Disability status,individual variable pay,and pay satisfaction: Does relational and institutional trust make a difference?

Although prior research suggests that disabled employees have different needs in the context of some HRM practices, we know little about their reactions to reward systems. We address this gap in the literature by testing a model using the 2011 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (disabled employees, n = 1,251; nondisabled employees, n = 9,959; workplaces, n = 1,806) and find that disabled employees report lower levels of pay satisfaction than nondisabled employees, and when compensated based on individual performance, the difference in pay satisfaction is larger. We suggest that relational (derived from trust in management) and institutional (derived from firm‐wide policies and HRM practices, both intended to provide equitable treatment to disabled employees) forms of trust play important roles. The results of multilevel analyses show that when trust in management is high, the difference in pay satisfaction under variable pay is reduced. We find just the opposite for employees who work in organizations with a formal disability policy but without supportive HRM practices; the gap in pay satisfaction is exacerbated. However, the combination of the presence of a firm‐wide policy and HRM practices reduced the difference in pay satisfaction. Implications of the findings for theory, future research, and management practice are discussed.     

Is Red or Blue More Likely to Narrow the Gap? The Effect of CEO Political Ideology on CEO-Employee Pay Disparity

How does CEO political ideology influence the pay disparity between a CEO and typical firm employees? Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we postulate that politically liberal CEOs are more inclined to address within-firm vertical pay disparity versus conservative or neutral CEOs, because liberals attend more closely to potential inequality issues and are more open to social changes. We furthermore contend that the effect of CEO political ideology varies across certain contextual factors. Results based on a sample of United States public firms support our arguments. Our study contributes to the literature on income inequality by highlighting CEO political ideology as a crucial determinant and investigating the boundary conditions.     

Executive Pay Matters: Looking Beyond the CEO to Explore Implications of Pay Disparity on Non‐CEO Executive Turnover and Firm Performance

Using a longitudinal data set covering a span of 10 years, we investigate the impact of vertical and horizontal pay disparity on non‐CEO executive turnover and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesizing differential responses to pay disparity depending on a non‐CEO executive's responsibilities, we first categorize non‐CEO executives based on their job demands and their role in the organization (e.g., oversight, divisional). We then explore how pay disparity influences the relationship between executive category and turnover, and how the level of pay disparity impacts the relationship between turnover and firm performance. We find that executive category significantly impacts the likelihood of turnover, and also influences firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

How the CEO power and age dissimilarity shape the chair-CEO pay gap: Empirical evidence from China

Using data on China’s listed firms from 2009 to 2018, this paper investigates how the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and CEO power affect the chair-CEO pay gap from both managerial power theory and optimal contract theory. We find that CEO power and age dissimilarity have opposite effects on pay gap between the chairman and the CEO. And the cognitive conflict caused by age dissimilarity can effectively restrain the compensation-seeking behavior of CEO for non-performance compensation growth. More importantly, both the age difference and its sign have important value. When we consider age dissimilarity between the CEO and the entire board of directors, our hypotheses are still confirmed. Finally, we document that both CEO ability and co-working time between chairman and CEO could reduce the inhibition effect of age dissimilarity on compensation incentive from capability and relationship view. Overall, the results are beneficial to reform the top managers’ compensation incentive system and to improve the explicit and implicit supervision mechanisms.     

Dimensions of CEO–Board Relations

Interactions between CEOs and their boards of directors are a prominent focus of management and strategy research. Despite the extensive literature on CEO–board relations, to date there has been limited integration of theoretical perspectives and measurement schemes. Through an extensive analysis of published studies, we hope to facilitate future research on CEO–board relations. We begin with a comparison of key theoretical approaches. Next, we conduct a content analysis of 51 empirical articles. We find that prior studies have an unbalanced focus regarding both topics and theoretical perspectives, and that there is limited consistency in the choice of measures. Based on this review, we lay out a number of promising directions for future research. We also find that, while there has been progress in international research on CEO–board relations, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the generalizability of governance theories across different geographic settings.     

家族管理与CEO支配力对企业价值之影响

本文以台湾上市公司为研究对象,实证探讨家族管理与CEO支配力对企业价值之影响,研究结果发现:控制股东之家族成员参与高阶管理团队时,若增强CEO结构支配力,减弱CEO股权支配力,对企业价值具有正面影响.因此,从本研究可获得启示,若控制股东家族希望能够借由参与高阶管理团队以提升企业价值,应同时考虑CEO支配力之影响.     

