Fukushima power crisis: a dynamic computable general equilibrium analysis with foreign direct investment

The Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami that hit and severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station resulted indirectly in the shutdown of most of the nuclear power plants in Japan. To compensate for the lost nuclear power supply, more fossil fuels were used. People became concerned that this could be disadvantageous for domestic manufacturing industries and accelerated their offshoring to Asia, especially China, through foreign direct investment (FDI). We used a world trade computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with endogenous FDI from Japan to China to quantify the impact of the power crisis on the Japanese manufacturing sectors. We found that the power crisis as well as FDI would adversely affect several sectors that use power intensively, but would benefit the transportation equipment (TEQ), electric equipment (EEQ) and machinery sectors, despite the common expectation that these sectors would undergo a so-called ‘hollowing-out.’     

Regulating away competition: the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship and employment

Many scholars have worried that regulation deters entrepreneurship because it increases the cost of entry, reduces innovation in the regulated industry, and benefits large firms because they can overcome the costs of complying with regulations more easily than smaller firms. Using novel data on the extent of US federal regulations by industry and data on firm births and employment from the Statistics of US Businesses, we run fixed effects regressions to show that more-regulated industries experienced fewer new firm births and slower employment growth in the period 1998–2011. Large firms may even successfully lobby government officials to increase regulations to raise their smaller rivals’ costs. We also find that regulations inhibit employment growth in all firms and that large firms are less likely to exit a heavily regulated industry than small firms.     

The effects of air quality regulations on the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants

This research examines the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) on the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants. We develop a panel data set to analyze plant births of polluting manufacturers over time as a function county-level attainment status of the federal standard for ozone pollution. We find that more stringent county-level environmental regulations impact pollution-intensive capital flows through deterring new plant births. We also find that the impact of stricter regulations varies by pollution-intensity of manufacturers, with results suggesting that federal guidelines have a greater impact on high pollution intensive manufacturers than more moderate polluters.      

The labor market and corporate structure

We analyze the impact of labor demand and labor market regulations on the corporate structure of firms. Higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labor market regulations, unions or higher labor demand. We also find that the organization of firms has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, monitoring is a type of “rent-seeking” activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring. Labor market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce employment.     

Do Environmental Standards Harm Manufacturing Employment?

A major issue in the debate about imposing environmental standards on polluting firms is the possibility of negative effects on employment. We examine the impact of environmental regulations on employment in an empirical analysis. Norwegian data are used to study three manufacturing sectors with high shares of units under strict environmental regulations. We find that for two of these sectors, firms under strict environmental regulations had a higher tendency to increase employment and a lower tendency to exit than firms under weak or no environmental regulation. For the third sector, environmental regulations had no significant impact on employment.     

Culture,legal heritage and the regulation of labor

According to cross-cultural psychologists, cross-country differences in individualism vs. collectivism constitute an important dimension of cultural variation. Legal-economic theorists argue that legal philosophies such as common law and civil law have developed differently over centuries and have persistent effects. In this paper, we argue that the effects of culture and institutions should not be analyzed in isolation from each other, as this disregards their interactions. We merge the two separate literatures on cultural attributes and legal origin theories, and derive a hypothesis regarding their joint effects on labor market regulations. We hypothesize that the effect of individualism on the political determination of labor regulations should be particularly pronounced in more market-oriented economic systems (as in British common law countries) compared to more rigid and bureaucratic state-centered systems (as in French civil law countries). Market oriented economies give individual effort and ability greater room to flourish, which in individualistic cultures yields weaker labor regulations. The effect of individualism should be smaller in state centered systems. Using data on the average rigidity of labor regulations during the years 1950–2004 in 86 countries, we find that the negative effect of individualism on the rigidity of labor regulations is enhanced by the presence of a common law legal system. In fact, individualism has no effect on the rigidity of labor market regulations in civil law countries. Analogously, the negative effect of common law legal origin on labor market regulations is found to be conditional on the level of individualism. Individualism and common law legal systems are complements in the determination of labor regulations.     

Is environmental regulation bad for competition? A survey

Theoretical and empirical research points to environmental regulation affecting the vigour of competition in product markets. We provide a critical, selective survey of that research. Environmental regulations can advantage large firms over small and raise concentration. They can discourage entry in their own right, and provide instruments with which incumbents can discourage entry strategically. They can provide the basis for predatory behavior by incumbents. Policy governance needs to be coordinated sufficiently to ensure that these secondary effects are accounted for in policy design. Cost-benefit evaluation of environmental policies that fail to account for likely detrimental impacts on product market competition will overstate the net benefits. This survey is a heavily-revised version of a discussion paper that the author wrote for presentation to a meeting of the OECD Competition Committee in June 2006 (OECD 2006). The support of OECD in the writing of that paper is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Nick Johnstone, Jean-Phillipe Barde, Jeremy West, Sandeep Kapur, Michael Crew and an anonymous referee from this journal for helpful comments on earlier versions. All views expressed are those of the author alone.     

