PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION WHEN EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT IS COSTLY*

The paper introduces employment adjustment costs into two widely used models of the trade union, and contrasts the resulting equilibrium wage and employment levels with those which result if employment can be costlessly adjusted.     

INFLATION AND THE PUBLIC DEFICIT WHEN THE UTILITY OF MONEY IS INSATIABLE*

When the marginal utility of money is positive even at very high levels of the asset (Yoshiyasu Ono's, 1994, assumption), the relationship between inflation and the public deficit at full employment may result in a unique perverse equilibrium where higher deficits reduce inflation. If there are two equilibria, the low inflation equilibrium is one where the perverse effect between inflation and the public deficit prevails; while in the high inflation equilibrium higher public deficits increase inflation. These results contrast sharply with traditional results found in the literature.     

UNCERTAIN INCOME,UNCERTAIN TAXES AND RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE*

L. K. C. Chan (1983) and R. B. Barsky et al. (1986) have demonstrated that a tax cut financed by bonds to be repaid from proportional income taxes on uncertain future income, by reducing the latter's riskiness, stimulates current consumption - Ricardian equivalence does not hold. However, their two-period models exclude the possibility that future taxes are uncertain. In this paper a three-period model is developed that, by allowing the government two periods in which to collect taxes, introduces ex ante tax rate uncertainty. This renders the result concerning Ricardian equivalence ambiguous. By comparison, taxes levied as lump sums and via a ‘lottery’ respectively produce the ‘usual’ effects (zero and negative) on consumption.     

NEEDS FOR CONSISTENCY AND FLEXIBILITY IN MEASURES OF REAL PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY1

Study of relationships between outputs, inputs, prices, and final demands in the United States can be strengthened by: (1) eliminating disparities in official measures of output (mainly the Index of Industrial Production and Real Gross National Product), and (2) obtaining agreement on the conceptual framework for studying these relationships. Real Gross Product has provided a consistent framework for study of productivity and prices for the total economy and for broad industry groups, but has not easily permitted the analysis of commodity detail particularly for intermediate commodities. Industrial Production, on the other hand, has considerably extended the detailed analysis of commodity output but has not provided a basis for systematic analysis of productivity and prices within a consistent framework for the total economy. This paper illustrates the effect of some of the disparities between Industrial Production and Gross Product in manufacturing on the analysis of relations between prices and output and prices and productivity. This is done for the 1954–1958 period when benchmark data are available for both measures. Inconsistencies for a number of industries cause difficulties in analyzing the interplay of demand and cost influences on price changes; for example, industries which rise above average in output and below in price in one measure are not the same as those in similar price-quantity relationships in the other measure. The paper concludes by recommending improvements in data and concept in order to eliminate some of the disparities and to enable analysts to reap the benefits of both types of measures of real output.     

FIRM SIZE AND PRICING POLICY

We relate pricing policy of firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational backlash if it ‘reneges’, i.e., deviates from its earlier price offer. This allows the firm to effectively commit to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay. Interestingly, this equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium of the related model that does not allow for reneging possibilities. For smaller firms, however, the reputational effects are much less intense, and consequently the equilibria may involve deviation possibilities. In this case, the equilibria are non‐unique and may involve delays as well.     

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM EXIT ROUTES

ABSTRACT

Our study presents empirical evidence about the role of ownership structure for firm exit probability by explicitly differentiating between distinct exit routes (bankruptcy and forced liquidation, voluntary liquidation, mergers and acquisitions – M&A, and removal from the court register). Based on the population of Slovenian firms in the 2006–2012 period and using multinomial probit, our findings support the predictions of agency theory. Ownership concentration, share of the largest owner, and the difference in shares between two largest owners all decrease the likelihood of exit for all studied exit routes but M&A. The magnitude of their impact is largest for exits, in which owners play a decisive role, i.e. voluntary liquidation and removal. The link between the number of primary owners and exit likelihood is U-shaped with the lowest exit probability for firms with around two owners.     

VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS†

One of the puzzles in the political economic theory of unfunded pension systems is that middle-aged voters do not seem to advocate unlimited increases in the level of contributions and benefits if they take this decision to be valid forever. While the previous literature answered this question by pointing at borrowing restrictions, a more convincing explanation rests on the voters’understanding that future social security taxes will adversely affect future labor supply and thus the source from which their own pensions must be financed. This paper analyzes the validity of this explanation for two different types of pension systems, (a) the lump-sum benefits case, and (b) the case of fairness within cohorts.