我国创业板上市公司高管薪酬结构对公司绩效的影响研究

如何设计一套具有激励性的薪酬方案对于现代公司发展至关重要,以我国2010年创业板上市公司为样本,对以净利润衡量的公司绩效与高管薪酬结构间的关系的研究发现:公司绩效与高管层平均薪酬显著正相关,与CEO薪酬无显著相关性;与CEO持股比例负相关性较显著,但与高管层平均持股比例无显著相关性;与CEO和高管层的薪酬差距、持股比例差距均显著负相关;与公司规模、公司董事、监事和高级管理人员总数显著正相关。     

Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure

This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.     

The effect of CEO compensation structure on the early internationalization of newly public firms

This study suggests the incentive perspective as an antecedent of early internationalization. We argue that early internationalization is a risky strategy for a CEO in a relatively young firm and that a potential agency problem arises between a CEO and shareholders in such a context. By drawing on agency theory, we theorize that the CEO compensation structure plays a critical role in the early internationalization decision. In a sample of 145 newly public U.S. firms, we find that the likelihood of early internationalization is negatively associated with the CEO’s secured cash pay and positively associated with the CEO’s equity-based compensation. In addition, we find that the positive association between equity-based compensation and the likelihood of early internationalization becomes stronger as the CEO’s tenure increases. These findings show that the interest alignment between a CEO and shareholders affects the strategic decision of early internationalization. Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and international business by underscoring the importance of the compensation structure as a significant driver of value-creating strategic initiatives and by identifying incentive factors that spur firms to internationalize early.     

Does partnership at work increase trust? An analysis based on the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey

In the late 1990s, partnership at work was embraced with some enthusiasm by a number of stakeholders in employment relations and incorporated in the 1999 Employment Relations Act. The implementation of the Information and Consultation Regulations has also been extensively signalled. We might therefore expect to see some evidence of partnership‐related practices in Britain. The 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2004) provides an opportunity to explore the extent of partnership practice, and also, for the first time, to explore its link to trust relations. This article reports evidence from WERS 2004 suggesting that partnership practice remains relatively undeveloped and that it is only weakly related to trust between management and employee representatives and to employees’ trust in management. Direct forms of participation generally have a more positive association with trust than representative forms. There is also modest evidence that trust may be associated with certain workplace outcomes. The case for partnership and more particularly representative partnership as a basis for mutuality and trust is not supported by this evidence.     

Court Intervention as a Governance Mechanism over CEO Pay: Evidence from the Citigroup Derivative Lawsuit

Abstract

We use an unanticipated court ruling in a lawsuit against Citigroup claiming corporate waste related to CEO pay to analyse court intervention as an alternative governance mechanism in cases of excess pay. We find a negative relation between announcement returns and excess pay, consistent with shareholders of these firms perceiving court intervention as net costly. However, we find a positive relation between announcement returns and excess pay accompanied by poor performance, suggesting that intervention is welcome when pay is more egregious. Finally, we find that firms with excess pay and whose shareholders welcome intervention reduce future pay relative to other firms, suggesting that the threat of court intervention is a potential mechanism to control excess pay.     

Least-cost alternatives to layoffs in declining industries

The demand for services provided by a telecommunications firm dropped sharply during the 1979 recession. The company had no history of layoffs. Because it was in a regulated industry and its rate-of-return was guaranteed, the firm was buffered from many of the usual uncertainties associated with declining demand. In spite of its secure position, history, and reputation, top management made a decision to respond quickly to the downturn and lay off 100 employees. Perhaps the layoffs were intended to be a symbolic gesture, since the number of people affected was very small relative to the total number of employees. If this was the company's intention, the impact was grossly miscalculated. Because of the unwise timing of the layoffs, they caused widespread disaffection. Employee morale and confidence in top management plummeted. The event gained in infamy, and in the corridors and washrooms of corporate headquarters it became known as the “Christmas Eve Massacre”.     

MUTUALITY,PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION†

ABSTRACTS The determinants of CEO compensation within the UK Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986–90, we find only weak support for the existence of a positive link between performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast we find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market based control systems are absent, our results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the UK building societies.     