Firm location decisions,regional grants and agglomeration externalities

We examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants, and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments. We find that a region's existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants. Grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas, but importantly, we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry. This suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms' location decisions in the face of countervailing co-location benefits.     

ENTRY REGULATIONS,WELFARE, AND DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE

Welfare effects of entry regulations are theoretically ambiguous in differentiated product markets. We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store‐type differentiation and static price setting to evaluate how entry regulations affect long‐run profitability, market structure, and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry costs and fixed costs by store type. Counterfactual policy experiments show that welfare increases when competition is enhanced by lower entry costs. Protecting small stores by imposing licensing fees on large stores is not welfare enhancing.     

Dissertation abstract: Three essays on the determinants of behavior in the commons-experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia

This dissertation presents the results of a series of common pool experiments conducted in three regions of rural Colombia with individuals who face a social dilemma in their everyday lives that is similar to what was presented in the experiment. The research objectives are to develop an empirical characterization of how individual behavior deviates from purely self-interested Nash behavior and to further our understanding of the effects of alternative institutions to promote more conservative choices in common pool experiments.Groups of five subjects participated in a 20-period common pool resource game framed as a harvest decision from a fishery. Every group first played 10 rounds of a baseline limited access common pool resource game and then 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions: face-to-face communication, one of two external regulations, and communication combined with one of the two regulations. The two external regulations consisted of an individual harvest quota that was set at the efficient outcome, but differ with respect to the level of enforcement. A total of 420 individuals participated in the experiments, with individual earnings averaging slightly more than a day’s wages. The results are presented in three essays.The first essay, What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users?, develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by combinations of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or conformity. The results suggest that a model which balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. The data are inconsistent with a model of pure self-interest, as well as models that combine self-interest with individual preferences for altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion.The second essay, Communication and Regulation to Conserve Common Pool Resources, tests for interaction effects between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the same. The results indicate that formal regulations and informal communication are mutually reinforcing in some instances, but this result is not robust across regions or regulations. Therefore, the hypothesis of a complementary relationship of formal and informal control of local natural resources cannot be supported in general; instead the effects are likely to be community-specific. There is some evidence to suggest that these effects are correlated with the relative importance of formal regulations versus informal community efforts in the community.The third essay, Within and Between Group Variation in Individual Strategies in Common Pools, analyzes the relative effects of groups and individuals within groups in explaining variation in individual harvest decisions for particular institutions, and uses a hierarchical linear model to examine how these sources of variation may vary across institutions. Communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but these coordinated strategies vary considerably among groups. In contrast, externally-imposed regulatory schemes (as well as unregulated limited access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.     

Bankruptcy Decision Making

When a firm encounters financial distress, there is a significantpossibility that, at some point, the firm itself should be shutdown and its assets put to better use. But Chapter 11 and indeedall market-mimicking reorganization regimes other than a speedyauction entrust the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judgewho lacks information and expertise, as well as the abilityto control the timing of her decisions. Understanding the costsof entrusting the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge iscentral to assessing any law of corporate reorganizations. Thisarticle models the shutdown decision as the exercise of a realoption. The model suggests that the shutdown decision may loomso large in the early parts of the bankruptcy case that it erasesany significant difference between Chapter 11 and many alternativemarket-mimicking regimes. All these regimes take more time thanmandatory auctions and thus increase the cost of taking theshutdown decision away from a market actor. Moreover, the realoption itself gives parties an incentive to withhold information.Only a system of mandatory auctions both limits the amount oftime the shutdown option resides with an inexpert decision makerand forces insiders to give that decision maker sufficient informationto value the option while it is in her hands.     

Trade liberalization in the presence of domestic regulations: public policies applied to EU and U.S. wine markets

Wine is the highest valued product in the agricultural, food, and beverage sector traded between the United States and the European Union (EU) and wine faces a range of tariffs that are differentiated by country and product category. In addition, the production of wine grapes is heavily regulated within the EU and there are complicated state-level policies in the United States designed to limit the retail availability of wine. There continues to be economic and political pressure for reform to the tariffs between the United States and the EU, and to the domestic regulations in each region. We carefully develop parameters to characterize the effects of tariffs and domestic regulations that affect production and consumption of wine in the two regions. Simulation results show that reductions in tariffs would have relatively small effects in EU and U.S. wine markets, whereas reductions in EU domestic policies that affect wine grape production would have much larger trade and welfare implications.     

A policy model to analyze macroprudential regulations and monetary policy

We construct a small‐open‐economy, new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general‐equilibrium model with real financial linkages to analyze the effects of financial shocks and macroprudential policies on the Canadian economy. The model incorporates rich interactions between the balance sheets of households, firms and banks, long‐term household and business debt, macroprudential policy instruments and nominal and real rigidities and is calibrated to match dynamics in Canadian macroeconomic and financial data. We study the transmission of monetary policy and financial and real shocks in the model economy and analyze the effectiveness of various policies in simultaneously achieving macroeconomic and financial stability. We find that, in terms of reducing household debt, more targeted tools such as loan‐to‐value regulations are the most effective and least costly, followed by bank capital regulations and monetary policy, respectively.     