权益性超额薪酬、CEO权力强度与真实盈余管理

基于公司治理角度,以2011—2016年沪深A股上市公司非平衡面板数据为样本,分析了A股上市公司真实盈余管理水平是否受到高管团队权益性超额薪酬的影响以及CEO权力强度和内部控制质量对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,高管权益性超额薪酬与真实盈余管理呈显著正相关关系,CEO权力强度能够显著加强权益性超额薪酬对于真实盈余管理的正向影响,而高质量的内部控制整体上能够抑制权益性超额薪酬对于真实盈余管理的促进作用。     

Mutual Gains? Health‐Related HRM,Collective Well‐Being and Organizational Performance

Research on the effects of HR management on employees’ psychological well‐being has yielded inconclusive results. Moreover, prior works remain unclear on whether human resource practices specifically aimed at enhancing employee well‐being also benefit organizational performance. Building on signaling theory and conservation of resources theory, our study investigates the relationship between health‐related human resource management (HHRM), employees’ collective well‐being (in terms of collective emotional exhaustion and collective engagement) and organizational performance. Results from a multi‐source field study of top management team members, HR representatives, and 15,952 employees in 88 organizations reveal a positive indirect relationship between HHRM and employees’ collective well‐being, which is mediated by employees’ positive stress mindset. In addition, we find this positive indirect association to depend on the level of transformational leadership climate in organizations. Finally, our findings also show a positive indirect relationship between HHRM and company performance, mediated by employees’ positive stress mindset and collective engagement.     

Modelling the Joint Impact of the CEO and the TMT on Organizational Ambidexterity

While researchers continue to debate how firms might attain ambidexterity, recent research demonstrates that top management teams (TMTs) play a pivotal role. We enrich this line of inquiry by specifying a model that blends the effect of the CEO and the TMT on ambidexterity. Specifically, given the importance of networking and building social capital to the access of timely, valuable, and diverse information, we first envision that the CEO's network extensiveness will positively impact ambidexterity. Next, we argue that this impact will be bolstered when the CEO–TMT interactional interface, including communication richness, functional complementarity, and power decentralization, enable the entire TMT to process disparate information demands essential to attaining ambidexterity. We test and find general support for our model using multi‐source survey data from 122 small‐ to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs).     

Union effects on pay levels in Britain

The contraction of union representation in Britain raises the question of whether or not unions still achieve a wage premium. Analysis of matched employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that there is now no demonstrable premium for private sector workers in general. However, unions do achieve a wage premium of around 9% for about half of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The effect of union bargaining spills over to other employees in the same workplaces. The paper identifies circumstances where union effects are strongest—employer endorsement of union membership, high collective bargaining coverage and multi-unionism.     

Disengaging from engagement

Two basic approaches to engagement are contrasted. Work engagement relates to an individual's psychological state of mind while at work. The problems with this and its limited relevance to HRM are considered: its concern with a minority of employees, the way non‐engaged staff are portrayed, the airbrushing out of conflict and the pernicious use of positive psychology. Employee or behavioural engagement is more relevant to HRM and employment relations but suffers from a lack of definition and a failure to specify the components that are associated with higher levels of employee engagement. It is usually a‐contextual and lacks the subtlety of earlier work on HR and performance, while covering the same ground. Problems remain with research seeking to show the connections with financial performance. Boiling engagement measures down to one score is particularly worrying. The management of employee engagement in the UK National Health Service illustrates that properly constructed studies of employee engagement can inform policies and practices to improve work relations, employee well‐being and aspects of performance.     

‘How would you measure something like that?’: Quality in a Retail Bank

In this paper we explore a case study of total quality management (TQM) within the financial services sector. We demonstrate that a ‘conformance to requirements’ approach towards TQM is concerned with increasing management’s physical and financial control over procedures, documentation, systems and people. Such an approach only partially addresses quality because (a) there can never be a precise ‘conformance’ and (b) this approach neglects customers and employees. We illustrate that often management do not understand the flaws/problematics and underlying philosophy behind TQM. Thus they continue to adopt ‘inconsistent’ approaches, such as attempting to control costs and employees while espousing the importance of the customer and the need for a trust-based culture. Yet, whether or not they understand the rationale behind TQM and attempt to widen their focus by considering people and customers more directly, we argue that management cannot easily adopt a ‘consistent’ approach because a preoccupation with controlling costs is bound up with career-based identities and hierarchical power relations. Ultimately we argue that management cannot control ‘quality’ in any simple top down way, essentially because of the ‘indeterminacy’ of labour, the ‘intangibility’ of customer satisfaction, and the complexity of organizational power and identity relations.     

Tournament Structure of Managerial Pay: Evidence from the Transition Period

This paper uses matched employer–employee data to study the structure of managerial compensation. The evidence supports key predictions from tournament theory. First, the managerial pay differential between organizational levels is non‐decreasing as one goes up the corporate ladder. This result is robust to controlling for human capital characteristics and firm fixed effects. I document a particularly large increment in the pay differential at the top of a firm's hierarchy. Second, the winner's prize in the CEO tournament increases with the number of competitors for the CEO position. Last, high wage dispersion is associated with high firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.