Ambiguous protection

Import regulations are globally the most prevalent form of intervention in international trade. The regulations should, under rules of the WTO, protect consumers and the environment but can be used to protect producers. We investigate the ambiguity of intent of the regulations. We set out a model that when applied empirically suggests, as a benchmark estimate, equal divide between social benefit and producer protection. Inefficiency and distributional effects of the regulations are consistent with producer-protecting trade policy. Country diversity in use of regulations supplements our estimates in suggesting presence of producer-protecting intent. We look at how WTO procedures have allowed producer protection in the guise of social benefit.     

The effects of regulations on state liquor prices

Several estimation methods agree that state regulations such as resale price maintenance and retail price posting affected the prices of liquor brands up to the mid-1970s in the US states in which the distribution system is privately owned; before-versus-after analysis using the quasiexperimental method provides the strongest evidence. The effects of particular regulations are not so clearcut, however.In the 1970s, the regulations supporting these practices began to be removed. The regulations that continued in effect seem to have lost their potency about that time. The effects of regulation no longer are seen.This paper is an outgrowth of a senior thesis by the second author. We appreciate useful information from Steve Barsby and James M. Ferguson, and helpful comments from Stanley Ornstein and Dennis W. Carlton. Gary L. Marshall of the Distilled Spirits Council of the US provided the information that After 1984, DISCUS no longer published the retailer's prices for distilled spirits sold at retail establishments (correspondence of October 25, 1993).     

Regulation of Performance Standards versus Equipment Specification with Asymmetric Information

Economists have greatly criticized regulations that impose uniform environmental standards. Such a critic ignores that the implementation of the standards may vary significantly across plants, thus giving rise in fact to non-uniform standards. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the regulator's monitoring activities. We show that greater inspection effort, ceteris paribus, is allocated towards those plants whose emissions are likely to generate a higher level of damages. On the other hand, we show that the behavior of the regulator is also a function of variables that may not be directly related to abatement cost and damages. In particular, we show that variables pertaining to local labor market conditions have an impact on the monitoring strategy adopted by the regulator.     

Effects of the October 2013 U.S. Federal government shutdown on National Park gateway communities: the case of Acadia National Park and Bar Harbor,Maine

The U.S. Federal Government experienced a shutdown that halted much of its spending and services over 16 days in October 2013. Federal government officials noted a wide variety of impacts that the shutdown had on economic activity, including a reduction in the admission fees collected by the National Park Service and losses of visitor spending in ‘gateway communities’ located near national parks and monuments. This article examines the effects of the October 2013 federal government shutdown on Acadia National Park’s gateway community of Bar Harbor, Maine. Regression results show that the 16-day shutdown is associated with a 76% reduction in Acadia visitation in October 2013 and a 13% reduction in tourism-related sales. This suggests that an estimated 17% of the potential visitors impacted by the Acadia closure cancelled their trips to Bar Harbor. This change in visitor behaviour is a reasonably large response to a short-term event such as the government shutdown.     

Can Direct Regulations Spur Innovations in Environmental Technologies? A Study on Firm‐Level Patenting

Using a rich Norwegian panel dataset that includes information about the type and number of patent applications, direct environmental regulations, and a large number of control variables, we analyze the effects of direct regulations on environmental patenting. We use inspection violation status as a measure of regulatory stringency, while controlling for risk class. Violation status captures the probability that a firm might be sanctioned for violating its emission permit. Controlling for risk class captures firm heterogeneity related to dirtiness and inspection frequency. We empirically identify strong and significant effects on innovations resulting from the implicit regulatory costs of direct regulations.     

Environmental Regulations,Producer Responses,and Secondary Benefits: Carbon Dioxide Reductions Under the Acid Rain Program

This paper derives a production analysis framework for modeling secondary benefits from environmental regulation, i.e. induced changes in yet unregulated pollutants. We emphasize the various ways in which the producers can respond to environmental regulations, and evaluate them in terms of their costs and their generation of secondary benefits. An application on the US electricity sector illustrates our main point: In our case, abatement technologies that reduce regulated emissions while leaving the plants’ unregulated emissions unchanged appear to be among the least costly producer responses to the existing sulfur and nitrogen regulations, but at the expense of limited secondary reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. This finding raises questions about the magnitude of the much debated secondary benefits from future regulations on carbon dioxide emissions, since similar abatement technologies are currently being developed for carbon dioxide. With new environmental issues emerging over time, our findings suggest that regulators should signal the possibilities of new regulations on connected pollutants to producers. Such information may be relevant for producers when choosing current abatement strategies—with minor cost increases to deal with today’s issues, overall compliance costs for near-future environmental problems may be lowered.